Opinion

Keith Goodman v. Kim Runion

  • 676 F. App'x 156
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Filed
Jan 25, 2017
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
Gregory, Traxler, Diaz
Cited by
12 cases
Authority
More cited than 59.3%

taking same approach in case involving moderate myopia and headaches allegedly caused by eyeglasses

How later courts described this case

  • taking same approach in case involving moderate myopia and headaches allegedly caused by eyeglasses
  • “Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-6733

KEITH D. GOODMAN,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

KIM RUNION; ELTON BROWN, Doctor; KRYM; SPRUILL, Doctor,

Defendants – Appellees,

and

A. DAVID ROBINSON; J. LAFOON; Q. BIRCHETTE; MS. G. F.

SIVELS; G. ROBINSON; CASSANDRA TAYLOR; C. MAYES; C. BAILEY;

PRISON HEALTH SERVICES; GENE M. JOHNSON; HAROLD W. CLARKE;

JOHN JABE; FRED SHILLING; HARVARD STEPHENS, Doctor,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District

Judge. (1:11-cv-00079-GBL-IDD)

Argued: December 6, 2016 Decided: January 25, 2017

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and TRAXLER and DIAZ, Circuit

Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Erik R. Zimmerman, ROBINSON, BRADSHAW & HINSON, P.A.,

Chapel Hill, North Carolina, for Appellant. Carlene Booth

Johnson, PERRY LAW FIRM, Dillwyn, Virginia; Gary Christopher

Jones, Jr., SINNOTT, NUCKOLS & LOGAN, P.C., Midlothian,

Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

2

PER CURIAM:

Keith Goodman is an inmate in the custody of the Virginia

Department of Corrections (“VDOC”). He brought this action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against optometrists Dr. Elton Brown and

Dr. David Spruill, (together “Defendants”), claiming that they

were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by refusing

to prescribe him contact lenses instead of eyeglasses to correct

his vision, in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition

against cruel and unusual punishment. Goodman appeals the

district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Defendants, as

well as the district court’s denial of his motion for

appointment of an expert witness and for discovery. We affirm.

I.

Prior to his incarceration, Goodman primarily wore contact

lenses to correct his condition of moderate myopia, commonly

known as nearsightedness. From 2005 through 2008, VDOC

optometrists prescribed Goodman contact lenses, rather than

eyeglasses, at his request. According to Goodman, he avoided

wearing prescription eyeglasses because he believed that they

caused him to experience headaches.

In January 2009, Dr. Elton Brown, the treating optometrist

at Brunswick Correctional Center, where Goodman had been

transferred, evaluated Goodman’s vision and refused to prescribe

him contact lenses. Under VDOC policy:

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Contact lens[es] will be supplied when medically

indicated. Offenders wearing contact lens[es] when

entering the system will be evaluated and allowed to

keep the lenses if medically indicated. Offenders not

meeting the criteria for contact lens[es] will be

issued eyeglasses if needed.

J.A. 85. The policy was based upon the VDOC’s understanding

“that there are a few ophthalmologic diseases which are improved

with contact lenses versus eyeglasses.” J.A. 81. Absent that

medical determination, however, “eyeglasses, for the most part,

correct vision disorders, are easier to manage, and are less

expensive” than contact lenses. J.A. 81-82.

Dr. Brown “saw no indication of any medical need for Mr.

Goodman to be prescribed contact lenses, nor any reason why

having eyeglasses instead of contact lenses would cause Mr.

Goodman to have any headaches or discomfort.” J.A. 157.

According to Goodman, Dr. Brown told him that he would check

with the prison warden and see if she would approve the

prescription of contact lenses to correct Goodman’s vision, at

Goodman’s expense, notwithstanding the VDOC policy. However,

that request was denied, and Dr. Brown thereafter prescribed and

fitted Goodman with prescription eyeglasses.

In April 2009, Goodman visited Dr. Brown again and

complained of headaches which Goodman attributed to his wearing

his eyeglasses. Dr. Brown informed Goodman that he “had

excellent vision in both eyes with the correction of his

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eyeglasses, and there was no medical reason for his level of

myopia, with only a minimum difference between the two eyes, to

cause headaches with his prescribed eyeglasses.” J.A. 158. In

Dr. Brown’s judgment, “[t]here was no medical reason for Mr.

Goodman to be prescribed contact lenses instead of eyeglasses,

nor any medical reason for switching Mr. Goodman to contact

lenses from eyeglasses to alleviate any headaches.” J.A. 158.

And “because [Dr. Brown] was unable to verify [Goodman’s]

headaches, he w[as] disallowed from prescribing anything other

than eyeglasses for [Goodman’s] needed vision-correction.” J.A.

39.

In September 2009, Goodman was evaluated by Dr. Krym, the

VDOC optometrist at Green Rock Correctional Center, where

Goodman had been transferred. Goodman alleged that Dr. Krym

likewise informed him that he could not prescribe contact lenses

to correct his vision.

Goodman was subsequently transferred to Greensville

Correctional Center. In March 2010, Goodman was evaluated by

Dr. David Spruill, the prison optometrist at Greensville. Dr.

Spruill also found no medical indication for contact lenses.

According to Dr. Spruill, “[a]t no time, did I believe, in my

medical judgment, that anything to do with Mr. Goodman having

been prescribed eyeglasses instead of contact lenses was the

cause of any headaches, nor did I believe that prescribing Mr.

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Goodman contact lenses would alleviate any headaches.” J.A.

227. Goodman subsequently requested that Prison Health Services

clarify to Dr. Spruill that the VDOC policy did not prohibit him

from prescribing contacts if medically indicated to alleviate

Goodman’s headaches. In response, Goodman was advised by the

prison officials that “contact lenses can only be prescribed

when medically necessary. According to your medical record you

do not have a clinical need for contacts.” J.A. 90.

Noting that the optometrist had stated that Goodman’s

headaches “were unrelated to the eyeglasses,” the VDOC medical

officials then referred Goodman to an outside ophthalmologist

“to determine what [was] causing his headaches,” J.A. 79. 1

Goodman was seen by Dr. Gupta in July 2011. Goodman has

provided no medical evidence or other information about the

results of his ophthalmology examination. However, he does not

assert that Dr. Gupta found his headaches to be causally related

1

An optometrist is “a health care provider who examines,

diagnoses, treats, and manages diseases and disorders of the

visual system, the eye, and associated structures, as well as

diagnosing related systemic conditions.” Dorland’s Illustrated

Medical Dictionary 1331 (32nd ed. 2012). An ophthalmologist is

“a physician who specializes in the diagnosis and medical and

surgical treatment of diseases and defects of the eye and

related structures.” Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary

1329 (32nd ed. 2012) (emphasis added).

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to his wearing eyeglasses and he continues to assert that he has

been denied contact lenses by the VDOC. 2

Goodman thereafter filed this complaint under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 against various prison officials, alleging that they failed

to adequately respond to his vision and headache complaints.

Goodman additionally sued the three optometrists that had

evaluated him - Dr. Brown, Dr. Spruill, and Dr. Krym - alleging

that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical

needs because they knew that his eyeglasses caused him to suffer

from headaches and nonetheless refused to prescribe him contact

lenses. Goodman did not name Dr. Gupta, the ophthalmologist, as

a defendant.

We previously affirmed the district court’s dismissal of

Goodman’s claims against the prison officials under 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a

claim. See Goodman v. Johnson, 524 Fed. App’x. 887 (4th Cir.

2013) (per curiam). Assuming without deciding that Goodman

suffered from a sufficiently serious medical need, however, we

reversed the district court’s dismissal of Goodman’s claims

2 Goodman’s father, a physician specializing in obstetrics

and gynecology, contacted the VDOC to advocate his son’s request

for contact lenses during this time period and has filed an

affidavit on his son’s behalf. However, Dr. Goodman does not

claim to have evaluated or treated Goodman for his myopia, nor

does he specialize in optometry or ophthalmology.

7

against the three optometrists because the VDOC policy alone

would not insulate them from liability if their treatment

otherwise rose to the level of deliberate indifference.

On remand, the district court granted summary judgment to

Dr. Brown and Dr. Spruill and denied Goodman’s motion for

summary judgment. The district court dismissed Goodman’s claim

against Dr. Krym for lack of service. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).

This appeal followed.

II.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de

novo, applying the same legal standards as the district court

and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. See Martin v. Lloyd, 700 F.3d 132, 135 (4th

Cir. 2012). “The court shall grant summary judgment if the

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Conclusory or speculative allegations

do not suffice” to defeat summary judgment, “nor does a mere

scintilla of evidence in support of [the non-moving party’s]

case” suffice. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d

645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution

prohibits prison officials from inflicting “cruel and unusual

punishments” by acting with deliberate indifference to a

8

prisoner’s serious medical needs. U.S. Const. amend. VIII;

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To prevail in a

medical needs case, the inmate must satisfy the two-pronged test

set forth in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).

First, the inmate must demonstrate the defendant’s

deliberate indifference to an “objectively ‘sufficiently

serious’” medical need, Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225

(4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Farmer, 51 U.S. at 834), “that has

either ‘been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or

. . . is so obvious that even a lay person would easily

recognize the necessity for a doctors’ attention.’” Id.

(quoting Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008)).

Second, under the subjective prong, the inmate must prove

that the defendants “acted with a ‘sufficiently culpable state

of mind.’” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). The inmate

must show that the defendant “actually knew of and disregarded a

substantial risk of serious injury . . . or that they actually

knew of and ignored a . . . serious need for medical care.”

Young v. City of Mt. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 576 (4th Cir. 2001);

see also Scinto, 841 F.3d at 225.

“Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional

violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle,

429 U.S. at 106. “Thus, a complaint that a physician has been

negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not

9

state a valid claim.” Id. And “an inadvertent failure to

provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute an

unnecessary and wonton infliction of pain or to be repugnant to

the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 105-06 (internal quotation

marks omitted); Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir.

1990) (The medical provider’s disregard of the prisoner’s

serious medical needs must have been “so grossly incompetent,

inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be

intolerable to fundamental fairness.”), overruled in part on

other grounds by Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

III.

A.

Viewed in the light most favorable to Goodman, the record

creates no genuine issue of material fact to support Goodman’s

deliberate indifference claim against the Defendants.

Even assuming, without deciding, that Goodman’s need for

vision correction and/or his subjective complaints of headaches

constituted an “objectively sufficiently serious medical need,”

there is no evidence that Defendants denied Goodman medically

necessary treatment or that their failure to provide alternative

treatment in the form of contact lenses was the result of

deliberate indifference on their part.

Goodman has moderate myopia, which Defendants corrected to

20/20 vision by prescription eyeglasses. Goodman subjectively

10

complained of headaches and informed Defendants of his opinion

that such headaches were causally related to his wearing

eyeglasses. Defendants independently evaluated and treated

Goodman at two separate prisons, considered his complaint from

the perspective of their field of optometry, and found no

medical basis upon which to believe that Goodman’s headaches

were caused by his eyeglasses or that contact lenses would

alleviate them. According to Goodman’s complaint, a third

optometrist, Dr. Krym, also evaluated Goodman and refused to

prescribe contact lenses. And because the optometrists had

concluded that Goodman’s headaches were not causally related to

his prescription eyeglasses, VDOC medical personnel thereafter

referred Goodman to an ophthalmologist for a follow-up

examination to determine the cause of Goodman’s headaches.

Plainly, Goodman disagrees with the Defendants’ medical

judgment that his headaches were not causally related to his

wearing prescription eyeglasses. For that reason, he also

disagrees with their decision not to authorize the prescription

of contact lenses under the VDOC policy as being medically

indicated to alleviate such headaches. Generally, such

“[d]isagreements between an inmate and a physician over the

inmate’s proper medical care do not state a § 1983 claim.”

Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985); see also

Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1975) (per

11

curiam) (“Questions of medical judgment are not subject to

judicial review.”).

There is also insufficient evidence to support Goodman’s

theory that Defendants must have actually believed that Goodman

was experiencing headaches caused by his eyeglasses, but would

not say so because prison officials, notwithstanding the written

VDOC policy, had forbidden them from prescribing contact lenses

even if medically indicated. In support, Goodman points to his

factual allegations that Dr. Brown told him that he would

inquire as to whether the prison officials would allow Goodman

to obtain contacts at his own expense and that both Defendants

told him that they could not prescribe him contact lenses under

the VDOC policy and would face consequences if they did.

At best, Goodman’s factual assertions might establish that

Defendants followed the VDOC policy and that Dr. Brown made an

effort on Goodman’s behalf to obtain an exception to the policy.

But there is no evidence that Dr. Brown told any prison official

that, in his medical judgment, contact lenses were medically

indicated under the policy as opposed to simply an appropriate

form of vision correction. Nor is there any evidence that Dr.

Brown or Dr. Spruill were told by the prison officials that,

notwithstanding the VDOC policy, they could not prescribe

contact lenses even if, in their medical judgment, the

prescription was indicated to prevent headaches. Moreover,

12

Goodman’s theory is inconsistent with the undisputed fact that,

after both Defendants had concluded that Goodman’s subjective

complaints of headaches were not related to his prescription

eyeglasses, the VDOC referred Goodman to a specialist in

ophthalmology, Dr. Gupta, for evaluation of other possible

causes for his headaches. Accordingly, Goodman’s theory is much

too speculative and conclusory to defeat Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment.

B.

Goodman also appeals the district court’s denial of his

request for discovery and for appointment of an expert witness.

Goodman had sought to inquire into whether Defendants treated

non-prisoners differently than prisoners and he wanted the

opportunity to obtain a medical opinion and develop other

evidence that would refute Defendants’ medical judgments. We

find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s rulings.

The discovery and expert opinions that Goodman sought might or

might not have substantiated his opinion that his headaches were

causally related to his wearing prescription eyeglasses, but

they would not have supported his claim that Defendants were

subjectively aware of this causal relationship and yet, with

deliberate indifference thereto, issued medical opinions to the

contrary. Accordingly, we affirm these rulings as well.

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IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

grant of summary judgment to the Defendants. We also find no

reversible error in the district court’s orders denying Goodman

an expert witness and discovery. 3

AFFIRMED

3 In the event that we reversed the grant of summary

judgment to Dr. Brown and Dr. Spruill, Goodman requested that we

also reverse the district court’s order dismissing his § 1983

deliberate-indifference claim against Dr. Krym for lack of

service and that we instruct the district court to appoint

counsel for Goodman on remand. Because we affirm the grant of

summary judgment to Dr. Brown and Dr. Spruill, we do not address

these issues.

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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