Richardson v. U.S. Parole Commission

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

JAMES RICHARDSON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 16-0972 (RJL)

)

U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION, )

)

Respondent. ) F I L E D

) FEB 1 7 2017

MEMORANDUM OPINION Clerk. U.S. D|str|ct & Bankrupwy

(,7/ Courts for the D|str|ct of Columb|a

February / 6 , 2017

This matter is before the Court on petitioner’s pro se petition for a Writ of habeas

corpus (“Pet.”) and the United States Parole Commission’s Opposition to Defendant’s

Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Cornm’n Opp’n”). For the

reasons discussed below, the petition will be denied.

BACKGROUND

On March 8, 1989, on petitioner’s conviction for distribution of cocaine and

possession With intent to distribute cocaine, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia

imposed a sentence of 40 months to 10 years’ incarceration Comm’n Opp’n at 1; see id.,

EX. 2 (Judgrnent and Commitment Order, United States v. Rz'chara’son, No. F-4054-88

(D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 8, 1989)). Although the former Board of Parole of the District of

Columbia granted petitioner parole through Work release in 1992, it rescinded the grant

and denied parole. See id., Exs. 3-4 (Notices of Board Order dated May 21, 1992 and

September 17, 1992, respectively). On March 22, 1993, on petitioner’s conviction for

distribution of cocaine, the Superior Court imposed a consecutive sentence of four to

twelve years’ incarceration See id., Ex. 5 (Judgment and Commitment Order, United

States v. Richardson, No. F-5793-92 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 22, 1993)). His aggregate

sentence, then, was 22 years’ incarceration See id., Ex. l (Sentence Monitoring

Computation Data) at 16. Since petitioner’s parole release in 1996, see id., Ex. 6

(Certificate of Parole), his parole has been revoked seven times, see id. at 2-4. As of

petitioner’s most recent parole release on October 31, 2015, he was to remain under

supervision until January 13, 2019. See icz’., Ex. 24 (Certiflcate ofParole) at 1.

DISCUSSION

According to petitioner, “the sentence the court handed down has long since passed

and/or expired[.]” Pet. at l (page numbers designated by ECF). “The sentence here should

have expired in 2010,” or 22 years after he was taken into custody in 1998, id., yet he

remains in custody six years later, see id. at 9. He attributes this circumstance to the Parole

Commission’s actions “extending the court[’]s sentence.” Id. at l. His sentences “were

handed down by the Court the Judicial Branch,” l`d. at 8, and he claims that the Parole

Commission violates the separation of powers doctrine by acting outside of its executive

branch functions, id., causing him to “serve a longer sentence than the court[] intended,”

id. at l. “This claim is a non-starter.” Rczhim v. U.S. Parole Comm ’n, 77 F. Supp. 3d 140,

145 (D.D.C. 2015); see Hammett v. U.S. ParOle Comm ’1/1, 2010 WL 1257669, at *1 (D.D.C.

Apr. 2, 2010) (observing that “[t]his argument, and similar separation of powers arguments,

have been raised often and rejected each time”).

2

The Parole Commission is not a court, and it cannot impose a criminal sentence.

This authority rests with the Superior Court. See D.C. Code § 11-923(b). Rather, the

Parole Commission is authorized “to grant, deny, or revoke a District of Columbia

offender’s parole and to impose or modify his parole conditions.” Brown v. United States

Parole Comm’n, 190 F.Supp.3d 186, 189 (D.D.C. 2016) (citing D.C. Code § 24-131(a),

(c)); see also Frcmklin v. District of Columbia, 163 F.3d 625, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

(discussing the transfer of parole jurisdiction for District of Columbia prisoners to the

Parole Commission). “lts jurisdiction instead extends only to the execution of a judicially

imposed sentence[.]” Rahim, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 145 (citing Smallwooa’ v. U.S. Parole

Comm’n, 777 F. Supp. 2d 148, 150 (D.D.C. 2011)); see also Maa’a’ox v. Elzl`e, 238 F.3d

437, 445 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Thus, “[a]s the duly authorized paroling authority, the [Parole]

Commission does not usurp a judicial function when, as here, it acts pursuant to the parole

laws and regulations of the District of Columbia.” Thompson v. D.C. Dep ’t ofCorr., 51 1

F. Supp. 2d 111, 114 (D.D.C. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). ln

short, the Parole Commission “exercises no judicial function, and its decisions do not

violate the separation of powers doctrine.” Ramsey v. Faust, 943 F. Supp. 2d 77, 81

(D.D.C. 2013) (citations omitted).

Petitioner also argues that the Parole Commission’s actions violate the double

jeopardy and ex post facto clauses. See Pet. at 1. He is mistaken “The double jeopardy

clause prohibits the executive branch from doubling down, bringing multiple prosecutions

or seeking successive punishments against a defendant for the same criminal offense.”

Brown, 190 F.Supp.3d at 189 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Parole

3

proceedings are not criminal prosecutions Rather, they are the “continuation of the

original sentence that resulted in parole,” and jeopardy therefore does not attach. Ia’.

(citations omitted); Campbell v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 563 F. Supp. 2d 23, 27 (D.D.C.

2008) (finding the double jeopardy clause “simply not applicable to parole decisions”).

An ex post facto violation occurs when a law “retroactively alter[s] the definition of

crimes or increase[s] the punishment for criminal acts.” Brown, 190 F.Supp.3d at 190

(quoting Collins v. Youngblooa’, 497 U.S. 37, 43 (1990)). The Court presumes that

petitioner’s ex post facto claim arises from the recalculation of his aggregate sentence upon

each revocation of parole. “Under District of Columbia law, [petitioner] cannot receive

credit for time on parole, commonly known as ‘street time,’ after his parole has been

revoked.” Jones v. Bureau ofPrisoz/zs, No. 02-5054, 2002 WL 31189792, *1 (D.C. Cir.

Oct. 2, 2002) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Accordingly, “there is no ex post

facto violation when [petitioner’s] sentence was recalculated to exclude any credit

previously given for street time.” Ia’. (citing Davis v. Moore, 772 A.2d 204, 214-15 (D.C.

2001) (en banc)); see also Thompson, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 113 (flnding that forfeiture of

street time “simply returned [petitioner] to the position he would have been but for his

release to parole”).

Petitioner fails to show that he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). His petition for a writ of habeas

saw

RICHA“Rfrfl. LEoN

UNITED sTATEs DISTRICT JUDGE

corpus is denied. An Order is issued separately.