Opinion

Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

Court
Texas Attorney General Reports
Filed
Jul 2, 1951
Status
Published
On the bench
Price Daniel
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 3.5%

The opinion

August 25, 1951

Hon. Allan Shivers OpinionNo. V-l.254

Governorof Texas

Austin,Texas Re: Validityof "riders"in H.B.

426, Acts 52nd Legislature,

1951; the generalappropria-

tion bill for the biennium

Dear GovernorShivers: ending August 31, 1953.

In your original.requestfor an opinionyou asked

that we studythe legalityand ccmstltutionality of the riders

in House Bill 426, Acts 52nd Leg., KS., 1951, snd adviseyou

as to our concluslonsas early as possible. In subsequentcon-

ferencesyou Xndlcatedthat'ymsrs primarilyinters*ed in ss-

curingthe rulesoflawapplicabls ln&tendningthslegality

or constitutlomlltyof riders In an approprlatlon bill. You

s'kated~thatin vlew'ofthe h&ding In Fulmo& v. Lane, 104 Tex.

499, l&C SiW. 405 (19l.l)and Att&ney GenerBl'sOpinionNo.

V-1196 (1951)that the Governorhas no authorityto veto a non-

appropriating ri$er In an appropriationbill, you are particular-

lyconcernsdajmutthe growlngtendencyt~rd "governmen by

riders'and desirea general*ateme& of the rules of law ap-

plicableto rldsrsratherthan a specificruling on each sepa-

rate rider. With this in n&&we shallpresentthe general

rules.andrefer to specificriders only by'way of illusttition

as to howthg generalrules are applied.

Gsne++y speaking,the constitution@. provision

limitdngt&. scope of riders in gsneralappropriation bills

and the power of the Legislaturewith regardthereto is Sec-

tion 35 of.ArticleIII of the Te%as Constitution: In addition,

Section1 of ArticleII is sometimesapplicable.

The historyof Section35 of ArticleIII and discus-

slons,b$cont.emp+ry juristsgive an insightinto the evils

by its adoption. Sect&n

which ~rs intendedto be corrsctefl

35 p~oviaes:~

."Nobill, (exceptgeneralappropriation bills,

which may embracethe various subj&ts ad accounts,

for and on accountof which moneys are apprdprlated)

shall containmore thsn one subject,which shallbe

expressedin its title. But if any subjectshallbe

embracedin an act, which shall not be expressedin

158

Hon. Allan Shiv-eSS,

PW3e 2 (v-1254)

the title, such act shall be void only as to so much

thereof,as shsllnot be so expressed."

A similarprovisionoriginallyappearedin Section24

of ArticleVII of the *eras Constitutionof 1845 as follows:

"J?xerylawenectedbythe Legislatureshallem-

brace but one object,sndthat shallbe expressedin

the title."

Thiswasthe first time inTexas historythatanat-

tempt was made to controlthe title and inclusiveness of legis-

lation. The Constitutions of 1861, 1866, and 1869 carriedfor-

ward the wordingwithoutchange.

.Indiscussingthebe&groundoftheTexasprovision

cplef Justice0. M. 'Roberts,

a memberof the 1866 Convention

anda contempoFaryofthisperlod,said:

Yl!h%sprovl+xainthe Constitutionor~giaate~ in,

andwas adoptedtopreventthe repetitionofamost

flagwit cibue of legislativepower inthe State of

Georgiainthe la&century. Its historylsbriefiy

sketchedinenopinion&eliveredinthe Supremecourt

of that State,a6 follows,to wit: *As to the objec-

tionthat the act of l&is violative'ofthe17th sec.

lst art. of the Constituti&of Georgie,becausel~e

tit~"la at variancewith the body of the cd, I would

obeervethatthetraditionaryhietorJrofthisclause

ls,'thetit was insertedin the Constitutionof 1798,

atthe'iwta&e of'GeneralJauk?sJackson, andthat

its necessitywas suggestedby the Yaeoo act. 'That

meiwrablemeasureof tti~li'th of Jsne, 1795; as

ie&.lknown,wwe smugg&edthroughtheLegislature

under the captian.ofsn act, "for the kymsnt of &

let& State troopa,"and a declarationin its title of

the right of the State to the unappropriatedterritory

thereof,"for the protectionend supportof Its fron-

tier settlements." (Mayorsnd Aldermanof Savannah

v. The State of Georgia,4 Ga., 38.) This obnoxious

act was repealed'thenext year, and the large grant of

land to privateindividualsembracedin it declared.

null and void for fraud in its enactent. This z&t

becams stillmore notoriouslymemorableby its tibjed-

matterbeing litigated,and its historybeing devel-

oped in the report of the leadingcase of Fletcherv.

Peck, decidedby the SupremeCourt of the United States

in 1816. (6 Cranch,U.S., 87.)

Hon. Allan Shivers,F'age3 (V-1254)

"Hencethis provisionlimitingthelegislative

power, hasbeen adoptedinmnyif not most of the

Constitutionsof the differentStates of ths Union.

djlngsv. San Antonio,47 Tex. 548, 555,

;5i &3;;.-

In 1851 the Texas'Suprene

court, in an opinionby

Chief JusticeHemphill,held that Section24 of ArticleVII

rasmlaatory,notmerelyairectory.

The evils to be avoidedby this constltutionallimi-

tation have been discussedin iumerousc&es. Typical of these

discussionsis the followingfrom Stons v. Brown, 54 Tex. 330

(188lrat 342, in which the SupremeCourt of Texas said:

"Ths principalobjectof this constitutional pro-

vieion la to advisethe lsgislaturstid the people of

the naturs of each particularbill, so as to prevent

the insertionof obnoxiousclauses,which other@e

might be engraftedthereuponand become the law; and

aleo $0 preventconibinations,whsrsbyw+dbs concen-

ttitedthe votes of the friendsof differsntmeasurk .f

nohe of which could pass singly;thus causingeach

bill to stand on its own merits.3

In CooleytsConstitutional

Ll.mi~at,ions

(8thEd. 1927)

295, ths purposeof the constitutional

provisionis -ised

as follows:

n. . . It rcay.therefore

be assumedas settled

that the purposeof thess provisionswas: first,to

:prevsnthedge-podgeor 'log-rolling' .&egisl$$;

second,to preventsurpriseor fraud upon the legisla-

ture by means of provisionsin bills of which the title,s,

.g .Georgiawas the first State to place this type of limi-

tation in its constitution.There are now 41 Statesthat have

provisionsof this generalnature. &ly connectic.ut, Maine, Mas-

sachusetts,New Bampehire,North Carolina,Rhode Islandand Ver-

mont are withoutit. ConstStutional Limitationsupon Statute

Tltles.inLouisiana,6 La. LA 72, 78 (Comment1944).

g Cannonv. Hemphill,7 Tex. 184 (1851).

.1/ Similargtatementsare found in the g&era1 treatises,of

Freud, Standardsof AmericanLegislation,155, 156; 1 Sutherland

Statutoryconstruction(3rdEd. 1943) 287, Sec. 1702; 1 Cool6yle

Constitutional

Limitations(8thEd. 1927) 294, 295, 296.

Hon. Allsn Shivers,Page 4 (V-1254)

gave no Intimation,and which might thereforebe over-

lookedand carelesslyandunintentianallyadoptea;

and, third,to fairlyapprisethe people,throughsuch

publicationof legislativeproceedingsas is usually

made, of the subjectsof legislationthat are being

considered,in or&r that they may have opportunity

of being heard thereon,by petitionor otherwise,if

they shall so desire."

In 1 Sutherland,StatutoryConstruction(3rdEd. 1943)

290, it is stated:

". . . It preventsthe surreptitious passageof

laws containingprovisionsincongrouswith the subject

proclaimedin the title. It militatesagainst 'omnibus,'

or multi-subjectlegislation, the practiseof procuring

dlves~ anduurelatedmatterstobe passedas one act

throughthe consolidated vote of.thcadvocates of each

separatemaasure,whenuerhausuo sinalemeasurecould

ha& been pasf&~oz.i its-ownmerits. It also prevents

the attachmsutof uudeeirable!riders~upon:bille kek-

passed beeause'oftheir.~lic,~~

taln to 'be' ity

oFdesirability." (Emphasisadded throughout:)"'

The last sentenceabove quoted frOm Sutherlandis.

partlcula+y applicableto geueralapprop&tion bills..It

is c&tAinthattheyare desirableand.iufad necessarylegis-

lii+,ion.Asausu&thiug,thist~ ofbill comesup fo+&ui

+?T8tion late IIIthe E~SS~OII and mu& bepassed. Ev&;permis-

sibli and appropriateridersare often attachedin conference

committee,and the entirebill is submittedto the House slidthe

Senate on a."takeor leave it" vote. Iu such instances,there

is no opportunityfor-publicnotice,full discussion,~amsndment,

or eliminationof a particularrider. Legislatorsare called

upon to vote for the entirebill as draftedby the conference

committeeor vote againstthe entirkbilli

In the sams manner,the entire generalappropriation

bill is submittedto the Governor. Ik can veto appropriation

items and riders,but he doe6 not have the power to veto non-

appropriating riders. AttorneyC+eral's opinionNo..V-llg6

(1951). If an objectionable matter of generallegislationis

containedin a non-appropriating rider, the Governormust never-

thelessaccept it or else veto the entire generalappropriation

act. :Thishe can seldomaffordto do.

The constitutional limitationnow under consideration

was aimad at praventingsuch situations.T,hiswas statedby the

Hon. Allan Shivers,Page 5 (V-129)

SupremeCourt of PennsylvanIa,a State which has a similarcon-

stitutionalprovision,in Commonwsalthv. Barustt,1% Pa. 161,

48 Atl. 976 (lgol),as followsz

11

. . . by joininga number of differ& subjectsin

one bill the governor was put under compulsionto ac-

cept sons enactmentsthat hs could not approve,or to

defeatthe whole, includingothersthat he thought

desirableor even necessary. Such bills, popularly

called *omnibusbills,'became a cryingevil, not ouly

from the confusionand distractionof the legislative

mind by the jumblingtogetherof incongroussubjects,

but stillmore by the facilitythey affordedto cor-

rupt combinations of minoritieswith differentinter-

ests to force the passageof bills with provisions

which could mver succeedif they stood,onthsirsepa-

rate merits. So,~omon was this practicethat it got

a popularname. universallyunderstood,as ~logrolling.'

A kill more objectionabls~practice grew up, of putting

what is known as a 'rider'(that is, a new~andunrelated

enactmentor provision)on ths ~appropriationbill~, and'

thus'kokrcingtheexecutiveto approve'obnoxioils legis-

lation,or bring the wheels of.ths governmentto a stop

for want of funds. Thesewere some ofthe evilswhich

the later changesin the constitution were intendedto

nm?dy* . .."

Again with specificreferenceto the reasonfor this

type of constltutlonailimitation in the case of appropriation

. bills,tha SuprktsCourt ofOregon +a:

The evidentpurposeof this provisionwas to

preventmsttersforeignto the generalpurpo* of ap-

propriationbills being attachedto them as riders,

therebytakingadvantageof the necessityof the state

for money to defrayits currentexpensesand to pay

its officersto pass measurasthat perhapswould other-

wise have been defeated." Evsnhoffv. State Industrial

AccidantCommission,154 .Pac.106, 111 (1915).

Three changeswere made in the wordingof this Article

IJAthe c~stituth of 1876. The provisionwas moved from the

GeneralProvisionssectionof the Constitutionto the Iegisla-

tive Sectionwhere it became Section35 of Article III, with the

wording it has today, It is quoted in full on page 1 of'this

opinion. The reasonsforthethree changesare readilyapparent.

The exceptionmade for appropriation bills was to insurethat no

courtwould hold the appropriationfor each subjector account

Hon. Allan Shivers,Page 6 (V-3254)

a separategeneralsubjectand as a resulti-squire a multiplic-

ityofappropriationbills;audths savingclausswas addsdto

preventthe strikingdownofths whole ofths Act. The other

basic chauge,from the use of ths word "object"to "subject,"

has been explainedas ping an attemptto m&e the whole provi-

sion less restrictive. The generalpurposeand objectof the

constitutionalprovisionremainsdths ssms.

In dealingwith Section35 of ArticleIII, a ruls of

liberalinterpretation has alwaysbeen applied. Ths tendency

of the dscislonsis to construethe constitutioual provisions

onthis subjectliberallyrathsrthanto embarrasslegislation

by a construction whose strictnessis -cessary to the accom-

pllshmsntof the beneficialpurposefor which it was adopted.5

But at the same tims the Court has been carefulto point out,

as was orlgiuallydons by Chief JusticeHemphlllin Cannonv.

Hemphill;7 Tax. 184, 208 (1851),that t&is provisioncanuotbe

ignoredand thus nullified.

,Withreferenceto generalappropriation bills, ths

SupremeCourt of Texas has held that "the appropriatingoffunds

to be paid from the StateTreasuryis's ~mibject~~withiu he

mesuingof ArticleIII, Ssdion 35, of oul.constitution." 2 It

is clear frouths terms of the constitutional provisionthat

geueralappropriationbillsmaycontainmorethan ens subject

of this sanbsnature,i.e., appropriations for the variousde-

partxfsntsand accounts. The exceptlouof generalappxopriation

bills from the constitutionalprohibitiou againstbills.contaiu-

ing more than one subjectis a limitedand restrictedexception.

The exact wordingIs

". . . except generalappropriation

bills, which may

embracethe varioussubjectsand accounts,for and

on accountof.whichmoneysaFe to bs appropriated

. . .II

As long as a gene-1 appropriationbill includesonly

subjectsof appropriatingmoney and likitingthe use thereofin

harmonywith generallegislation,it may relateto any numberof

UJ 'Stone.v.Brown,~54 Tex. ,330,341~(1881),and Travelers

ProtectiveAssociationof Americav. Ziegler,250 SiW. lll5, I..u~,

.(.Tex.

Civ. App. 1923, error ref.).

I/ Giddingsv. San Antonio,47 Tex. 548 (1877);Dellinger

v. State,28 S,Wi2d 537 (Tex. Grim. App. 1933).

q Moore v. Sheppard, 144 Tex. 537, 192 S.W.2d 559 (1946).

Hon. Allan Shivers,Page 7 (V-1254)

different"subjectsand accounts." In suchimtancesallof

the subjectsa.r$under the one generalpbjectand purpose of

appmprfatingfhde fromthetreasury. !i!he obviou?purposeof

this l.kited.~xceptionwastolPahe certaintb&.appropriations

to more than one departmentin the same bill would not be pro-

hibited. In all other respectsgeneralappropriation bills

are subjectto the 88013prohibitionas all otherbills against

contalnlngmore than one subject. The result is that general

legislationcsmotbe embodiedulthina generalappropriation

bill. Moore v. Sheppard,supra.

A generalappropriationbillmaybe deflnedas a single

bill which appropriatesfunds for two or more departments,sub-

jects,accounts,or purposes. Ithasthe one generalpurposeor

mbject matterof appropria&g money.7

Oenerallegislationdaagmorethanappmpriate money

andl+titsexpsImtllre. AssaidbyafonssrAtto~yGeneral

a opipronNo. 2965 0935)p

*. . . iithcBilldoeemonthansetael~a~of

monsy,providethe means of its.'di&ributlon,and tO

vhom it shallbe distributed,then it is .ageneral

lav...;"

Thus,the distindionbetvpen~ralappropriatian

bU and e=nersllagi+Wion has been r+tgni+ irithie state . .

Inthe ~h@lefactthatthe formrmerely@ts apa$suq of'

molrapf~gaAfic obJ+ganduseswhilethe lattardqepmore

than+Myappropriateandlimittheuse~f~iunds. C&neral

legislationConstituteeaseuaratem&S&t andcannotbe ln-

clkdwlthlna generalappr~priakmbiil. Moo&v. Sheppard,

supra;Att'y Gen..Op.2965, mpra.

This does not mean 4hat ge!qal legislationmay not

containanappropriatlanwhichismere~ incidentaltoaudneces-

sexy to carry out the subjectand purpose of.the generaljaw.

u The Arizonfr S&ems Court has said:- The generalappro-.

priationbillieno~ inthetrue sense of the Wxqlegislation;

it is, as the lauguageImplies,merely a settingapart of the

funds necessaryfor the use andmaintenanceof the v&riousdepart-

mznts of the &ate governmentalready inexistence andtiction~

ins." Sellersv. Fn&miller, 24 P.2d 666, 669 (Aris.Sup:l933).

TheNevadaSup- Court has said: 'The?+approp~iationbille~

as indicatedby the titles,are p+sed fv cpp+ ef the s+&e-

government, and are pot legislativeacts changingtk, +zbstantive

orgenerallaws. . . ." State v..Eggem, 136 Pac. 100, 101 (Nev.

slip:1913).

.Hon.Allan Shiv'qs,Page 8 (v-129)

AttorneyCensral*sOpinionNo. 2965, supra. Neitherdoss it

meanthata generalappropriationbFUm~~ynotcontain~ral

provisionsaad.~taFlslimitingandr‘estrictingt~use of the

fundsthereinappropriated, if.suchprovisionsare necessarily

connectedwith and incidentaltoths aooropriation and use of

ths funds and if they do not conflictiith-or.

amountto general

legislation.Conleyv. Daughtersof the Republic,106 Tex. 80,

156 S.W. 197 (qu).

Th? generalrule with referenceto all bills was stated

by the SupremeCourt of Texas in Phillipsv. Daniel,94 S.W.2d

1193, llfl'(Tex.Civ. App. 1936, error ref.),as follows:

"The law is settledthatunderthe Constitutional

provisionreferredto @tlcle III, Section3fl auy num-

ber of provisionsmay be containedin the samsbill or

act,houeverdivsrsatheymaybs; the only requirement

beingthatthsyare conslstentuithths generalobJect

or subJect,andhava amutualralationsndconnsdion,

dQedlyor indirectly,withths generalsubjector ob-

ject of the act or bill."

With specialregardtowhat incidentalprovisionsmay

bs includedwithin a generalappropr~iation bill, our Texas courts

have not stateda general.rule..I@ever, from statementsas to

what may not bs includedand from numsrousopinionsof the Attor-

nqGeneral,ve~belie~the ru&sniqbe state!generallyas fol-

lows:-Inadditiontd appropriatingmoneyandstipulatingthe

amount,namer, and purposeof the varlous~itemsof expsnditure,

a generalappropriation bill may containany provisionsorelders

which detail,limit,or restrictthe use of the funds or othsr-

wise inkrethatthemoneyis spantforthe requiredactivity

for which It is thereinappropriated,if.theprovisionsor riders

are necessarilyconnectedwith and incidentalto the appropriation

and use of the funds,and providedthey do not conflictwith gen-

eral legislation.8

g AttorneyGeneral'sOpinionNo. 2965 (1935) saysthat we'

shouldbe governedby the ordinarilyacceptedsksaning of "Appro-

priationBill" and quotesas accepteddefinitionsthefollowing:

"*A settingapart from the public rsvenueof a

certain-aimof money for a specificobject in such a

msnnerthat the executiveofficersof the government

ars authorizedto use thatmoney.and no more for that

objectand for no other.' C.J. -iol.,~4, pa@ 1460.

"Websterdefinesan appropriation bill as follows:

"'A measurebefore a legislativebody authorieing

the expenditureof.publicmoneys and stipulating the

amount,manner,and purpose of the various items of

expenditures.'"

Hon. Allan Shivers,Page 9 (V-1254)

In supportof this generalstatementof the rule we

call your attentionto the cass of Lindenv. Finley,92 Tex. 451,

49 S.W. 578 (l&p), in which the SuprenwCourt of Texas said:

"Thereis nothingin the Constitutionwhich prohibitsthe Legis-

lature from limitingsny appropriation by any apt words exprss-

sive of their intent." Also, in Conlsyv. Daughtersof the Re-

public,106 Tex. 8C, 156 S.W. 197 (1913),the Court uphelda pro-

vision in &general appropriation bill which requiredthat funds

appropriatedthereinfor improvementof the Alamo propertywere

to be expsndsdupon approvalof the Governor. The Court said:

"It cannotbethata separateand independentlaw

wouldbe necessaryto directand controlthe expendi-

ture of every item of appropriation."

Courts of severalother Stateswith similarconstitu-

tlonalprovisionshave appliedthis generalrule. A riders that

limitedexpensesfor transportation, lodgingand subsistence to

a $5 per day maxlnnnawas held valid in New Mexico. The Suprsms

Court ofthat'.Statesaid, "!l!hsdetailsof spendingthemoney so

a~~~~d,~irhichslp necessarilyconnsctedwithand. . .

. . . don0tviolatethe Ccmstitutioniiincorporated

in such generalappropriation bill." Whittierv. Safford,214

Pac. 759 (N. Msx. Sup. 1923). The MississippiSiiprems Court has

said: :Ths legislaturscan providsin bills makingappropria-

tions for the expenditureof the monsy, andths conditionson

whicli.itmaybe drawn+e~thetreasory, add for the administra-

tion of the fund so long'asthe machinerycreatedis'limitedto

ths appropriationso made." Trotterv. Gates & Co.; &I So; 843,

846 (Miss.Sup. 1932). TheSuprsmeCourtofi4ontana,inholding

that a rider inanappropriationbill changingths methodof

paymsntout of a designatedfund is valid, said, ". . . so long

as incidentalprovisionsof an appropriation bill are germane

to ths purposeof the appropriationit does not conflictwith

any Constitutional provision. . . . What valid objectioncan bs

interposedto such a course,so long as the Legislatureconfines

the incidentalprovls.ions to the main fakt of the appropriation,

and does not attemptto incorporatein such act generallegisla-

tion, not necessarilyor directlyconnectedwith the appropria-

tionlegally made, under the restrictionsof the sectionin

@Lest Davi.dson.v..Ford,l!~Lp..2h-~3~..3~.(Mont. Sup.

F"

1943).

e/ ~Cnlythe State of Florida,where the Constitution pro-

vides that the appropriationbill shall coutainnothingbut appro-

priations,holds that any rider which in fact doss not appropriate

money is'invalid. Lee v. Dowda, 19 So.2d 570 (Fla. Sup. 1944).

166 . Hall.

AlLanShiPe~%Pal+'l.o (V-1254)

This lnterpretatianoftherule applicabletorlders

ina generalapproprlationbillunderSection35 of ArticleIII

has been followedby the Texas Legislatum for msuy ysars. It

has continuouslyprovidedforaccolmtingprocedures inconzbx-

tlon with the funds appropriated,limited~theuse of coutiagent

expenseappropriations, set the rates fortravslexpeusstobe

paid from the fundsto State employees,spscifiedthstime of

'paymentof salariesappropriated, and.prohibitsd

use of appro-

priatedfmds forpaymntof salariesto "snyemployee.who uses

alcoholicbew?raSeswhile on active duty" or who engagesin cer-

tain politicalactivities. Riders ofthis natureinths general

appropriationbillareconstitutional,becausethsynrnlyds-

tail,limit,orrsstrlctthe use of the fundsappropriatedor

otherwIseinsursthatthe-ywillbeussdforthe purposes

i&en&d. liventhe riders prohibitingpaymentof salariesto

thosewho consumsalcoholicbeverageswhilsondutyorwhoen-

gage in politicalactivitiesare legitimateswans of inmuing

that the purposeoft&s appropriationwillnotbs defeatedand

thsnoneywastedonenployeaswho carryonunauthorlsedactivi-

ties daringthe time for which thay 85e bain~ p$dto'attendto

t&s stats'sbus~ss. IntheTexasLegislative'Manual.(1~),

page 263, this typi of provisionIs referredto as "a condition

attachedto au appropriation, upon failureto complywith which

the appropriatldnwillcease to be effective." See also pags

224.

.Approprfationbillriderswhich violateSsctlon35 of

ArticleIIXhave beenmore fr&ua&lydiscusssdbythe dourts:

snd the AttorneyGsneral'thanthos,awhich are propsrlywithinthe

scopeof‘suclibills. The majority of l&s rider.6which have been

strichurarethosewhichattempttomodiiyoramanda~ral

statute. It is well settledin this State that a rider attached

to a aeneralaimronriationbill cannotrewal. nodifyor amend

an existingg&r& law. State v..Steele;r(-Tex.203 (18&Z);

Llndenv. Finley,92 Tex. 451, 4.9'S.W.578 (l&J); Attorney

GeneaX's OpinionsNo. 1745 (19171,2787 (19291,2965 (19351,

2970 (1935);0-445 (1g39j1.

o,-1837~i1940),~0-2573(wo);-0.~5329

(1g43),v-412 (1947),and v-894 (1949).

In Statev. Steele, supra,Linden Y. Finlsy,supra,am

AttornsyGeneral'sOginions1745, 2787, 2965, mpra, it was held

that gnsral statutesfirinS salariesor fees couldnot be amen&

by a generalappropriation bill. Riders providingfor uss or

transferof specialfunds contraryto generalstatuteswhich pro-

vided for a differentdepositor use were hsldunconstitutional

by AttorneyGeneral'sOpinions2970 (1935),O-5329(19431,and

V-412 (1947). A rider requiringthree years residenceinTexas

beforebeing adatittedto the State TuberculosisSanatoriumwhen

Hon. Allan Shivers,Page 11 (V-1254)

the generalstatuterequiredonly citizenshipin Texas was held

invalidin AttornsyGeneral’s OpinionO-2573 (194'3).

Generallegislationattemptedin a'generalappropria-

tion bill, even thoughnot desiguedto modify or amend au exist-

ing statute,was condemnedby the SupremeCourt of Texas in Moore

v. Sheppard,supra. In that case the Legislaturshad provi&Z--

by rider iu the appropriation bill that the Clerks of the Courts

of Civil Appeals shoulddepositall unofficialfees collected

,bythsm in the StateTreasuryand that they shouldnot be paid

their salariesuntil and unless they filed au affidavitshoving

compliancetharewith.Moors refusedto complyand broughtsuit

to requirepaymentof his salary. The Couxtrenderedjudgmsnt

in his favor upon the groundsthat the rider attemptedto fir

fees of officeand that this was a subjectof geuerallegisla-

tion separateaudapart fromappropriatingmoneyandtherefors

unconstitutional.The Court said:

"Phatthe fixingof officialfees is a matter of

generallegislation, and is a *subJect'of generallegis-

lationwithin the IssaIling

of ArticleIII, Section35,

above, cannotbs questioned. . . .

n. . . that portionof the AppropriationBill setting

out for ths firsttime mattersnot germansthereto,

and dealingwith gsnexallegislationon the different

sndwhollymrelated ‘subject of fees chargedbypstl-

tiohersfor unofficialcopies,andprsscribingths dis-

positionof such fees, is in conflictwith the mandate

of Article III, Section35, and is unconstitutional.

. . ."

A similarrulingwasmads bythe AttorneyGeneralof

Texas in OpinionO-445 (1939)writtenby former.As6ociat.e Justice

James P. Hart concerninga rider which prohibitedState employees

from acceptingor using passes Issuedby transportation agencies.

In this opinionit was said:

'The anti-passprovisionsof the appropriation

bill do not constitutea regulationof the manner in

which the sums appropriatedthereinshallbs expended.

If construedas an impliedamendmentof the general

statutesprohibitingthe issuanceof free passes by

transportation agencies,said provisionswould be in-

valid since a generallaw'maynot be amendedby provi-

sions of a generalappropriation bill. See State v.

Steels,57 Tex. 200; Lindenv. Finley,92 TeX. 451."10

9 This riderwas also held unconstitutional

becauseit

was not coveredby the captionof the act.

Hon..AllanShivem, Page l2 (V-1254)

Examplesof valid and invalidridersin HouseBill 426,

the generalappropriation bill for the bieuniumendingAugust 31,

1953, may be found in Subdivision(15) of Section2, ArticleIII,

relatingto State-ownedautomobiles.The valid riderprovides:

,I

. . . No motor-propelled passenger-carrying

vehi-

cle may be purchasedwith any of the fundsappropriated

in this Article, . . ."

Thisisa constitutionalriderbecause it dossnoxorethanlimit

and restrictuse of the.fondsappropriatedby HouseBill 426.

The invalidrider readsas follows:

."AllState-ownedmotor-propelled passenger-

carqing vehiclesunder the controlof any department,

conmission,board, or otherStateagencyars hereby

declarsdtobe nolongerneeded. Suchmotor-propelled

passenger-carrying vehicles shallbe sold in compli-

- with and as providedfor in Article666, Revised

Civil Statutesof Texas,as amended,or otherwiseas

providedby law, not laterthan October1, 1951. . . .

provided,however,that theseprovisionsof this Ssc-

tion in regardto the sale and purchaseof motor-

propelledpassenger-carrying vehiclesshallnot apply

to the ExecutiveDepartment,StateHighwayDepartment,

Departmentof Pulbic Safety,Cuss,Fish and Oyster

Ccmds*ion, and the Railroad~ssion, providedthat

th+RailroadConmlssionshallonlykeepandhavs in its

possessionnot to.exceedtwenty (20)motor-propelled

passenger-camyfngvehiclesand the Texas PrisonSystem

shall only keep and have in Its possessionthosevehi-

cles equippedwith two-wayradios. Noticesshallbe

given in +M.ng to personsnow using said vehicles

of the time and place they are goingto be sold &order

that such persons may have an opportunityto bid on said

motor-propelled passenger-carryingvehicles."

Ths forsgoingrider is not incidentaltothe appropria-

tion of money or 'alimitationor restrictionof the use of money

appropriatedby House Bill 426. It relatesto an entirelydif-

ferent subjectand is generallegislation prohibitedby Section

35 of.ArticleIII of the Constitution.Att,orney Gsneral'sOpinion

No..V-1253 (1951). This rider illustrates

the reason for the con-

stitutional~prohibition againstgenerallegislationin an appropria-

tion bill. As pointedout in the above opinion,if this type of

legislationwere valid, it would be possiblefor the Legislatureto

providefor the sale of the State'sofficebuildingsor the public

169

Eon. AlUmShivers, Page 13 (V-1254)

schoollands ina generalappropriationbill. Clearly,the

sala of State-owsedautomobilesand other.propsrty,in the words

of the SupremsCourt inMoore v. Sheppard,supra,is ona "dif-

ferentand whollyurirelated subject"froivapproppiatingfunds.

This rider is also unconstitutional

becausethe captionof the

bill gives no noticewhateverof its presencein the bill. At-

torney General'8opinionv-l.253(1951).

As previouslypointedout, riders in an appropriation

bill may sosetisk?s

conflictwith Section1 of ArticleII of ths

Texas Constitution,which provides:

DThepowersof the Coverumentof the Stats of

Tees shallbe dividedinto three distinctdepartments,

each of which shall be confidedto a separatebody of

maglst.racy,to wit: Those which are Isgislativeto one;

those which are Executiveto anotheriaudthosewhich

ire Judicialto another;and no parson or collectionof

perffons,being of one of these departments,shallexer-

ciss auy power propsrlyattachedto either of the others,

exceptin the instsncesherein expresslypermitted.?

The LegislativeBudgetBoard, composedofthe Speaker

and four Ho&z membersappointedby him (includingChairmanof

tlw Appropriations Comittee and Chairmenof Revenueand Tsxa-

tionCommittee)audthe LieutenagtGovernorand four Senateem-

krsappointed~hhim(inclubingCbsirmanofFinancc Committee

and Chairmsnof StateAffairsCommittee)was createdby Senate

sill 387,.Acts 51t3tLeg., R.S., l$+g,'ch.k@, 'p.,906(Art.

5kZgc,V.C.S.) to serve in an iuvestlgatoryaudadvisokycapa-

city with respectto proposedappropriations.The Board'sfunc-

tions Eve supplementary to those of the Board of Controland the

Covernogas alreadyprescribedin Articles68ga:lthrough6&a-7,

V.C.S. Article6&a ime amsndsdby Senate Bill 413, Acts 52n8

m., R.S., 1951, ch. 332, p. 572.

There is no constitutioual questioninvolvedin

creationof such au advisorylegislativebudget conmittee. 1'

But the same Legislature,in a rider to its generalappropria-

tion bill for the Beard for Texas State Hospitalsend Special

Schools,went furtherin subjectingthe expenditureof trans-

ferredfunds and unexpendedbalancesby the Texas State Board

for Hospitalsand'Spedal Schoolsto the approvalof the

il.J~Ter+ll v. King, 118 Tex. 237, 14 S.W.2d786 (1929).

Eon. Allan Shivers,Page 14 .(v-1254)

I2

LegislativeBudgetBoard.

In like vein, the Fifty-secondIegislaturehas appended

severalsimilarridersto its generalappropriation bill, as fol-

lows:

The LegislativeBudgetCommitteebid is here-

by authorizedto requirequarterlybudget approvalprior

to the expenditureof enyofthe fuuds appropriatedto

the departmentsend agenciesof the State of Texas in

this Ad. Suchreq~~ntwhenFxercisedshallbe made

by filingwrittennoticewith the State Comptrollerand

writtendirediim with the departmentor agency. After

tich notice,no moneys hereinappropriatedshallbe ex-

pendeduntil such budget approvalshallhave been se-

curea." ArticleIII, Section2, cbd. (34),LB. 426,

Acts 52nd Leg., 19.51.

nBuD(;gTAPPROVALJ6ENREQUISED.The Ie@+.etive

BudgetBoard is hereby authorizedto requirethe sub-

mimion of a budget for Ws approvalprior to the ex-

pepdltun of any of the funds appropriatedto the St&e

institutions of highereducationand to thepther edu-

cationalagenciesof the St&e of Texes nan~d in his

&kg article. Suchrequirement,whenexercised,shall

be made by filingwrittennoticewith the State.Comptrol-

ler a&written dir&&ion with the institutionor ageky.

After the effectivedate providedin ech notice,no man-

eys hereinappropriatedshellbe expendeduntil such

budget approvalshallbeen Bid beefisecured. The au-

thority&rantedby this peragraphshallbe exercised

only in emergncies. The LegislativeBudgetBoard

dalYdetermine when such an emergency~exists." Arti-

cle V, Sectiw’16, LB. ,426,Acts 52nd L&g., 1951.

/

"QuarterlyBudgets. The tigislativeBudgetR&d

shall requirequarterlybudget approval.prior to the ob-

ligation~orexpknditti of any of the'fundsappropriated

to the Board institutionsand the Centrd Officeti this

Article& No moneys herein appropriatedshallbe expended

until such budget kpprovalshall have been secured.!'Ar-

~ticieII, Section14, 'E.B.~

426, Acts 52nd Leg., 1951.

'a Section18(b)'and(c), House Bill 321, Acti 5lst Leg.9

R.S.,~1949;ch.842, pt 1084.

Non. Al.LsnShivers,Page 15 (V-1254)

Since the State departments,institutionsof higher

education,and other State institutionsare not a part of the

legislativebranchof the State government,these rider6, in

requiringfurtheritemizationof appropriations or approval

of the expenditureof appropriatedfunds by the Legislative

BudgetBoard, violatethe constitutional provisionprescrib-

..ingthe separationof powers.

The phrase "any power properlyattack&to either

of the others"promptsinquiryas to what powersbelongto

each branch. "Legislative" mans %zking, or havingthe power

to make, a law or laws." Webster'6New lnternationel Diction-

ary (2dEd. 1938). This includesmakIng and itemizingappro-

priations. :YChf.power to itemizeappropriation8 is a legisla-

U-power which it may exerciseif it sees fit as long as'the

is in its hanas. The legislationis completewhen the

appropriation-is &&.+ People v. Tremaiue,I.68N.E. 817 (N.Y.

Ct. App. 19s). The money once appropriated, the Le&slature

Is no longerauthorizedto concernitselfwith the fin-ther seg-

regationand disbursementof the funds,the constitutional in-

hibitionbeing not only againstactualusurpztionof the func-

tion, but also againstone departztent's settingItselfup in

a supervisorycapacityover the actionsof another.l3 Paren-

thetically,it maybe notedherethat if the approvalofpro-

posdexpenditures'beconsi&redalegislatlve function,still.

such functioncouldno be delee;ated by the body as a whole to

a'few of its zembers.lfi

The legislativefunctionbeing to make laws, the execu-

tive iunctionis to carry them out. Webster'sNew International

Dictionzry(2dEd. 1938), in Its definitionof "executive," uses

the phrases"or carryinginto effect" . . . "or zecurestheir

due performance."More specifically, the fizcaladministration

of the affairsof the governuetihas been held to be an execu-

tive duty.15 The above ridersthus attemptto vest au execu-

tive power in a joint cozmitteeof the legislativebranch.

AlthoughTexas cases upholdingthe separationof powers

are too nmrterous

to requirecitation,one exampleof an unwar-

rantedlegislativeinterference with the executivedepartmentis

the strikingdown of Article803a, V.P.C.., which prescribedthe

u Cooley'sConstitutional

Li$tations (8thEd. 1927) 227.

w Ex parte Youngblood,251 S,W. 509 (Tex. Grim.App. 1923).

w In re Opinionof the Justices,68 AtL.873 (N.H. Sup.

1907).

HCJL Al&an Shivers,Page 16 (V-U*)

to be worn by peace officersmskingarrests

Other ju.rlsdictions

likewiseabound in case authority.

The United StatesSupremeCourt struckdown an act of the Philip-

pine Legislature,creatinga gove-nt-ownedbsnkandcoalcom-

pany end vestingthe voting power thereofin a codttee includ-

inp the Presidentof the Senateand the Speakerof the House of

Representatives, as au attemptto engraftexecutivedutiesupon

a legisla vs officeand thus usurp the executivepower by indi-

rection.if Similarly,an act creatinga legislativecommittee

onStatewaterrightswasheld invalidwherethe court foundthat

the b@3lhuX! hadnot only&d? a &~Wbutn!a e a joint commit-

tee its executiveagent to carry out the law.18

A New York decisionexactlyin point, conc+rningan

appropriationfetteredby a provisionthat the money appropriated

k spent ouly with.approvalof two legislativeofficers,held un-

constitutionalthe provisionof StateFinanceLaw, # 139, re-

quirlngsuch approval,the Court of Appeals saying:

'The Legislaturehas not only mads a law--i.e.,

an appropriation--but has made two of its membersex

officioits executiveagentsto carry out the law;

i.e., to act on the segregationof the appropriation.

This is a clear and ccmspicuousinstanceof au attempt

bythe Legislatursto conferadmluistrative power upon

Go Of ItS owu members." Peoplev. Tremaine;168 N:E.

817, 822 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1929).

AttorneyGeneral'sOpinionNo. O-4609 (1942)is also

in point. That opinionconst~eB a rural aid appropriation bill

(H.B. 284, Acts 47th Leg., R.S., 1941, ch. $9, p. 880). In

that statutea joint legislativeadvisorycomnittee,composed

of five Senatemembersand five House members,was given power

to approvenumeroustransactions,includingthe receiptof tui-

tion paymentand @anspotiation aid by schooldistricts. The

AttorneyGeneralruled that only so much'ofthe act as created

a joint 1egisLativeadvisoFycommitteeto study schoollaws as

an aid to their recodification was constitutional,whereasthe

provisionsimposingupon said committeeof the Legislaturethe

authorityto administerthe law were unconstitutional. ,_

l6J Scogginv. State, 38 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Grim.App. 1931).

II/ Springerv. PhilippineIslands,277 U.S. 169, 202 (1927)

W StOCkmanV- L-=aaY,55 Colo. 24, I29 Pac. 220 (1912).

173

Hon. Allan Shivers,Page 17 (V-1254)

Therefore,in so far as the powersend dutiesof the

LzgislativeBudgetBoard are extendedin HouseBill 4.26beyond

the dutiesprescribedfor that Board in the statuteby which it

was created,the Legislaturehas attemptedto placeupon the

Board dutieswhich are in violationof Section1 of ArticleII

of the Terns Constitution.

HouseBill 426 containsa total of 235 riders. Their

validityor invaliditycan be determiuedin most instancesby

applyingto each specificrider the generalrules herelnstated.

In some instances,however,the question&ay be closeenoughto

require additionalopinions.

At this time severalopinionrequestsare pendingin

this officerelatingto the validityof specificriderswhich

hzve not been discussedin this opinion. We shallbe pleased

to furnishyou a copy of each additionalop$nionas it is corn-

pletd.

In so far as Section35 of ArticleIII of the

Texas Constitutionis concerned,in aaditionto ap-

propriating money and stipulatingthe amount,msnuer,

and purposeof the variousitems of expenditure to

variousdepartments and accounts,a generalapproprla-

tion bill may containeny provisions.or riderswhich

deteil,limit,or restrictthe use of the fun&3 or

otherwiseinsurethat the money is spentfor the re-

quiredactivityfor which it is thereinappropriated,

if the provisionsor ridersare necessarilyconnected

with and incidentalto the appropriation and provided

they do not conflictwith generallegislation.

Ridersprovidingfor accountingproceduresin

connection with the funds appropriated,lImitlugthe

use of contingentexpenseappropriations; settingthe

rates for travelexpenseto be paid from the.fundsto

Stateemployeea,specifyingthe time of paymentof

,~~lzries appropriated and prohibitingthe use of ap-

propriatedfunds for the paymentof salariesto "any

employeewho uses alcoholicbeverageswhile on active

duty" or.whoengagesin certainpoliticalactivities

are valid in a generalappropriation bill because

they merelydetail,limit,or restrictthe use of the

fwds appropriated or otherwiseinsurethat the money

will be used for the purposesintended. They do not

174 Non. AllaIlsuverI3,Pe@ 18 (v-12541

constituteadditionalsubjectsof gepesallegislation

inviolationofSection35 ofArticle III offheTexas

constitutiorL.

Riders attemptingto fix salariesend fees or

transferfunds contraryto generalstatutesareuncon-

stitutlcmal,because agenmalappropriationbill can-

not amend,modify,or repeal a generallaw.

Arider~prcdding for the sale of State property

is notrelatedor incidentaltothe appropriationof

funaz. It la generallegislationon a subjectother

thanappropriationsandtherefore camotbe constitu-

tionallyenactedin a generalappropriation bill.

Sec. 35, Art. III, Con&. of Texas;Att'y Gen. Op.

r253 ( 1951) -

The riders inthe,generalappropristionbillwhich

seekto conferupona joiutbOBldcomposedofnmnbers

of the Legielature(Lsgielative Budget Board)author-

ityto repuircfurtherltemisationof appropx%atedfwi

ora~~oft~e*pendituret~reofviolatt Section

1 of Article II of the Constitutionof Texas, which pro

hibitst&e exerciseby the legielatlvebranch of~powers

properlyattacbedtothe executivebrmch.

AttorneyGeneral

E. Wayne Mode

Assistante

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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