The opinion
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF TEXAS
.JIX MATTOX March 22, 1990
ATMRNEY OENERAX.
Honorable Stephen C. Howard Opinion No. JM-1150
.Orange County Attorney
Orange County Courthouse Re: Authority to set the
Orange, Texas 77630 salaries of the Orange County
Child Support Office
(RQ-1892)
Dear Mr. Howard:
You ask whether it is the function of the juvenile
board or the commissioners court to set the salaries of
child support office personnel in Orange County.
Subsection (a) of section 152.1872 of the Human Re-
sources Code provides that the Orange County Juvenile Board
- shall establish a child support office and appoint a child
support collector to collect and disburse child support
payments as ordered by a court. Subsection (b) authorizes
the collection of not less than one dollar per month from
the payor of the support for collecting and disbursing child
or spousal support payments made to the office. Section
152.1873 provides for the payment of a five dollar fee by
each person who files for a divorce in Orange County to be
used to assist in maintaining the child support office.
Subsection (f) of section 152.1872 states that these fees
shall be deposited in a separate fund known as the "Child
Support Fund I1by the county treasurer.
Subsection (g) of section 152.1872 concerns the ad-
ministration of the fees in this account and the funding of
the child support office.
(g) The juvenile board shall 'administer
the fees collected under this section and
Section 152.1873 to meet the expenses of the
office, including postage, equipment, sta-
tionery, office supplies, subpoenas, sala-
ries, and other expenses authorized by the
board. The fund shall be supplemented from
the general fund or other available funds of
,P. the county as necessary.
p. 6069
Honorable Stephen C. Howard - Page 2 (JM-1150)
you advise that your question is prompted by the
juvenile board's submission of a budget to the commissioners
court that included a nine percent raise for employees in
the child support office. The commissioners court rejected
that raise, stating "the court feels a 6 percent salary
increase is' acceptable." &2~ Local Gov't Code 5 152.012
(commissioners court shall set salaries of county
employees).
Prior to the enactment of article 42.121 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, Acts 1977, 65th Leg., ch. 343, at 910
(eff. Sept. 1, 1978), article 42.12 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure provided that the district judges of the county
would hire and fix the salaries of probation officers "with
the advice and consent of the commissioners court." The
salaries were funded by the counties except for the portion
defrayed by probation fees.
ssioners Court of U&&G& Countv v. Martin 471
Civ. App. - Amarillo 1971, writ kef'd
n.r.e.), the court rejected the position of the commis-
sioners court that the [then] provision in article 42.12
permitting district judges to appoint and fix salaries for
probation officers was unconstitutional. In upholding the
action of the judges in fixing the salaries of probation
officers, the court found that it was the intent of the
legislature to place on the judges the authority to provide
for and supervise the administration of probation depart-
ments. The court reasoned that it was a subject not only
peculiarly within the knowledge of the judges, but one
specifically entrusted to them. The court stated that the
commissioners' approval of the salaries, under the provision
of article 42.12 requiring their %onsent;ll was a minis-
terial duty in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse of
discretion.
While wsioners Court of Harris Countv v. Full.f&~r
ton, 596 S.W.ld 572 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [lst Dist.]
1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.), involved purchase of office
equipment by the auditor, rather than salaries, the court
upheld the county auditor#s budget that included equipment
the commissioners court refused to approve. The court found
that statutes expressly authorizing-the auditor to prescribe
the system of accounting for the county and provide himself
with equipment did not deny the commissioners court its
right to exercise budgetary authority. The court concluded,
however, that the commissioners court had authority to
review or reject the auditorgs budget "only to the extent
that the specific cost of an enumerated item is excessive or
p. 6070
Honorable Stephen C. Howard - Page 3 (JM-1150)
unreasonable in its monetary demands upon county funds,
available or to become available, subject to any abuse of
discretion."
Attorney General opinion JN-79 (1983) concerned the
authority of the Harris County: Commissioners Court to
refuse to approve the budget of the Harris County Hospital
District. Section 8 of article 4494n. V.T.C.S., authorized
the administrator, under the direction of the board of
managers, to prepare an.annual budget to be presented to the
commissioners court for final approval. Attorney General
Opinion 374-79 concluded that while the statute authorized
the administrator and board of managers of the hospital
district to submit a suggested budget, "it accords to the
commissioners court the right of 'final approval.'"
The same conclusion was reached in Attorney General
Opinion MW-15 (1979) under article 5142b, V.T.C.S., re-
garding the budget submitted by a juvenile board. Article
5142b provided that the compensation of all probation
officers shall be fixed by the board "subject to the
approval of'tbe County Commissioners Court."
7- A like result was reached in Attorney General Opinion
H-908 (1976) under article 332a, V.T.C.S., now section
41.106 of the Government Code, which authorized the
prosecuting attorney to hire personnel and set salaries
conditioned on the approval of the commissioners court.
martin was discussed and distinguished in Attorney
General Opinions m-79 and MW-15. In Attorney General
Opinion MW-15 it was stated:
The language relating to the commissioners
court's duty in [Martin] was ambiguous,
and . . . the courts relied on the rest of
the act to ascertain the legislative intent.
The statute specifically indicated that this
purpose was to place responsibility for
probation supervision wholly within the state
courts. There is neither a similar ambiguity
in article 514223 nor similar language which
would broaden the responsibility of the
juvenile board.
Attorney General Opinion JM-79, in considering puller-
-, stated:
p. 6071
Honorable Stephen C. Howard - Page 4 (JM-1150)
The court held that, once the auditor makes a
determination that a particular item of
equipment is necessary for the proper func-
tioning of his office, the commissioners must
ministerially take the proper legal steps to
provide that equipment *unless it finds that
the county auditor abused his discretion.'
[m] at 576. The decision was based,
however, on article 1650, V.T.C.S., which
authorizes a county auditor 'to provide
himself with all necessary ledgers, books,
records, blanks, stationary, equipment,
telephones and postage at the county's
expense. '
Under the court's reasoning in Fullerton,
the commissioners court would be obliged to
ministerially approve only those items in the
hospital district's budget which article
4494n, or some other statute, specifically
authorized. Since no statute specifically
authorizes a hospital district to make the
expenditureEnabou: which you inquire, we must
conclude, authority of Attorney
General Opinions WW-15 and H-908, that the
commissioners court is the body ultimately
responsible for the financial affairs of the
county, and that, as such, it is empowered to
reject any budget submitted by the hospital
district.
The legislature authorized the Orange County Juvenile
Board to establish a child support office, appoint a child
support collector, and administer the fees collected for the
child support fund to meet, among other expenses, salaries
"authorized by the board." Subsection (g) of section
152.1872 further provides "the fund shall be supplemented
from the general fund or other available funds of the county
as necessary.N We construe this provision to reflect an
intent on the part of the legislature that the county
supplement the child support fund to the extent that it
is necessary to meet the expenses authorized by section
152.1872, including salaries budgeted by the juvenile board. _
Unlike the expenses under the statutes considered '
Attorney General Opinions JW-79, WW-15, and H-908, tit
expenses budgeted by the juvenile board are not statutorily
conditioned on the approval of the commissioners court. As
with the statutes considered in &8&j.~ and mlerton, it
appears that it was the intent of the legislature that the
p. 6072
Honorable Stephen C. Howard - Page 5 (JM-1150)
juvenile board create and supervise the child support
office, appoint its collector, and provide for the expenses
of the office. We conclude that it is the commissioners
court's function to ministerially approve the budget for
child support office personnel submitted by the juvenile
board, subject to a showing that the juvenile board abused
its discretion.
SUMMARY
The Juvenile Board of Orange County is
authorized to set the salaries of the child
support office personnel. The authority of
the commissioners court of Orange County to
very
truly
,
reject the salaries budgeted by the board is
.
limited to a showing that the board abused
its discretion.
Ic
.J*clfb.
JIM
Y
M A'T T 0 X
Attorney General of Texas
WARYRRLLER
First Assistant Attorney General
JUDGE ZOLIJE STEARLEY.
Special Assistant Attorney General
RENEA HICKS
Special Assistant Attorney General
RICK GILPIN
Chairman, Opinion Committee
Prepared by Tom G. Davis
Assistant Attorney General
P. 6073