Opinion

Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

Court
Texas Attorney General Reports
Filed
Jul 2, 1986
Status
Published
On the bench
Jim Mattox
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 3.5%

The opinion

The Attorney General of Texas

JIM MAlTOX , llarch24, 1986

AttorneyGeneral

Supreme Cowl Building Mr. James Ken Newman Opinion No. ~~-457

P. 0. BOX 12548

Chairman

Austin. TX. 78711. 2548

5121475-2501

Texas State Board of Registration Re: Validity of proposed dis-

Telex 91olB74.1387 for Professioni: Engineers ciplinary rule of the Board of

Telecopier 512I475-0266 P. 0. Drawer 1832') Registration for Professional

Austin, Texas 7:3760 Engineers

714 Jackson. Suite 700

Dallas. TX. 75202-4506 Dear Mr. Newman:

214il428944

You wish to !mow whether a proposed amendment to the Board of

Registration for Professional Engineers Rule 131.151, revising

4B24 Alberta Ave.. Suite 180

El Paso, TX. 799052793

Disciplinary Rule 5.4, is within the authority of the board to

9154533.3484 promulgate. We conclude that it is not.

Disciplinary :Rule5.4 presently reads as follows:

1001 Texas, Suite 700

Houston, TX. 77002-3111

(iv) DR 5.4.. It shall be a violation of the

713/223-5888

Texas Engineering Practice Act for a registrant to

submit or request a competitive bid to perform

806 Broadway, Suite 312 engineering services for any state agency, poli-

Lubbock. TX. 79401.3479 tical stibdivision,county, municipality, district,

806/747-5238 authority, or publicly owned utility of the State

of Texas, or for any agency of dther entity of the

4309 N. Tenth. Suite B federal government, when the procurement of such

McAllan, TX. 78501-1685 professional services is in violation of the

5121882.4547 state's Professional Services Procurement -Act or

the Federal Property and Administrative Services

200 Main Plaza. Suite 400

Act of 1949, as amended, respectively.

San Antonio. TX. 78205-2797

51212254191 (I) For purposes of this disciplinary rule,

the board has adopted the Supreme Court of Texas'

definition of competitive bidding, which in part

An Equal Opportunity/

Affirmative Action Employer

is as follows:

Compe,titive bidding . . . contemplates a

bidiiing on the same undertaking upon each of

the same material items covered by the con-

tract.;upon the same thing. It requires that

all bidders be placed upon the same plane of

equality and that they each bid upon the same

terns and conditions involved in all the items

and parts of the contract, and that the

p. 2082

Mr. James Ken Nwman - Pa& 2 (J&457)'* )

proposal specify as to all bids the same, or

substantially s.imilarspecifications.

(Texas Eighway C~~wission v. Texas Association of

Steel Importers: Inc., 372 S.W.2D 525, Texas

1963); however, *

(II) the engineer shall not be considered in

violation of the Act in cases where his

engineering serr:lces may legally be offered,

furnished, or plxformed as an integral part of

research and development programs, construction

projects, manuflxtured products, processes, or

devices, which are to be offered, performed,

supplied, or obts:Lnedon the basis of competitive

bids.

The proposed amendment reads as follows:

(iv) DR 5.4. As public policy, competitive

bidding for professional engineering services for

public works is ,prohibited by state and federal

law, and particip~ationin such bidding activities

by any engineer registered in this state shall be

considered a.vi~~:lationof the Texas Engineering

Practice Act.

I. Where there is a competitive situation in

the procurement of professional engineering

services by aqy state agency. political sub-

division, coulty, municipality, district,

authority, or publicly owned utility of the State

of Texas, or by any agency or other entity of the

federal govermect, all registered engineers

involved will sseure that such professional

contracts are awarded in conformance with the

.approprlate procurement laws; that selection of

the best engineer for the contract is sought and

made on the bas.ls of demonstrated competence and

overall qualifications, subject to negotiation of

a fair and reescoable fee; that only after selec-

tion by the pub:.icagency on the basis of demon-

strated compete& and overall qualifications will

the engineer pr&de proposed or estimnted costs

for that project-and enter into negotiations with

the public agene; concerning a fair and reasonable

fee for the eng$eering services to be rendered;

and that if an zpeement cannot be reached on the

amount of a fair and reasonable fee, the engineer

shall terminate-negotiations and withdraw from

consideration, ;Ild the next best engineer max

p. 2083

Mr. James Ken Newman - Page :3 (JM-457)

iwarded. (Emphasis added).

Essentially the proposed amendment to Disciplinary Rule 5.4 would

require a bifurcated process whenever a professional engineer is to be

selected to work on a publLc project. The first stage of the process

involves selection of an er.gineerby the public agency on the.basis of

"demonstrated skill and overall qualifications"; only after selection

may the engineer provide ir.formationas to proposed or estimated costs

and then enter into negotlr.tionswith the public agency.

The process set forth in the proposed amendment substantially

tracks the process set f#orth in the federal statutes governing

selection by federal agemies of architects and engineers. See 40

U.S.C. 55541 et seq. IO 1:h.e first stage of the federal processeach

agency head requests data from architectural and engineering firms

and, for each proposed pro:e:ct,evaluates such data, together with any

such information submitted by other firms. After discussions with no

less than three firms, ani, on the basis of established and published

criteria, the agency selecta no less than three firms deemed to be the

most highly qualified to provide the services required. In the second

stage of the process, the agency head then enters into negotiation

with the firm selected a3 the most qualified. If the agency head

cannot negotiate a satisfactory contract with the first firm selected,

he shall enter into negotj.ationswith the second firm chosen, and so

on with the third.

Generally, the power:3 of an administrative agency are derived

entirely from legislative enactment. Corzelius v. Railroad Commis-

sion, 182 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tax. Civ. App. - Austin 1944, no writ);

broad Commission v. Fact Worth & Denver City Railway Co., 161

S.W.2d 560. 561 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.). An

agency has only such powers as are expressly conferred on it by

statute, Stauffer v. City Iof San Antonio, 344 S.W.2d 158. 160 (Tex.

1961); Railroad Commissior~v. Fort Worth h Denver City Railway Co.,

s, together with those powers necessarily implied from powers and

duties expressly given or imposed. City of Sherman V. Public Utility

Commission~of Texas, 643 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Tex. 1983); Brown v. Humble

Oil & Refining Co., 83 S.W.2d 935, 941 (Tex. 1935). If the statutes

do not grant an agency thtspower fo do a thing, then it has no such

power. Nueces County Water Control and Improvement District v. Texas

Water Rights Commission, 4gl S.W.2d 924, 929 (Tex. Civ. App. -Austin

1972. writ ref'd n.r.e.). You contend that the board is conferred

authority to promulgate. the rule you propose by section 8(b) of

article 3271a. V.T.C.S.. the Texas Engineering Practice Act, which

contains the following in pertinent part: "The [bloard may

p. 2084

Mr. James Ken N-n - Page 4 (m-457) ,

promulgate rules restricting competitive bidding." We conclude for

two reasons that the above sentence confers no such authority.

First, without specif>%ng the contours which eny rule promulgated

by the board to restrict c,ompetitivebidding may take, we conclude

that any rule so promnlgllted cannot reach a situation in which a

political subdivision of the state seeks to procure the profrssional

services of an engineer.

The procedure by which political subdivisions of this state are

governed with respect to l:heprocurement of professional services is

article 664-4, V.T.C.S., which provides the following:

Section 1. Th!isAct shall be known and may be

cited as the 'Irofessioaal Services Procurement

Act.'

Sec. 2. For 'purposes of this Act the term

'professional services' shall mean those within

the scope of the practice of accounting, architec-

ture , optometry, medicine or professional engi-

neering as defined by the laws of the State of

Texas or those performed by any licensed archi-

tect, optometrist, physician, surgeon, certified

public accountant or professional engineer in

connection with his professional employment or

practice.

No state agence, political subdivision,

Sec. 3. --

county, municipality, district, authority or

publicly-owned utility of the State of Texas shall

make any contract for, or engage the profess-

services of.~any-licensed physician, optometrist,

surgeon, archite&, certified public accountsnt z

registered engio&, or any group or association

thereof, selectezx the basis of competitive bids

submitted for su+ contract or for such services

to be performed!-but shall select and award such

contracts and enE:agesuch services on the basis of

demonstrated competence and qualifications for the

type of professIona services to be performed and

at fair and rearznable prices, as long as profes-

sional fees are-consistent with and ndt higher

than the publi&:d recommended practices and fees

of the various ~%pplicable professional associa-.

tions and do nc; exceed the maximum provided by

any state law.

Sec. 4. Any and all such contracts, agreements

or arrangements for professional services nego-

tiated, made or entered into, directly or

p. 2085

Mr. James Ken N-n - Page 5 (JM-457)

indirectly, by any agency or department of the

State of Texas, county, municipality, political

subdivision, district, authority or publicly-owned

utility in any wily in violation of the provisions

of this Act or any part thereof are hereby

declared to be void as contrary to the public

policy of this State and shall not be given effect

or enforced by any Court of this State or by any

of its public of:ficers or employees. (Emphasis

added).

Section 8 of Acts 1971, Sixty-second Legislature, chapter 38. page 73,

the emergency provision of the Act, contains the following language

detailing the public policy considerations prompting the passage of

the Act:

The fact thatf:he selection of certified public

accountants, architects, physicians, optometrists,

surgeons and professional engineers on the basis

of the lowest bitiplaces a premium on incompetence

and is the most l&sly procedure for selecting the

least able or qt;lified and the most incompetent

practitioner fo:; the performance of services

vitally affecting the health, welfare and safety

of the public .uld that; in spite of repeated

expressions of the legislature excepting such

professional serrices from statutes providing for

competitive bii,ding procedures, some public

officers contints to apply competitive bidding

procedures to the selection of such professional

personnel, creates an emergency of the greatest

public importan~x to the health, safety and

welfare of the people of Texas. . . . (Emphasis

added)..

BY whatever phrase the means by which political subdivisions

procure professional serxlces is called, it is manifestly not

..

"competitive bidding." The legislature has unequivocally declared its

intent that political subdivisions of this state not procure profes-

sional services through the process commonly known as "competitive

bidding." Any statute which confers to a licensing agency the

authority to restrict the competitive btdding practices of its

licensees could not reach itsituation in which a political subdivision

seeks the professional se,rvlces of an engineer because political

subdivisions cannot procure professional services by competitive

bidding. Section 8(b) can logically only reach those situations in

which the practice of competitive bidding is not otherwise forbidden

by law or is affirmatively permitted or required; such a rule could

z reach a situation in which competitive bldding is affirmatively

prohibited.

p. 2086

Ur. James Ken Newman - Page 6 m-4571

There is a second, ev~1 mar+ compelling, reason. Even if we were

to assume arguendo that se:lclon8(b) somehow provides authority 'for

the board to promulgate the amendment whfch you propose, we would have

to declare that the rule is in violation of Texas statutory law,

specifically article 664-4, V.T.C.S. The rulemaking power of adminis-

trative agencies does not permit the promulgation of rules which are

inconsistent with the expression of the legislature's intent ic

statutes other than those under which the rules are promulgated.

Thus, when the legtslature acts with respect to a particular matter,

the administrative agency myy not so act with respect to the marter as

to nullify the legislature's actions, even though the matter is within

the agency's regulatory f:Leld. State v. Jackson, 376 S.W.2d 341,

344-45 (Tex. 1964); -- Hartjnez v. Texas Employment Commission, 570

S.W.2d 28, 31 (Tex. Civ. QI. - Corpus Christ1 1978, no writ). In a

brief submitted to this ofMce in support of your proposed amendment,

It is suggested that thaz proposed rule governs the conduct of

registrants of your board only, that it in no way regulates the

procedures to be employed by the political subdivisions themselves.

This suggestion is disingaluous at best. The amendment which you

propose would effectively tislpose on state and local governments the

same procedures which the United States Congress has imposed on the

federal government.

The proposed rule vio:latasthe Professional Services Procurement

Act in at least two ways. First, article 664-4, V.T.C.S.. does not

contemplate a bifurcated Iprocess; rather, the act requires that

political subdivisions musl: award contracts for professional services

in a one-step process to a professional who is selected

on the basis of demonstrated competence and quali-

fications for thlrtype of professional services to

be performed and at fair and reasonable prices, as

long 8s professiolaalfees are consistent with and

not higher than t,h,e published recommended practices

and fees of th<! various applicable professional

associations and d,onot exceed the maximum provided

by any state law.

V.T.C.S. art. 664-4, 53. If the Texas Legislature had intended that

state agencies and local governments amploy a two-step procedure

similar to that set forth in the federal act when procuring profes-

sional services, it could have done so. But it clearly did not.

Second, the proposed ruk, would effectively eviscerate the clear

statutory requirement tha: fees be considered as a factor in the

awarding of such contracts for professional services. As we stated in

Attorney General Opinion JN-155 (1984).

The clear terns of the Act itself do not merely

p+rmit the consideration by the agency of the fees

charged for certain professional services, but

require it. Whi:lethe Act expressly prohibits the

p. 2087

Hr. James Ken Newman - Page 7 (Jl'f-452)

awarding of contracts for certain professional

services on the ‘basis of competitive bids, it

clearly requires an agency to award such contracts

'on the basis oE demonstrated competence and

quallflcatlons for the type of professional

services to be plarformed and at fair and reason-

able prices.' V.T.C.S. art. 664-4, 03 (emphasis

added). Section 3 goes on to require that such

professional fees be 'consistent with and not

higher than the 'published recommended practices

and fees for the various applicable professional

associations ani. do not exceed, the maximum

provided by any state law.' Therefore, the

imposition of fees must be one factor considered

by any agency in awardingacontract for such

professional services; however, it cannot be the

a factor to be cousidered.

Accordingly, we conclude that the proposed amendment to

Disciplinary Rule 5.4 by the board is not authorized by the Texas

Engineering Practice Act.

S U-M M ARY

The Board of Registration for Professional

Engineers is not (conferredauthority by the Texas

Engineering Pra,:tices Act to promulgate its

proposed amendment to board Rule 131.151 revising

Disciplinary Rule 5.4.

JIM HATTOX

Attorney General of Texas

JACK HIGETOWFR

First Assistant Attorney Goneral

MART KZLLBR

Executive Assistant Attormy General

ROBERT GRAY

Special Assistant Attorney General

RICK GILPIN

Chairman. Opinion Committe~z

Prepared by Jim Moellinger

Assistant Attorney General

p. 2088

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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