Opinion

Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

Court
Texas Attorney General Reports
Filed
Jul 2, 1987
Status
Published
On the bench
Jim Mattox
Cited by
0 cases

The opinion

i

r

Mr. Lyndon L. Olson, Jr. Opinion No. m-734

Chairman

State Board of Insurance Re: Whether an insurance carrier

1110 San Jacinto Boulevard m=Y consider completion of a

Austin, Texas 78701 defensive driving course under

article 6701d, section 143A.

V.T.C.S.

Dear Mr. Olson:

You ask several questions about the practice engaged in by some

insurance companies of considering the completion of a defensive

driving course as the equivalent of a conviction of certain mis-

demeanor offenses under article 6701d, V.T.C.S., the Uniform Act

Regulating Traffic on Highways. Your questions are:

1. Does article 6701d, section 143A, prohibit

insurers from considering completion of a defensive

driving course for underwriting purposes or does it

merely prohibit the charge from being considered by

a court in assessing punishment for subsequent

traffic citations?

2. If the statute prohibits the consideration

of completion of a defensive driving course for

underwriting purposes, would an insurer's con-

sideration of such completion violate the Deceptive

Trade Practices - Consumer Protection Act, Business

and Commerce Code section 17.46 and thereby allow

enforcement by the State Board of Insurance under

article 21.21, section 7 of the Insurance Code? If

not, would such an act violate other Insurance Code

provisions?

You advise that various insurance companies charge increased insurance

prices when an insured or a person seeking insurance takes a defensive

driving course in exchange for dismissal of a traffic citation under

section 143A of article 6701d.

Section 143A of article 6701d, V.T.C.S., provides:

p. 3414

Mr. Lyndon L. Olson, Jr. - Page 2 (JM-734) i

i

1

(a) When a person is cherged with e mis-

demeanor offense under this Act, other then a

violation of Section 51. committed while operating

a motor vehicle, the court:

(1) in its discretion may defer proceedings

end allow the person 90 days to present evidence

that, subsequent to the alleged act, the person

has successfully completed e defensive driver’s

course approved by the Texas Department of Public

Safety or other driving safety course approved by

the court; or

(2) shall defer proceedings end allow the

person 90 days to present written evidence that,

subsequent to the alleged act, the person has

successfully completed a defensive driver’s course

approved by the Texas Department of Public Safety

or another driving safety course approved by the

court, if:

(A) the person presents to the court en

oral request or written motion to take a

course ;

(B) the person has a valid Texas driver’s

license or permit; end

(C) the person’s driving record es main-

tained by the Texas Department of Public Safety

does not indicate successful completipn of a

driving safety course under this subdivision

within the two years immediately preceding the

date of the alleged offense.

(b) When the person complies with the pro-

visions of Subsection (a) of this section and the

evidence presented is eccepted by the court, the

court shall dismiss the charge.

When a charge is dismissed under this section,

the charge may not be pert of the person’s driving

record or used for any purpose, but the court

shall report the fact that a person has success-

fully completed a driving safety course and the

date of completion to the Texas Department of

Public Safety for inclusion in the person’s

driving record. The court shall note in its

report whether the course was taken under the

procedure provided by Subdivision (2) of Sub-

section (a) of this section for the purpose of -,

p. 3415

Mr. Lyndon L. Olson, Jr. - Page 3 (JM-734)

providing information necessary to determine

eligibility to take a subsequent course under that

subdivision. (Emphasis added).

Resolution of your first question depends on whether the

underscored language in section 143A applies to insurance companies.

It has been suggested that the directive that “the charge may not be

pert of the person’s driving record or used for any purpose” applies

only to the courts. This language, however, is broad end is not, by

its terms, limited to the courts. Because the prohibition is somewhat

embiguous, its scope depends on the legislative intent behind the

phrase in question end behind the whole of section 143A.

Legislative intent is derived from a general review of en entire

enactment es well es from an examination of the circumstances existing

at the time of enactment, any “evil” to be corrected by the statute,

end the purpose to be accomplished by the statute. The legislature

added section 143A to article 6701d in 1975. Acts 1975, 64th Leg.,

ch. 738, et 2406. As originally enacted, the provision applied only

when the courts exercised their discretion to apply it. In 1979, the

legislature emended section 143A to require the courts to apply the

section to defendants who comply with the three requirements set forth

in subsections (a)(2)(A), (B), and (C) of section 143A. Acts 1979,

66th Leg., ch. 610, et 1359; see Attorney General Opinion NW-428

(1982) . The bill analysis to thisamendment notes that

[e]ven though [section 143A] is advantageous to

people in that it gives them en alternative to

traffic fines and raised insurance retes. the law

is only applicable to those persons whom the court

chooses to allow the benefit. (Emphasis added).

This language indicates that one of the primary purposes for the

alternative provided by section 143A is to prevent en increase of

insurance premiums.

It is significant that the bill also emended subsection (f) of

section 21 of article 6687b, V.T.C.S., the statute governing the

department’s jurisdiction over Texas drivers’ licenses, to provide

that the department may not release the reasons for the completion of

a driving safety course. The department may only release this

information to the courts for the purpose of determining eligibility

to take a subsequent course uuder section 143A. The fact that the

legislature restricted the access of all persons except. the courts to

the information indicates chat the legislature intended the

prohibition to apply broadly. Consequently, section 143A prohibits

insurers from considering a charge that is dismissed pursuant to

section 143A as pert of a person’s driving record and from using the

dismissal of the charge for “any purpose.”

p. 3416

Mr. Lyndon L. Olson, Jr. - Page 4 (JM-734)

1

?

You also ask whether, if section 143A prohibits the consideration

of the completion of a defensive driving course under section 143A for

insurance purposes, such consideration violates the Texas Deceptive

Trade Practices - Consumer Protection Act, Business end Commerce Code

section 17.46, thereby allowing the board to prohibit the conduct

under article 21.21, section 7, of the Insurance Code. Secrion 7

authorizes the board to issue a cease end desist order against: persons

found , after a board hearing, to have violeted the unfair

competition/deceptive acts provisions of the Insurance Code or the

Deceptive Trade Practices - Consumer Protection Act. It should be

noted that the board does not hold the exclusive means to regulate the

legality of insurance practices. See Attorney General of Texas v.

Allstate Insurance Company, 687 S.Wx 803 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1985,

writ ref’d n.r.e.). Additionally, section 16 of article 21.21 of the

Insurance Code creates a private cause of action for treble damages

for injury from unfair or deceptive insurance practices (1) prohibited

in section 4 of article 21.21, or (2) rules lawfully adopted by the

Insurance Board under article 21.21, or (3) described in the Deceptive

Trade Practices - Consumer Protection Act as unlawful. See Royal

Globe Insurance Company v. Bar Consultants, Inc., 577 S.W.2d688, 691

(Tex. 1979).

Subsection (b) (12) of section 17.46 of the Business end Commerce

Code, the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, provides that the term

“f else, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices includes . . .

representing that en agreement confers or involves rights, remedies,

or obligations which it does not have or involve, or which are

prohibited by law.” (Emphasis added). As indicated, section 143A of

article 6701d, V.T.C.S.. prohibits insurers from considering the

completion of a defensive driving course under section 143A as pert of

a person’s driving record or for any other purpose. Consequently, the

practice could fell within et least one express prohibition of the

Deceptive Trade Practices - Consumer Protection Act. A violation of

the act necessarily depends on the facts in each case. See Royal

Globe Insurance Co. v. Bar Consultants, Inc., supra; Attorney General

Opinion JK-218 (1984).

Your final question is whether, if the practice in question does

not violate the Deceptive Trade Practices - Consumer Protection Act,

the practice violates other Insurance Code provisions. Because your

question is premised on a negative response to your inquiry about the

Deceptive Trade Practices - Consumer Protection Act, it is not

necessary to address it in full in this opinion. You should be aware,

however, that a number of Insurance Code provisions are implicated.

For example, article 5.09 of the code prohibits distinctions or

discrimination between insureds having like hazards. See also Ins.

Code art. 21.21, §4(7). Considering the completion of a defensive

driving course as the equivalent of a conviction for insurance

purposes raises discrimination questions.

p. 3417

Mr. Lyndon L. Olson, Jr. - Page 5 (JM-734)

Moreover, article 5.01-l of the Insurance Code provides:

A rating plan promulgated by the State Board of

Insurance respecting the writing of motor vehicle

insurance, other than insurance written pursuant

to Section 35 [assigned risk plans] of the Texas

Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act (Article

6701h. Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes), may not

assign any rate consequence to a charge or convic-

tion, or otherwise cause premiums for motor

vehicle insurance to be increased because of a

charge or conviction for a violation of the

Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, as

amended (article 6701d. Vernon's Texas Civil

Statutes) .. (Emphasis added).

A full discussion of these provisions is beyond the scope of your

opinion request.

SUMMARY

Section 143A of article 6701d. V.T.C.S.. the

Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, pro-

hibits insurers from considering the completion of

a defensive driving course under section 143A for

the dismissal of a traffic citation as part of a

person's driving record for insurance purposes.

Subsection (b)(12) of section 17.46 of the Texas

Business and Commerce Code (the Deceptive Trade

Practices - Consumer Protection Act) defines as

unlawful an agreement that "confers or involves

rights, remedies, or obligations which it does not

have or involve, or which are prohibited by law."

Consequently, because consideration of a defensive

driving course is prohibited by section 143A of

article 6701d, V.T.C.S., it Is prohibited by

subsection (b)(12) of section 17.46 of the

Business and Commerce Code. Additionally,

considering the completion of a defensive driving

course under section 143A as the equivalent of a

conviction for insurance purposes raises dis-

crimination questions which implicate other

orovisions of the Insurance Code.

JIM MATTOX

Attorney General of Texas

p. 3418

Mr. Lyndon L. Olson, Jr. - Page 6 (JM-734)

--Y

NARY KELLER

Executive Assistant Attorney General

JUDGE ZOLLIE STJUKLEY

Special Assistant Attorney General

RICK GILPIN

Chairman, Opinion Cormnittee

Prepared by Jennifer Riggs

Assistant Attorney General

.-

p. 3419

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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