Opinion

Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

Court
Texas Attorney General Reports
Filed
Jul 2, 1972
Status
Published
On the bench
Crawford Martin
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 3.5%

The opinion

July 21, 1972

Hon. Cecil M. Pruett Opinion No. M- 1174

Hutchinson County Attorney

630 North Deahl Street Re: Whether a county judge

Borger, Texas 79007 who signs a driver's

license application

for a minor under

eighteen years of age

thereby assumes per-

sonal liability for

any subsequent negli-

gence or misconduct of

such minor in operating

a motor vehicle, pursuant

to Subsection (b) of

Section 7 of Article

6687b, Vernon's Civil

Statutes, and related

Dear Mr. Pruett: question

Your recent letter requesting the opinion of this

office concerning the referenced matter states, in part, as

follows:

"Our County Judge has requested that we ask

for an opinion as to his personal liability in

the event he signs an application for driver's

license submitted to him by a minor under 18

years of age.

,I

. . . .

"Question No. 1

-5731-

I .

Hon. Cecil M. Pruett, page 2, (M-1174)

"In the event the County Judge signs the

application of a minor under the age of 18 years

and over the age of 16 years for a driver's

license, as provided in Article 6687b, Section

7(b), does the County Judge and/or his bondsman

become personally liable for any subsequent

negligence or wilful misconduct of such minor

in operating a motor vehicle?

"Question No. 2

"(a) IS it necessary that the father,

mother, guardian, employer or County Judge

sign the application of a minor not less than

15 years of age for a driver's license under

Article 668733, Section 12(d)?

"(b) In the event the County Judge signs

such application, does he and/or his bondsman

become personally liable for the subsequent

negligence or wilful misconduct of such minor

in operating a motor vehicle?"

Subsection (b) of Section 7 of Article 668713, Vernon's

Civil Statutes, as amended, provides:

"(b) The Department (of Public Safety) shall

not grant the application of any minor under the

ace of eiqhteen (18) years for an operator's,

commercial operator's, chauffeur's license unless

such application is signed by the father of the

applicant, if the father is living and has the

custody of the applicant, othertiise by the mother

or guardian having the custody of such minor, or

in the event a minor under the age of eighteen

(18) years has no father, mother, or guardian.

the license shall not be issued to the minor un-

less his application therefor is signed by his

employer or by the county judge of his residence."

(emphasis added.)

-5732-

Hon. Cecil M. Pruett, page 3, (M-1174)

Section 8 of Article 668713 provides that:

"Any person who has signed the application of

a minor for a license may thereafter file with the

Department a request that the license of said minor

so granted be cancelled, which request shall be in

writing and acknowledged before some officer author-

ized to administer oaths. Thereupon the Department

shall cancel the license of said minor and the per-

son who signed the application of such minor shall

be relieved from anv liabilitv bv reason of havinq

siqned such application on account of any subsequent

neqliqence or wilful misconduct of such minor in

operatinq a motor vehicle." (emphasis added.)

The general rule of law applicable to your first ques-

tion has been stated as follows:

"It is the general rule that where a judge has

jurisdiction he is not civilly liable for acts done

in the exercise of his judicial function. A judicial

officer cannot be called to account in a civil action

for his determination and acts in his judicial capa-

city and within his jurisdiction, however erroneous.

For a mere error of judgment in the ~execution of his

office, no action can be maintained against a judge

of any court, and he should not be mulcted in costs

or other forms of damages because of judgments ren-

dered by him. This principle may be said to be as

old as the beginning of)the English common law. It

rests upon considerations of public policy, its

purpose being to preserve the integrity and inde-

pendence of the judiciary, and to insure that judges

will act on their own free, unbiased convictions,

uninfluenced by any apprehensions of consequences.

Indeed, it is said that on considerations of public

policy all judicial officers are absolutely privileged

in what they speak, write, or do in the performance of

their judicial acts, at least where such statements

-5733-

.

Hon. Cecil M. Pruett, page 4. (M-1174)

or acts are relevant and pertinent to the matter

before them. Such acts are judicial acts and

cannot form the basis for money damages. The

underlying reason for this rule of privilege is

not the judicial character of the officer but

the judicial character of the act: it is the

public necessity that public agents engaged in

the performance of a public duty under compulsion

of law should not suffer personally in performing

a judicial act for an error of judgment which the

wisest and most circumspect cannot avoid. The

rule of immunity does not extend to acts of a

judge which are ministerial rather than judicial

in character." 46 Am.Jur.2d 141-43, Judges,

Sec. 72.

The foregoing rule of immunity is followed in Texas.

See, e.g., 33 Tex.Jur.2d 381-83, Judges, Sec. 21; Krueqel v.

Murphy, 126 S.W. 343, 345 (Tex.Civ.App. 1910, error ref.);

Jarnagin v. Garrett, 69 S.W.2d 511, 514 (Tex.Civ.App. 1934,

error ref.): Welch v. Kent; 153 S.W.2d 284 (Tex.Civ.App. 1941,

no writ); Penninqton v. State, 332 S.W.Zd 569, 570 (Tex.Crim.

1960): and Turner v. Pruitt, 161 Tex. 532, 342 S.W.2d 422 (1961).

Thus, notwithstanding the broad language of Section

8 of Article 6687b, which conceivably could bring county judges

within its purview and thus render them liable for a minor's

driving negligence, we are of the opinion that the language

must be read in conjunction with the common law rule of judicial

immunity set forth hereinabove.

The further question to be resolved in connection with

your first question is: Is a county judge's signing of a minor's

application for a driver's license, pursuant to Section 7 of

Article 668713, a judicial or a ministerial act? Clearly, if

the signing is but a ministerial act, the rule of judicial

immunity would not apply.

-5734-

Hon. Cecil M. Pruett, page 5, (M-1174)

A ministerial act has been defined as follows:

I,

. . . The distinction between ministerial,

and judicial and other official acts, seems to

be, that where the law prescribes and defines

the duty to be performed, with such precision

and certainty as to leave nothing to the exer-

cise of discretion, or judgment, the act is

ministerial: but where the act to be done in-

volves the exercise of discretion or judgment

in determining whether the duty exists, it is

not to be deemed merely ministerial." Commis-

sioner of General Land Office v. Smith, 5 Tex.

471, 479 (1849).

We are of the opinion that Section 7 of Article 6687b,

quoted supra, does not place a ministerial duty on a county

judges to sign a minor's application for a driver's license,

any more than it places such a duty on any of the other parties

named in that Section. The law is clear that a minor becomes

entitled to apply for a driver's license, solely in his own

right, when he attains the age of eighteen years. To qualify

for a driver's license under the age of eighteen, he must not

only have completed an approved driver training course (Sub-

section (a) of Section 7), but must also have the consent of

his parent or guardian. The parent or guardian may or may not

give his consent for various reasons, such as the under-eighteen

minor's maturity, stability, sense of discipline and responsi-

bility, or his lack of such qualities.

The county judge can sign the application for the

minor only when he has no father, mother, or guardian. Thus,

the county judge is placed in a position of in loco parentis

to the minor, and is vested with the absent parent-guardian's

sense of discretion as to whether the minor should be granted

a driver's license.

-5735-

.

Hon. Cecil M. Pruett, page 6, (M-1174)

Inasmuch as Section 7 of Article 668713 imposes no

mandatory ministerial duty on a county judge to sign an under-

eighteen minor's application for a driver's license, we hold

that the county judge is performing a discretionary judicial

function incident to his office, and prescribed by statute.

In this capacity, and in view of the foregoing authorities,

you are advised that in our opinion neither a county judge nor

his bondsman becomes personally liable for any subsequent

negligence or wilful misconduct of an under-eighteen minor

whose driver's license application such county judge has signed.

Therefore, your first question is answered in the

negative.

Your second question, in essence, is: Does Subsec-

tion (b) of Section 7 of Article 6687b require the signatures

of parents, guardians, employers, and county judges only on

the applications of those under-eighteen minors between the

ages of sixteen to eighteen years, or does it also require the

signatures of those persons on the applications of minors aged

fifteen years?

Section 7 falls under the heading "Application of

minors". As has heretofore been made evident, Subsection (b)

sets forth the parties who must sign the application. However,

Subsection (a) of Section 7 refers only to minors between the

ages of sixteen to eighteen years.

Sections 4 and 12(d) of Article 668713 provide three

criteria whereby driver's licenses may also be issued to minors

fifteen years of age in certain hardship situations. However,

nowhere in these Sections is there a requirement that any of

the foregoing persons must also approve the application of a

fifteen year old minor.

It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that

"In order to arrive at a proper construction

of a statute, and determine the exact legislative

intent, all acts and parts of acts in pari materia

-5736-

. .

Hon. Cecil M. Pruett. Page 7, (M-1174)

will, therefore, be taken, read, and construed

together, each enactment in reference to the

other, as though they were parts of one and the

same law. Any conflict between their provisions

will be harmonized, if possible, and effect will

be given to all the provisions of each act if

they can be made to stand together and have

concurrent efficacy.

II

. The rule proceeds on the supposition

. .

that several statutes relating to one subject

are governed by one spirit and policy, and are

intended to be consistent and harmonious in their

several parts and provisions." 53 Tex.Jur.2d

282-84, Statutes, Sec. 186.

Statutes must also be construed in a reasonable manner,

so that an absurd result will be avoided. g., at pp. 187-89,

Sec. 126.

While it is true that Subsection (b) of Section 7 is

under the heading of "Application of minors", is part of the

same Section 7 of which Subsection (a) relates only to minors

between the ages of sixteen to eighteen, and while it is also

true that neither Sections 4 nor 12(d), relating to minors aged

fifteen, require the signatures of any adult person, it is

nonetheless also a fact that Subsection (b) of Section 7 expli-

citly states that "The Department shall not grant the application

of any minor under the ace of eishteen (18) vears"(emphasis

added) for a driver's license until the signatures of the

enumerated persons have also been obtained.

Viewed in light of the foregoing rules of construction,

we think that Subsection (b) of Section 7 can reasonably be read

in conjunction with Sections 4 and 12(d), relating to fifteen

year old minors, and that the requirements of that Subsection

apply to fifteen year old minors, as well as those sixteen to

eighteen. To hold otherwise would be to allow fifteen year old

minors to apply, solely in their own right, for a driver's

license, and deny this privilege to their older minor peers.

-5737-

. .

Hon. Cecil M. Pruett, page 8, (M-1174)

We cannot believe the Legislature intended such an unreasonable,

absurd and illogical differentiation. We must give the statute

rational, reasonable, and sensible construction. 53 Tex.Jur.2d

187, Statutes, Sec. 126.

You are therefore advised that it is necessary for a

father, mother, guardian, employer, or county judge to sign

the application for a driver's license of a minor fifteen years

of age, in addition to the other requirements set forth in

Section 12(d). Your question 2(a) is thus answered in the

affirmative.

We are of the opinion that our answer to your first

question sufficiently answers your question 2(b), and you are

advised that your question 2(b) is answered in the negative.

SUMMARY

-------

(1) The doctrine of judicial immunity from

civil liability resulting from acts performed by

judges in their discretionary judicial capacity

is recognized in the State of Texas, and will be

applied unless a judge acts solely in a minis-

terial capacity.

(2) Pursuant to Subsection (b) of Section

7 of Article 668733, Vernon's Civil Statutes,

neither a county judge nor his bondsman is liable

for any subsequent negligence or wilful miscon-

duct of the operation of a motor vehicle by any

minor under the age of eighteen years if they

have signed the minor's application for a driv-

er's license.

(3) The act of signing an under-eighteen

minor's application for a'driver's license is a

discretionary judicial function of a county judge,

and is not a ministerial act.

-5738-

. .

Hon. Cecil M. Pruett, page 9, (M-1174)

(4) Fifteen year old minors applying for a

driver's license pursuant to Subsection (d) of

Section 12 of Article 6687b must also have the

signature of one of the persons enumerated in

Subsection (b) of Section 7 when they apply for

a driver's license.

Vejq truly yours,

CRAWBjbRD C. MARTIN

Att ney General of Texas

Prepared by Austin C. Bray, Jr.

Assistant Attorney General

APPROVED:

OPINION COMMITTEE

Kerns Taylor, Chairman

W. E. Allen, Co-Chairman

Bob Gauss

Roger Tyler

Sally Phillips

John P. Traylor

SAMUEL D. MCDANIEL

Staff Legal Assistant

ALFRED WALKER

Executive Assistant

NOLA WHITE

First Assistant

-5739-

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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