Opinion

Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

Court
Texas Attorney General Reports
Filed
Jul 2, 1983
Status
Published
On the bench
Jim Mattox
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 3.5%

The opinion

The Attorney General of Texas

December 30, 1983

JIM MAllOX

Attorney General

Eouorablc Reynaldo S. Cantu Opinion No. JM-123

Criminal District Attorney

Cameron County Re: Play Cameron County enforce

Rail of Justice building regulations enacted to

974 E. Xarrison Street restrict developwnt in flood-

Brovusville, Texas 70520 prone areas by prohibiting

provisions of utility service

714 Jackeon. Suile 700

to mu-complying atructurae

,Dallar. TX. 75202-4506

2w742-Sv44

Dear Mr. Cantu:

You have requested an Attorney General Opinion on a question

arising from the following facts:

Since the passage of Cameron County’s building

regulations in 1971, the county has been denying

building permits to those individuals vhose

subdivisions and lots do not meet, tbe regulations

established by the county under federal and state

-

SW Broadway. malt. 312

enablrng regialation through the Eederal ,Plood

Lubbock. TX. 704013479 Insurance Program. Various utilities -have ,been

Sow747-52Ss .,(’ ,cooperating with the county In slso not providing

I;;~ :

service ‘,~to those households which have .,~not

receIved~bullding permits from the county.

4202 N. TwUh, Sult.8

McAllen. TX. 7Sm~~. .' : Recently;‘houever.‘questions have arisen ae to

512MS2.4S47 ,‘.’ ”

whether or not the utilities can deny service to a

‘household just because~the county has not giveu it

200 MaIn PIaz& Suulte4w .:_

San Antonlo, TX. 7820527s7

‘a building permit. Our discussions vith the

512/2254191 utilities have not resolved this issue. and we

have agreed to seek an Attorney General’s Opinion

as to whether,or not Cameron County can prevent a

An Equal Opwftunltyl utility from providing service to an individual

Afllrmatlre Actlon EmpIoyar

who has been denied a building permit for failure

to comply with the county's building regulations.

We will first consider whether the utilities may voluntarily deny

service under the facts given.

P

Article 144612, section 58(a), V.T.C.S.. the Public Utility

Regulatory Act, provides that

p. 519

Ronorable Reynaldo S. Cantu - Page 2 (~~-123)

[t]he holder of any certificate of public

convenience and ueceeeity shall serve every

consumer within its certlflcdrea and shall

render continuous and adequate service within the

area. (Emphasis added).

Certificates of convenience and necessity are issued to public

utilities pursuaot to sections 49-62 of the Public Utility Regulatory

Act. The public utilities in question provide, for example,

electricity, water, sewage disposal and natural gas. V.T.C.S. art.

1446~. $3(c). Unless the commission issues a certificate that the

convenience and necessity mill not be adversely affected, the holder

of a certificate shall not discontinue service except for:

(1) non-payment of charges;

co nonuee; or

(3) other similar reasons in the usual course of

business

V.T.C.S. art. 1446~. 158(b). Any discontinuance of service must be

subject to conditions prescribed by the commission. Id. ‘?

The commission has promulgated a rule permitting any utility to

decline to serve an applicant until he has complied vith the state and

municipal regulations. Rule 052.02.04.043(a) codified at 16 T.A.C.

123.33. Ewaver, municipality is defined as a “city, incorporated

- village orYi%m;“. .” -2 d -‘-- i@ude a county. Rule

052.01.00.012 codified at “F6 T.::. yil.2. The commission’e rule

052.02.04.043(a) also permits the utility to decline service to an

applicant who has not complied with the utility’s approved rules and

regulations filed with the coam~ission or an spplicant whose equipment

is hazfrdous or of such character that satisfactory service cannot be

given. Thus. the utility may voluntarily deny service to au

applicant. for the reasons set out in the co=ission rule. If the

Cameron County regulations guard against the same conditions expressed

in the utility’s approved regulations on file with the cotmniesion or

if they prohibit utility hook-ups to applicants with equipment

hazardous or unsatisfactory because of the danger of-being located in

a flood prone area, the utility may voluntarily comply with them.

1. Cameron County might approach the PUC about amending its rule

to include the county. ?

2. The utility could seek an amendment to its regulations to

deny service to buildings which lack permits required by local law.

. .

Honorable Reynaldo S. Csntu - Page 3 (JM-123)

If the utility cannot voluntarily refuse service to an individual

who has been denied a building permit for failure to comply with

county building regulations promulgsted pursuant to article lS81e-1,

V.T.C.S., and sections 16.311 through 16.319 of the Texas Water Code,

you wish to know vhether Cameron County may prevent the utilities from

providing such service.

The Public Utility Commisalon has general power to regulate

public utilities and to make rules reasonably required In the exercise

of this power. V.T.C.S. art. 1446~. 116. Section 17(e) of the act

vests in the coxw~ission exclusive jurisdiction over “electric, water,

and sewer utility rates. operations and services not within the

incorporsted limits of a municipality exercising exclusive original

jurisdiction . . . .” Section 18 of the act vests similar

jurisdiction in the commission over telecommunications utilities in

all areas of the state. This latter jurisdictional grant has been

construed broadly to include “the entire field of legislative

regulatfon of public utilities.” Southwestern Bell Telephone Company

v. City of Kountre. 543 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1976, no

writ). See also V.T.C.S. art. 1446~. 135.

Counties have only those powers and duties expressly granted or

necessarily implied from statutory and constitutional provisions.

Canales v. Laughlin, 214 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. 1948); Anderson v. Wood, 152

S.W.Zd 1084 (Tex. 1941); Attorney General Opinion R-374 (1974). The

commissioners court does not have general police powers.

_.- Commissioners’ Court v. Kaiu S.W.2& 840 (Tei. Civ. pp. -

Galveston T929, writYef’d)Z

Article 1581e-1. section 4. V.T.C.S.. authorizes counties

bordering on the Gulf of Mexico or the tidewater limits thereof

to enact and enforce regulations vhich regulate,

restrict, or control the management and use of

land, structures, and other development in flood,

or rising water prone, areas in such a manner as

to reduce the danger of. damage.caused by flood

losses. This power and authority may include, but

shall not be limited to, requirements for

flood-proofing of structures which are permitted

to remain in, or be constructed in. flood or

rising water prone. areas; regulations concerning

minimum elevation of any structure permitted to be

erected in, or improved in. such areas;

specifications for drainage; and any other action

which is feasible to minfmiie flooding and rising

P water damage.

p. 521

Honorable Reynaldo S. Cantu - Page 4 (Jli-123)

Article 15Sle-1, V.T.C.S., wss enacted in 1969 to enable coastal

counties to qualify for participation in the Nations1 Flood Insurance

Program. Acts 1969. 61et Leg., ch. 720, I1 at 2107; Attorney General

Opinion E-1024 (1977).

Sections 16.311 through 16.319 of the Water Code authorize a

number of polltical subdivisions including any county “to take all

necessary and reasonable actions to comply with the requirements and

criteria of the National Flood Insurance Program.” Specific powers

include, but are not limited to, the following:

(1) making appropriate land use adjustments to

constrict the development of land vhich is exposed

to flood damage and minimire damage caused by

flood losses;

(2) guiding the development of proposed future

construction. vhere practicable, away from

location which Is threatened by flood hazards;

(3) assisting in minimizing damage caused by

floods;

. . . .

(5) engaging in floodplain management and

adopting enforcing permanent land use and .control.~ __ _

measures consistent with the criteria established

under the National Flood Insurance Act;

(6) declaring property, when such is the case,

to be in violation of local laws, regulations, or

ordinances vhich are intended to discourage or

otherwise restrict land development or occupancy

in flood-prone areas and notifying the secretary,

or whomever he designates, of such property;

. . . .

(12) eatlsfying criteria adopted and

promulgated by the department pursuant to the

National Flood Insurance Program; and

(13) adopting permanent land use and control

measures with enforcement provisions which are

consistent with the criteria for land management

and use adopted by the secretary . . . .

Water Code 116.315.

p. 522

Ronorable Reynaldo S. Cantu - Page 5 (JR-123)

Article 1581e-1, V.T.C.S.. and sections 16.311 through 16.319 of

the Water Code must be construed in conformity vith their purpose --

that is. enabling counties and various other political subdivisions to

qualify for participation in the National Flood Insurance Program.

See Texas Liquor Control Board v. Falstaff Distributing Company. 369

E2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston 1963. no writ). See also Code

Construction Act. V.T.C.S.. art. 5429b-2. 13.03(l) (in construinn a

statute, a court-may consider the object bo,ght~;o.b,~attained). &The

language and the purpose of these statutes do not require us to

conclude that counties have been given land regulation powers broader

than those necessary and reasonable to qualify for the National Flood

Insurance Program. Attorney General R-978 (1977). in considering

whether counties could enforce requirements in excess of the minimum

necessary to qualify for insurance under the federal program, stated

as follows:

the authorization of . . . [the predecessor of

section 16.3151 clearly is not an unconditional

grant of authority for political subdivisions to

enact land use regulations not otherwise

sanctioned by law. The regulations so enacted

must have as their purpose and effect compliance

with the requirements and criteria promulgated

pursuant to the National Flood Insurance Program.

The Public Utility Regulatory Act was enacted in 1975. subsequent to

article 1581e-1, V.T.Cu Acts 1975. 64th Leg., ch. 721 at 2327.

Thus, even if article 1581e-1. V.T.C.S., could be construed to

impliedly authorize counties to deny utili~ty hook-ups to consumers as

a means of enforcing land use regulations, that power would have been

repealed by the enactment of the Public Utility Regulatory Act. See

V.T.C.S. art. 1446~. 1f16. 17(e), 18. 35. 58; see also & 190

(express repqal of conflicting laws).

The denial of utility connections to non-complying construction

in a flood plain might be a means of "minimizing damage caused by

floods." Water Code 516;315(3). Hovever , we do not believe this

general authorization evinces a legislative intent to repeal

provisions of the Public Utility Regulatory Act requiring regulated

utilities to serve customers within the certified area or providing

that the Public Utility Commission has exclusive original jurisdiction

in unincorporated areas over telec~unicationr. water, sewer and

electric utilities. The comaiseion, in the exercise of its

Nle-making power, may define the limitations on a utility's duty to

serve every customer in its area. Neither article 1581e-1 nor section

16.315 of the Water Code authorize a county to do so. We conclude

that a county may not require a utility to deny service to an

individual or entity not in compliance with county flood control

ordinances or regulations.

p. 523

Honorable Reynaldo S. Cantu - Page 6 (JM-123)

SUMMARY

The Public Utility Realatory Act, article

1446~. V.T.C.S., and present regulations

promulgated thereunder, prevent Cameron County

from requiring utilities to deny service to

individuals or entities not in compliance with

county flood regulations.

b

Very trul yours.

*i&n /VW

cl

Attorney General of Texas

Tot4 GREEN

First Assistant Attorney General

DAVID R. RICSARDS

Executive Assistant Attorney General

Prepared by Susan L. Garrison

Assistant Attorney General

PROVED: _.__

COMMITEE

Rick Gilpin. Chairman

Jon Bible

Susan Garrison

Jim Floellinger

Fernando Rodriquez

Nancy Sutton

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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