Opinion

Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

Court
Texas Attorney General Reports
Filed
Jul 2, 1972
Status
Published
On the bench
Crawford Martin
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 3.5%

The opinion

June 5, 1972

Mr. James Ii. Harwell Opinion No. M- 1136

Executive Director

Texas Industrial Commission Re: Questions relating to

P. 0. Box 12728, Capitol Station meanings of terms used

Austin, Texas 78711 in Art. lOlSj-1, V.C.S.

Dear Mr. Harwell:

Your recent letter requests the opinion of this

department as to the meaning of certain terminology used in

House Bill 226, Acts of the 62nd Legislature. That bill, as

enacted, is codified as Article 1015j-1, Vernon's Civil

Statutes.

Your first question. is as follows:

"Line three of the attached act refers to

'one percent of the city's general fund budget'.

What is a city's general fund budget? Can it

include the total of all revenues collected re-

gardless of source or regardless of account

title such as 'utility fund'? If 'general fund'

does not include all accounts or revenue funds

in'these accounts, which titled accounts do fall

under the legal definition of general fund budget

as used in this act."

Your second question is as follows:

"Line four refers to ~'and promoting its

(i.e., the city's) growth and development'. If

it were determined by a city that the extension

of utilities to an industry (cost to be paid

out of funds appropriated pursuant to this act)

-5531-

Mr. James II. lIarwell. page 2, (M-1136)

were necessary to 'promote the city and its

growth and development' would this constitute

a legal expenditure of funds on the part of

said city? If not, what types of expenditures,

other than purchase of advertising, if any, fall

under the legal definition of 'promotion' as

used in this act?"

Section 1 of Article 1015j-1 reads as follows:

"The governing body of any incorporated city

having a population of not more than 500,000

according to the last preceding Federal Census

may appropriate from the general fund an amount

not exceeding one percent of the general fund

budget for that year, such appropriation to be

for advertising such city and promoting its

growth and development."

A reply to your first question may not be made in the

absence of more facts. While state statutes govern extensively

the fiscal affairs of our cities, yet there is not complete

uniformity as to charter provisions, status,of bonded indebt-

edness, or accounting procedures and terminology. Accordingly,

in furnishing this opinion, we are necessarily confined to a

general statement without any attempt to hold that a certain

accounting procedure applies to a given city.

You have asked, What is a city's general fund

budget, etc.?" As qualified above, we are of the opinion

that a city's general fund budget generally governs the

expenditure of all income which is not by charter, ordinance,

statute, contract or bond indenture committed to paying desig-

nated portions of the city's debtsor expenses. For example,

utility revenue is commonly held apart from general funds until

interest and sinking funds on any utility bond indebtedness

are taken care of.

-5532-

Hr. James H. Harwell, page 3, (M-1136)

The cities have authority to earmark certain revenue

for a special purpose. See 40 Texas Jurisprudence 2d, page 225,

Section 535, Special Funds, for the statement,

"The governing body of a municipality oper-

ating under the general laws is authorized by

statute to provide special funds for special

purposes and to make a particular fpnd disbursa-

ble only for the purpose for which it was created."

See also Articles 1113 and 1113a, Revised Civil Statutes

of Texas, 1925, for laws relating expressly to revenue from

utilities operated by a city.

We construe.your second inquiry as including two ques-

tions. The First is whether money appropriated under Article

1015j-l* may lawfully be used to extend the city's utility lines

to serve an industry. In other words, would making utilities

available to an industry fall under the heading of promoting the

growth and development of the city as contemplated by Article

lOlSj-1. This is a fact question to be determined by the gov-

erning body of the city. The Attorney General cannot determine

fact questions. Atty. Gen. Opin. No. M-517 (1969, at p. 2470).

In City of Biq Spring v. Board of Control, 404 S.W.2d

810 (Tex.Sup. 1966), the Court said:

"Art. 1108, Vernon's Tex.Civ. Statutes is

equally as broad in giving to the city authorities

the right to contract under such terms and condi-

tions as may appear to be for the best interest of

such city or town 'with regard to furnishing water

outside the city limits.' In making this determina-

tion the City could take into consideration the

* Article lOlSj.-1 applies only to incorporated cities having a

population of not more than 500,000.

-5533-

.

Mr. James H. Harwell, page 4, (M-1136)

advantages which would accrue to the inhabitants of

the- City by virtue of the location of the hospital

adjoining their City. The City Council doubtless

considered the fact that such hospital would have

many employees who would live in the city limits

and spend a large part of their wages with the

merchants and other business and professional men

in Big Spring: and that additional ad valorem tax

revenues would become available to the City through

the ownership of property inside the City limits by

the families moving to Big Spring and employed by

the hospital.

"The judgment of the City Council has been

borne out by the fact that the hospital did provide

a new payroll to Big Spring, and at the time of the

trial it was stipulated between the parties that

such payroll amounted to $91,000.00 per month. The

same is true with regard to ad valorem taxes that

would be available to Big Spring. At the time of the

trial it was stipulated by the parties that hospital

employees residing in the city limits were paying

$3.000.00 per year in ad valorem taxes to the City.

It was also stipulated that in,addition to the

approximately $875,000.00 original appropriation

for construction of the hospital plant, the State

has spent in excess of $18,000,000.00 in establish-

ing the hospital facilities." (at p. 812-813).

The Court here points out many of the benefits accruing to the

city from the nearby location of a hospital. A new industry

in or near a city or town might be equally beneficial to the

growth and development of the city.

A city clearly has authority to serve users beyond

its limits under Article 1108, Vernon's Civil Statutes, Section

3, reading as follows:

-5534-

Mr. James H. Harwell, page 5, (M-1136)

"any townor city in this State which has or

may be chartered or organized under the general

laws of Texas, or by special Act or charter, and

which owns or operates waterworks, sewers, gas or

electric lights, shall have the power and right:

I#

. . . .

"3 . To extend the lines of such systems out-

side the limits of such towns or cities and to sell

water, sewer, gas, and electric light and power

privileges or service to any person or corporation

outside of the limits of such towns or cities, or

permit them to connect therewith under contract as

may appear to be for the best interest of such town

or city; provided that no electric lines shall, for

the purposes stated in this section, be extended

into the corporate limits of another incorporated

town or city."

In the 1966 Supreme Court case, City of Big Snrins v.

Board of Control, supra, the Court expressly approved of Article

1108 in the following language:

"Art. 1108, Section 3, Vernon's Texas Civil

Statutes expressly confers the power upon a city

such as Big Spring to enter.into the contract we

have here. The legislative and judicial history

of this Act can leave no doubt as to the intent

of the Legislature in the passage of this Act. . . .I'

(at p. 812).

We are of the opinion that in view of the legislative

and judicial history of Article 1108, a city may extend its

utility lines beyond the city limits.'

1 City of Sweetwater v. Hamner, 259 S.W. 191 (Tex.Civ.App. 1924,

error dism.), holding Article III, Section 52, and Article XI,

Section 3, Texas Constitution, forbids such extension of the

City's utility lines, is no longer the law in view of the Big

Spring case, supra; and see also City of Texarkana v. Wiqqins,

151 Tex. 100, 246 S.W.2d 622, 627 (1952).

-5535-

Mr. James H. Harwell, page 6, (M-1136)

We do not regard Article 1108, Section 3, and the Biq

Sprinq and Texarkana decisions as being in conflict with Article

970a, the Municipal Annexation Act enacted in 1963. Article 970a

pertains only to the general territorial jurisdictions of cities,

overlapping jurisdictions, and annexations. The right of a city

to serve others with extension of utility services beyond the

city limits is not expressly dealt with in the Municipal Annexa-

tion Act but is expressly authorized in Section 3 of Article 1108.

With reference to your second inquiry, you also request

that we name the types of expenditures, other than purchase of

advertising, if any.' that fall under the legal definition of

"promotion" as used in Article lOlSj-1. We cannot do so, because

that is entirely too broad a question, and would require our

dealing in speculative hypothetical problems. Each proposal

must be considered on its own merits as the problem arises.

SUMMARY

_--__--

As a general rule, a.city's general fund budget

generally governs the expenditures of all income

which is not by charter, ordinance, statute, con-

tract or bond indenture committed to paying designated

portions of the city's debts or expenses.

Under Article 1108, V.C.S., any town or city in

this State which has or may be chartered as authorized

under the general laws of Texas, or by special Act or

charter, and which owns or operates waterworks, sewers,

gas or electric lights, shall have the power and right

to extend the lines of such systems outside of the

limits or such towns or cities.

truly yours,

General of Texas

-5536-

.

1

.

Mr. James H. Harwell, page 7, (M-1136)

Prepared by James S. Swearingen

Assistant Attorney General

APPROVED:

OPINION COMMITTEE

Kerns Taylor, Chairman

W. E. Allen, Co-Chairman

John Banks

James Quick

Lewis Jones

Mel Corley

SAMUEL D. MCDANIEL

Staff Legal Assistant

ALFREDWALKER

Executive Assistant

NOLA WHITE

First Assistant

-5537-

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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