Opinion

Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

Court
Texas Attorney General Reports
Filed
Jul 2, 1995
Status
Published
On the bench
Dan Morales
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 3.5%

holding that Lntemal Security Act of 1950 was not unconstitutional delegation of r&making authority because other statutes provided standards for determming what aliens were subject to deportation and thus limited attorney general’s p. 1670 Ms. Rebecca Lightsey - Page 4 (DM-314

How later courts described this case

  • holding that Lntemal Security Act of 1950 was not unconstitutional delegation of r&making authority because other statutes provided standards for determming what aliens were subject to deportation and thus limited attorney general’s p. 1670 Ms. Rebecca Lightsey - Page 4 (DM-314

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

QEWce of the Bttornep @enera

&date of Qexae

DAN MORALES

ATTORNEY

GENERAL

January lo,1995

Ms. Rebecca Lightsey Opinion No. DM-3 14

Interim Commissioner of Insurance

Texas Department of Insurance Re: Whether the Department of Insurance

P.O. Box 149104 may, pursuant to Insurance Code article

Austin, Texas 78714-9104 3.50-6A license noninsurance entities that

offer via&al settlement agreements, and

related questions (RQ-663)

Dear Ms. Lightsey:

Your predecessor in office asked us four questions about Insurance Code (“code”)

article 3.50-6A:

1. Does article 3.50-6A authorize the Department of Insurance (the

“department”) to license noninsurance entities that offer viatical

settlement agreements?

2. If the answer to the first question is afErmative, does article

3.50-6A authorize the department to charge a fee for such a license?

3. Does article 3.50-6A authorize the commissioner of insurance to

enforce, through the sanctions provided in code article 1.10,

subsection 7(a),’ rules the department would adopt under article

3.50-6A?

4. If the answer to the third question is negative, does article

3.50-6A authorize the department to report to the attorney general

violations of rules promulgated under article 3.50-6A and to request

that the attorney general file suit to enforce such rules?

All four questions assume as a threshold matter that article 3.50-6A validly

delegates authority to the department to regulate viatical settlements. For the following

reasons, we are of the opinion that article 3.50-6A is invalid as an unconstitutional

‘Subsection7(a) authorizesthe commissionerof insuranceto ordersanctionsagainst “the hold-

or possessor0F a “permit,license. ceticate of authority,certificateof registration,or otherauthotition

issd or existing under [the Commissioner’s]authorityor the authorizationof th[e Iusmauw] code.”

p. 1668

Ms. Rebecca Lightsey - Page 2 (DM-314)

delegation of regulatory authority and therefore that the department has no authority

under this statute to regulate via&l settlements.

The concept of a via&al2 settlement agreement

is simple but controversial: An investor buys the life insurance policy

of someone with AIDS for less than the face value, becomes the

lxeiiciary and makes money when the person dies.

In return, the AIDS suffbrer receives a large amount of cash-

usually 50 to 80 percent of the policy depend@ on his or her life

epxtang-to pay off debts or just enjoy.

Housewright, .wqru note 2. “The viatical industry got started in 1989 because of AIDS,

although people with terminal illness such as cancer are also selling their policies.”

LeighHopper, AIDS Sufferers Swq In.wance for Ready Cash, HOUSTON POST,

Apr. 1, 1994, at Al, A15; c$ Miller, .w~prunote 2 (“The first viaticai company appeared in

19W). Cancer patients make up only ten percent of those now selling their policies but

are expected to become a majority in the near future. Quint, supru note 2, at Cl, C2.

Some viatical companies buy and hold policies, and others “are brokers that Snd buyers

and receive a fee for their service.” Housewright. zqoru note 2.

Article 3.50-644 which was added to the code in the last legislative session, see

Acts 1993,73d Leg., ch. 918, provides as follows:

Definitions

Sec. 1. In this article, ‘%atical settlement” means a contract,

entered into by an insured with a terminal illness who owns a life

insurance policy insuring the life of the insured, under which the

insured assigns or transfers the insurance policy to another person or

entity for valuable consideration.

Regulation by Board

Sec. 2. The board has exclusive jurisdiction in this state to

regulate viatical settlements, regardless of form, other than

transactions governed by The Securities Act (Article 581-1 et seq.,

Vernon’s Texas Civil Statutes).

zkWica/ dcrhea from UICLatin wordviaticum, which mfermdto “the meaey and sqqrites &en

to Rolnallo5eids bcfom risky journeys to far-nm.g legions of th unpin.” Micbacl Quint, Pre-Deuth

C&h: A Busim~ Grmvs,N.Y. TIMES,Nov. 14, 1994, at Cl. Vitical setUcmentsscmuium SE called

‘living bedi&,” Ed Houscwri%t, Investors’ Purchase of AIDS Patients’ Insvroncc Policies Rakes

Ethical Qavtions, DALLASMxumm NEWS,Feb. 7.1994, at Al, or “deathfWu.m,*MarkMiller, Taking

on “‘Ded~Futws, ” NEWSWEEK.

Mar.2 1.1994, at 54.

p. 1669

Ms. RebeccaLightsey - Page 3 (DM-314)

The department is the %oard” to which article 3.50-6A refers. See Ins. Code art.

l.OlA(c).

It is settled law in this state that “some criteria or safeguards” are necessary to the

valid delegation of legislative power to administrative agexies. Texas Antiquities Comm.

v. Daub Gnot~ Communi~ College Dist., 554 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Tex. 1977) (plurality

opinion). The “criteria or safeguards” do not have to be found in the statutory delegation,

however: the separation of powers required by section 1 of article II of the Texas

Constitutions does not forbid that an administrative agency itself make rules estabMing

standards to guide its exercise of power in e&&ration of the legislative purpose, provided

that the rules are made pursuant to power delegated by the legislature and in accordance

with procedures that protect the rights of persons affected by the exercise of regulatory

discretion. See T-p v. Shell Oil Co., 198 S.W.2d 424, 438-39 (Tex. 1946) (on motion

for rehearing), see also Texus Antiquities &mm., 554 S.W.2d at 928 @hnality opinion)

(“We have, ln this case, no standard or criteria either by statute or rule which affords

safeguards for the at&cted parties”). Thus, to constitute a valid delegation of legislative

power, an organic statute that lacks meanin@ standards must at least have a discernible

general regulatory purpose. See Trqp, 198 S.W.2d at 438; see also 1

KENNETHC. DAVIS, AD~~NISTIMIVELAW TREATISEp 3:15, at 209 (2d ed. 1978) (“a

delegation without stun&r& of power to make rules in accordance with proper rule-

making procedure and a delegation without stat&r& of power to work out policy

through case-to-case adjudication based on trial-type hearings should normally be

sustained, whenew?rthe general legidative puqxxe is hcemible”) (last emphasis added).

The legislature must set the public policy of the state, and the agency must exercise its

delegated r&making power within the limits of the primary standards prescribed by the

legislature or implicit in the public policy. See Brown v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 83

S.W.2d 935. 940-41 (Tex. 1935). Analyzing under these principles, we find that article

3.50-6A has neither standards nor a discernible regulatory purpose.

Article 3.50-6A does not express any standards or guidelines for regulation, nor

can we tier from readii the article in pari muteria with the rest of the code any

legislative intent as to such standards or guidelines. C’ Car&m v. Lrmdon, 342 U.S. 524,

544 (1952) (holding that Lntemal Security Act of 1950 was not unconstitutional

delegation of r&making authority because other statutes provided standards for

determming what aliens were subject to deportation and thus limited attorney general’s

p. 1670

Ms. Rebecca Lightsey - Page 4 (DM-314)

authority under Internal Security Act of 1950 to detain such aliens without bail pending

deportation proceeding). For instance, we cBMot read code article 1.lOA, which

authorizes the commissioner of insurance to issue a cease and desist order in certain

circumstances against a person “engaging in the business of insurance,” as being applicable

to a viatical company unless that company in fact engages in some act in Texas that

con&utesthebusinessof~ asde6nedincodeartick.1.14-1.4 Thesameistrue

of code article 21.21, which prohibits certain “u&r methods of competition or unfair or

deceptive acts or practices [m the business of insurance].”

2.Thcmakingofol ~mmalrc,~guarpntoro~~,aoY

contmztdguamntyorsurdysbipasavocationandaotmerelyincidentaltoany

otlmlegitimatcbusiwmnr~tydtbcgwmatnrnrmrcty.

3.TlEtakiagorraxivhgofanyapplicatiorlforiaarrana.

4. The mwiviug or cdlaXion of any pmndum, commission,membership

fccs,asscsrmcnts,duesorotkrmnsidcrationforanyinwam M pny part

tkreof.

5.Thcimuwceordeuverynfwnuaclsofhuanawe tolwidemaofthia

dateMlopcmma-to&buaiwasintldastate.

7.coouaaingteprwidcindc~Mcapenscrcimburacmnththis

~topersonsdomiciltdinthisstattorforridrslocatcdinthisgatc....

8.l%edoiq~ofaaykindofircam~x bmiincm~~aa

mnstitutiagthedoingefaninsurancc busincsswithiaIhemcaningoftllestahnes

mlatingloia&umwc.

9. T&e doiag or pmposipsfoQany iwurawebusinessin~

~knaay of the foregomgm a mawcrdmi~tocvadethcpmvisioas

10. AnyotkrbanmaionsofbusinCmillthisstatebyanirlaucr.

Ins. Cc& art. 1.14-l. 5 2(a). You do not Cite,nor baw wc fou@ any pmvision in the oxk pmdating

article3.50-6A tbat wudd anthoriz the liccnsurrof Compani~to Cngagein ViatiCalservim.

p. 1671

Ms. RebeccaLightsey - Page 5 (DM-314)

Furthermore, there is no well-established case law, administrative practice, or

background of custom that the legislature could have intended the department to rely on

as standards of practice or policy guidelines for the inthnt viatical industry. We have

found in our research no reported case dealing with viatical settlements.’ The department

has no existing regulatory scheme with crystallii standards of practice that the

legislature could have intended to extend to viatical settlements. C’ Kent v. Lhdles, 357

U.S. 116, 127-28 (1958) (administrative practice prior to enactment of standardless

statute granting secretary of state discretion to grant passports had crystallized into two

grounds for passport denial, citizenship [or allegiance] and unlawful conduct, which were

“the only ones which it could fairly be argued were adopted by Congress in light of prior

administrative practice”).

Compare the legislative delegation of regulatory power in Fahey v. Mallonee, 332

U.S. 245 (1947), where a statute authorized the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to

regulate “the reorganization, consolidation, merger, or liquidation of [building and loan]

associations,” with “the power to appoint a conservator or receiver to take charge of the

affairs of any such association.” Id. at 249. The Court there held that the statute was a

constitutionally valid delegation of legislative fimctions, despite its lack of standards,

because banking was a long-regulated industry with “well-defined practices” for

appointment of conservators and receivers and the courts had “many precedents” in the

field of corporate management that had “crystallized into well-known and generally

acceptable standards.” Id. at 250. Article 3.50-6A, unliie the statute in Fuky, cannot be

construed as conforming to wnstitutionally permissible “‘well-known and generally

acceptable standards” that would limit the department’s rulemaking discretion.” Id.

Article 3.50-6A lacks even a discernible legislative purpose for the delegation of

regulatory power. One author opines in the following words that exactitude should not be

a requirement for the expression of regulatory purpose:

When the legislative draftsmen decide upon the terms of the

delegation, it is for them to decide whether the legislature shall set

the policy in definitive terms, or whether on the other hand the

legislative enactment shall express its general purpose only in terms

of a pious wish, delegating to an administrative agency the

responsibility of actually determining the working policies by which

the generally-phrased legislative desire should be attained.

LAW 71 (1965). We need not consider here

FRANKE. COOPER,STATEADMTNISTRA~VE

how precise an expression of regulatory purpose must be to pass muster under the Texas

%nly a handful of states have laws regulatingthe industry. Ernest Sander, Grim Reapers,

Aufam AMEIUCAN-STATESMAN. May 1,1994, at Jl, 16 (listing California,lndiana, Kansas,New Mexico,

and New York). Early last year the National Associationof lnsunce Commissionersadopted model

legislationfor stateregulationof viaticalsettlements.See id. Viatical8ettlementsModelAct (Nat’1Ass’n

of Ins. c4Xnm’rs1994).

p. 1672

Ms.RebewaLightsey - Page 6 (DM-314)

Constitution, for article 3.50-6A lacks the expression of even a “pious wish” or “ge.neraIly-

phrased legislative desire.” Compare the legislative purpose in the statutory delegation

upheld in the Trupp case: “for the wnwrvation of crude petroleum oil and natural gas and

to prevent the waste thereof” V.T.C.S. art. 6029. repealed by Acts 1977,65th Leg., ch.

871, art. I, 5 2(a)(2); see Trqp, 198 S.WSd at 438. There is no discernible implication of

legislative purpose from the statute’s expression of “via&al settlements” as the subject

matter to be regulated.

Fiiy, we do not find in the legislative history of article 3.50-6A any statement of

the legislature’s objective for regulation by the department. Furthermore, the House

Committee on Insurance’s analysis for the Seventy-third Legislature’s House Bii 431,

which added article 3.50&A to the code, see Acts 1993, 73d Leg., ch. 918, provides,

surprisingly, ,-It is the opinion of this committee that this bill does not confer rulemaking

authority to a state officer, agency, department or institution.” House Comm. on

Inswanw, Bii halysis, H.B. 43 1.73d Leg. (1993). In the House Research organization

analysis of the House Bii 431 unnamed “other opponents” of the bill are cited for the

following arguments:

unless regulated wrrectly, unscrupulous viatical settlement

operators could prey upon physically or mentally vulnerable and

financially desperate individuals. HB 431 should contain specific

direction to TDI to ensure the protection of wnsumers, such as

regulations that would require wnsumers to seek legal counsel,

operators to offer tax advice and to discuss via&al settlement

options and the establishment of a waiting period for the insured to

reconsider a sale.

Acceptable fee schedules for viatical settlement brokers and

agents should also be implemented to ensure against high profits

made at the expense of the terminahy ill. Currently, a wide range of

fees and expenses are charged for the arrangement of viatical

WttlWlUltS.

House Research won, Bii Analysis, H.B. 431,73d Leg., at 3 (1993). Any or all

of the objectives that the “other opponents” allude to above-prohibiting tmscntpulou~

practices; preventing the exploitation of weak, desperate, or incompetent insumds;

rewiring that the decision to sell one’s life insmwce policy be an informed one;

wntrolling investors’ profits-may have been intended by the legislators to be incorporated

within the article 3.50&t’s textually empty delegation of authority “to regulate viatical

settlements.” Any of these objectives would have served to give purport to the delegation

of regulatory power if there had been an expression in the legislative history of such

objectives as the sense of the lawmakers. Unfortunately, there is no such expression.

Rather, the purpose of House Bii 431 as stated in the House Committee on Insurance’s

bii analysis, “to clearly establish the jurisdiction of the State Board of Insurance over the

regulation of viatical settlements,” adds no substance to the needed regulatory objective.

p. 1673

Ms. Rebecca Lightsey - Page 7 (DM-314)

We believe the nondelegation doctrine requires that a valid delegation of

. .

admuustratve regulatory power contain either in the. text or in the legislative history of the

organic statute a discemihle legislative regulatory objective. See Trupp, 198 S.W.2d at

438; 1 DAVIS, supru p. 3. A court may not assume the function of formulating an

objective upon which to limit the scope of regulatory power under article 3.50-6A. Such

judicial legislation to formulate regulatory policy would constitute an invasion of a

nondelegable responsibiity of representative government, see Stephen Koslow,

S-em Adminishztive A+dication, 22 ADMIN.L. REV. 407,420 (l%l), as well as

a function for which the court may not be institutionslly equipped:

In a representative democracy, regulatory policy is likely to be the

product of compromise among a multitude of conflicting interests

and views which find a voice in the legislative process. Logic and

legal analysis, touchstones of the judicial process, so &r as relevant

at all in the work of legislative bodies, play a distinctly subordiite

role. Courts cannot succeed in simulating that feature of the

legislative process in the fashioning of regulatory goals unless they

are willing openly to assume the role of legislators.

Id. at 420-21. Article 3.50-6A is a good example of a statute that purports to regulate a

matter (viatical settlements) involving contlicting interests (persons with terminal illnesses,

viatical companies, investors). Although this statute ought to voice some compromise

among the congicting interests in the form of a discernible objective, it in fact is mute.

Because there are no standards and no discerniile legislative purpose in the

delegation of regulatory authority in article 3.50-64 we must conclude that the statute

violates the separation of powers principle of the Texas Constitution. See Tex. Const. art.

II, 8 1; cfl Attorney General Opiion JM-1134 (1990) at 4 (statute grant@ Texas Racing

Commission authority to regulate non-pari-mutuel racetracks was unconstitutional

delegation of legislative power). Article 3.50-6A therefore is null and void.

p. 1674

Ms. RebeccaLightsey - Page 8 (DM-314)

SUMMARY

Article 3.50-6A of the Insurance Code is null and void because it

violates the Beparation of powers required by section 1 of article II of

the Texas Constitution in that it provides neither standards nor a

discernible objective in its delegation of regulatory authority to the

DepameM of Insurance.

DAN MORALES

Attorney General of Texas

JORGE VEGA

First Assistant Attorney General

SARAH J. SHIRLEY

Chair, Opinion Committee

Prepared by James B. Pinson

Assistant Attorney General

p. 1675

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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