Brown v. Njoku

******************************************************

The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the

beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will

be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the

date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative

date for the beginning of all time periods for filing

postopinion motions and petitions for certification is

the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion.

In no event will any such motions be accepted before

the ‘‘officially released’’ date.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical

correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-

cut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the

event of discrepancies between the electronic version

of an opinion and the print version appearing in the

Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Con-

necticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the

latest print version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying

the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official

Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service

and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes

of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of

the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be repro-

duced and distributed without the express written per-

mission of the Commission on Official Legal

Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************

SUZETTE BROWN v. EDWIN NJOKU ET AL.

(AC 38022)

Lavine, Beach and West, Js.

Argued December 7, 2016—officially released January 17, 2017

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Hartford, Wiese, J.)

Edwin Njoku, self-represented, the appellant

(named defendant).

Mark J. Migliaccio, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

PER CURIAM. Following a trial to the court, the self-

represented defendant, Edwin Njoku, appeals from the

judgment rendered by the court in favor of the plaintiff,

Suzette Brown. On appeal, the defendant claims that

the court (1) erred by failing ‘‘to enter an appearance’’

for Christus Medical Group, P.C. (business),1 (2) abused

its discretion by denying his request for a continuance,

(3) improperly found that the plaintiff had sustained

her burden of proof, and (4) denied him the right to due

process and a fair trial by failing to let him participate in

‘‘trial management’’ and to oppose a trial to the court.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record discloses the following facts. The plaintiff

commenced the present action on July 22, 2013. In her

complaint, she alleged five counts: three against the

defendant, i.e., battery, negligent infliction of emotional

distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress;

and two against the business, i.e., negligent supervision

and respondeat superior. In its memorandum of deci-

sion, the court found that the plaintiff was a patient

of the defendant, a physician, from whom she sought

medical treatment for injuries she sustained in a motor

vehicle accident that occurred in July, 2010. The plain-

tiff went to the defendant’s office for treatment between

July and October, 2010. During her visits, the defendant

inappropriately touched the plaintiff’s buttocks and

breasts. The defendant’s physical contact with the plain-

tiff was unrelated to appropriate medical care. As a

proximate cause of the defendant’s inappropriate

touching, the plaintiff sustained emotional injuries and

was traumatized by the defendant’s unwanted sexual

advances. The court awarded the plaintiff $35,000 as

fair, just, and reasonable compensation for the defen-

dant’s tortious conduct. The defendant appealed from

the court’s judgment.

The defendant has raised four claims on appeal. He

first claims that the court erred by failing ‘‘to enter an

appearance’’ on behalf of the business. At trial, the

defendant appeared as a self-represented,2 or pro se,

party and sought to file an appearance on behalf of the

business of which he was the sole owner. The defendant

is not a member of the bar. ‘‘Any person who is not an

attorney is prohibited from practicing law, except that

any person may practice law, or plead in any court of

this state ‘in his own cause.’ General Statutes § 51-88

(d) (2). The authorization to appear pro se is limited

to representing one’s own cause, and does not permit

individuals to appear pro se in a representative capac-

ity.’’ Expressway Associates II v. Friendly Ice Cream

Corp. of Connecticut, 34 Conn. App. 543, 546, 642 A.2d

62, cert. denied, 230 Conn. 915, 645 A.2d 1018 (1994).

The defendant had no authority to represent the busi-

ness. The court, therefore, properly defaulted the busi-

ness for failure to appear.

We are unable to review the defendant’s remaining

claims that the court abused its discretion by failing

to grant him a continuance, denying him the right to

participate in ‘‘trial management’’ and to oppose a trial

to the court, and finding that the plaintiff had sustained

her burden of proof due to the fact that the record is

inadequate to review the claims and the claims are

inadequately briefed. The defendant’s brief consists pri-

marily of his view of the facts.

‘‘It is well settled that [we] are not required to review

claims that are inadequately briefed. . . . We consis-

tently have held that [a]nalysis, rather than mere

abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid aban-

doning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.

. . . [F]or this court judiciously and efficiently to con-

sider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties

must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their

briefs. We do not reverse the judgment of a trial court

on the basis of challenges to its rulings that have not

been adequately briefed. . . . The parties may not

merely cite a legal principle without analyzing the rela-

tionship between the facts of the case and the law

cited. . . . [A]ssignments of error which are merely

mentioned but not briefed beyond a statement of the

claim will be deemed abandoned and will not be

reviewed by this court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-

ted.) Clelford v. Bristol, 150 Conn. App. 229, 233, 90

A.3d 998 (2014); see also Practice Book §§ 61-10 and

67-4.

The judgment is affirmed.

1

The business also was named as a defendant but failed to appear through

counsel in the trial court. The court, therefore, rendered a default judgment

against it. The business is not a party to this appeal. In this opinion, we

refer to Njoku as the defendant.

2

We note that the defendant was convicted of charges unrelated to the

facts of the present case. At the time of the trial and the present appeal,

the defendant was incarcerated.