Opinion

Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

Court
Texas Attorney General Reports
Filed
Jul 2, 1951
Status
Published
On the bench
Price Daniel
Cited by
0 cases

The opinion

THE

August 28, 191

Hon. Coke R. Stevenson, Jr. Opinion No. v-1259

Administrator

Texas Liquor Control Board Ret Is person owning in-

Auqtin, Texas terest in business

holding beer distrlb-

utor'0 license ellgi-

ble'~for employment by

Texas Liquor Control

Dear SIP: Board.

Your request for an opinion ask8 whether a person

who owna an interest in a beer distributing buSine88 con-

ducted under a license issued by the Texas Liquor Control

Board is eligible for employment by the Board.

Article 666-5, V.P.C., in so far as pertinent to

your inquiry, provides that:

"No person shall be eligible for appoint-

ment nor Shall hold the office of member of the

Board, nor be appointed by the Board, nor hold

any office or position under the Board, who has

any connection with any association, firm, person,

or corporation engaged in or conducting any alco-

h2 OP who holds

8tOCkS or bond8 therein, or who ha8 pecuniary in-

terest there& nor shall any such person receive

any commission or profit whatsoever from or have

any interest whatsoever in any purchase or Sale8

of any alcoholic liquors. D . e

"The Board or Administrator shall appoint

all necessary clerks, stenographers, inSpeCtOr8,

and Chemists, and other employees to properly

enforce the provisions of this Act.

'No person shall be eligible for any ap-

pointment who has any financial connection what-

ever with any person engaged in or conducting

any liquor business of any kind, or who holds

stock OP bonds therein, or who has any pecuniary

interest therein, nor shall any such person re-

ceive any commission or profit whatever from, or

Hon. Coke R. Stevenson, Jr,, page 2 (v-l%g)

have any interest whatsoever In, the pur-

chases or sales made by pers~ons authorized

by this Act to manufacture, purchase, aelj;,

or otherwise deal in the llcuor business,

(&UphaSiS Supplied throughout opinion.)

your question turns on whether a beer bUSine88

18 a liquor business within the meaning of Article 666-5.

That question arises by reason of the deflnitiod of

"liquor" contained in Article 666-se, V,P.C., that:

"liquor' shall mean any alcoholic bev-

erage containing alcohol in excess of four

(4) per centum bx weight, unless otherwa

indicated. . o o

"Any definition contained herein shall

apply to the same word in any form.

The definition of 'beer" contained in Article 667-1,

V,P,C,, is:

"The term 'beer' means a malt beverage

containing one-half of l$ or more of alcohol

by volume and not more than 4% of alcohol by

weight, and shall not be inclusive of any

beverage designated by late1 or otherwise by

any other name than beer.

"ALcohollc'Beverage" is defined in Article 666-3a to mean

alcohol and any beverage containing

i&k ihan one-half of one per cent (& of .W

of alcohol by volume which is capable of use

for beverage purposes, either alone or WheU

diluted."

If these definitions control and apply to the word llauor,

as used in Article 666-5, then a strictly bm bU8ineSS

would not be a liauor business within the provision8 Of

this Article and a person owning an interest in a beer

business would not by reason of Article 666-5 be ineligi-

ble for employment by the Board,

We are of the opinion that the word 'liquor,n

as used in the quoted portion of Article 666-5, 18 not

limited to the technical definition as containe$i In

Article 666-3a, but Is used as generally descriptive of

those businesses dealing in alcoholic beverage8 which

.

Han, Coke R. Stevenson, Jr., page 3 (V-1259)

the Texas Liquor Control Act subject8 to regulations

by the Texas Liquor Control Board.

The eligibility provisions in Article 666-5

were contained In the first comprehensive regulatory

act adopted In 1935. H. B. 77, Acts 44th~ Leg., 2nd

C.S. 1935, ch. 467, pa 1795. While substantially the

same technical definitions of "li$uor" and nbeer' were

therein also contained, the word liquor" was used at

times in the technical sense of the definition and at

other times in a general sense meaning beverageS eon-

taining lesser amounts of alcohol. Subsequent amend-

ments have substituted the broader term "alcoholic

bevePagesn for the word 'liquor" In many provisions of

the Act, but there is no indication that the meaning

of the word "1Iquor" in Article 666-5, where It remains,

has been changed. The meaning Is to be determined from

the context in which it Is used, and where the context

indicate8 the broader significance the meaning, to use

the language of the definition Is, "OthePwise Indicated."

Examination of the 1935 Act illustrates the original

significance of the term "liquor business of any kind"

as contained therein to include a beer business, which

meaning we conclude is the same today.

The conclusion indicated is borne out in the

caption of the 1935 Act, That dct regulated all kinds

of alcoholic beverages including beer, yet the caption

described it as "regulating the traffic in alcoholic

liquors," as creating a "Liquor Control Board," a8 pro-

viding for local option elections a8 to the sale of

."intoxicating liquors having various alcoholic contents,"'

and as providing for permits $0 engage "in the various

phases of the liquor traffic. Nowhere in the caption is

'beer" mentioned, yet elaborete regulation of beer traf-

fic is established in the Act. It was obviously consid-

ered by the Legislature as one of the "kinds" Of "liquor"

buSines8, The phrase "liquor b&Sine88 of any kind" bears

close resemblance to the phrases used in the caption to

indicate regulation of the "various phases of the liquor

traffic" and sale of "liquors having various alcoholic

contents," which obviously included 'beer".

Again, in the emergency clause, traffic in beer

was certainly contemplated by the general Statement8 of

the need for early effectiveness of the Act. It refers to

the adoption of the constitutional amendment legalizing

the sale of "liquor" in wet areas and recites the fact that

traffic In "liquor" was then unregulated. Both statement8

Hon. Coke El. Stevenson, Jr., page 4 (v-1259)

applied in fact to beer sales and traffic.

The word "liquor" was used exclusively through-

out Section 6 of Article I of the original Act, which

enUm8rated the general duties and responsibilities of the

Board, SOme of which applied to the beer business. Sec-

tion 23 of Article I defining "wet" and "dry" at-east spoke

of "liquor" only but obviously applied to areas where

"beer" sales were permitted or prohibited.

The section8 dealing with local option elections

and particularly with ballots used the word "liquor" in

the sense of an alcoholic beverage and left its applica-

tion to b88r to depend on the designated alcoholic content.

These Illustrations suffice to evidence the fact

that the word 'liquor," especially when used in the provi-

sions of more general application, USUally carried the

generic connotations of the phrase "alcoholic beverages"

and was quite often qualified by a statement of the partlc-

ular alcoholic content to which th8 particular provision

applied.

Finally, and quite significantly, the original

Act was scrupulously specific in prescribing absolute in-

dependence of the regulatory agency and the industry over

which It had jurisdiction. Not only was the eligibility

provision repeated in Section 5 of Article 1 but Section

21a of Article II of the original Act made the following

specific provisions designed to guarantee that the Board

and Its employees would not participate in pOlItiCa el8C-

tions.

"Sec. 21a o It shall be unawful big for

any person paid a salary or per diem or receiv-

ing any compensation out of the appropriation

made or tax88 collected under the term8 Of this

Act to engage in or take part in any pOlitiCa

campaign. By engaging in a political campaign

or taking part in a political Campaign i8 meant

and shall include distributing circulars, hand-

bills, posting pictures, handing out cards,

making Speech88 or soliciting support for or

opposing the election of any candidate for any

public office. Any such employee engaging in

such inhibited and unlawful conduct shall be

subject to removal from his pOSitiOn and re-

straint from reemplogment in such department for

a period of one (1) year by a judgment in the

Hon. Coke R. Stevenson, Jr., page 5 (V-1259)

district court of the county wherein Such

unlawful activity occurred, either In whole

or in part. Any ten (10) or more qualified

resident voter8 of such county shall have

authority t0 institute a Suit in a district

court of such county praying for the removal

of such employee Prom such department, citing

such employee and any member of the Board,

and, upon final hearing, the allegations of

the petition being sustained, the judgment

Shall be to discharge the employee and to re-

strain the department from re-employing such

employee for a period of one (1) year from

the date of the judgment.

"In like manner, any member of the Board

who shall violate this section or who shall

solicit, ask or suggest to any employee, either

directly or through any other person, that such

employee violate such section, then and In that

event such Board member may be removed by quo

warrant0 proceedings in the district court upon

the relation of any ten (10) qualified voter8

of the county in which such violation occurred.

The writing of a letter into any county where-

in such letter violates or Suggests, asks or

solicits a violation of this law shall consti-

tute snfficient grounds for removal in any

county through which such letter paSSed or in-

to which such letter passed."

This section was obviously designed to aSSUre lm-

partial administration and activity by the regulatory body

and its personnel. The whole scheme for setting up the

Liquor Control Board was to create an Independent agency

whose actions would not be Influenced by a financial lnter-

est in the industry over which it exercised jUrlSdiOtiOn,

and who would be expressly prohibited from exerting politi-

cal influence in furtherance of or opposition to the inter-

ests of such industry.

The principle promulgated in Article 666-5 is not

novel to Texas administrative law. See Article 4681, V.C.S.,

declaring that no person who Is directly or indirectly in-

terested in any Insurance company may be a member of the

Board of Insurance Commissioners or a clerk in the Insurance

Department.

Hon. Coke R. Stevenson, Jr., page 6 (V-1259)

,.

We are constrained to attribute to the Legis-

lature a consistent policy In regard to such eligibility

provisions, where such con8i8tency~finds support in the

law e You are, therefore, advisedzthat one who owns an

interest in a licensed beer distPlbuting business 18 in-

eligible for employment by the Texas Liquor Control Board.

One who owns an interest in a licensed

beer distributing business is ineligible for

emplo nt by the Texas Liquor Control Board.

Art. r 66-5, V.P.C.

APPROVED: Yours very truly

Ned McDaniel PRICE DAIUEL~

State Affairs Division Attorney General

Everett Hutchinson

Executive Assistant

Charles D. Mathews

First Assistant

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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