Opinion

Scott Allin v. City of Springfield

  • 845 F.3d 858
  • 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 533
  • 2017 WL 108035
Court
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Filed
Jan 11, 2017
Status
Published
Author
Bauer
On the bench
Wood, Bauer, Manion
Nature of suit
civil
Cited by
45 cases
Authority
More cited than 82.7%

qualified immunity protects officers who, faced with disputed claims of ownership of motorcycle, ran title searches, reviewed certificate of title, questioned competing claimants, and ultimately supported defendant’s ownership claim

How later courts described this case

  • qualified immunity protects officers who, faced with disputed claims of ownership of motorcycle, ran title searches, reviewed certificate of title, questioned competing claimants, and ultimately supported defendant’s ownership claim
  • where the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because one of the parties claiming ownership presented him with a certificate of title and the officer conducted a title search

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 16-1155

SCOTT ALLIN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois.

No. 3:14-cv-03013-CSB-EIL — Colin S. Bruce, Judge.

ARGUED OCTOBER 27, 2016 — DECIDED JANUARY 11, 2017

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and MANION, Circuit

Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellee, Scott Allin, brought

this action against Patricia Baskett, Sergeant Jeff Barr of the

Springfield Police Department, and the City of Springfield,

Illinois, raising both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims.

2 No. 16-1155

Allin asserts that his Fourth Amendment rights were

violated when Baskett, with Barr in attendance, came to his

residence to gather her property, and, after a dispute about the

ownership of a motorcycle, Barr announced he would not

prevent her from taking it. Barr filed a motion for summary

judgment on Allin’s § 1983 claims, contending that he was

entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied his

motion. We reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

Allin and Baskett lived together in Allin’s residence from

December 2010 until February 2012. In late July or early

August 2011, Allin was in poor health and signed over the

titles to the numerous vehicles that he owned, including a 2001

FLSTS Harley Davidson motorcycle, believing it “would make

it easier for his survivors if he passed away.”

On August 29, 2011, the Illinois Secretary of State issued a

change of ownership on the motorcycle and a certificate of title

in Baskett’s name.

By February 25, 2012, Allin and Baskett’s relationship had

soured. They had an argument and Baskett moved in with her

sister, Kelly McClure. Baskett asked Allin for $1,000 to help her

find her own place, but Allin refused. Following this argument,

he discovered that the certificate of title to his motorcycle was

missing. He filed a theft report with the Springfield Police

Department, alleging that Baskett had stolen the title.

Sometime between February 25 and February 27, Baskett

told McClure that she was concerned about retrieving her

personal belongings from Allin’s residence; McClure contacted

No. 16-1155 3

Ami Barr—Sergeant Barr’s wife and McClure’s coworker—

about Baskett’s fears. Ami knew Baskett, having met her on a

few occasions. Ami asked Barr if he would accompany Baskett

to Allin’s residence when Baskett went to remove her belong-

ings. Barr told Ami that he would.

On February 27, 2012, Baskett and others arrived at Allin’s

residence to gather her personal property; Springfield police

officers, including Barr, were there to ensure a peaceful

transition of the property. At the residence, Allin and Baskett

had a dispute as to the ownership of the motorcycle, and

decided to present their conflicting stories to Barr. Baskett

produced the certificate of title for the motorcycle and claimed

that Allin gave her the motorcycle for taking care of him when

he was sick. Allin admitted that he signed over the title, but he

stated that he did not intend for ownership to pass to Baskett.

Allin also said that he reported the certificate of title stolen two

days earlier.

The police ran a title search; it is the Springfield Police

Department’s policy to run title searches and rely upon the

results when responding to a removal of property call. The

search showed that title to the motorcycle had been in Baskett’s

name since August 29, 2011.

The officers also conducted a computer search of the

reported theft records; the results did not indicate that the

motorcycle was reported stolen.

Barr also claims to have sought advice from a superior, but

Allin disputes this; Barr’s call records failed to show that a call

took place around that time. In light of the situation, Barr

4 No. 16-1155

announced that he would not prevent Baskett from taking the

motorcycle.

Barr left Allin’s residence at 2:51 p.m. At approximately

7:00 or 8:00 p.m., Baskett removed the motorcycle from Allin’s

residence—officers were not present.

At some point after February 27, 2012, Baskett went to Halls

Harley Davidson in Springfield to obtain keys to the motor-

cycle. Later, Barr, Ami, McClure, and Baskett met at a storage

unit where the motorcycle had been stored; however, the keys

would not start the motorcycle due to a security system

problem. Some time later, Springfield police officers and

Baskett met at Halls, and Baskett provided a Halls’ employee

with a copy of the title. The Halls’ employee then fixed the

motorcycle’s security system.

The motorcycle was now operational, allowing Barr to take

the motorcycle for a test drive. Following the test drive, Barr

agreed to buy the motorcycle from Baskett for $7,000, and on

March 13, 2012, the sale was complete.

On January 15, 2014, Allin filed suit against the City of

Springfield, Barr, and Baskett, raising both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

state law claims. Allin’s claims allege an unreasonable seizure

of property, civil conspiracy, violation of substantive due

process, and violation of procedural due process.1

On July 31, 2015, each Defendant filed a motion for sum-

mary judgment. The district court denied the motions, and

1

Out of the four claims Allin brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district

court addressed only the unreasonable seizure of property and civil

conspiracy claims.

No. 16-1155 5

held that Barr was not entitled to qualified immunity. Barr and

the City of Springfield have appealed.2

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo a district court’s denial of summary

judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Leaf v. Shelnutt, 400

F.3d 1070, 1077 (7th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is proper

only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We view the factual

record and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Findlay v. Lendermon, 722 F.3d 895, 899

(7th Cir. 2013).

B. Qualified Immunity

1. Jurisdiction

We have interlocutory jurisdiction over a district court’s

denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.

Gibbs v. Lomas, 755 F.3d 529, 535 (7th Cir. 2014). We consider

such appeals to the extent that the defendant public official

presents an “abstract issue of law,” Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S.

299, 313 (1996), such as “whether the right at issue is clearly

established or whether the district court correctly decided a

question of law,” Huff v. Reichert, 744 F.3d 999, 1004 (7th Cir.

2014) (citing Leaf, 400 F.3d at 1078).

2

We previously asked the parties to address the issue of this Court’s

jurisdiction over the City of Springfield’s interlocutory appeal. We need not

address this issue because it is now moot.

6 No. 16-1155

2. Qualified Immunity Framework

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields public officials

from civil liability if their “conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555

U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,

818 (1982)). When examining a qualified immunity claim, we

consider two questions: “(1) whether the facts, taken in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff, make out a violation of a

constitutional right, and (2) whether that constitutional right

was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.”

Gibbs, 755 F.3d at 537 (quoting Williams v. City of Chicago, 733

F.3d 749, 758 (7th Cir. 2013)).

“A right is clearly established if it is sufficiently clear that

any reasonable official would understand that his or her

actions violate that right, meaning that existing precedent must

have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond

debate.” Zimmerman v. Doran, 807 F.3d 178, 182 (7th Cir. 2015)

(citing Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015)). “Put simply,

qualified immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or

those who knowingly violate the law.’” Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at

308 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).

The Supreme Court has repeatedly advised courts “not to

define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” Id.

(quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)).

The dispositive question is “whether the violative

nature of particular conduct is clearly established.”

… This inquiry “‘must be undertaken in light of the

specific context of the case, not as a broad general

No. 16-1155 7

proposition.’” … Such specificity is especially

important in the Fourth Amendment context, where

the Court has recognized that “[i]t is sometimes

difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant

legal doctrine … will apply to the factual situation

the officer confronts.”

Id. (citations omitted).

Allin contends that the “case law establishes that the

constitutional right at stake here is clearly established.”

Appellee’s Br. at 13. He concedes that the district court did not

identify a “closely analogous” case. Instead, Allin relies on

generalized assertions of law. First, Allin argues that it was

clearly established that a governmental actor is liable under

§ 1983 when he knows about a constitutional violation and has

the requisite “personal involvement.” Second, he contends that

there need not be a case directly on point for a reasonable

officer to know that Barr’s actions were unlawful. As support,

Allin provides a string cite to Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56,

61 (1992), Perry v. Sheehan, 222 F.3d 309, 316 (7th Cir. 2000), and

Dixon v. Lowery, 302 F.3d 857, 866–67 (8th Cir. 2002), with

parentheticals containing generalized assertions of law.3

The conduct in the cases cited by Allin would not alert

every reasonable police officer that the particular conduct

taken by Barr would constitute governmental action or be in

violation of the Fourth Amendment. In Soldal, the Supreme

3

Significantly, Allin’s argument based on these cases is raised for the first

time on appeal. These cases were not even mentioned in his opposition to

Barr’s motion for summary judgment.

8 No. 16-1155

Court held that the forcible removal of the plaintiff’s mobile

home, leaving him dispossessed of his home, constituted a

seizure invoking the protections under the Fourth Amend-

ment. 506 U.S. at 61. In Perry v. Sheehan, officers seized a

plaintiff’s firearms from plaintiff’s apartment “even though

they knew that the eviction had been stayed by order of the

court and thus that the seizure was not pursuant to any court

order.” 222 F.3d at 317. In Dixon v. Lowery, the Eighth Circuit

found that reasonable officers would have known that the

plaintiff’s rights were being violated when the officers com-

mandeered a restaurant, without a court order, to the exclusion

of the owner and personally occupied the premises for three

weeks. 302 F.3d at 864–66. While these cases are helpful in

establishing, in general, that there is a Fourth Amendment

right against unreasonable seizures, the particular conduct in

those cases does not establish beyond debate that Barr’s

particular conduct in the specific circumstances constituted

either governmental action or a Fourth Amendment violation.

Contrary to what Allin must establish to defeat qualified

immunity, the record here belies any contention that Barr acted

plainly incompetently or that he knowingly violated the law.

Baskett and Allin decided to present their dispute over the

ownership of the motorcycle to Barr. Baskett told officers that

Allin had given the motorcycle to her for taking care of him

when he was sick. Baskett produced a certificate of title. Under

Illinois law, the certificate of title “provide[s] the public with a

readily available means of identifying the owners … to the

vehicle described in the certificate of title.” Spaulding v. Peoples

State Bank of Bloomington, 323 N.E.2d 143, 144 (Ill. App. Ct.

1975) (citation omitted). Thus, under Illinois law, there was a

No. 16-1155 9

rebuttable presumption that Baskett was the owner of the

motorcycle. Even then, Barr took additional steps in his

investigation. It was undisputed that Springfield Police officers

ran title searches and relied upon the results when responding

to removal of property calls. Barr conducted a title search,

which revealed that the title had been in Baskett’s name since

August 29, 2011—approximately six months before the day in

question. In response, Allin admitted to Barr that he signed

over the title, but claimed that he did not pass ownership to

Baskett. Allin informed Barr that he filed a police report

claiming that the title was stolen two days prior. The officers,

however, ran a search on their computer and the search did not

reveal that the motorcycle was reported stolen. In the end, with

the evidence pointing to Baskett as the owner of the motor-

cycle, Barr is entitled to qualified immunity. The district court

erred in denying Barr’s motion for summary judgment on

qualified immunity grounds.

We reverse the district court’s denial of Barr’s motion for

summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, and direct

the district court to grant the motion.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.