Opinion

Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

Court
Texas Attorney General Reports
Filed
Jul 2, 2006
Status
Published
On the bench
Greg Abbott
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 3.5%

The opinion

ATTORNEY GE&RAL OF TEXAS

GREG ABBOTT

September 5,2006

Raymund A. Paredes, Ph.D. Opinion No. GA-0452

Commissioner of Higher Education

Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board Re: Annexation of territory by ajunior college

Post Office Box 12788 district (RQ-0446-GA)

Austin, Texas 78711

Dear Commissioner Paredes:

On behalf of Coastal Bend College, you ask our opinion regarding the authority of a

governing board~of a junior college district to order an annexation election under chapter 130, Texas

Education Code.’ Specifically, you inquire about the operation of sections 130.065 and 130.068.

See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1.

Section 130.065 provides the requirements for the annexation ofterritory by ajunior college

district by election. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. 5 130.065 (Vernon Supp. 2006). The governing

board of a junior college district is authorized to call an annexation election upon the “presentation

of a petition proposing the annexation ofterritory to the district.” Id. S 130.065(a). The petition

must adequately describe the territory proposed for annexation and “be signed by a number of

registered voters in the territory equal to at least five percent of the registered voters in that

territory.” Id. $ 130,065(a)(l>(2). Section 130.065 also sets forth the procedures for conducting

the election; procedures that include a public hearing, an informational service plan, the ballot

language, and a majority vote. See id. 5 130.065(b) (public hearing), (c) (service plan), (g) (ballot

language), (h) (majority vote); see also id. 5 130.065(d)-(f), (i)-(l) (additional procedures and

requirements),.

Section 130.068 provides that a “governing board of a’junior college district may order an

election on the question of establishing expanded boundaries for the junior college district. . within

[all or part ofI2 the district’s service area established by Subchapter J” in two instances. Id. 5

130.068(ah(b). Those two instances occur:

‘See Letter from Raymund A. Panda, Ph.D., Commissioner of Higher Education, Texas Higher Education

Coordinating Board, to Honorable Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, at 1 (Feb. 6, 2006) (on tile with the

Opinion Committee, also available af http:llwww.oag.state.tx.us) [hereinafter Request Letter].

‘Subsection 130.068(a) relates to the expansion ofthe juniqr college district to “encompass all of the territory

located within the district’s service area established by Subchapter J.” TEX. EDUC.CODEANN. 5 130.068(a) (Vernon

Supp. 2006) (emphasis added). Subsection 130.068(b) pertains to the expansion of the junior college district to

“encompasspart ofthe territory located within the district’s service area established by Subchapter J.” Id. $ 130.068(b)

(emphasis added); see generally Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0314 (2005).

Raymund A. Paredes, Ph.D. - Page 2 (GA-0452)

(a) . . if more than 35 percent of the total number of students who

enrolled in the junior college district in the most recent academic year

resided outside of the existing junior college district[, or]

(b) if more than 15 percent of the high school graduates for each

of the preceding five academic years in the territory proposed to be

added to the district have enrolled in the junior college district.

Id. Section 130.068 also provides that “[elxcept as otherwise provided by this section, Section

130.065 applies to an action taken under this section, including the provisions of Section 130.065

requiring a petition to be submitted before an election may be called.” Id. 5 130.068(c). Coastal

Bend College wants to know whether its governing board may call an annexation election without

a petition when one of these alternative circumstances exist. See Request Letter, supva note 1, at

l-2. Your question requires us to construe sections 130.065 and 130.068.

The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the legislature’s intent and to give

effect to that intent. See Union Bankers Ins. Co. v. Shelton, 889 S.W.2d 278,280 (Tex. 1994). The

plain language of the statute is the primary indication of legislative intent. See Fitzgerald v.

Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 865-66 (Tex. 1999). Where the intent is

unclear from the literal language we may consider aids to construction such as the legislative history,

the object to be obtained, and the consequences of a particular construction. See Union Bunkers Ins.

Co., 889 S.W.2d at 280; see also TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. 3 311.023 (Vernon 2005) (Code

Construction Act). A statute is to be construed so that it harmonizes with other law unless the statute

clearly contains a contrary intention. See Blackv. Am. Bankers Ins. Co., 478 S. W.2d 434,437 (Tex.

1972). But we will not apply the statutory language literally if the statute’s plain language would

lead to absurd consequences that the legislature could not have possibly intended. See Sharp v.

House ofLloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245,249 (Tex. 1991). And we strive to always “give effect to all

the words of a statute and not treat any statutory language as surplusage.” Chevron Corp. v. Redmon,

745 S.W.2d 314,316 (Tex. 1987) (citing Perkins v. State, 367 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. 1963)).

Subsection 130.068(c) is unclear. See nx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 130.068(c) (Vernon Supp.

2006). The language-“[elxcept as otherwise provided by this section, Section 130.065 applies to

an action taken under this section”-indicates that where section 130.068 provides otherwise, it does

so as an exception to section 130.065. Id.; see Fain v. State, 986 S.W.2d 666, 672 (Tex.

App.-Austin 1998, pet. ref d) (recognizing the language “except as otherwise provided” creates an

exception). Section 130.068 provides otherwise from section 130.065 in only one respect-section

130.068 authorizes the governing board to call, an election based on student benchmarks,. while

section 130.065 authorizes an election upon presentment of a petition. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.

$5 130.065(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006) (“Onpresentation.. ofapetition. .“); 130.068(a)-(b) (“[tlhe

governing board may order an election. . . if [specified student attendance thresholds are metI”).

In all other respects the two provisions are harmonious, so that the requirements and procedures in

section 130.065 apply to an election authorized by subsections 130.068(a) or@). Thus, the authority

to call an election based on student benchmarks and the authority based on a petition appear to be

alternatives, so that subsections 130.068(a) and (b) are exceptions to section 130.065 to the extent

that section 130.065 requires a petition.

Raymund A. Paredes, Ph.D. - Page 3 (GA-0452)

But subsection 130.068(c) also states that section 130.065 applies to actions taken under

section 130.068, “including the provisions of section 130.065 requiring a petition to be submitted

before an election may be called.” Id. $ 130.068(c). This language which can be interpreted to

require a petition would directly conflict with the construction that subsections 130.068(a) and (b)

are alternatives to the petition requirement. Were we to construe this phrase literally and under the

ordinary rules of grammar, a petition wouid seem to be required in all instances. Such a construction

would render subsections 130.068(a) and (b) meaningless and make the first part of subsection

130.068(c) surplusage. If a petition under subsection 130.065(a) is a prerequisite to an annexation

election, then satisfaction of that requirement alone would authorize the governing board to call the

election under section 130.065-the student benchmark provisions in subsections 130.068(a) and

(b) would be unnecessary. And there is no need for subsection 130.068(c) to create an exception to

section 130.065 when it provides otherwise if section 130.068 does not provide otherwise in any

respect. Based on a purely plain reading of subsection 130.068(c), we appear to be faced then with

a choice between construing as meaningless either (1) the last phrase of subsection 130.068(c) or (2)

the fast phrase of subsection 130.068(c) as well as the entirety of subsections 130.068(a) and (b).

But there is a construction that gives full effect to all of~section 130.068 and section 130.065

and that at the same time retains all of the statutory language of subsection 130.068(c). That

construction requires us to interpret the language of subsection 130.068(c) that states “including the

provisions of Section 130.065 requiring a petition to be submitted before an election may be called”

to relate to the “[elxcept as otherwise provided” language atthe beginning of subsection 130.068(c)

and not to the immediately preceding language that states that “Section 130.065 applies to an action

taken under this section.” Id. Under this construction, subsection 130.068(c) can be understood to

provide that section 130.068 operates as an exception to section 130.065 including section 130.065’s

petition requirement. Such a construction harmonizes sections 130.065 and 130.068 and preserves

the legislative enactment. Though this construction may not follow the ordinary rules of grammar,

we are to avoid treating statutory language as surplusage unless doing so is absolutely unavoidable.

See Davis v. State, 225 S.W. 532,535 (Tex. Crim. App. 1920); see also Escobar v. Sutherland, 917

S.W.2d 399, 407 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, no writ) (recognizing that courts may disregard the

rules of grammar to give effect to legislative intent). Much like the Texas Supreme Court, here we

do not lightly presume the Legislature [to] have done a useless act,

and [do] not read statutory language to be pointless if it is reasonably

susceptible of another construction. But as both these statements

suggest, we must recognize that possibility. It is at least theoretically

possible that legislators-like judges or anyone else-may make a

mistake.

Brown v. De Jo Cruz, 156 S.W.3d 560,566 (Tex. 2004) (footnotes omitted).

When subsection 130.068(c) is given this construction, subsections 130.068(a) and (b)

operate as narrow exceptions to only the petition requirement of section 130.065. The remaining

provisions of section 130.065 would apply to an annexation election called by a governing board

under subsections 130.068(a) or(b). Accordingly, we conclude that the governing body of ajunior

college district may call an annexation election without a petition when authorized by subsections

130.068(a) or(b).

Raymund A. Paredes, Ph.D. - Page 4 (GA-0452)

SUMMARY

Under the Texas Education Code, chapter 130, a governing

board of a junior college district may call or order an annexation

election without a voter petition when authorized by subsections

130.068(a) or (b). An election so called must nevertheless comply

with all other procedural requirements of section 130.065.

Very truly yours,

4kiZBW

Attorney General of Texas

KENT C. SULLIVAN

First Assistant Attorney General

ELLEN L. WITT

Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel

NANCY S. FULLER

Chair, Opinion Committee

Charlotte M. Harper

Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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