Opinion

Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

Court
Texas Attorney General Reports
Filed
Jul 2, 1983
Status
Published
On the bench
Jim Mattox
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 3.5%

The opinion

The Attorney General of Texas

March 11, 1983

JIM MATTOX

Attorney General

Mr. C. A. Wilkins opinion No. JM-9

Supreme Court Building Executive Director, TX. Aeronautics Corm.

P. 0. Box 12546 P. 0. Box 12607, Capitol Station Re: Loan8 to cities and

Austin. Tx. 78711.2548 Austin, Texas 78711 counties by the Texas

5121475.2501

Aeronautics Commission

Telex 9101a74.1367

Tekcopier 5121475-0266

Dear Mr. Wilkins:

,607 Main ?.I.. Suite 1400 You have asked whether the Texas Aeronautics Commission is

oa,,as, TX. 75201.4709

prohibited by the Texas Constitution from making loans to cities and

-2141742.8944

counties for airport construction and development without requiring

them to provide a revenue source for the payment of interest and the

4624 Alberta Ave.. Suite 160 creation of a sinking fund to retire the debt.

E, Paso. TX. 79905-2793

9~51533.3484

Article 46c-6. subdivision 10, V.T.C.S.. as amended in 1981,

P authorizes the commission to provide funds “through loan agreements or

0 Dallas Ave.. Suite 202 grant contracts” to any governmental entity in the state “for the

tious!on. TX. 77002-6986 establishment, construction, reconstruction, enlargement or repair of

7 131650-0666 airstrips. or air navigational facilities.”

airports, In Attorney

General Opinion H-416 (1974). this office concluded that subdivision

806 Broadway. Swte 312 10 of the statute, as it then read, was not violative of the

Lubbock. TX, 79401-3479 constitutional prohibitions against loans and grants of public funds

W,6,747-5236 for improper purposes. The opinion did not address the constitutional

authority of a municipality to assume debt, however.

4309 N. Tenth, Suite B

M~AII~~. TX. 78501-1685 Two provisions of the Texas Constitution speak to the assumption

‘512I682-4547 of debt by cities and counties. Section 5 of article 11 declares that

“no debt shall ever be created by any city, unless at the same time

provision be made to assess and collect annually a sufficient sum to

200 Main Plaza. Suite 400

pay the. interest thereon and creating a sinking fund of. at least two

San Anlonio. TX. 782052797

5121225-4191

percent thereon.” Section 7 of article 11, as amended in 1973, reads

in part:

An EaualOpporlunilyl [N]o debt for any purpose shall ever be incurred

Aflirmative Action Employer

in any manner by any city or county unless

provision is made, at the time of creating the

same, for levying and collecting a sufficient tax

to pay the interest thereon and provide at least

two percent (2%) as a sinking fund; . . .

-.

p. 36

Mr. C. A. Wilkins - Page 2 (JM-9)

The Texas Supreme Court has defined the term “debt” used in the

foregoing provisions as “any pecuniary obligation imposed by contract.

except such as were, at the date of the contract, within the lawful

and reasonable contemplation of the parties, to be satisfied out of

current revenues for the year, or out of some fund then within the

immediate control of the corporation.” Neil1 v. City of Waco, 33

S.W.322. 324 (Tex. 1895); Stevenson v. Blake, 113 S.W.2d 525. 527

(Tex. 1938). See also Brown v. J efferson County, 406 S.W.2d 185, 188

(Tex. 1966); City DfWichita Falls v. Kemp Public Library Board of

Trustees, 593 S.W.21i 834 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1980, writ ref’d

n.r.e.). A loan agreement or “contract grant” which obligates a city

or county upon some contingency or at a time certain to repay the

amount of the loan or grant, or to undertake some other monetary

obligation. is a “debt” within the constitutional meaning if the

obligation is not to be satisfied out of current revenues or a fund

currently within the control of the governmental unit.

The Commission of Appeals noted in Andrus v. Crystal City, 265

S.W.550 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1924). that no purchase authorized by a

statute could be valid which violated these express provisions of the

constitution. Id. at 522. The court concluded, however. that the

statute at issue there contemplated compliance with, rather than

violation of, sections 5 and 7 of article 11. & See also Wheeler

?

v. city of Brownsville, 220 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. 1949). We reach a

similar conclusion here. Subsection (a) of subdivision 10. article

46c-6. V.T.C.S., expressly requires that any funds provided by the

commission “must be expended by the governmental entity . . . in

conformity with the laws of this state.” In our opinion, the instant

legislation contemplates that the commission will not make loans or

grants to cities or counties that would create debts in the

constitutional sense. Agreements to do so would be void, in any

event. See T. & N.O.R.R. Company v. Galveston County, 169 S.W.2d 713

(Tex. 19m; Andrus V. Crystal City, supra.

We advise that the Texas Aeronautics Commission is without

authority to make loans or grants to cities or counties that have not

complied with sections 5 and 7 of article 11 of the Texas

Constitution, if applicable.

In anticipation of the answer given to your first question. you

have also asked how the commission should comply with its statutory

responsibility to make loans.

First, we note that article 46c-6. subdivision 10, V.T.C.S.. is

not a legislative mandate that the commission make loans. Subdivision

10, subsection (a), declares that the commission “may provide funds,

through loan agreements or grant contracts, appropriated to it for

that purpose by the Legislature.” Subsection (f) of subdivision 10

?

does say that “[lloans shall be made in lieu of grants whenever

p. 37

Mr. C. A. Wilkins - Page 3 (JM-9)

~,~ :

feasible . . .", but it stops far short of issuing an imperative that

the commission make loans to cities and counties.

Assuming -- without deciding -- that there are no other

constitutional impediments, there is nothing to prevent cities and

counties from complying with the "debt" provisions in order to obtain

loans or grants from the commission. ice, e.g., City of Dayton v.

Allred, 68 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. 1934); City of Ingleside v. Stewart, 554

S.W.2d 939, 946 (Tex. Civ. App. - Corpus Christi 1977. writ ref'd

n.r.e.); City of Nederland v. Callihan, 299 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Clv. App.

- Beaumont 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

SUMMARY

The Texas Aeronautics Conrmission is without

authority to make loans or grants to cities or

bounties that have not complied with sections 5

and 7 of article 11 of the Texas Constitution, If

applicable.

JIM MATTOX

Attorney General of Texas

TOM GREEN

First Assistant Attorney General

DAVID R. RICHARDS

Executive Assistant Attorney General

Prepared by Bruce Youngblood

Assistant Attorney General

APPROVED:

OPINION COMMITTEE

Susan L. Garrison, Chairman

Jon Bible

Rick Gilpin

Jim Moellinger

Bruce Youngblood

p. 38

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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