Opinion

Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

Court
Texas Attorney General Reports
Filed
Jul 2, 2014
Status
Published
On the bench
Greg Abbott
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 3.5%

"[T]he Contract Clause does not operate to obliterate the police power of the States."

How later courts described this case

  • "[T]he Contract Clause does not operate to obliterate the police power of the States."
  • upholding the Edwards Aquifer Act against a challenge that it violated the Contract Clause of the Texas Constitution

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

GREG

0

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

ABBOTT

April 28, 2014

The Honorable Linda Harper-Brown Opinion No. GA-1054

Chair, Committee on Government

Efficiency and Reform Re: Whether state statutes that prohibit or

Texas House of Representatives void certain restrictive covenants affect

Post Office Box 2910 covenants existing at the time the statutes are

Austin, Texas 78768-2910 enacted (RQ-1161-GA)

Dear Representative Harper-Brown:

You ask three questions concerning the Legislature's authority to enact legislation that

may impact property owners' association ("POA") covenants. 1 As background, you explain that

the Eighty-secopd Legislature enacted Property Code section 202.010, which, in relevant part,

prohibits a POA from including or enforcing "a provision in a dedicatory instrument that

prohibits or restricts a property owner from installing a solar energy device." TEX. PROP. CoDE

ANN. § 202.010(b) (West Supp. 2013); Request Letter at 1. You note that "[q]uestions have

been raised regarding what effect legislation like this has on existing POA covenants." Request

Letter at 1. Your request, however, does not ask specifically about this statute but instead

questions generally the effect that new legislation could have on existing contracts. See id.

You first ask whether POA covenants "receive protection under various portions of both

state and federal constitutions ... , and if so [whether] the Texas Legislature [must] afford POAs

the same or greater protection than is given to these fundamental civil rights by the U.S . Supreme

Court." Id. Your third question relatedly asks whether article I, section 29 of the Texas

Constitution prohibits the Legislature from "pass[ing] legislation for the health, safety and

welfare of the public" when doing so interferes with "areas that are protected by the Bill of

Rights, specifically in reference to any legislation that may interfere with Article I, Section 16."

ld. at 2. Because these questions both concern the constitutional prohibition on the impairment

of contracts, we will answer them together.

POA covenants are treated as "contracts between parties." Ostrowski v. Ivanhoe Prop.

Owners Improvement Ass'n, 38 S.W.3d 248, 252 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. denied).

1

See Letter from Hon. Linda Harper-Brown, House Comm. on Gov't Efficiency & Reform, to Hon. Greg

Abbott, Tex. Att'y Gen. at 1-2 (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.texasattomeygeneral.gov/opin ("Request Letter").

The Honorable Linda Harper-Brown - Page 2 (GA-1054)

Article I section 16 of the Texas Constitution provides that "[n]o . . . law impairing the

obligation f contracts, shall be made. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16; see also U.S. CaNST. art. I,

§ 10 cl. 1 ("No State sh all ... pass any . .. Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts"). Article

I, section 29 of lhe Texas Constitution further provides:

To guard against transgressions of the high powers herein

delegated, we declare that everything in this "Bill of Rights" is

excepted out of the general powers of government, and shall

forever remain inviolate, and all laws contrary thereto, or to the

following provisions, shall be void.

TEX. CONST. art. I,§ 29.

Both the Texas Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court have determined

that the constitutional rule against impairment of contracts "may yield to statutes which are

necessary to safeguard the public safety and welfare." Barshop v. Medina Cnty. Underground

Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 635 (Tex. 1996) (upholding the Edwards Aquifer

Act against a challenge that it violated the Contract Clause of the Texas Constitution); Allied

Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 (1978) ("[T]he Contract Clause does not

operate to obliterate the police power of the States."). In order to withstand a challenge under

the Contract Clause, a state law that substantially impairs a contractual relationship must serve a

"significant and legitimate public purpose," and the adjustment of the rights and responsibilities

of the contracting parties must be based upon reasonable conditions and of a character

appropriate to the public purpose justifying the adjustment. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tex. Dep 't of

Ins., 187 S.W.3d 808, 824-25 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, pet. denied). A court reviewing the

constitutionality of a statute challenged under the Contract Clause would begin with the

presumption that the statute is valid and that the Legislature has not acted unreasonably or

arbitrarily. See HL Farm C01p. v. Self, 877 S.W.2d 288, 290 (Tex. 1994). Whether any specific

statute can withstand this scrutiny such that it could lawfully affect the rights established by a

particular POA covenant will be for a court to determine.

In your second question you ask whether "Texas Property Code 202.006 [is] a bill of

attainder" such that it is unconstitutional under "state and federal constitutions." Request Letter

at 1. Section 202.006 of the Property Code provides:

(a) A property owners' association shall file all dedicatory

instruments in the real property records of each county in

which the property to which the dedicatory instruments relate

is located.

(b) A dedicatory instrument has no effect until the instrument is

filed in accordance with this section.

TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 202.006 (West Supp. 2013). Both the Texas and United States

Constitutions provide that "[n]o bill of attainder ... shall be made" by the Legislature. TEX.

CONST. art. I, § 16; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No bill of attainder . . . shall be passed.").

The Honorable Linda Harper-Brown - Page 3 (GA-1054)

Texas and federal courts define a bill of attainder as "a legislative act that applies to a named

individual or to an easily identified member of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment

without a trial." Johnson v. Davis, 178 S.W.3d 230, 240 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]

2005, pet. denied) (citing United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303,315 (1946)).

"The proscription against bills of attainder reaches only statutes that inflict punishment

on the specified individual or group." Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp.,

468 U.S. 841, 851 (1984). Three inquiries are used to determine whether a statute inflicts

punishment: "(1) whether the challenged statute falls within the historical meaning of legislative

punishment; (2) whether the statute, viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens

imposed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes; and (3) whether the

legislative record evinces a congressional intent to punish." In re Commitment of Miller, 262

S.W.3d 877, 888 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2008, pet. denied) (cert. denied) (quoting Selective

Serv. Sys., 468 U.S. at 852) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

With regard to the first inquiry, courts have recognized that a burden placed on citizens

by a governmental authority does not necessarily equate to punishment. See Nixon v. Adm 'r of

Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 470 (1977). Historically, the list of punishments forbidden by the Bill

of Attainder Clause has been limited to imprisonment, banishment, punitive confiscation of

property and legislative bars to participation by individuals or groups in specific employments or

professions. Selective Serv. Sys., 468 U.S. at 852. Section 202.006 imposes none of the burdens

historically associated with "punishment." With regard to the second inquiry, the burden

imposed by section 202.006 requires property owners' associations to file all dedicatory

instruments with the county in order to make them effective. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.

§ 202.006(a) (West Supp. 2013). A court would likely conclude that this burden on property

owners' associations furthers a nonpunitive purpose of ensuring that purchasers of real property

have notice of the legal restrictions placed on that property prior to purchasing. Third, you have

not directed us to, and we have not independently found, any suggestion that the Legislature

intended to punish property owners' associations by enactment of section 202.006. Because it

appears that none of the three punishment inquiries are met, a court would likely conclude that

Texas Property Code section 202.006 is not a bill of attainder prohibited by the Texas or United

States Constitutions.

The Honorable Linda Harper-Brown - Page 4 (GA-1054)

SUMMARY

Property owners' association covenants are treated as

contracts between parties under Texas law and are therefore

protected by the Contract Clauses of both the Texas and United

States Constitutions. Both the Texas Supreme Court and the

United States Supreme Court have determined that the

constitutional rule against impairment of contracts may yield to

statutes that serve a significant and legitimate public purpose.

A court would likely conclude that Property Code section

202.006 is not a bill of attainder prohibited by the Texas or United

States Constitutions.

Very truly yours,

~Q:c;j'

ABBOTT

Attorney General of Texas

DANIEL T. HODGE

First Assistant Attorney General

JAMES D. BLACKLOCK

Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel

VIRGINIA K. HOELSCHER

Chair, Opinion Committee

Virginia K. Hoelscher

Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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