Opinion

Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

Court
Texas Attorney General Reports
Filed
Jul 2, 1987
Status
Published
On the bench
Jim Mattox
Cited by
0 cases

The opinion

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

OF TEXAS

Novaher 20, 1987

Honorable Bob Bullock Opinion No. m-823

Comptroller of public Accounts

L.B.J. Building Re: Whether attorneys fees

Austin, Texas 70774 are in certain circum-

stances subject to sales

tax (RQ-1217)

Dear Mr. Bullock:

You ask our opinion about recent amendments to the

Tax Code provisions that govern the limited sales, excise,

and use tax. Tax Code ch. 151. During the second called

session the legislature expanded the definition of

"taxable services" to include "debt collectiont' services.

C

Acts 1987, 70th Leg., 2d C-S., ch. 5, art. 1, pt. 4, 512,

at 17, 25 (amending Tax Code §151.01Dl(a)). The

legislature defined "debt collection service" as follows:

(a) 'Debt collection service' means

activity to collect a debt or claim, to

adjust a debt or claim, or to repossess

property subject to a claim.

(b) 'Debt collection service' does not

include the collection of a judgment by an

attorney or by a partnership or professional

corporation of attorneys if the attorney,

partnership, or corporation represented the

person in the suit from which the judgment

arose.

Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 5, art. 1, pt. 4, 54, at 17, 21

(to be codified as Tax Code 5151.0036).

You ask questions about statutory construction: we

limit this opinion to those questions. Your questions

,!- are:

1. Are attorneys' fees to date of judg-

ment for the collection of open accounts and

-

debts subject to tax?

p. 3914

Honorable Bob Bullock - Page 2 (JM-8Zz3)

2. Are attorneys' fees for filing bank-

ruptcy claims subject to tax?

?

3. Are charges by attorneys and others

in connection with land foreclosures subject

to tax?

4. Are attorneys' fees for enforcing

contracts where there is a money dispute

subject to tax?

5. If an attorney charges for enforcing

a judgment in a case in which he was not the

attorney who obtained the judgment, are his

fees subject to tax?

6. Are attorneys' fees for negotiating

debt and claim adjustments subject to tax?

7. Are attorneys' fees in connection

with enforcing insurance claims subject to

tax?

-,

Before we address the issues raised by those questions, a

review of the legislative history of section 151.0036 may

be helpful.

The extension of the sales tax to debt collection

services was part of House Bill No. 61, the omnibus tax

measure adopted by the second called session of the 70th

Legislature. On July 2, 1987, Representative Paul Colbert

offered an amendment from the floor that would have

extended the sales tax to include legal services. The

amendment was tabled, with 104 voting yea and 14 voting

nay. House Journal, 70th Leg., 2d C.S., at 181 (1987). A

second amendment from the floor on the same subject,

offered by Representative Al Luna, likewise was tabled,

with 116 voting yea and 2% voting nay. H.J., ,70th Leg.,

2d C.S., at 219 (1987).1 The Senate then considered Rouse

Bill No. 61 and added provisions to extend the sales tax

to include services, but not those, such as the practice

1. Another measure, House Bill No. 6, also was

introduced during the second called session, specifically

to extend the sales tax to legal services: it was reported

out of committee, but not considered on the floor.

p. 3915

Honorable Bob Bullock - Page 3 0-823)

of law, denominated as 81professional." See aenerallv Bill

Analysis to H.B. No. 61, prepared for House Ways and Means

Committee, filed in Bill File to H.B. No. 61, Legislative

Reference Library.

The House refused to concur in the Senate version of

the substitute, see H.J., 70th Leg., 2d C-S., at 335

(1987) t and a conference committee of members from the two

houses was appointed to fashion a compromise. Before the

aooointment of the' conference committee, the oresent

section anneared in neither the Senate nor the House

versions of H.B. 61.

The circumstances leading to the adoption by the

legislature of the final version of House Bill No. 61

suggest that the language adding section 151.0036 to the

Tax Code was given brief attention, both in the conference

committee deliberations and on the floors of the House and

Senate. Thus, the legislative history available for

determining legislative intent is scant. See aenerallv

Gov't Code 5311.023.

C The only reference to section 151.0036 in the debates

in either house on the conference committee version of

House Bill No. 61 before final passage came during a

colloquy on the floor of the House of Representatives

between Representative Dan Morales, the House sponsor of

House Bill No. 61 and a member of the conference committee

that produced section 151.0036, and Representative Greg

Luna. We set out the exchange in its entirety below.

Representative Luna: On these debt collec-

tion service: if an attorney sends a letter

for a debt?

Representative Morales: No, that would not

be covered.

Representative Luna: That would not be

covered. If an attorney seeks to have

foreclosure on real property? It says

repossessed property subject to a claim.

Representative Morales: Repeat that again.

Representative Luna: If an attorney proceeds

to represent a client on a foreclosure on

p. 3916

Honorable Bob Bullock - Page 4 (JM-823)

real property -- would that be subject to

fax?

?

Representative Morales: No, Greg, and I

guess that I would refer you to paragraph B

of that, of the debt collection provision,

where it indicates that a debt collection

service does not include collection of a

judgment by an attorney or by a partnership

or professional corporation of attorneys if

that attorney represented the person in the

suit.

Representative Luna: But what bothers

Dan is that a lot of collection is done :;

attorneys that does not result in a

judgment.

Representative Morales: That is right.

Representative Luna: And so,' even if it

does not, it would not be subject. . . .

Representative Morales: Greg, I think, that

if the reason that there is a lawyer

involved in a particular case is to

establish the claim then that would not

satisfy the definitional language and would

not be debt service collection. Because it

would not be focused upon collecting the

debt but would be deemed to be an establish-

ment of the existing claim.

Representative Luna: But, sometimes YOU

know on a debt and on an account - and I

don't do this much, I am trying to clarify

it for a later purpose - attorneys do send

letters on accounts that are due and most of

them are resolved without a judgment.

Representative Morales: Greg, I guess maybe

the easiest way for us to think about that

is that if the lawyer is doing what debt

collectors do and that is all then he would

be treated, that attorney would be treated -.

as a debt collector. However, if that

attorney has been involved in some other

aspect of the case relative to establishing

the claim or ultimately receiving the ---.

p. 3917

Honorable Bob Bullock - Page 5 (JM-823)

judgment he would fall, that individual

would fall, under the exception under para-

graph B.

Representative Luna: Many general practi-

tioners do this as a minor, incidental item

of their practice.

Representative Morales: Well they are debt

collectors, they are debt collectors and

subject to that provision of the bill.

Representative Luna: Will they have to

prescribe to any fee, permit fee, that sort

of thing?

Representative Morales: No, they are

already licensed by the state as an attorney

and I would presume that that would be

sufficient.

Debate on H.B. No. 61 on the floor of the House of

Representatives, 70th Leg., 2d C.S. (July 20, 1987)

(transcript available from House Hearing Reporter).

We think that the legislative intent behind this

hastily-drafted and ambiguous statute is most clearly

reflected in Representative Morales' statements. Repre-

sentative Morales' initial responses to Representative

Luna's questions are all to the effect that the services

of a lawyer would not be subject to the tax. Then

Representative Morales qualifies those statements by

saying that the tax would apply to a lawyer's services if,

the lawyer "is doing what debt collectors do and that is

all." Representative Morales' statements, taken together,

suggest that the legislative intent behind section

151.0036 was that a lawyer would be engaged in a taxable

activity & when engaged in debt-collection activity

that a non-lawyer could also engage in. That interpreta-

tion can be harmonized with the language of section

151.0036. Also, that interpretation is supported by the

fact that the same legislature that enacted section

151.0036 rejected a proposition to apply the sales tax to

legal fees generally.

Although we think it is possible to identify the

legislative intent behind section 151.0036, the legisla-

ture did not provide any guidelines for determining when a

lawyer "is doing what debt collectors do and that is all."

p. 3918

Honorable Bob Bullock - Page 6 (JM-823)

The practical difficulty with applying that standard is

that a lawyer's services to a creditor client may include,

in the same instance, services that only a lawyer can

render as well as services that non-lawyers, such as debt

collectors, can render. See aenerally Note, Collection

Aaen ies and th Unauthorized Pra tice of La 1 J. Legal

ProfC 155 (19;6); Annot., 27 CA.L.R.3d :i52 (1969) ;

Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics, 5844 (1987). See also

Attorney General Opinion WW-312 (1981) (corporation may

not be represented in county court or county court at law

on action to collect debt by an officer who is not

lawyer). For example, a lawyer might write a demand

letter after counseling a client about different ways to

attempt to collect a debt or to adjust a claim. The

lawyer's advice, based on his legal skills and knowledge;

might be that further attempts to collect the debt or to

adjust the claim might be unfruitful because of various

legal or practical impediments or that additional efforts

might simply be too costly in light of the benefits even a

complete victory in the courts might bring. Although the

paperwork ultimately produced by the lawyer might be

similar to the paperwork produced by a non-lawyer debt

collector, the lawyer certainly would have practiced law

as part of the overall transaction. The question raised

by section 151.0036 is whether any part of a lawyer's

services in such a situation are subject to the sales tax.

If a part of a lawyer's services in situations like

the one described above were to be taxed, the comptroller

would be required to analyze the services provided by a

lawyer in order to identify the aspects that did not

involve the lawyer's legal skill or knowledge in any

way. It would be absurd for the legislature to,put the

comptroller in that position. Further, even if it were

possible to make that distinction, the attorney-client

privilege would make it nearly impossible for the

comptroller to obtain the information necessary to make

such a determination. Therefore, we conclude that the

legislature did not intend for "debt collection servicesl*

to include isolated pieces of transactions engaged in by

lawyers. See Gov't Code.J311.021 (legislature is assumed

not to intend absurd results). Rather, we think that the

legislature intended to tax services provided by a lawyer

only if it is clear that the lawyer is acting in a

transaction as nothina more than a debt collector. Again,

that interpretation is supported by the fact the the

legislature rejected a proposal to tax legal services

generally. Therefore, only in an instance in which your

p. 3919

Honorable Bob Bullock - Page 7 (JM-82%

office can demonstrate that a lawyer is not providing

legal services at all but is, for example, merely using

- his license to shield debt collection services from the

sales tax, would services provided by a lawyer be subject

to the sales tax.

SUMMARY

The services of a lawyer are not taxable

services under chapter 151 of the Tax Code

unless the comptroller determines that the

lawyer is not providing legal services and

is acting solely as a debt collector.

J-b

Very truly yo

.

JIM MATTOX

Attorney General of Texas

MARYKELLER

P Executive Assistant Attorney General

JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY

Special Assistant Attorney General

RICK GILPIN

Chairman, Opinion Committee

Prepared by Don Bustion and Sarah Woelk

Assistant Attorneys General

p. 3920

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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