qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
- parole officers are entitled to absolute immunity against claims for damages arising from imposition of parole conditions, while qualified immunity applies to claims arising from enforcement
- “An actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.”
- dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 23 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL IZELL SEALS, AKA Michael No. 15-17219
Izell Seals-Brown,
D.C. No. 5:13-cv-04824-PSG
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
JEFFREY LLOPIS, Parole Agent; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Paul S. Grewal, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted February 14, 2017***
Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
Michael Izell Seals, aka Michael Izell Seals-Brown, a California state
prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
action alleging constitutional violations arising from the imposition of certain
parole conditions. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo, Decker v. Advantage Fund Ltd., 362 F.3d 593, 595-96 (9th Cir. 2004)
(dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)); Edgerly v.
City & County of San Francisco, 599 F.3d 946, 960 (9th Cir. 2010) (summary
judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Seals’ claims for monetary damages
against defendants Llopis and McNunn because they are entitled to absolute
immunity for the imposition of the challenged parole conditions and to qualified
immunity related to their enforcement of those conditions. See Thornton v. Brown,
757 F.3d 834, 840 (9th Cir. 2014) (parole officers are entitled to absolute immunity
against claims for damages arising from imposition of parole conditions, while
qualified immunity applies to claims arising from enforcement); see also Pearson
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (qualified immunity protects government
officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants Mills
and Waidelich because Seals failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether these defendants imposed or enforced the challenged parole conditions.
2 15-17219
See Preschooler II v. Clark Cty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir.
2007) (“[A] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right,
within the meaning of § 1983, ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in
another’s affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to
do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made’” (citation omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Seals’ claim for injunctive relief as
moot because plaintiff is no longer on parole subject to the challenged conditions.
See Bernhardt v. County of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 871 (9th Cir. 2002) (“An
actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the
complaint is filed.”).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Llopis and McNunn’s motion to take judicial notice, filed on March 11,
2016, is granted.
Seals’s motion to file a supplemental brief, filed on February 6, 2017, is
denied.
Seals’s request for injunctive relief, set forth in his reply brief and motion to
file a supplemental brief, is denied.
AFFIRMED.
3 15-17219