Opinion

Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

Court
Texas Attorney General Reports
Filed
Jul 2, 1959
Status
Published
On the bench
Will Wilson
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 3.5%

The opinion

HE .s~-JITORNEY GENERAL

OF TEXAS

April 2, 1959

Honorable Truett Latimer O-oinionNo. W-584

Chairman

Agriculture Committee Re: Constitutionality of H.B.

House of Representatives 174, 56th Leg., relating

Austin, Texas to producers of peanuts-

acting jointly with the

Commissioner of Agrlcul-

ture In promoting the

production and use of

Dear Sir: peanuts,

In your recent letter you have advised us that

the House Agriculture Committee, 56th Legislature, has

referred House Bill 174 to thls.office for an opinion re-

garding its constitutionality.

House Bill 174 authorizes the Commissioner of

Agriculture to certify an association recommended by the

Southwestern Peanut Growers Association to conduct a State-

wide referendum among commercial reducers of peanuts. An

annual assessment of One Dollar (% 1) per net ton of peanuts

marketed by such producers is to be levied against such pro-

ducer8, if as many as two-thirds (2/X) of those voting in

such referendum favor the levy.

The annual assessment Is to be continued until at

least ten per cent (10%) of the members of the association

call for another referendum, and at such subsequent referen-

dum a certain percentage vote to discontinue the assessment.

We note here that the bill is not @ear on the

matter of ,what circumstances are required In order to dis-

continue the assessments, the last sentence of Section 12

in the proposed legislation providing as follows:

If such a partition 1 sic 1 is

presented'& the said board, then ‘i--z

he oard

shall conduct a subsequent referendum in the

same manner as outlined above and future as-

sessments will be made only two-thirds or

Honorable Truett Latimer, page 2 (~~334)

more of the producers eligible to participate

in such referendum and voting therein shall

vote in the affirmative." (Emphasis ours.)

We assume that the error is typographical and

will be corrected before final enactment of the legislation.

House Bill 174 provides that the Commissioner of

Agriculture shall upon request of the certified association

following a vote in the referendum favoring the assessment

notify all purchasers of the product that on and after a cer-

tain date the assessments shall be deducted by the purchaser

or his agent from the purchase price of such product. The

assessment SO deducted is to be remitted by the purchaser to

the Commissioner on or before the 20th day of the month fol-

lowing such deduction. The ComjaXssionerof Agriculture is

to pay ninety-five per cent (95%)'of the assessments to the

certified association or organization by the end of the month.

Inspection of the purchaser's books and records

by the Commissioner is authorized by the bill. On all sums

so remitted to the Commissioner he is entitled to deduct

five per cent (5%) for administration of the act. These

amounts deducted by the Commissioner are to be paid into the

State Treasury and are by the act appropriated for the use

of the Commissioner In carrying out the provisions of the

act.

With the exception of the five per cent (5s) noted

above, the bill does not authorize the deposit of the asaess-

ments in the State Treasury, but providesonly that they

shall be received by the Commissioner of Agriculture and

by him remitted to the certified association or organization.

Under the bill any producer who is dissatisfied

with the assessment may demand and receive from the treas-

urer of said assooiation a refund If the demand is made in

writing within thirty (30) days from the date on which the

assessment is collected from the producer.

The proposed statute indicates that the portjon

of the assessments in excess of the fjve per cent (5%) to

be deducted by the Commissioner is to be used for the pur-

pose of financing or contributing toward the financing of

Honorable Truett Latimer, page 3 (WWz584)

a program of research, education and promotion designed to

increase the production, consumption and quality of Texas

grown peanuts.

Does the exaction authorized by House Bill 174

constitute a tax?

A tax is not a voluntar payment or donation,

but an enforced contribution. 54 C.J.S. 32, Taxation,~

Sec. 1. Although the peanut producer who is dissatisfied

with an annual assessment is authorized by House Bill 174 to

demand the return of his money, the fact remains that he

has been made by law to part with it involuntarily In the

first Instance. Under this bill money may be taken, for

a time at least, without the consent of as many as one-

third (l/3) of the class subject to the exaction. The

farmer is deprived of the use of his money, but no pro-

vision is made to pay him interest. Further, he is put

to the trouble of having to make written demand for the

return of his money, and no provision is made as to when

the money must be returned to him following demand. The

fact that the farmer's money has been taken without his

consent and diverted to .

other uses

.. . for a time

_. is not ex-

plalnea away Dy saying tne conustlon may only be temporary.

The revenue derived from the exation authorized

by House Bill 174 does not enter the State Treasury. But

the case of Friedman v. American Surety Co. of New:=,

137 Tex. 149, 151 S.W.2d 570 (1941) indicates that circul-

ation through the State Treasury is not a prerequisite of a

tax. In that case ituas held that the "contributions" re-

quired by the Unemployment Act to be made by employers to pro-

vide compensation ?or certain employees during involuntary

unemployment are taxes, and that the statute is a tax statute,

even though the fund Into which such contributions are made

never becomes a "State fund," that is, paid into the State

Treasury, but only a fund in the custody or trust of the

State Treasurer. In the words of the Court:

I! The taxes are levied and col-

lected ho; such fund, and not for the State

in its sovereign capacity. . . .'

Under House Bill 174 money Is to be collected

from a certainclass for a particular fund. It is not

Honorable Truett Latimer, page 4 (W-584)

colleated for the general use of the State and does not

come into the State Treasury. It comes within the custody

of a State officer to be expended for the primary benefit

of a certain class. In these respects the "assessments"

provided for in House Bill 174 are like the "contributions"

held to be a tax in the Friedman case, supra.

The question of whether a particular charge or

burden .isa tax depends on its real nature, and if in 1~s na-

tureit is a tax, it makes no difference that it be other-

wise labeled in-the statute imposing such burden.

of Harris v. Shepperd, 156 Tex. 18, 291 S.W.2d 721

84 C .J .S . 34 , Taxation, Sec. 1.

In Texas Jurisprudence a tax is described in the

following t&ma::

"Broadly speaking, 'tax' embraces every

levy made by the government (or any subdi-

vision thereof) for public uses. But in a nar-

rower sense, the term connotes a charge

imposed in aid of revenue, . . ." 40 Tex.Jvr.

11, Taxation, Sec. 2.

That the exaction of money authorized by House

Bill 174 from producers of peanuts is a levy made by the

government for what are ostensibly public uses is self-

evident. The exaction is plainly a charge imposed in aid

of revenue, as is seen from the case of R. Rouw Co. v.

Texas Citrus Commission, 151 Tex. 182, 237 S.W 2d 231

n9‘52), which is hereinafter considered in detail.

If the revenue derived from the charge is not

for a public,,orgovernmental'purpose then the Legislature

has no authority to authorize'the levy, the bill thereby

becoming unconstitutional on that ground alone. Fourteenth

Amendment, U.S. Con&.; Tex. Const. Art. VIII, Sec. 3.

For present purposes only we assume that the exaction is

for'a "public purpose" within the meaning of the foregoing

constitutional provisions,

Under the instant bill producers of peanuts sup-

posedly benefit from the money deducted from the sale of

their crop, but the public In general is also benefited and,

hence the benefits are merged. Any payment exacted at the

instance of the State as a contribution toward maintaining

Honorable Truett Latimer, page 5 (~~-584)

governmental functions is a tax rather than an assessment,

if the special benefits derived by those who pay the charge

are merged in general benefit. Dickson v. Jefferson Count

Board of Education, 311 Ky. 781, 225 s.w.26 b’/2*

State ex rel Fargo v. Wetz, 40 N.D. 299, 168 N.W. 835

(1918); 5 A.L.R. 731; 51 Am, Jur. 38, Taxation, Set, 4.

True assessments are levied with reference to

special benefit which the property is supposed to receive

from the charge. City of Wichita Falls v. Williams, 119

Tex. 163, 26 S.W.2d 910 (1930). But if the exaction is

levied upon all within the class in proportion to the value

of the thing taxed, such charge is ordinarily held to be a

tax and not-an assessment. Wharton County Drainage District

No. 1 v. Holmes, 149 S.W. 381 (Tex.Civ.App. 1912, error ref.)

Here the levy is against all within the class, the

producers of peanuts for commercial purposes. The value de-

rived by the various producers from research, education and

promotion is practically incapable of estimation. The levy

is not in proportion to the,benefits to be derived from the

charge as in the aase of assessments.

A charge or a fee, if for the purpose of raising

revenue, is a tax and levied under the taxing power. Harris

County v. Shepperd, supra. The monies secured by the exaction

made under House Bill are to be used for research, educa-

tion and promotion Instead of regulation of the peanut

industry. As is hereafter shown by the case of H. Rouw Co.

v. Texas Citrus Commission, supra, an exaction for such pur-

nose is regarded as a revenue measure. Being a revenue

measure rather than a regulatory measure, it-is B tax.

Present here are the essential characteristics of

a tax. Money may be taken without the consent of the person

paying the exaction. It is taken under the authority of

legislative act. It is taken for revenue purposes. A State

official receives and handles the revenue derived from the

"assessment," using his State office and powers in an

integral phase of the collection and disbursement of the

revenue, This official is called upon to certify the agency

that will conduct the referendum and expend the funds col-

lected from peanut producers. He is empowered to inspect

the books of those who collect the charge against producers.

The funds collected are to be spent for the purposes desig-

nated In the bill. Clearly, the State lends its authority

Honorable Truett Latimer, page 6 (WbJ-584)

and the aura of governmental power to the imposition of this

burden and the expenditure of the revenue derived from the

exaction.

What kind of tax is authorized by House Bill 174?

In H. Rouw Co. v. Texas Citrus Commission, supra, the

Texas Supreme Court held that a tax authorized by the Texas

Citrus Law (Art. 118d, V.T.C.9.) to be imposed bv the Texas

Citrus Commission on persons, firms, associations and corpora-

tions of not exceeding Three Cents (3#) per standard box or

bag on all aitrus fruit grown in the State and packed or

placed In containers and marketed or processed and sold dur-

ing a certain time was an occupation tax. The charge was

not designated as an oocupation tax in the statute.

The Texas Citrus Law provided that the tax money

was ' . . . to be used . . . in eduaation and research for

the purpose of increasing knowledge with respect to Texas

citrus fruits and by-products, and ~protecting Texas citrus

fruits from pests and diseases and of finding new uses for

Texas.citrus fruits and by-products and of improving the

quality and y&&l&of~ such fruit and by-products." The test

laid down by the Court and its application to the facts of

that ease were as follows:

There has been much written upon the

dlffere&& between a license tax, and an occupa-

tion tax. This court, in very clear and com-

pelling la&age, laid down the rule for determining

the distinction in the case of Hurt v. Cooper, 130

Tex. 433, 110 S.W.2d 899, (1) as follows: 'It is

sometfmee difficult to determine whether a given

atatute should be classed a8 a regulatory measure

6r ‘a tax measure. The principle of distinction

generally reoognized is that when; from"a'donsidera-

tion of the statute as a.whole, the primary purpose

of the fees ~providedtherein ~is~the'ralsing'of revenue,

then aii&'feeKare In fadt ocduijationtaxes, and

;;;zdregardless of the name by which they are deslg-

. On the other hand, if its primary purpose

appears to be that of regulation, then the fees

levlddc~ are license fees and not taxes. Hoefling

v. Clt~ of San Antonio, 85 Tex. 228, 20 S.W. 85,

16 '&.L..Ri.'608;. Brown v. City of Qalveston, 97 Tex. 1,

75 S.W.488; Cit,;r-yof. .FortWorth v. Gulf Refining Co.,

Honorable Truett Latimer, page '7 (~~-584)

125 Tex. 512, a3 S.W.2d 610; Royal1 v. Virginia,

116 U.S. 572, 577; 6 S.Ct. 510. 29 L. Rd. 735:

Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. Co. v. United States, D. C.,

287 F. 728; Te~xasco, v. Brown, D, c., 266 r.

577, 37 C.J. p. 169, & 6.'

"Applying the above rule tc the Act under

consideration we find the taz levied to oe an

occupation tax, A reading of the Act clearly

demonstrates that its primary purpose is to

raise revenue, and not a regulation of the

citrus fruit industry.under the police power.

Laudable as the purpose of the Act may be;

viz.: to advertise and enlarge the markets

for Texas citrus fruit and its by-products,

and for research beneficial to the citrus fruit

Industry, the primary purpose being the rals-

ing of revenues In excess of the amount needed

for regulation of the industry to carry out

the above provisions, under the well established

rules of law, the tax levied must of necessity

be classed as an occupation tax. . . ."

From the Rouw case, au ra it is seen that House

Bill 174 is an occupation tax

-5 ra her than a license tax

because it authorizes the levy of a tax on growers for the

primary purpose of raising revenue to stimulate the sale

of peanuts instead of regulating the industry.

There can be no doubt that the tax provided by the

bill is an occupation tax by reason of being a tax on the

grower or aotivity of commercially producing peanuts rather

than a property or sales tax. Like the tax in the Rouw case,

supra, it is levied on persons based on certain occupational

activity ensaged in by them. The bill purports in its title

to provide . . ,.,

that producers may levy upon themselves

assessments . . (Rnphasis ours.) This language appears

again in Sections 4, 7 and 21 Nowhere in the bill Is it

provided that the “assessmenth is on peanuts; that is, the

property. Nowhere in the bill is the "assessment" called

a sales tax.

The tax is not an ad valorem tax in that It Is not

based on the value of the crop, but on the quantity sold.

The bill provides that the "assessment" shall be

levied on the commercial producer and fixes the rate at

One Dollar ($1) per net ton of farmer's stock peanuts

Honorable Truett Latimer, page 8 (Ww-584)

marketed. The effect of the bill is to place a tax on the

commercial production of peanuts, *the sale of the crop

being a necessary incident to.duch commercial production.

Louisiana State Department of Agriculture v. Sibille, 207

La. 877, 22 So. 2d 202 (1945). Consequently, the levy of

an occupation tax is authorized by the bill.

Section,3 of Article VIII of the Constitution of

Texas provides in part as follows:

"Sec. 3. One-fourth of the revenue

derived from the State occupation taxes . . .

shall be set apart annually for the benefit

of the public free schools; . . ."

House Bill 174 is, in our opinion, repugnant to

Section 3 of Article VII of the Texas Constitution by rea-

son of not setting apart annually one-fourth (+) of the

revenue derived from the occupation tax for the benefit of

the public free schools of Texas. All of the revenue de-

rived from this occupation tax, except five per cent (5%)

which goes to the Commissioner of Agriculture, is by House

Bill 174 diverted to the certified association in violation

of the Texas Constitution.

Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution ,or’

Texas provides In part as follows:

”

. persons engaged in mechanical and

. .

agricultural pursuits shall never be required

to pay an occupation tax; . . .'

The Constitution of the State of Louisiana simi-

larly forbids the levying of license taxes on persons

engaged in agricultural pursuits. La. Const. Art. X, Sec.

8. The Supreme Court of that State in Louisiana State De-

partment of Agriculture v. Sibille, supra, struck down the

Louisiana statute imposing a tax on all sweet potatoes

shipped in Louisiana in so far as the tax violated the

aforesaid constitutional provision by imposing a tax on

the farmer shipping or carrying his crop to market. The

Court stated:

"In the case of State v. Hayes, 143 La.

39, 78 So. 143, 144, which Involved a provi-

sion of the 1913 Constitution identical with

that above quoted, it was stated:

Honorable Truett Latimer, page 9 (WW-584)

'It has been dgcided~by'this court that

a farmer who goes from place to place selling

at retail the products of his farm is only

pursuing his farming business and is not a

peddler or hawker. He is engaged in an agri-

cultural pursuit, which is, by the terms of

article 229 of the Constitution, exempt from

any license tax. Roy v. Schuff, 51 La. Ann.

86, 24 So. 788.1

"The cited case of Roy v. &huff concerned

Article 206 of the Constitution of.1879 which

exempted all persons engaged in agricultural

pursuits from the payment of a license tax. In

refusing to compel defendant to pay a municipal

license Imposed on peddlers the court said

L5 1 La. Ann. 86, 24 So.,78$:

I* * * He was only carrying out the purpose

he had In view in making the crop,--to sell it

at retail or wholesale, as deemed most advanta-

geous to him as a farmer. The selling was an

incident of farming, it may be said. It was a

part of his pursuit as a farmer, and he thereby

in no way became a peddler or a merchant. 'The

exemption covers both the farmer and the sale

by the farmer of that which his industry ~pro-

duces. . . .I"

The rationale of the above-cited Louisiana case is

persuasive on the issue now before us.

It is the farmer that Is required to pay the tax

although it is not due until he sells his crop. How else

than by sale does the farmer utilize his agricultural pur-

suits? He cannot live on peanuts. The sale of the crop

is a vital and necessary element of and incident to the

occupation of farming. To hold that the producer of pea-

nuts is not engaged in agricultural pursuits when he harvests

the fruits of his labors from the sale of his crop would be

wholly unrealistic.

Inasmuch as the charge authorized by House Bill 174

is plainly an occupation tax and one which is to be levied

on persons engaged in agricultural pursuits; namely, the pro-

ducer of peanuts at the time he sells his crop, the proposed

legislation violates Section 1 of Article VIII of the Texas

Constitution.

.

Honorable Truett Latimer, page 10 (W-584)

In H. Rouw Co. v. Texas Citrus Commission, supra,

it was held t,hatSection 1 of Article VIII of the Texas

Constitution was not contravened by a statute requiring

the vavment or ?.tax on citrus fruft by all whn q%c:lr

or wlace

in containers and market or process and :ell citrus fruits,

the opirlionof the Coui*L;

on reheariog I'~~cL~II~,

in part, a0

follows:

"In Its motion for rehearing appellee, for

the first time, contends that even if the tax

be held to be an occupation tax, it is valid

within that part of Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the

State Constitution, which reads as follows:

I* * * except that persons engaged in mechani-

cal and agricultural pursuits shall never be

required to pay an occupation tax; * * *.I

The present tax is not a tax levied upon per-

sons engaged in 'agricultural pursuits' within

the meaning of the above quoted phrase from the

Constitution. As Is said in the amicus curiae

brief supporting appellee's position 'the tax

is levied upon the activity of packing or plac-

ing in containers and marketing or processing

and selling citrus fruit grown in Texas.

. . . The tax is exacted of any person, engaged

in any vocation whatever, who performs these

acts, whether he be commercial packer, gift

fruit shipper, canner of citrus or bottler of

lemon juice, processor of frozen orange juices,

marmalade manufacturer, or whatever."'

In contradistinction to the Texas Citrus Law under

consideration in the Rouw case, supra, the instant bill

taxes only "persons engaged in the production of peanuts

in the State of Texas". It does not tax all who engage

in the activity of selling peanuts, but only the producer

who sells his own peanuts. The tax is not paid until the

time of sale, but it is paid by the producer then and by

no other person. It does not tax "any person engaged in

any vocation whatever who performs the acts", but only the

farmer, and thereby, In our opinion, places an occupation

tax on persons engaged in "agricultural pursuits" within

the purview of the constitutional provision prohibiting

such taxes.

We examine now the effect which the invalidity of

the tax provided by House Bill 174 will have on the re-

mainder of the bill. Consideration will be given by the

: -

<.

Honorable Truett Latlmer, page 11 (~~-584)

courts to a legislative declaration to the effect that an

adjudication of the invalidity of a portion of the act should

not affect any other portion. 39 Tex.Jur, 24, Statutes,Sec.

9. House Bill 174 contains such a declaration in its

"severability clause".

Nevertheless, when the invalid portions of an act

are an integral and necessary part of the act, so as to

preclude a separation leaving a complete, workable and other-

wise valid law capable of being executed in accordance with

legislative Intent the entire act must fall.

and Fuel Co. v. State, 121 Tex. 138, 47 S.W. 2d 2 5 1932);

-=P

Taylor v. Taylor Bedding Mfg. Co., 245 S.W. 2d 215 (Tex.Civ.

APP. 1948 error ref g v. State, 267 S.W.

2d 423 (T~xr%%%~~. 1954); 39 &e:?&. 22, Statutes, Sec.

9.

Without the portion of the act authorizing the levy

of an "assessment" on producers of peanuts, the main purpose

of House Bill 174 is defeated, it being apparent that the

design of the bill is to raise revenue to finance promotion

of the sale of Texas peanuts. The provisions for "assessment"

are so intimately connected with the remainder of the bill

that they are inseparable. The portion of the bill left

after taking away the invalid part is plainly incomplete and

unworkable. Here the invalidity of a part permeates the

whole, and we must advise you that the entire bill would fol-

low the fate of the unconstitutional provisions authorizing

the levy of a tax.

As the question of constitutionality posed by your

letter is resolved on the above grounds, we deem it unneces-

sary to consider others. Accordingly, we base our opinion

solely on the grounds stated and do not pass on any con-

stitutional issues other than those expressly considered

herein.

SUMMARY

House Bill 174 is unconstitutional

by reason of (1) authorizing the

levying of an occupation tax

without setting apart annually one-

fourth (t) of the revenue derived

..

*.

Honorable Truett Latimer, page 12 (ww-584)

from such tax for the benefit of

the public free schools of Texas

in violation of Section 3 of Article

VII of the Texas Constitution and

(2) authorizing the levying of an

occupation tax on persons engaged in

agricultural pursuits, in violation

of Section 1 of Article VII of the

Texas Constitution.

Very truly yours,

WILL WILSON

Attorney General of Texas

J49vybu

BY

Henry . Braswell

Assistant

HGB:mg

APPROVED:

OPINION COMMITTEE

Geo. P. Blackburn, Chairman

Riley Eugene Fletcher

Charles D. Cabaniss

William R. Hemphill

Tom I. McFarling

REVIEWED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

By: W. V. Geppert

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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