Opinion

Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

Court
Texas Attorney General Reports
Filed
Jul 2, 1987
Status
Published
On the bench
Jim Mattox
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 3.5%

The opinion

Honorable George Pierce Opinion No..JM-750

Chairman

Urban Affairs Coxaaittee Re: Validity of incorporation

Texas House of Representatives of the city of Montgomery

P. 0. Box 2910

Austin, Texas 78769

Honorable Stan Schlueter

Chairman

Ways and Means Committee

Texas House of Representatives

P. 0. Box 2910

Austin, Texas 78769

Gentlemen:

P

You have submitted a request for our opinion concerning the

validity of the incorporation of the city of Montgomery, Texas, and

the authority of the city to assess and collect taxes on property that

is alleged to be beyond the boundaries of the city. The issues you

have submitted involve complex questions of fact which cannot be

resolved in an Attorney General's Opinion. We can, however, discuss

those rules and principles which guide the courts in resolving such

disputes. We shall begin by reviewing the information supplied to

this office in connection with this request.

The town of Montgomery, Texas , was established by a special act

of the legislature in 1848. Acts 1848, 2d Leg., ch. 191. at 355. An

attempt to incorporate it was made in 1967. The petition filed

pursuant to the incorporation of the town of Montgomery described its

boundaries as being

[i]n the form of a square with its center the town

square of the Town of Montgomery, Texas as now

established and extending in all four directions

from the center of such town square a distance of

one mile.

In 1972, two years after the town was designated a general law city

pursuant to article 1153a, V.T.C.S., the city council passed an

ordinance describing the boundaries of the city of Montgomery in

p. 3493

Honorable George Pierce .!

Honorable Stan Schlueter

Page 2 m-750)

identical terms, including therewith territory annexed to the town in

1970.

In 1973. the city elected to exercise its taxing authority. It

appears, though, that only about one square mile of the city's

territory was appraised for tax purposes. This area. we are told,

extended one-half mile in four directions from the center of the town

square and constituted the original 640 acre tract of land designated

in 1848 as the town of Montgomery. In 1985, the city sought to

include the remaining territory on the tax rolls and assess and

collect taxes thereon for those years the territory was omitted from

the tax rolls.

A brief submitted on behalf of persons residing within this area

challenges the city's authority to assess and collect taxes on their

property. These residents allege a number of defects in the

incorporation of the town of Montgomery in 1967 which preclude it from

exercising taxing authority over their property. They argue that the

boundaries described in the 1967 petition for an election on the

question of incorporation embraced an excessive amount of territory in

violation of articles 971 and 1134, V.T.C.S. Article 971 was

violated, they claim, because the town did not have the number of

inhabitants required for a town encompassing an area of four square

miles. They contend article 1134 was violated because the territory -.

outside the original square mile area forming the town of Montgomery

was included solely for tax purposes and not for town purposes, as

article 1134 requires. Finally, it is alleged that the residents of

this area were not allowed to vote in the 1967 incorporation election.

The residents seek to avoid liability for property taxes assessed

by the city. We note, however, that a mere allegation by a taxpayer

that a city's incorporation was accompanied by fraud is not a defense

to the assessment and collection of ad valorem taxes owed by the

taxpayer to the city. McDannald v. League City, 528 S.W.2d 880 (Tex.

Civ. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Moreover,

they urge that the boundaries of Montgomery should be "rolled back" to

those designated in 1848. Apparently, they believe the town of

Montgomery received its charter pursuant to a local or special law

prior to the adoption of article III, section 56, of the Texas

Constitution, and that such charter was never repealed by the

legislature. See State ex rel. Richardson v. Larkin. 90 S.W. 912

(Tex. Civ. App.1905, writ ref'd) (an attempt to incorporate a city

under the general laws is void while the special act incorporating it

is in force). We have been supplied no authority for either of these

propositions. Thus. we will assume that the 1967 attempt to

incorporate the town of Montgomery was not prohibited by reason of an

unrepealed special charter.

p. 3494

Honorable George Pierce

Eonorable Stan Schlueter

Page 3 (JM-750)

Article 971, V.T.C.S., prescribes territorial limits for cities

and towns seeking to incorporate under Title 28 of the civil statutes:

No city or town in this State shall be here-

after incorporated under the provisions of the

general charter for cities and towns contained in

this title with a superficial area of more than

two square miles, when such town or city has less

than two thousand inhabitants, nor more than four

square miles when such city or town has more than

two thousand and less than five thousand inhabi-

tants, nor more than nine square miles, when such

city or town has more than five and less than ten

thousand inhabitants. The mayor and board of

aldermen, immediately after they qualify as such

officers, shall pass an ordinance causing an

actual survey of the boundaries of such town to be

made according to the boundaries designated in the

petition for incorporation and the field notes

thereof recorded in the minute book of such town

or city, and also in the record books of deeds in

the county in which such city or town is situated.

This provision is applicable to all cities, towns, and villages

attempting to incorporate under Title 28 regardless of the chapter

under which incorporation is attempted. Mallow v. State ex rel. City

of Denton, 374 S.W.Zd 732, 736 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1964, writ

ref'd n.r.e.); Richardson v. State, 199 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Tex. Civ.

APP. - Dallas 1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The residents challenging the

city's recent efforts to tax their property contend that the

population of the town of Montgomery in 1967 stood at approximately

400 persons, far short of the limits imposed by article 971.

Article 1133, V.T.C.S., authorizes a town or village of more than

200 and less than 10,000 inhabitants to incorporate as a town or

village under chapter 11 of Title 28. The procedures for incorpora-

tion provided in chapter 11 contemplate the existence of an actual

town or village and are not intended to create a town or village where

none in fact exists. See Rogers v. Raines, 512 S.W.Zd 725, 730 (Tex.

Civ. App. - Tyler 1974,it ref'd n.r.e.).

Article 1134, V.T.C.S., sets forth the procedure whereby the

inhabitants of a town may petition for an election on the issue of

incorporation. The petition must include the signatures of at least

20 qualified voters, a description of the proposed boundaries of the

town, the proposed name of the town, and a plat of the proposed town

"including therein no territory except that which is intended to be

used for strictly town purposes."

p. 3495

Honorable George Pierce

Honorable Stan Schlueter

Page 4 (JM-750)

-.

When a community seeks to incorporate pursuant to the general

laws, the petition for incorporation must describe an area sufficient

to include the minimum number of inhabitants required by statute. The

area described in the petition should be susceptible of receiving some

municipal services. Harang v. State ex rel. City of West Columbia,

466 S.W.Zd 8, 11 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, no

writ). An area which, because of its geographical or population

characteristics and development, is not capable of receiving municipal

services on any reasonable basis does not constitute a "city" or

"town" authorized to be incorporated. State ex rel. Needham v.

Wilbanks, 595 S.W.Zd 849 (Tex. 1980).

The laws authorizing the creation of municipal corporations also

incorporate the cormnon-law prohibition against a town or village

including within its boundaries land which is not intended to be used

for town purposes, but is included only for tax purposes. Gray County

Production Co. v. Christian, 231 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo

1950, no writ). The residents of the disputed territory claim the

city has failed to provide any municipal services beyond the original

square mile nucleus of Montgomery. This, they contend, clearly

establishes that their property was included in the city's corporate

area solely for tax purposes and was not intended to be used for town

purposes. However, they concede thatprior to 1985 no taxes were

levied on their property. Whether the town's boundaries included more ?

land than was intended to be used for town purposes is a question of

fact for a jury to decide and is tried as any other fact issue. Ellis

v. State, 383 S.W.Zd 635, 637 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1964. no writ).

The courts have identified three defects in the incorporation

process which will render the incorporation of a town absolutely void.

They are: (1) that the act of incorporation was either prohibited or

unauthorized by law; (2) that the incorporation was attempted pursuant

to an unconstitutional statute; or (3) that the attempt to comply with

the laws authorizing the creation of the municipality was so utterly

lacking or defective as to render the attempted incorporation void.

Durham v. Crutchfield, 578 S.W.2d 438, 441 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana

1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The lack of the requisite number of

inhabitants to hold an incorporation election renders the incorpora-

tion of a community under such circumstances void as a matter of law,

since there is no authority for groups smaller than those prescribed

by statute to incorporate. w, Ellis v. State, w. Similarly,

it has been held that the incorporation of a city or town in violation

of the area and population limits of article 97i is void and illegal.

Richardson v. State, 199 S.W.2d at 241. Other defects in the incor-

poration process. such as including land within the town's boundaries

which is unsuitable or not intended to be used for town purposes,

render the incorporation merely voidable. City of Gladewater v.

Pelphrey. 309 S.W.2d 472, 474 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1957, writ

ref'd n.r.e.).

p. 3496

Ronorable George Pierce

Honorable Stan Schlueter

Page 5 (.TM-750)

The legislature, however, has enacted a series of statutes which

validate the incorporation of cities and towns that, for one reason or

another, do not conform to the statute authorizing incorporation.

See, e.g., V.T.C.S. arts. 974d-974d-35; 11346; 1139a. Validating

statutes may cure defects in the incorporation proceedings of cities

and towns which would otherwise be void from their inception because

of either an absence or an unwarranted exercise of power. Perkins v.

State, 367 S.W.2d 140, 145 (Tex. 1964). For example, where the act of

incorporation was flawed because of an erroneous boundary description

but was done under color of statutory authority, the legislature may

ratify the incorporation with ,uo lapse in the city's status during the

period ic was defectively incorporated. See, e.g., Universal City v.

City of Selma, 514 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1974, writ ref'd

n.r.e.). These statutes will not, however, validate boundary lines

unless they expressly provide so. Richardson v. State, 199 S.W.2d at

244. They have no bearing on what constitutes a city or town. Rogers

.v. Raines, 512 S.W.Zd 725 (Tex. Civ. App. - Tyler 1974, writ ref'd

n.r.e.1. Thus, a validating statute will not cure an attempt to

incorporate a community where the facts reveal that it does not

constitute a city or town. State ex rel. Needham v. Wilbanks. supra.

In 1971, the legislature enacted article 974d-15, V.T.C.S., which

purported to validate the incorporation and boundaries of cities and

towns having a population of not less than 215 nor more than 217

according to the 1970 federal census. The population of the town of.

Montgomery in 1970 was 216. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of

Population: 1970, vol. 1, Characteristics of the Population, Part 45,

Texas - section 1. The legislature evidently enacted article 974d-15

to ratify the incorporationand boundaries of Montgomery. However, by

confining the act's population classification to the 1970 federal

cansus, the legislature permanently closed the class of municipalities

which could come within the classification at any time in the future.

This renders the act a local or special law, prohibited by article

III, section 56, of rhe Texas Constitution. See Morris v. City of San

Antonio, 572 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. Civ. App. -Austin 1978, no writ);

Attornev General Oninion MW-183 (1980). It does not. therefore,

validate the original incorporation and boundaries of the town of

Montgomery. We do not determine whether any other validating statute

accomplishes this result.

Several residents of the territory in question, however, allege

that they were not allowed to vote in the 1967 incorporation election.

In the absence of a showing of fraud or unfairness, an election on the

question of the creation of a municipal corporation will be upheld

where, despite irregularities, the result was not affected thereby.

Nueces County Water Control and Improvement District No. 4 v. State ex

rel. Wilson, 270 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1954, writ

ref'd n.r.e.). Irregularities which prevent the voters from freely

and fairly exercising-their right to suffrage are not created as mere

p. 3497

Honorable George Pierce

Honorable Stan Schlueter

Page 6 (JM-750)

informalities. See Branaum v. Patrick. 643 S.W.2d 745, 750 (Tex. App.

- San Antonio 19=, no writ). Because the legislature has the power

to ratify in a validating statute only what it has the power to

authorize, Perkins v. State, supra. article 974d-15 would not cure the

denial of a person's right tOvote. See generally Leach v. City of

North Richland Hills, 627 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 1982, no

writ) (validatinn statutes cannot cure constitutional defects).

Beyond the affir&tions of these residents, we have been provided no

other information concerning the circumstances under which the denial

of their right to vote allegedly occurred. Whether any person

qualified to vote in the 1967 election was unlawfully denied this

right cannot be determined in this opinion.

SUMMARY

Deteminiag the validity of the 1967

incorporation of Montgomery, Texas, involves

questions of fact which cannot be resolved in aa

Attorney General's Opinion. Article 974d-15,

V.T.C.S., which purported to validate the

incorporation and boundaries of the city of

Montgomery, is invalid under article III, section

56. of the Texas Constitution as a local or

special law. A validating statute will not cure a

defect in the incorporation of a city or town

resulting from the denial of a person's right to

vote.

JIM MATTOX

Attorney General of Texas

MART KELLER

Executive Assistant Attorney General

JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY

Special Assistant Attorney General

RICK GILPIN

Chairman, Opinion Committee

Prepared by Rick Gilpin

Assistant Attorney General

p. 3498

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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