Opinion

Victoria Zetwick v. County of Yolo

  • 850 F.3d 436
  • 101 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 45,744
  • 129 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1657
  • 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 3260
  • 2017 WL 710476
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
Feb 23, 2017
Status
Published
Author
Bennett
On the bench
Bennett, Graber, Mark, Mary, Murguia, Susan
Nature of suit
Civil
Cited by
581 cases
Authority
More cited than 98.9%

stating that a “court 17 must not make any credibility determinations” at summary judgment, and that evidence 18 such as conflicting testimony creates a genuine dispute rendering resolution on 19 summary judgment inappropriate

How later courts described this case

  • stating that a “court 17 must not make any credibility determinations” at summary judgment, and that evidence 18 such as conflicting testimony creates a genuine dispute rendering resolution on 19 summary judgment inappropriate
  • holding that a reasonable jury could find that a supervisor’s hugging was “out of proportion to ordinary workplace socializing and had, instead, become abusive”
  • stating 25 that it is improper for the Court to resolve genuine factual disputes or make credibility 26 determinations at the summary judgment stage
  • holding 10 harassing conduct aimed at others “helps to generate genuine issues of material fact that 11 the environment was objectively hostile”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

VICTORIA ZETWICK, No. 14-17341

Plaintiff-Appellant,

D.C. No.

v. 2:12-CV-02486-TLN-AC

COUNTY OF YOLO; EDWARD ORDER AND OPINION

G. PRIETO, Sheriff of Yolo

County,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Troy L. Nunley, District Court Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 18, 2016.

San Francisco, California

Filed February 23, 2017

Before: Susan P. Graber and Mary H. Murguia, Circuit

Judges, and Mark W. Bennett,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Bennett

*

The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, United States District Judge for

the Northern District of Iowa, sitting by designation.

2 ZETWICK V. COUNTY OF YOLO

SUMMARY**

Employment Discrimination

The panel filed (1) an order recalling the mandate,

granting a request for publication, and redesignating a

memorandum disposition as an authored opinion with

modifications, and (2) an opinion reversing the district court’s

summary judgment in favor of the defendants in an action

under Title VII and the California Fair Employment and

Housing Act.

A county correctional officer alleged that the county

sheriff created a sexually hostile work environment. The

panel held that a reasonable juror could conclude that

differences in the sheriff’s hugging of men and women were

not, as the defendants argued, just “genuine but innocuous

differences in the ways men and women routinely interact

with members of the same sex and the opposite sex.” In

addition, the district court’s contrary conclusion may have

been influenced by application of incorrect legal standards.

The panel held that hugging can create a hostile or abusive

workplace when it is unwelcome and pervasive, and summary

judgment on a hostile work environment claim is appropriate

only if the defendant’s conduct was neither severe nor

pervasive enough to alter the conditions of the plaintiff’s

employment. The panel remanded the case to the district

court for a trial on the merits of the plaintiff’s federal and

state sexual harassment claims and her state claim of failing

to prevent sexual harassment.

**

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

ZETWICK V. COUNTY OF YOLO 3

COUNSEL

Manolo Olaso (argued) and Johnny L. Griffin, III, Law

Offices of Johnny L. Griffin III, Sacramento, California, for

Plaintiff-Appellant.

John A. Whitesides (argued), Cori R. Sarno, and Carolee G.

Kilduff, Angelo Kilday & Kilduff LLP, Sacramento,

California, for Defendants-Appellees.

ORDER

Appellant’s request for publication is GRANTED. The

mandate issued December 2, 2016, is recalled.

The memorandum disposition filed November 9, 2016, is

redesignated as an authored opinion by Judge Bennett with

modifications.

OPINION

BENNETT, District Judge:

Plaintiff Victoria Zetwick, a county correctional officer,

alleges that defendant Edward G. Prieto, the county sheriff,

created a sexually hostile work environment, in violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

et seq., and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act

(FEHA), CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12900 et seq., by, among other

things, greeting her with unwelcome hugs on more than one

hundred occasions, and a kiss at least once, during a 12-year

4 ZETWICK V. COUNTY OF YOLO

period. The defendants, Prieto and the County of Yolo, argue

that such conduct was not objectively severe or pervasive

enough to establish a hostile work environment, but merely

innocuous, socially acceptable conduct. The district court

granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and

Zetwick appeals. We reverse and remand.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Factual Background

Zetwick began her employment with the Yolo County

Sheriff’s Department in 1988 as a correctional officer. She

was promoted to sergeant in 2002. In 1999, Edward G. Prieto

was elected as the county sheriff. He was in charge of a

sheriff’s office with approximately 250 employees, including

the correctional officers. The defendants acknowledge that,

after his election, Prieto introduced himself to the corrections

staff and hugged all the female officers present, including

Zetwick. Zetwick contends that, thereafter, from 1999 to

2012, Prieto subjected her to numerous unwelcome hugs and

at least one unwelcome kiss that, taken as a whole, created a

sexually hostile work environment.

Zetwick estimates that, from about 1999 to 2002, Prieto

hugged her at least two dozen times and that, between 2003

and 2011, Prieto hugged her at least a hundred times. The

defendants dispute the number and frequency of the hugs.

They point out that, during 2000, Zetwick worked the night

shift and rarely, if ever, encountered Prieto, whose office was

not in the jail; during 2001, Zetwick worked in the courthouse

holding facility and saw Prieto only occasionally; and, in

2002, after Zetwick was promoted and returned to the night

shift, Prieto visited the jail perhaps once and hugged her. The

ZETWICK V. COUNTY OF YOLO 5

defendants contend that most of the incidents in which Prieto

hugged Zetwick were at parties involving sheriff’s office

employees, awards banquets, GED graduations for prisoners,

and some training sessions or meetings, but no incidents

when Prieto and Zetwick were alone.

In one particular incident, in May 2003, at an awards

ceremony, Prieto kissed Zetwick, ostensibly to congratulate

Zetwick on her recent marriage to a sheriff’s deputy. The

kiss landed on or, because Zetwick turned her head, partially

on the lips. Zetwick states that she expressed her shock at

this incident to her husband, co-workers, and supervising

lieutenants, but not to Prieto. Her supervising lieutenants did

not forward her complaints for investigation or resolution.

Zetwick contends that, over the years, her co-workers and

supervising lieutenants teased her that Prieto was going to

kiss her on the lips. She contends that, on another occasion,

in 2010, when she was working in the booking area with

another female sergeant named Malugani, Prieto approached

Zetwick, reached out to hug her, then stopped himself, and

told her that people had complained, so he would not give her

a hug. He then promptly hugged both Zetwick and Malugani

anyway. Zetwick avers that the last hug that Prieto gave her

was in December 2011. The defendants point out that Prieto

first became aware of Zetwick’s dislike of his hugs when she

filed her administrative claim in early 2012.

Zetwick also contends that, from 1999 to 2013, she saw

Prieto hug and kiss several dozen other female employees,

but did not see him hug male employees. Rather, she

observed that Prieto gave male employees handshakes. She

also details an incident in which Prieto repeatedly asked

Malugani how much Mulagani weighed, until Malugani

answered. Zetwick contends that, during this incident, Prieto

6 ZETWICK V. COUNTY OF YOLO

stared at Malugani’s body in a sexually suggestive manner

and that Zetwick believed that Malugani was embarrassed

and uncomfortable. The defendants counter that Malugani

stated in a declaration that she was embarrassed, because her

weight loss was from a health problem, but that she was not

offended by Prieto’s questions or hugs. The defendants also

contend that even Zetwick described Prieto’s hugs as the kind

that one might give a relative or friend, lasting only a couple

of seconds, and not involving sexual comments or other

touching. Zetwick contends that the hugs were, nevertheless,

chest to breasts. The defendants contend that, even if

Zetwick did not see it, Prieto also hugged male employees on

occasion. They add that Zetwick admits that she also hugged

male co-workers and occasionally joined in banter about

Prieto’s hugs.

Zetwick contends that her workplace changed, and that

she found it difficult to concentrate, because of Prieto’s

conduct, in that she was constantly stressed and anxious about

Prieto’s touching, which she believed had sexual overtones.

She testified in a deposition that she sometimes cried at work,

in the locker room, because of stress from Prieto’s conduct,

that she lost sleep, and that she had to take sleep aids because

of her anxiety.

B. Procedural Background

After exhausting administrative remedies, Zetwick filed

suit on October 3, 2012, against the County of Yolo, Prieto,

and Does 1 through 50. She asserted claims of sexual

harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., against the County and Does

1 through 50; sexual harassment in violation of the California

Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), CAL. GOV’T

ZETWICK V. COUNTY OF YOLO 7

CODE § 12900 et seq., against all defendants; and failure to

prevent sexual harassment, in violation of the FEHA, CAL.

GOV’T CODE § 12940(k), against the County and Does 1

through 50. Zetwick sought compensatory, general, and

special damages, punitive and exemplary damages, costs and

attorney’s fees, and such other relief, including injunctive

and/or declaratory relief, as the court might deem appropriate.

The County and Prieto filed a joint Answer on November 16,

2012, denying Zetwick’s claims and asserting various

affirmative defenses.

On October 3, 2013, the County and Prieto filed a Motion

for Summary Judgment. Zetwick filed her Opposition on

October 17, 2013, and the defendants filed their Reply on

October 24, 2013. The district court heard oral arguments on

the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on October

31, 2013. Just over a year later, on November 6, 2014, the

district court granted the defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment, dismissed Zetwick’s claims, and directed the Clerk

of Court to close the case. Zetwick v. Cty. of Yolo, 66 F.

Supp. 3d 1274 (E.D. Cal. 2014). Judgment was entered

accordingly on November 6, 2014. Zetwick timely filed her

Notice Of Appeal on November 24, 2014. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standards

Our review of a summary judgment ruling is de novo.

Animal Legal Def. Fund v. FDA, 836 F.3d 987, 988 (9th Cir.

2016) (en banc) (per curiam). The standard for summary

judgment is familiar: “Summary judgment is appropriate

when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

8 ZETWICK V. COUNTY OF YOLO

nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact.” See, e.g., United States v. JP Morgan Chase

Bank Account No. Ending 8215, 835 F.3d 1159, 1162 (9th

Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). This statement

does not fully explain the role of the courts at summary

judgment, however.

As to that, the Supreme Court recently reiterated:

[C]ourts may not resolve genuine disputes of

fact in favor of the party seeking summary

judgment. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S.

194, 195 n.2 (2004) (per curiam ); Saucier [v.

Katz, 533 U.S. 194,] 201 [(2001)]; Hope [v.

Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,] 733 n.1 [(2002)]. This

. . . is simply an application of the more

general rule that a “judge’s function” at

summary judgment is not “to weigh the

evidence and determine the truth of the matter

but to determine whether there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Anderson [v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc.], 477 U.S. [242,] 249 [(1986)].

Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (per curiam).

It is also clear that the court must not make any credibility

determinations. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Reeves v.

Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)

(explaining that the standard for summary judgment

“mirrors” the standard for judgment as a matter of law).

Similarly, the district court must recognize that, where

evidence is genuinely disputed on a particular issue—such as

by conflicting testimony—that “issue is inappropriate for

resolution on summary judgment.” Direct Techs., LLC v.

ZETWICK V. COUNTY OF YOLO 9

Elec. Arts, Inc., 836 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2016); Pan

Pac. Retail Props., Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 471 F.3d 961, 970

(9th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he district court erred in granting

summary judgment to the defendants, resolving [an] issue in

light of the disputed and conflicting evidence before it.”). To

put it another way, “where the district court has made a

factual determination, summary judgment cannot be

appropriate.” Animal Legal Def. Fund, 836 F.3d at 990. The

proper question for the district court is whether, viewing the

facts in the non-moving party’s favor, summary judgment for

the moving party is appropriate. See Arizona ex rel. Horne v.

Geo Grp., Inc., 816 F.3d 1189, 1207 (9th Cir. 2016) (“We

express no view on whether [the plaintiff] was actually

sexually harassed or harassed on the basis of her sex, but hold

that viewing the facts in her favor, the district court erred in

dismissing [the plaintiff’s] hostile work environment

claim.”), cert. denied, 2017 WL 69195 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2017)

(No. 16-302).

In short, what is required to defeat summary judgment is

simply evidence “such that a reasonable juror drawing all

inferences in favor of the respondent could return a verdict in

the respondent’s favor.” Reza v. Pearce, 806 F.3d 497, 505

(9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (“[T]here is no issue for trial

unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving

party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.”). On the

other hand, the Supreme Court has made clear: “Where the

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact

to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for

trial,” and summary judgment is appropriate. Ricci v.

DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009) (quoting Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587

(1986)).

10 ZETWICK V. COUNTY OF YOLO

The district court must not only properly consider the

record on summary judgment, but must consider that record

in light of the “governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248;

Animal Legal Def. Fund, 836 F.3d at 989 (appellate review of

a summary judgment ruling involves, inter alia, “decid[ing]

whether the district court correctly applied the relevant

substantive law”). Thus, where application of incorrect legal

standards may have influenced the district court’s conclusion,

remand is appropriate. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S.

17, 23 (1993).

B. Zetwick’s Sexually Hostile Work Environment Claim

The “governing law,” see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248,

requires Zetwick to generate genuine issues of material fact

that Prieto’s conduct “was sufficiently severe or pervasive to

alter the conditions of [Zetwick’s] employment and create an

[objectively] abusive working environment.” Craig v. M &

O Agencies, Inc., 496 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see id. (identifying the

elements of a prima facie case of a sex-based hostile work

environment (internal quotation marks omitted)); accord Geo

Grp., Inc., 816 F.3d at 1206 (“An employer is liable under

Title VII for conduct giving rise to a hostile environment

where the employee proves (1) that he was subjected to

verbal or physical conduct of a harassing nature, (2) that this

conduct was unwelcome, and (3) that the conduct was

sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the

victim’s employment and create an abusive working

environment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).1 We hold

1

Essentially the same legal analysis applies to Zetwick’s hostile work

environment sexual harassment claims under the FEHA as federal courts

apply to Title VII claims. Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 923

ZETWICK V. COUNTY OF YOLO 11

that, giving the record proper consideration, a reasonable

juror could conclude that the differences in hugging of men

and women were not, as the defendants argue, just “genuine

but innocuous differences in the ways men and women

routinely interact with members of the same sex and of the

opposite sex.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,

788 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,

summary judgment was inappropriate. Reza, 806 F.3d at 505.

We also hold that the district court’s contrary conclusion may

have been influenced by application of incorrect legal

standards. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.

1. Application of incorrect legal standards

The first incorrect legal standard the district court applied

involved extraction of a sort of black letter rule, from just a

few cases, that courts do not consider hugs and kisses on the

cheek to be outside the realm of common workplace

behavior. Zetwick, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1280–81. In support of

this proposition, the district court cited three cases: Lefevre

v. Design Prof’ls Ins. Cos., No. C 93-20720 RPA, 1994 WL

514020 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 1994); Graves v. City of Durant,

No. C 09-0061, 2010 WL 785850 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 5, 2010);

and Joiner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 400, 409

(W.D.N.C. 2000). None of these decisions states or properly

stands for that proposition. Furthermore, none identified

either the number of times or the period of time over which

(9th Cir. 2000). Therefore, like the district court, we will focus on Title

VII standards.

12 ZETWICK V. COUNTY OF YOLO

unwelcome hugging occurred; they are factually

distinguishable.2

This is particularly true of the decision in Joiner, which

states that the plaintiff complained “that he was subjected to

unwanted propositions and hugs and kisses from female

coworkers,” but does not indicate the frequency or period of

time over which such conduct occurred. 114 F. Supp. 2d at

407–09. What makes the decision in Joiner more interesting,

however, is that the district court stated only that flirting,

hugging, and even kissing in the workplace “are very

ordinary things that people do and are not per se intimidating,

hostile, humiliating, or offensive.” Id. at 409. The court then

recognized that “[i]t is only when such conduct is both

unwelcome and pervasive that [it] become[s] unlawful.” Id.

Thus, Joiner does not state a black letter rule that hugging

cannot create a hostile or abusive workplace. Rather, it

actually recognizes that such conduct can create a hostile or

abusive workplace, when “[i]t is . . . unwelcome and

pervasive.” Id.

2

Indeed, in Lefevre, the court confusingly states that the plaintiff

alleged that the harasser “forced her to shake hands with him each time

they met and would frequently hug her at business meetings where [the

plaintiff] was the only women [sic] in attendance,” but then dismisses the

plaintiff’s complaints as inadequate to create an objectively hostile work

environment, because “[f]requent handshakes and occasional hugs at

business meetings do not amount to pervasive harassment.” 1994 WL

514020, at *3 (emphasis added). The decision in Graves gives no

indication of the frequency of the unwelcome hugging at issue. See 2010

WL 785850, at *3 (referring to “being leaned into, touched or hugged,”

but without indicating the frequency or period of time over which such

conduct occurred); id. at *11 (again referring to “unwanted leaning,

touching, or hugging,” without indicating the frequency or period of time

over which such conduct occurred).

ZETWICK V. COUNTY OF YOLO 13

The district court also applied an incorrect legal standard

when it “f[ound] that Defendant Prieto’s conduct in this case

was not severe and pervasive.” Zetwick, 66 F. Supp. 3d at

1285 (emphasis added). The proper standard, however, is

whether the defendant’s conduct was “severe or pervasive.”

Geo Grp., Inc., 816 F.3d at 1206 (emphasis added).

Summary judgment is appropriate only if the conduct was

“neither severe nor pervasive enough to alter the conditions

of [Zetwick’s] employment.” Manatt v. Bank of Am., NA,

339 F.3d 792, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). We do

not dismiss this mistake as simply a typographical error,

notwithstanding that the district court properly stated the

requirement as “severe or pervasive” elsewhere in its

decision. The incorrect statement of the legal standard

occurred precisely where the district court made the pertinent

finding that Zetwick had not met the standard. Zetwick, 66 F.

Supp. 3d at 1285.

We conclude that the application of these incorrect legal

standards may have influenced the district court’s decision to

grant summary judgment. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.

2. Improper analysis of the record

Turning to the district court’s analysis of the record, on de

novo review, Animal Legal Def. Fund, 836 F.3d at 988, we

cannot accept the conclusion that Zetwick did not state an

actionable claim of a sexually hostile work environment. “To

be actionable under Title VII, a sexually objectionable

environment must be both objectively and subjectively

offensive, one that a reasonable person would find hostile or

abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so.”

Geo Grp., Inc., 816 F.3d at 1206 (internal quotation marks

omitted). A reasonable juror could credit Zetwick’s

14 ZETWICK V. COUNTY OF YOLO

testimony that Prieto’s conduct “was sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of [Zetwick’s] employment

and create an [objectively and subjectively] abusive working

environment.” Craig, 496 F.3d at 1055. This is so, where

her testimony is that Prieto hugged her more than one

hundred times over the period from 1999 to 2012, that he

hugged female employees much more often than male

employees and, indeed, from Zetwick’s observations, he

hugged female employees exclusively. Because a reasonable

juror could find in Zetwick’s favor, summary judgment was

inappropriate. Reza, 806 F.3d at 505.

More specifically, while it may appear that Prieto’s hugs

were “common” in the workplace, and that some other cross-

gender hugging occurred, neither of those things

demonstrates beyond dispute that Prieto’s hugging was within

the scope of “ordinary workplace socializing.” A reasonable

juror could find, for example, from the frequency of the hugs,

that Prieto’s conduct was out of proportion to “ordinary

workplace socializing” and had, instead, become abusive.

See Geo Grp., Inc., 816 F.3d at 1206 (citing factors relevant

to the determination of whether the environment was

sufficiently hostile or abusive, including the “frequency of the

discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically

threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and

whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work

performance” (internal quotation marks omitted)). This is so,

at least in part, because it is not possible to determine whether

the environment was “hostile or abusive” without considering

the cumulative effect of the conduct at issue to determine

whether it was sufficiently “severe or pervasive” to alter the

conditions of the workplace. Id. at 1207.

ZETWICK V. COUNTY OF YOLO 15

Instead of giving proper consideration to the cumulative

effect of the conduct at issue, the district court attempted to

apply “a mathematically precise test” to determine whether or

not Zetwick had generated genuine issues of material fact that

the environment created by Prieto’s hugging was sufficiently

hostile. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22–23 (rejecting such a test).

The district court stated: “While both parties acknowledged

that the frequency of the interactions varied, simple math

indicates that Plaintiff experienced this conduct an average of

around seven or eight times per year for a couple [of] seconds

on each occurrence,” the encounters were not “on a daily

basis,” “most . . . occurred outside of normal work hours,”

and the encounters were not physically threatening or

humiliating. Zetwick, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1285. The district

court correctly conceded that there was no “magic number of

harassing incidents” that would give rise to liability. Id. In

any event, there remain disputes concerning how many

hugging incidents there were; whether or not the hugs were

concentrated during certain periods of Zetwick’s

employment, when she was on certain shifts, resulting in

periods of relatively high frequency hugging, or spread

evenly or “sporadically” over the entire 12-year period; and

what percentage of the times the two met that Prieto hugged

Zetwick.

The district court erred in concluding as a matter of law

that, “[b]ased on the totality of the circumstances[,]

Defendant Prieto’s conduct did not create a severe or

pervasive work environment with respect to Plaintiff.” Id. at

1285–86. We conclude that the district court had not

properly considered the totality of the circumstances,

however. For example, the district court failed to consider

whether a reasonable juror would find that hugs, in the kind,

number, frequency, and persistence described by Zetwick,

16 ZETWICK V. COUNTY OF YOLO

create a hostile environment. Zetwick relies, in part, on

Alvarado v. Federal Express Corp., 384 F. App’x 585, 589

(9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished), in which we noted that the

hugging included chest to breast contact, which a reasonable

juror (and a reasonable woman) could find created a hostile

environment. Alvarado suggests that the hugs to which

Zetwick was subjected raise a jury question on the objective

abusiveness of the environment. In addition, Zetwick is

correct “that a hostile work environment is ambient and

persistent, and that it continues to exist between overt

manifestations.” Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147 F.3d

1104, 1108 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). This is yet another reason

why simply looking at the number of hugs over the period of

time did not adequately address whether Zetwick had

generated genuine issues of material fact that the environment

she faced was sexually hostile.

The district court also completely overlooked legal

recognition of the potentially greater impact of harassment

from a supervisor and, indeed, the highest ranking officer in

the department. The Supreme Court has recognized that “acts

of supervisors have greater power to alter the environment

than acts of coemployees generally.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at

805. Indeed, the Court has recognized that “a supervisor’s

power and authority invests his or her harassing conduct with

a particular threatening character.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v.

Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998). Thus, Prieto’s position as

Zetwick’s supervisor was significant to whether or not a

reasonable juror could find the hugs and the kiss to which

Zetwick was subjected created an abusive environment.

The district court also overlooked the import of its

observation that Zetwick had stated in a deposition that it was

difficult for her to go to work and that she was always

ZETWICK V. COUNTY OF YOLO 17

stressed, suffered from anxiety, and took a sleep aid, which

the district court conceded “[c]ertainly [would] interfere with

an individual’s job.” Zetwick, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1284. This

concession suggests that a reasonable juror would have an

evidentiary basis to find that Zetwick’s environment was

abusive. See Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1095

(9th Cir. 2008) (“A working environment is abusive if hostile

conduct pollutes the victim’s workplace, making it more

difficult for her to do her job, to take pride in her work, and

to desire to stay on in her position.” (emphasis added)

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

It was also improper for the district court to disregard

Zetwick’s evidence that Prieto hugged and kissed other

women. Zetwick argues that such evidence helps to generate

genuine issues of material fact that the environment was

objectively hostile. We have long recognized that “[t]he

sexual harassment of others, if shown to have occurred, is

relevant and probative of [a defendant’s] general attitude of

disrespect toward his female employees, and his sexual

objectification of them.” Heyne v. Caruso, 69 F.3d 1475,

1479–81 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Dominguez-Curry v.

Nevada Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005)

(concluding that evidence that other women were harassed

showed that hostility pervaded the workplace and helped

show that it was hostile).

As to one specific incident of Prieto’s conduct towards

other women, the district court observed that Zetwick’s

description of the incidents involving Malugani “do[] not

survive factual scrutiny in discovery,” in light of Malugani’s

declaration. Zetwick, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1283. It was

improper for the district court to determine that Zetwick’s

testimony that Malugani was embarrassed by Prieto’s

18 ZETWICK V. COUNTY OF YOLO

questions and hugs, based on her firsthand observation of the

incident, was necessarily less credible than Malugani’s

assertion, in her post hoc declaration, that she was

embarrassed about her weight loss, but not by Prieto’s

questions and hugs. A reasonable juror could conclude that

Malugani had reasons not to complain about past treatment

by her employer and to make a declaration, not subject to

cross-examination, to support her employer’s position. This

was the sort of conflict in the testimony that makes resolution

of the issue at summary judgment inappropriate. Direct

Techs., LLC, 836 F.3d at 1067. This conflict cannot be

ignored, because it is not clear that one of the versions of the

incident “is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no

reasonable jury could believe it.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.

372, 380 (2007).

Finally, the defendants assert that the record shows that

Prieto also hugged men, but they do not suggest that Prieto

hugged men as often as he hugged women. Zetwick has

submitted evidence that she never saw Prieto hug men and

evidence that others agreed that Prieto hugged women more

frequently than men. Thus, she submitted evidence from

which a reasonable juror could conclude that, even if Prieto

also hugged men on occasion, there were “qualitative and

quantitative differences” in the hugging conduct toward the

two genders. Geo Grp., Inc., 816 F.3d at 1207 n.12 (internal

quotation marks omitted). The offensive conduct does not

have to be “facially sex-specific.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted).3

3

The defendants argue that the hugging to which Zetwick was

subjected was “friendly” and “socially acceptable” and that Zetwick has

“exaggerated the evidence.” These arguments rely on weighing of the

evidence, which is not appropriate at the summary judgment stage of the

ZETWICK V. COUNTY OF YOLO 19

III. CONCLUSION

We reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of the

defendants and remand for a trial on the merits of Zetwick’s

federal and state sexual harassment claims and her state claim

of failing to prevent sexual harassment.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

proceedings, see Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1866; Geo Grp., Inc., 816 F.3d at

1207, even if such arguments may be presented to a jury.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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