Opinion

Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

Court
Texas Attorney General Reports
Filed
Jul 2, 1993
Status
Published
On the bench
Dan Morales
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 3.5%

The opinion

QBfficeof tfie !Zlttornep@eneral

&date of Qexae

DAN MORALES

ATTORSEY

CESERAL October 7,1993

Mr. Jack W. Garison Opiion No. DM-259

BxecutiveDirector

Texas Department of Licensing Re: Whetheramemberofanappraissl

and Beg&ion review board may appear before the

P.O. Box 12157 boardeitherinacapachyasawurt-

Austin, Texas 78711 appointed receiver or a registered

property tsx we without violsthtg

Honorable Mike Driscoll con&t-of-intmst laws and related

Harris County Attorney questions (BQ-507, JD# 18811)

1001 Preston, Suite 634

Houston, Texas 77002

Dear Mr. Garison and Mr. Driscotl:

Eachofyouhas~ustodetamineametheramrmberofMappraisalmiew

board or an appraisal district board may paform certain professional services.

Mr.Driswll asks whether a member of an apprsissl review board may repmsem a

taxpayer in connection with the valuation of a certain tract or parcel of land in the board

member’scapacity as a court-appointed receiver of the same tract or parcel of land. Mr.

Garison a&s whether an appraisal review board member may pet%ormproperty tax

consulting services, in the ssme or a ditferent appraisal district, without violating contlict-

of-interest laws. Mr. Garison also a&s whether an appraisal district board member may

perfom property tax consulting servicq either in the ssme or a different appraisal district.

An appraisal review board generally consists of three members, Tax Code

4 6.41(b), who meet to exsmine and approve appraisal records that the chief appraiser hss

submitted to the appraisal review board. Id 58 6.42(b), 41.01. Section 41.41 of the Tax

Code provides a property owner with a right to protest several hinds of actions before an

appraisal review board:

(1) determinstion of the appraised value of the ownefs property

or, in the case of land apprsised as provided by Subchapter C, D, or

E, Chapter 23, determinstion of its appraised or msrhet value;

(2) unequal apprsissl of the owner’sproperty;

(3) inclusion of the own&s property on the appraisal records;

(4) denial to the property owner in whole or in psrt of a partial

exemption;

p. 1345

Mr. Jack W. Gsrison - Page 2 (DM-259)

Honorable Mike Driscoll

(5) determination that the owner’s land does not qualify for

appraisal as provided by Subchapter C, D, or E. Chapter 23;

(6) identification of the taxing units in which the ownet’s

property is taxable in the case of the appraisal district’sappraisal roll;

(7) determination that the property owner is the owner of

property;

(8) a determinauon that a change in use of land appraised under

Subchapter C, D, or E, Chapter 23. has ocaured, or

(9) any other action of the chief appraiser, appraisal district, or

appraisal review board that applies to and adversely affects the

property owner.

See ah id. $8 41.411, 41.42, 41.43. Following notice and a hearing, see id. $5 41.45,

41.46. 41.461, the appraisal review board must determine the protest and, if necessary,

correct the appraisal records to conform with its determination. See id. $41.47(b).

Mr. DriscoU asks about the propriety of an appraisal review board member

mpment& a taxpayer in a capacity as the court-appointed receiver of the taxpayer%

property, which lies in the appraisal review board’sjurisdiction. Jn his brief, Mr. DriscoU

CXplGlS:

A receiver holds property for the be-n&t of the owner and the

receivds actions are generally in accordance with the best interests

of the property owner. The receiver is also entitled to reasonable

compensation for his services as receiver. . . .

In the situation at hand, the member bad been appointed receiver

by the judge of the 247th District Court of Harris County, Texas[,] in

1984. The judge of the 247th ordered that the receiver sell the

property using “prudent real estate practices” and that the proceeds

be distributed between the husband and wife.

Subsequently, the receiver was appointed to serve on the Harris

CountyAppraisalBeviewBosrdin1989andagainin 1991.. .

On December 9, 1992[,] the property owner notified the

appraisal district that the review board member would be handling [a]

protest and withdrew his approval of the 1992 market value which

had previously been settled with a district appraiser. Footnote

omitted.]

p. 1346

Mr. Jack W. Garison - Page 3 (DM-259)

Honorable Mike Driscoll

Mr. Driscd particularly asks about the applicabiity of section 6.412(a) of the Tax

Code and section 36.08 of the Pensl Code. Under section 6.412(a) of the Tax Code, an

individualis ineligiblefor service on an appraisal review board if the individual is “related

within the second degree by consanguinity or affhdty, as determined under Article 5996h,

Revised Statutes,1 to an individual who is engaged in the business. . of representing

property owners for compensation in proceedings under this title in the appraisal district

for which the appraisal review board is established.” (Footnote added.) The legislature

enscted section 6.412(a) in 1989. see Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 796. 4 12. at 3595, and

amended the subsection in 1991 by adding the language “as determined under Article

5996h, Revised Statutes,”see Acts 1991,72d Leg., ch. 561, Q45, at 1988.

Former article 559611,V.T.C.S., see slrpro note 1, which the legislature also

enacted in 1991 by the passage ofHouse Bill 1345, see Acts 1991,72d Leg., ch. 561, Q 1.

at 1979-80-&e same bii that amended section 6.412(a) of the Tax Code-provides that

relationships by wnsanguinity or aflinity must be determined using the civil Jaw method.

See Gov’t Code 8 573.021. The Government Code provides for the calculation of degree

of relationship as follows:

Sec. 573.022. (a) DETERMINATJON OF CONSANGUIN-

ITY. Two individualsare related to each other by wnsanguinity if:

(1) one is a descendant of the other, or

(2) ifthey shsre a wmmon ancestor.

. . .

Sec. 573.023. (a) COMPUTATION OF DEGREE OF CON-

SANGUINITY. The degree of relationship by wnsanguinity

between an individual and the individual’sdescendant is determined

by the number of generations that separate them. A parent and child

are related in the first degree, a grandparent and grandchild in the

second degree, a great-grandparent and great-grandchild in the third

degree and so on.

. .

Sec. 573.024. (a) DETERMINATION OF AFFINITY. Two

individuals are related to each other by affinity if:

(1) theyaremsrriedtoeachother;or

‘In 1993 the .ticven@tird Legislah~t repealedV.T.C.S. Miclc S9%h. See Acts 1993, 73d

l&g., ch. 268. The lnamial in thatsrlicle was oxiitied as chspter573 ofthc Gavcrnmentcnde.

p. 1347

Mr. Jack W. Carbon - Page 4 (DM-259)

Honorable Mike Driscoll

(2) the spouse of one of the individuals is related by

wnsanguinity to the other individual.

By definition, the determination of degree of a relationship by wnsanguinity or by athnity

assumes a relationship between twopersons. Thus, for purposes of calculating the degree

of a relationship by wnsanguinity or by &My, a person may not be related to hhnself or

herself We do not believe the legislature envisioned that section 6.412(a) of the Tax

Code would apply to a situation in which a member of the appraisal review board is the

“individual who is engaged in the business. . . of representing property owners for

wmpensation in proceedings under this title in the appraisal district for which the appraisal

review board is established.” See also infra note 11 and accompanying text (describing

legislative history of Tax Code section 6.035(a)). Jn our opinion, therefore, section

6.412(a) of the Tax Code is inapplicableto the situation before us here.2

Additionally, section 36.08 of the Penal Code is inapplicable. Section 36.08

prohibits gifrs to public servants in ceriain circumstances; it does not prohibit a public

servsnt from receiving adequate compensation for services the individualperformed in an

unofficial capacity. See Penal Code $5 36.08, 36.10(a)(l). See genera&v Attorney

Generd Opinion H-551 (1975).

We believe that section 41.69 of the Tax Code governs this situation. Section

41.69 precludes a member of an appraisal review board from participating in the

determination of certain taxpayer protests:

A member of the appraisal review board may not participate in

the determination of a taxpayer protest in which he is interested or in

which he is related to a party by atlinity within the second degree or

by wnsan8uinity within the third degree, as determined under Article

5996h, Revised Statutes.3 Footnote added.]

The legislature added section 41.69 to the Tax Code in 1979. See Acts 1979,66th Leg.,

ch. 841, Q 1, at 2309.

To fully answer your question, we must deduce the meaning the legislature

intended when it used the word “interested” in section 41.69 of the Tax Code.

2Suxion 41.69 nf the Tax CQ& pmhibils P member of an appmial review bard from

psrtioipaing in the determinationof a tapnyu protestin which the memberpusonally is intaemd or in

which the memberis mlated within a prohiiiteddegreetc a parryh&vat to the pmtest. See infio

(qootiq Tax Gxk @on 41.69). Clearly,ifthe legislatun wantedto write section 6.412(a) to apply to a

situation in which the appraisalreview boardmemberwas personallyim~lvcd as well as a situation in

which the memberwas mlatedto an individualrqescn~ proper&ownersbeforethe appraisalreview

bosrd,the legislatotecould have done so.

p. 1348

Mr. Jack W. Garison - Page 5 (DM-259)

Honorable Mike Driscoll

U~&or&unately, we found no legislative history indicating the kinds of situations in which

the legislature envisioned that an appraisal review board member might have an interest in

a taxpayer protest. We look, therefore, to similar wnstitutionsl and statutory provisions

in existence in 1979, of which we presume the legislature was aware. See Attorney

General Opiion V-1215 (1951) at 2.

The majority of the provisions we exsmined, however, modify the word “interest”

in such a way as to affect the interpretation of the provision. See, e.g., Tex. Con.% art.

III, 5 18 (prohibiting legislator from being “interested, either directly or indirectly” in

certain contracts with state), art. III, $22 (requiring legislator with “personal or private

interest” in proposed legislation to disclose interest and refrain from voting on proposal);

Gov’t Code 5 573.058(a) (requiring state board or commission member with “personal or

private interest” in matter before board to disclose interest and to refrain f?om voting on

matter); Local Gov’t Code 5 81.002 (requiring newly appointed wunty judge or county

commissioner to at&-m that he or she “will not be interested, directly or indirectly” in

wntract with or claim against county). We found one provision, article V, section 11 of

the Texas Constitution, that uses the word “interest”without any attendant modifiers, and

we believe this provision and the judicial interpretation of this provision are instructive for

our purposes here.

Article V. section 11 forbids a judge from sitting in any case in which the judge

“may be interestad,. . . or when he shall have been counsel in the case,” among other

things. “Interest”has been construed to refer to a direct personal or pecuniary interest in

the case. See Tex. Cons&art. V, 5 11 interp. commentary; City of Oat Cltflv. Stoe, 79

S.W. 1068, 1069 (Tar. 1904) (and cases cited therein); Attorney General Opiion

DM-109 (1992) at 34 (and cases cited therein). We accordingly interpret section 41.69

of the Tax Code to apply whenever a member of an appraisal review board has a direct

personal or pecuniary interest in the determination of a taxpayer protest before the

appraisal review board. In our opinion, a member of an appraisal review board who, as a

paid, court-appointed receiver, is representing a taxpayer in a protest before the appraisal

review board has, as a matter of law, a direct personal or pecuniary interest in the result.4

Section 41.69 of the Tax Code accordingly precludes the membe?s participation in the

appraisal review board’sdetermination of the protest.

p. 1349

Mr. Jack W. G&on - Page 6 (DM-259)

Honorable Mike Driscoll

We note that chapter 171 of the Local Government Code also may apply in this

situation. Chapter 171 of the Local Government Code, which regulates wnflicts of

interest of local public official-$including a member of an appraisal review board, requires

a local public official, prior to a vote or decision on any matter involving a business entity

or real property in which the official has a substantial interest, to disclose the nature and

extent of the interest. Local Gov’t Code 5 171.004(a); see 35 D. BROOKS,COUNTYAND

SPECIALDl8TRRXLAW 8 18.37, at 632-33 (Texas Practice 1989). Jn certain specified

circumstances, the official also must abstain from tbrther participation in the matter.6 Id.

Chapter 171 of the Local Government Code expressly preempts common-law wntlictsf-

interest rules as they apply to local public officials. Local Gov’t Code 6 171.007(a); see

also Attorney General Opinions JM-1187 (1990) at 4; JM-424 (1986) at 4.

Under chapter 171 of the Local Government Code, an official has a substantial

interest in a business entity if

(1) the person owns 10 percent or more of the voting stock or

shares of the business entity or owns either 10 percent or more or

SS,CMM or more of the fair market value of the business entity; or

(2) 5nds received by the person gem the business entity exceed

10 percent of the person’sgross income for the previous year.

Local Goti Code 5 171.002(a); see also Anomey General Opiion JM-.I187 at 2-3.

Notably, section 171.004(a) of the Local Government Code applies to any local public

official who has a substantial interest in a business entity or real property that is involved

in a matter before the governmental body. On the other hand, section 41.69 of the Tax

Code applies only to members of an appraisal review board, but it applies to a taxpayer

protest in which a member has a direct personal or pecuniary interest, regardless of the

quantity of the interest. Thus, if a member of an appraisal review board is interested in a

particular taxpayer protest before the board but that interest is not a “substantial interest”

Section 171.001(l) oftbe Local GovermnemCode detines “localpublic of&id’ as .a member

bodyoranotherofliax,wbelherelected,appointed,paid,orun@d,ofany

iist% .?z?

. exerch responsibilitiesbeyondthose that am advisoryin nahue.”

%ection 171.004(a)(l) quires a local public o5icial lo abstainfrom participationin a matter

kforcthgovcnunentalbodyofwhich(heofficialisamemkrifthcoff~cialhasasubstantialintaatina

budacssentity,and”actionmthemancrwill~aspecialeconomic~:eamthcbusinmmtitythatis

distinguishble from the tied on the public.” See infro (dclining “sobstantialinter&). Similarly,

section 171.004(a)(2)mquiresa local public official to abstain from participationin a matterbefore the

gwanwntal~ofwhichthofflcialiramcmbcriftbc~~hara~intcrcninrtal

pmperly,sod ‘it is reasonablyforeseeablethat an actionon the matterwill have P special economiceffect

on lbe value of lhe property,distinguishablefromits e&cl on the public.’ Id. (same).

Failure to comply with the requirementssection 171.004 articulatesmay am&uIe a class A

mi2demeanor.Local GJVVcode 0 171.003.

p. 1350

Mr. Jack W. Garison - Page 7 W-259)

Honorable Mike DriscoU

within the context of chapter 171 of the Local Government Code, section 171.004(a)

authorizes the member to participate in the determination of the protest, while section

41.69 of the Tax Code prohibits the members participation. Additionally, even if the

member has a substantial interest, section I71.004(c) may authorize the member to

participate after disclosingthe nature and extent of the interest, while, & section 41.69

of the Tax Code prohibits the member’s participation. To the extent of any wnflict

between section 171.004(a) of the Local Government Code as it applies to a member of an

appraisal review board and section 41.69 of the Tax Code, section 41.69 prevails because

it applies specificsUyto members of an appraisal review board. See 67 TEX. JUR 3d

Stitufes 8 126. at 719-24 (explaining that if general provision of statute irreconcilably

wnflicts with special or local provision, special or local provision generally prevails); id.

8 136, at 752 (stating that if general statute and more detailed enactment conflict, latter

generally prevails).

Mr. G&son’s questions involve a registered property tax wnsuhant. Article 8886,

section 2(d)(7), V.T.C.S., authorizes a registered property tax wmukant to perform or

supervise the performance of the following services:

(A) preparing a property tax rendition or report for another

person under Chapter 22, Tax Code;

(B) representing another person in a protest under Subchapter

C, Chapter 41, Tax Code;

(C) wnsuhing or advising another person wnwming the

preparation of a property tax rendition or report under Chapter 22.

Tax Code, or wncerning a matter the person may protest under

Subchapter C. Chapter 41. Tax Code;

(D) negotiating or entering into an agreement with an appraisal

district on behalf of another person wnceming a matter that is or

may be the subject of a protest under Subchapter C, Chapter 41, Tax

Code; or

Q acting as the designated agent of a property owner in

accordance with Section 1.111, Tax Code.7

V.T.C.S. art. 8886. 0 I(a)(7) (footnote added; footnote deleted). An appraisal review

board hears matters protested under subchapter C, chapter 41 of the Tax Code. See id.

5 l(a)(7)(C). Thus, a property tax wnsultsnt will have occasion to represent taxpayers

before an appraisal review board.

7Scaionl.llldthcTaxCodcauthorizerapmpcrty-tode+i~~apasonu,rctast&

owner’s agent for any purpose under title 1 of the Tax Code (chapters l-43) in ameuion wi(h the

propertyor propertyownerand providesthe m&cd by which a property- may so designate.

p. 1351

Mr. Jack W. Garison - Page 8 (DM-259)

Honorable Mike Hriscoll

Initially, Mr. Garison asks whether a registered property tax wnsultsnt may serve

as a member of an appraisal review board.* We are unaware of any statutory or wmmon-

law provision that prohibits a registered property tax wnsultant from serving as a member

of an appraisal review board. Of wurse, section 41.69 of the Tax Code limits a member’s

participation in a taxpayer protest in which the member has a direct personsl or pecuniary

interest. In our opinion, a member of sn appraisal rev& board who performs property

tax consulting services in a taxpayer protest that is before the appraisal review board has,

as a matter of law, a direct personal or pecuniary interest in the outcome of the matter.

Accordingly, section 41.69 of the Tax Code prohibits the member’sparticipation in the

determination of the protest.9 Neither section 41.69 nor any other law of which we are

awsre limits a member of an appraisal review board from performing property tax

wnsulting services before an appraisalreview board of snother district, however.

Mr. Garison also asks whether a registered property tax wnsuhant may serve as a

member of an appraisal district board, and conversely. whether a member of an appraisal

district board may perform property tax wnsulting services, in the ssme or a ditferent

appraisal district, without violating wntlict-of-interest laws.rO Section 6.01(a), (b) of the

Tax Code establishes in each county an appraisal district, which has the responsibility of

appraising property in the district for ad vulorem tax purposes of the taxing units in the

appraisal district. See Tax Code 6 1.04(12) (defining “taxing unit”); see also Attorney

Generd Cpiion JM-3060 (1989) at 1. A five-member board of directors governs each

appraisal district. Tax Code 4 6.03(a); see also Attorney General Opiion JM-1060 at 1.

The duties of the appraisal district board are largely administrative; for example, the

appraisal district board must appoint a chief appraiser, who serves as the chief

administrator of the appraisal office, Tax Code 8 6.05(c), and approve an annual budget

for the appraisal district, id. 8 6.06. Members of the public may wmment on any issue

*A0 wt amoider all nf Mr. Oarimn’sqwsUon9, we me a- that article 8886, section 6(a),

V.T.C.S.. reqdms the wmmimioner of licensing and regulation to “establish standa& of practice,

condw4 snd ethico” for registeredpmpertytax con&ants. Title 16, se&on 66.20(f) of the Texas

Mminidrativecode~ulatathecodeofahicstowhichcschngistrrcdpropertytax~~mmust

submit. Tbecodeofcthics~contDinraoprwisionrthatapplyto~ofthcrituationraboutwhich

Mr. Oarioon asks IO nor opinion, bownm, anick 8886, section 6(a). V.T.C.S., authorizes UK

commissi~ to promulgatesuch pmvisions.

9Forthcreasonsstated~,wcQnocw~dat&applicabilityofchapal7loftbcW

Ooemmal Cnde. See swprowtcs 5,6 mui accompanying text (discussing chapter 171 and ampring

Gavcrnaent Codesection 171.004(a)tithTaxCodesection41.69).

l”Additionally,Mr. G&son asks whdher the state eIhics law, Oovemment Code chap&r 572,

formerlyV.T.C.S. akcle 6252~9b.Acts 1993,73d Leg., ch. 268.0 1,46, pmhiiits a memberofeilher an

appraisaldiariaboardoran~praisalrcvicwboardfromprfonningpropcrtytaxwnsulting~~ia

lhe same or a di&mnt dihct, or wnvcrscly, a r@tered pmperIytax wnsultant from serving on either

board. The otstc ethics law applies only to slaIe officers and state employeesee Gov’tCode $572.001

(formerlyV.T.C.S. art. 6252~9b,8 1); it does not apply, therefore,to a memberof an appraisaldislricl

bC4Ud0rflp@.9dlCWbOiUd.

p. 1352

Mr. Jack W. Garison - Page 9 (DM-259)

Honorable M&e Driscoll

within an appraisal district board’sjurisdiction, see id. 5 6.04(d), and may 6le complaints

with the board, see id. 0 6.04(f). (g). Because a registered property tax consultant is

authorized to represent a property owner for any purpose under title 1 of the Tax Code

see V.T.C.S. art. 8886, 8 I(a)(7)(E); Tax Code 5 1.11l(a), a property tax consultant may

have occasion to represent a properly owner before an appraisal district board.

We End no wngict-of-interest law that prohibits a registered property tax

wnsuhant from serving as a member of an appraisal district board. Regarding the

propriety of an appraisal district board member performing property tax wnsulting

services either in the same or a different appraisal district, we note initiaUythat section

6.035(a) of the Tax Code parallels section 6.412(a) by making ineligible for service on a

appraisal district board an individual“related within the second degree by wnsan8uinity or

silinity, ss determined under Article 5996h, Revised Statutes, to an individual who is

engaged in the business. . of representing property owners for wmpensation in

proceedings under this title in the appraisal district.” The legislature enacted section

6.035(s) by mews of the same bii that enacted section 6.412(a). See Acts 1989. 71st

Leg., ch. 796, 8 4, at 3592. The legislature subsequently amended section 6.035(a)

expressly to reference article 599613 V.T.C.S., by means of the same bii similarly

amending section 6.412(a). See Acts 1991, 72d Leg., ch. 561, 5 43, at 1987. But see

supra note 1. For the reasons discussed in connection with section 6.412(a), see stcpra

notes l-2 and accompanying text, we believe that section 6.035(a) does not apply to a

situation in which a member of an appraisal district board is “an individualwho is engaged

in the business of apprsking propetty for compensation for use in proceedings under this

title or of representingproperty owners for wmpcnsation in proceedings under this title in

the appraisal district.“tr

zr Hemiogson H.B.24.95Beforethe HouseSubacun. en Ways& Mesns,71st Leg. (Apr.

mement 0fRepmatsnve Vsligura)(rapesvsilsblefromHcuss&aminee 8erviw OfIke).

kIdditionoOy,Rqmentstive Vsllgommawted for the mbanamttlcethe drauanaam in Mentgomcry

County,whichevidentlypmmptcdhim to iatmdweHouseBit 2495. He wted that th Montgomry

~Ehid~suwasnunorcdto~rrlativsinthcappraisalwwboccdimtErcaivad

pmfemtM trcatmcot Id. One of the boardmembers“a. sqportu of IRcpnscntatinValigura’r],*

stsohsdavaygmdspprstsslbusinw. Id. RcprcscntativeVsligurafchthstwpencnccmin8before

tbeapprairaldimidboardforprotcztorforvpluatioasrbouldreceive~typeofprrfaentiplmatmcnl

Id. We believethatRsprescntative Valigura’testtmony

s laudsfirrtkr suppcntc ear wnclusionthat

&on 6.035(a)cd lhc Tsx Cedeappliescmlyto sttustionsin whicha relativeof a boardmcmk is

iovolvedin the appraisalbusiness;the legislsturcdid not intendthe s&sectionto spptyin a stmstionin

whichtheboardmemberhim&for herselfis involvedin theappraisalbusiness.

p. 1353

Mr. Jack W. Garison - Page 10 (DM-259)

Honorable Mike Driscoll

We believe that chapter 171 of the Local Government Code governs the situation

about which Mr. Garison asks.12 Under chapter 171, a member of an appraisal district

board must, prior to a vote or decision on any matter involving a business entity or real

property in which the member hss a substantial interest, disclose the nature and extent of

the interest and possibly to abstain from tinther participation in the matter.‘3 See supra

notes 5, 6 and accompanying text (discussing chapter 171 and comparing Gov’t Code

# 171.004(a) with Tax Code § 41.69). However, whether, for purposes of chapter 171 of

the Local Government Code, a member of an appraisal district board has a substantial

interest in a business entity and therefore must comply with section 171.004(a) is a

question involving the resolution of facts; such a question cannot be determined in the

opinion process. Gn the other hand, we are unaware of any statute that limits a member

of an appraisal district board from performing property tax wnsultant services before the

appraisal district board of another district.

SUMMARY

Pursuant to section 41.69 of the Tax Code, a member of an

appraisal review board may not participate in the determination of a

taxpayer protest before the appraisal review board in which the

member, acting as a paid, court-appointed receiver of a tract of

property in the appraisal district, represented a property owner

becsuse the member has, as a matter of law, a direct personal or

pecuniary interest in the outcome of the protest. Siarly, section

41.69 of the Tax Code precludes a member of an appraisal review

board from participating in the deterrninstion of a taxpayer protest if

the member performed property tax wnsuhing services in the protest

RepmmnMvc Valigura’sbill, HouseBii 2495, was left pendingbeforethe damunit& of the

HouseCommiltceonWaysandMcans. Howcver,thcHouseChmitteeonWaysandMeansincorporatcd

into its wmmittce substiMe for House Bill 432 subrtantiallysimilar language to that House Bill 2495

propodforIhcacws&ion6.035ofUuTaxCdc. Furhnnorc,thcwmmitt~ddutepmpodtbc

addition d section 6.412(a) 10 the Tax Code, rhe language of which is atbaaotially similar lo the

lwgosge of section 6.035(a). Rqmsatalivc Stila, lhe authorof House Bill 432, wnsi6ered House Bill

432tobe’anomnibusbilltbat...willdeanupthcproblanrofadministration~financingd

appmiddiaricIsiathcatatc.’

12Section41.69 ofthe Tax Code&es not applyIme beta= that sectionapplies to the members

ofanapp&salreviewbmrd,noItothcmanbcrsofanappraisaldistriaboard

Whis office has 9tatedthat a memberof an appraisaldistrictboardis a local public official for

7 of chapter171 of tie Local GovernmentCode. See AnorneyGeneralOpinion JM-1187(1990)

p. 1354

Mr. Jack W. Garison - Page 11 W-259)

Honorable Mike Driscoll

because the member therefore has a direct personal or pecuniary

interest in the determination of the protest.

Section 171.004(a) of the Local Government Code requires a

member of an appraisal district board who has perfomxd property

tsx wnsulting services in a taxpayer protest before the appraisal

district board to disclose the nature and extent of the men&z’s

interest, but only ifthe member hss a substantial interest in a business

entity or real property involved in the matter. The determinstion of

whether an appraisal district board member hss such a substantial

interest involves the resolution of facts; it is therefore outside the

scope of the opinion process.

DAN MORALES

Attorney General of Texss

WILL PRYOR

First Assistant Attorney Genersl

MARYJCJZLJD

Deputy Attorney Genersl for Lit&ion

RENEA HICKS

State Solicitor

MADELEINE B. JOHNSON

Chair, opinion Committee

Prepared by Kymberly K. Oltrogge

Assistant Attorney General

p. 1355

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.