Opinion

Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

Court
Texas Attorney General Reports
Filed
Jul 2, 1943
Status
Published
On the bench
Gerald Mann
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 3.6%

The opinion

Bonorable Evans J. Adklns

County Attorney

McCulloch County

Brady, Texas

Dear Sir: Opinion NO. 0-5668

Re: Taxation of land acquired by the

State at tax sales held in accord-

ance with the provisions of Arti-

cle 7345b V.A.C.S.

In your letter of October 8, 1943, you state ths,tcer-

tain land in your county has been acquired by the State of

Texas at tax sales held in accordance with the provisions of

Article 7345b V.A.C.S., and that this land customarily is sold

by your sheriff at public auction after the expiration of the

statutory redemption period. With reference to this situation

you inquire:

1. After the land has been purchased by the

State, how should it be shown on the tax rolls?

2. When the purchaser at the sheriff's sale

takes title, is such title free of all back taxes,

providing that the proceedings have been regular?

3. Would the answers to the above questions

be altered or affected by the fact that the land

was bid in by the State for its "adjudged value"

rather than for "the amount of the judgment snd

costs"?

In our Opinion No. 0-5506 we ruled that the purchaser

at a foreclosure sale conducted in accordance with the provi-

sions of Article 7345b acquires a title which is free of all

liens and claims for ad valorem taxes delinquent at the time

of the ,iudnment in the tax suit, unless such claims or liens

are in favor of a taxing unit which was neither made a party

to the suit nor served with notice of such suit. In the Fn-

stant situation the State is the purchaser at the foreclosure

sale, and a subsequent purchaser takes title from the State

rather than from such sale. Consequently, the aforementioned

Opinion affords a partial solution to the questions here under

consideration. The State as purchaser at the foreclosure sale

Hon. Evans J. Adkins, page 2 o-5668

acquires a title which is free and clear with respect to the

taxes discussed in said Opinion; this title is in turn ac-

quired by the person who purchases from the State, with the

result that, with respect to the taxing units which were

parties to the tax suit or which were notified of its pend-

ency, such person acquires at the very least a title which

is free from liens and claims for ad valorem taxes delinquent

at the date of judgment in the tax suit.

Another partial solution is afforded,by our Opinion

No. O-3624, wherein we held that after the expiration of the

period of redemption, land acquired by the State in tax fore-

closure proceedings and held by it cannot be assessed for taxes.

As a consequence of this Opinion we must conclude that a person

who purchases such land from the State acquires, in addition

to the title discussed in the preceding paragraph, a title which

is free from all liens and claims for ad valorem taxes which

arise subsequent to the expiration of the period of redemption.

Consequently, if your second question is to be answered

other than in the affirmative, such answer can be made only

if it is possible for the land to become burdened with liens

and claims for taxes during the two year period in which the

original owner possesses a power of redemption.

In our Opinion No. o-265 and,in subsequent Opinions,

the tax immunity accorded lands held by the State after the

expiration of the period of redemption was rested upon the

principle that, absent a clear expression of intent, the State

neither taxes its own property nor consents to its taxation by

other taxing units. Property held by the State after the ex-

plratlon of the period of redemption clearly falls wlthin this

principle; the status of such property prior to the expiration

of the period is not so easily discernible, but if such prop-

erty can be said to be "property owned by the State" or "prop-

erty the title to which is in the State", it is apparent that

the aforementioned principle will operate to preclude any liens

or claims for taxes during such period.

When the State bids in land at a tax foreclosure sale,

the sheriff is required to "make and execute a deed to the

State" and to record such deed in the record,of deeds. Articles

7328, 7330, 7345b (7). Such deed stands as the strongest mun-

iment of title to the property which it covers; "any such deed

shall be held in any court of law or equity in this State to

vest good and perfect title in the purchaser thereof, subject

to be impeached only for actual fraud." Section 13 of Article

VIII of the Texas Constitution; Article 7330. "The title to

said property" is "held by the taxing unit purchasing same for

the use and beneflt of Itself and all other taxing units which

._ .

Hon. Evans J. Adklns, page 3 O-5668

are parties to the suit and which have been adjudged in said

suit to have tax liens against such property." Article 7345b

(9). As purchaser of such property, the State "acquires all

of the title of both the plaintiff and defendant In the judg-

ment" in the tax suit. City of Houston v. Bartlett, 68 S.W.

730 (error denied.). Contrariwise, for two years after the

foreclosure sale the original owner possesses the power to

redeem the propert and the right 'topossession thereof.

Articles 7345b (127 7340; 40 Tex, Jur. 1 1 205, 206. The

difficult task--the'task which will evolve a solution to the

questions under discussion--is to ascertain which of these

bundles of powers, rlshts and privileges constitutes the hold-

er thereof the "owner of the property for purposes of taxa-

tion.

In 26 R.C.L. 1 290, the next-writer states:

If

0 . . Lands bought in by a state at a sale

for non-payment of taxes and held by the state sub-

ject to the former owner's right of redemption can-

not be assessed for taxes while so held."

Agaln in 26 R.C.L. 1 384, the writer sags:

,I. . 0 While the details of the process of re-

demption vary In the different states, the proce-

dure being of course entirely a statutory one, the

methods adopted fall into two general classes. By

the original method, which still prevails In many

of the states, a deed was delivered to the purchaser

within a few days after the sale, and the title pass-

ed to him subject to defeasance by redemption during

the statutory period, which was commonly two years

from the sale. During that period the purchaser re-

mained passive, and if the owner failed.to exercise

his right of redemption within the specified ,time,

the title became absolute by force of the statute,

without any further proceedings in court OP else-

where to establish it. By the second method, which

is now in force in a number of the states, the pur-

chaser's title is inchoate and he receives no deed

until the period of redemption has expired, and be-

fore the expiration of the period,he must give per-

sonal notice to the owner, if it is possible to find

him, of the time when the right of redemption will

expire and the amount which he must pay in order to

redeem the property, and no deed Is issued to the

purchaser and no title passes to him until this notice

has been sent or it has been shown to be impossible

to sent it........."

Hon. Evans J, Aakins, page 4 o-5668

It will be notlced that the method of redemption es-

tablished by the Texas Constitution and.the statutes enacted

thereunder falls~w1thin the first class above described. We

aPe inclined to agree with the writer's statement that in

jurisdictions following this mode of redemption, tftle to then

property passes to the purchaser with the tax deed, such title

being subject to defeasance during the redemption period. Tne

power of redemption and the right to possession possessed by

the original owner are not, we feel, sufficient indLc%a of

ownership to justify the taxation of such person. During the

period of redemption, title is out of the orlginal owner; to

regain such title he must exercise the power which he possesses.

Additioml evidence in support of this conclusion IS

found in the statutes which prescribe the mode-'ofredemption

of property soid at tax sales~. Articles 7283 and 7345b allow

redemption of property upon payment by the original owner, ln-

ter alla, of 'all taxes. D a .thereafter paid thereon." The

textwriter in 40 Tex. Jur. 1 201 has interpreted this provl-

sLon to refer to taxes "paid by the purchaser subsequent to his

purchase." We agree with thfs lnterpretatlon. If It had been

the intention of the legislature to tax such property against

the 'original owner thereof during the period of redemption,

certainly some verb other than "paid" would have been employed,

for the use of this verb normally conveys the Idea that the

original owner 1s to reimburse some other person for taxes

which such person has paid, rather than the idea that the

original owner himself is to pay such taxes as a condition

of redemption.

Consequently, we hold that the purchase by the State

vests in it a defeasible title, which title 1s evidenced by the

sheriff's deed, and that as holder of this title the State is

the "owner" of such property for purpose of"taxation, If this

be true, the property is not subject to taxation during the two

year period, Your second questfon is therefore answered .in

the affirmative.

In reachi% this conclusion we are not unaware of the

fact that our courts have occasFonally asserted that the original

owner of property sola at a tax foreclosure sale possesses

"title" to such property aurlng the period of redemption. See

e-g., Bente v. Sullivan, 115 S.W. 350, 353 (error refused)

and McGraw v. Potts, 27 S.W. (2a) 550. However, an examination

of these and similar cases reveals that In each the court was

employing the word "title" not in the strictly technical sense

in which "title" is tantamount to ownership but rather fn the

looser sense in which "title* Is but an abbrevfated method of

saying that the original owner possesses a power of FedGmption

and a right to possession. In none of these cases has a court

-- 1

Han, Evans J. Adkins, page 5 o-5668

either declared or intimated that the possession of such

power and right constitutes the possessor an "owner" for

purposes of taxation. Consequently, we deem none of these

cases to be determinative of the question at hand. ,Any con-

trary statements contained in our Opinion No. O-3624 are

hereby overruled.

In answer to your first question, you are respectfully

advised that such property should be carried on the tax rolls

as Fs other non-taxable property owned by the State. Your

third question is answered in the negative; we se8 nothing

either in the statutes or in the cases which would make the

answers to your preceding questions dependent upon the method

by which the property Is bid in by the State.

Trusting that the foregoing satisfactorily answers

your questions, we are

Yours very truly

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

By s/R. Dean Moorhead

R. Dean Moorhead

Asslstant

RDM:fczwc

APPROVED DEC 10, 1943

s/Grover Sellers

FIRST ASSISTANT

ATTORNEY GENERAL

This Opinion Considered and Approved In Lfmited Conference

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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