Opinion

Robert Briseno v. Conagra Foods, Inc.

  • 844 F.3d 1121
  • 96 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 762
  • 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 20
  • 2017 WL 24618
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
Jan 3, 2017
Status
Published
Author
Friedland
On the bench
Friedland, Fletcher, Christen, Priedland
Nature of suit
Civil
Cited by
185 cases
Authority
More cited than 95.9%

Abrogated in part, on other grounds by TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021)

finding a separate administrative feasibility requirement would “render [the] manageability criterion [of Rule 23(b)(3)] largely superfluous, a result that contravenes the familiar precept that a rule should be interpreted to give effect to every clause”

How later courts described this case

  • finding a separate administrative feasibility requirement would “render [the] manageability criterion [of Rule 23(b)(3)] largely superfluous, a result that contravenes the familiar precept that a rule should be interpreted to give effect to every clause”
  • holding that what makes a 16 ||class ascertainable is not established in the Ninth Circuit
  • holding that notice by publication in a periodical, on a website, or at a physical location is sufficient to satisfy due process even if actual individuai notice is not received in all cases
  • interpreting an omission within 39 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 for concerns of administrative feasibility as an intentional omission, because we presume Congress acts intentionally, and that courts should not “interpose an additional hurdle” when the rule fails to do so

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Abrogated in part, on other grounds by TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021)

    844 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2017), abrogated in part on other grounds, TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 431
    Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 25, 2021other groundsin partmedium confidenceRead it

The opinion

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT BRISENO, individually and No. 15-55727

on behalf of all others similarly

situated, D.C. No.

Plaintiff-Appellee, 2:11-cv-05379-

MMM-AGR

v.

CONAGRA FOODS, INC., OPINION

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 12, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed January 3, 2017

Before: William A. Fletcher, Morgan B. Christen,

and Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Friedland

2 BRISENO V. CONAGRA FOODS

SUMMARY *

Class Certification

The panel affirmed the district court’s class certification

in putative class actions brought against ConAgra Foods in

eleven states by consumers who purchased Wesson-brand

cooking oil products labeled “100% Natural” during the

relevant period.

Plaintiffs argued that the “100% Natural” label was false

or misleading because Wesson oils are made from

bioengineered ingredients that plaintiffs contend are “not

natural.” ConAgra manufactures, markets, distributes, and

sells Wesson products. Defendant urged reversal of the

district court’s class certification because the district court

did not require Plaintiff-Appellee Robert Briseno and the

other named class representatives to proffer an

administratively feasible way to identify members of the

certified classes.

The panel held that the language of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 23 neither provides nor implies that

demonstrating an administratively feasible way to identify

class members is a prerequisite to class certification. The

panel therefore joined the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth

Circuits in declining to adopt an administrative feasibility

requirement.

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

BRISENO V. CONAGRA FOODS 3

COUNSEL

Angela Spivey (argued), McGuireWoods LLP, Atlanta,

Georgia; R. Trent Taylor, McGuireWoods LLP, Richmond,

Virginia; E. Rebecca Gantt, McGuireWoods LLP, Norfolk,

Virginia; A. Brooks Gresham and Laura E. Coombe,

McGuireWoods LLP, Los Angeles, California; for

Defendant-Appellant.

Adam Levitt (argued) and Edmund S. Aronowitz, Grant &

Eisenhofer P.A., Chicago, Illinois; Mary S. Thomas, Grant

& Eisenhofer P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Ariana J. Tadler,

Henry J. Kelston, Meagan Keenan, and Carey Alexander,

Milberg LLP, New York, New York; David E. Azar,

Milberg LLP, Los Angeles, California; for Plaintiff-

Appellee.

OPINION

FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judge:

This appeal requires us to decide whether, to obtain class

certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, class

representatives must demonstrate that there is an

“administratively feasible” means of identifying absent class

members. Defendant-Appellant ConAgra Foods, Inc.

(“ConAgra”) urges us to reverse class certification because

the district court did not require Plaintiff-Appellee Robert

Briseno and the other named class representatives

(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) to proffer a reliable way to

identify members of the certified classes here—consumers

4 BRISENO V. CONAGRA FOODS

in eleven states who purchased Wesson-brand cooking oils

labeled “100% Natural” during the relevant period. 1

We have never interpreted Rule 23 to require such a

showing, and, like the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits,

we decline to do so now. See Sandusky Wellness Ctr., LLC,

v. Medtox Sci., Inc., 821 F.3d 992, 995–96 (8th Cir. 2016);

Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co., 799 F.3d 497, 525 (6th Cir.

2015); Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 658

(7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016). A

separate administrative feasibility prerequisite to class

certification is not compatible with the language of Rule 23.

Further, Rule 23’s enumerated criteria already address the

policy concerns that have motivated some courts to adopt a

separate administrative feasibility requirement, and do so

without undermining the balance of interests struck by the

Supreme Court, Congress, and the other contributors to the

Rule. We therefore affirm.

I

Plaintiffs are consumers who purchased Wesson-brand

cooking oil products labeled “100% Natural.” The “100%

Natural” label appeared on every bottle of Wesson-brand oil

throughout the putative class periods (and continues to

appear on those products). Plaintiffs argue that the “100%

Natural” label is false or misleading because Wesson oils are

made from bioengineered ingredients (genetically modified

organisms, or GMOs) that Plaintiffs contend are “not

1

We address ConAgra’s other challenges to the district court’s class

certification order in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition.

BRISENO V. CONAGRA FOODS 5

natural.” ConAgra manufactures, markets, distributes, and

sells Wesson products.

Plaintiffs filed putative class actions asserting state-law

claims against ConAgra in eleven states, and those cases

were consolidated in this action. Plaintiffs moved to certify

eleven classes defined as follows: 2

All persons who reside in the States of

California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois,

Indiana, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oregon,

South Dakota, or Texas who have purchased

Wesson Oils within the applicable statute of

limitations periods established by the laws of

their state of residence (the “Class Period”)

through the final disposition of this and any

and all related actions.

As relevant here, ConAgra opposed class certification on the

ground that there would be no administratively feasible way

to identify members of the proposed classes because

consumers would not be able to reliably identify themselves

as class members. As a result, ConAgra argued that the class

was not eligible for certification. 3

2

We refer to Plaintiffs’ amended motion for class certification,

which is the subject of this appeal.

3

ConAgra called this a failure of “ascertainability.” We refrain

from referring to “ascertainability” in this opinion because courts ascribe

widely varied meanings to that term. For example, some courts use the

word “ascertainability” to deny certification of classes that are not

clearly or objectively defined. See, e.g., Brecher v. Republic of

Argentina, 806 F.3d 22, 24–26 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that a class

6 BRISENO V. CONAGRA FOODS

The district court acknowledged that the Third Circuit

and some district courts have refused certification in similar

circumstances, but it declined to join in their reasoning.

Instead, the district court held that, at the certification stage,

it was sufficient that the class was defined by an objective

criterion: whether class members purchased Wesson oil

during the class period.

The district court ultimately granted Plaintiffs’ motion in

part and certified eleven statewide classes to pursue certain

claims for damages under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

23(b)(3). ConAgra timely sought and obtained permission

to appeal pursuant to Rule 23(f).

II

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs the

maintenance of class actions in federal court. Parties seeking

class certification must satisfy each of the four requirements

of Rule 23(a)—numerosity, commonality, typicality, and

adequacy—and at least one of the requirements of Rule

23(b). Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 979–

80 (9th Cir. 2011).

defined as all owners of beneficial interests in a particular bond series,

without reference to the time owned, was too indefinite); DeBremaecker

v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970) (affirming denial of class

certification because a class composed of state residents “active in the

‘peace movement’” was uncertain and overbroad). Others have used the

term in referring to classes defined in terms of success on the merits.

See, e.g., EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 360 n.9 (4th Cir. 2014)

(remanding and instructing the district court to consider, “as part of its

class-definition analysis,” inter alia, whether the proposed classes could

be defined without creating a fail-safe class). Our court does not have

its own definition. See infra note 4.

BRISENO V. CONAGRA FOODS 7

ConAgra argues that, in addition to satisfying these

enumerated criteria, class proponents must also demonstrate

that there is an administratively feasible way to determine

who is in the class.4 ConAgra claims that Plaintiffs did not

propose any way to identify class members and cannot prove

that an administratively feasible method exists because

consumers do not generally save grocery receipts and are

unlikely to remember details about individual purchases of a

low-cost product like cooking oil. We have not previously

interpreted Rule 23 to require such a demonstration, and, for

the reasons that follow, we do not do so now.

A

We employ the “traditional tools of statutory

construction” to interpret the Federal Rules of Civil

4

On appeal, ConAgra continues to present administrative feasibility

as part of a threshold “ascertainability” prerequisite to certification.

ConAgra relies on a footnote in Berger v. Home Depot USA, Inc.,

741 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2014), to argue that our court has recognized

such a requirement. But in that footnote we explicitly declined to decide

whether the district court abused its discretion by denying certification

based on a “threshold ascertainability test.” Id. at 1071 n.3. ConAgra

cites no other precedent to support the notion that our court has adopted

an “ascertainability” requirement. This is not surprising because we

have not. Instead, we have addressed the types of alleged definitional

deficiencies other courts have referred to as “ascertainability” issues, see

supra note 3, through analysis of Rule 23’s enumerated requirements.

See, e.g., Torres v. Mercer Canyons Inc., 835 F.3d 1125, 1136–39 (9th

Cir. 2016) (addressing claim that class definition was overbroad—and

thus arguably contained some members who were not injured—as a Rule

23(b)(3) predominance issue); Probe v. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys.,

780 F.2d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 1986) (recognizing that a class must not be

vaguely defined and must be “sufficiently definite to conform to Rule

23”). Although the parties here use the word “ascertainability,” they

dispute only whether a class proponent must proffer an administratively

feasible way to identify class members. That is therefore the only issue

we decide.

8 BRISENO V. CONAGRA FOODS

Procedure. Republic of Ecuador v. Mackay, 742 F.3d 860,

864 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Petri, 731 F.3d

833, 839 (9th Cir. 2013)). In construing what Rule 23

requires, our “‘first step’” is thus “‘determin[ing] whether

the language at issue has a plain meaning.’” Id. (quoting

McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774, 780 (9th Cir.

2008)); see also Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S.

153, 163 (1988) (noting that interpretation of the federal

rules “begin[s] with the language of the Rule itself”). “When

interpreting [the Rule], words and phrases must not be read

in isolation, but with an eye toward the ‘purpose and context

of the statute.’” Petri, 731 F.3d at 839 (quoting Dolan v.

U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006)). “An

interpretation that gives effect to every clause is generally

preferable to one that does not.” Mackay, 742 F.3d at 864.

Beginning then with the plain language, Rule 23(a) is

titled “Prerequisites” and provides:

One or more members of a class may sue or

be sued as representative parties on behalf of

all members only if:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all

members is impracticable;

(2) there are questions of law or fact common

to the class;

(3) the claims or defenses of the

representative parties are typical of the

claims or defenses of the class; and

(4) the representative parties will fairly and

adequately protect the interests of the class.

BRISENO V. CONAGRA FOODS 9

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). This provision identifies the

prerequisites to maintaining a class action in federal court.

It does not mention “administrative feasibility.”

Traditional canons of statutory construction suggest that

this omission was meaningful. Because the drafters

specifically enumerated “[p]rerequisites,” we may conclude

that Rule 23(a) constitutes an exhaustive list. See Silvers v.

Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2005)

(explaining that, under the doctrine of expressio unius est

exclusio alterius, the enumeration of certain criteria to the

exclusion of others should be interpreted as an intentional

omission). We also take guidance from language used in

other provisions of the Rule. In contrast to Rule 23(a), Rule

23(b)(3) provides, “The matters pertinent to these findings

include,” followed by four listed considerations. FED. R.

CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (emphasis added). If the Rules Advisory

Committee had intended to create a non-exhaustive list in

Rule 23(a), it would have used similar language. See

Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“‘[W]here

Congress includes particular language in one section of a

statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is

generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and

purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’”

(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim

Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam))).

Moreover, Rule 23(b)(3) requires a court certifying a class

under that section to consider “the likely difficulties in

managing a class action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D).

Imposing a separate administrative feasibility requirement

would render that manageability criterion largely

superfluous, a result that contravenes the familiar precept

that a rule should be interpreted to “give[] effect to every

clause.” Mackay, 742 F.3d at 864.

10 BRISENO V. CONAGRA FOODS

Supreme Court precedent also counsels in favor of

hewing closely to the text of Rule 23. In Amchem Products,

Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), the Court considered

whether a settlement-only class could be certified without

satisfying the requirements of Rule 23. In holding that it

could not, 5 the Court underscored that the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure result from “an extensive deliberative

process involving . . . a Rules Advisory Committee, public

commenters, the Judicial Conference, [the Supreme] Court,

[and] Congress.” Id. at 620. The Court warned that “[t]he

text of a rule thus proposed and reviewed limits judicial

inventiveness” and admonished that “[c]ourts are not free to

amend a rule outside the process Congress ordered.” Id. The

lesson of Amchem Products is plain: “Federal courts . . .

lack authority to substitute for Rule 23’s certification criteria

a standard never adopted.” Id. at 622.

In sum, the language of Rule 23 does not impose a

freestanding administrative feasibility prerequisite to class

certification. Mindful of the Supreme Court’s guidance, we

decline to interpose an additional hurdle into the class

certification process delineated in the enacted Rule. See

Sandusky Wellness Ctr., LLC, v. Medtox Sci., Inc., 821 F.3d

992, 996 (8th Cir. 2016) (declining to recognize a “separate,

preliminary” requirement and, instead, “adher[ing] to a

rigorous analysis of the Rule 23 requirements”).

5

The Court recognized, however, that a settlement-only class—

which by definition will not proceed to trial—can be certified without

consideration of potential trial-management challenges under Rule

23(b)(3)(D). See Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 620.

BRISENO V. CONAGRA FOODS 11

B

We recognize that the Third Circuit does require putative

class representatives to demonstrate “administrative

feasibility” as a prerequisite to class certification. 6 See Byrd

6

Other circuits have cited the Third Circuit’s administrative

feasibility standard but have not actually imposed the standard in the

same manner as has the Third Circuit. The First Circuit has cited

Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2013), for the proposition

that at the class certification stage, it must be anticipated that, by the time

a case reaches the liability and claims administration stages, there will

be an administratively feasible way to distinguish injured from uninjured

class members. See In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 19–20 (1st

Cir. 2015). Requiring plaintiffs to propose a mechanism for eventually

determining whether a given class member is entitled to damages is

different from requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate an administratively

feasible way to identify all class members at the certification stage. In

Brecher v. Republic of Argentina, 806 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2015), the Second

Circuit mentioned administrative feasibility and cited Marcus v. BMW of

N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583 (3d Cir. 2012), but administrative feasibility

played no role in the court’s decision, which instead turned on the

principle that a class definition must be objective and definite. Brecher,

806 F.3d at 24–26. The Fourth Circuit has reversed class certification

based in part on potential “administrative barrier[s]” to ascertaining class

members and cited the Third Circuit in doing so. See EQT Prod. Co. v.

Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 358–60 (4th Cir. 2014). But the “administrative

barriers” identified by the court in EQT sounded in definitional

deficiencies, numerosity questions, predominance problems, and

management difficulties, see id.—issues that all implicate other class

certification criteria. It is thus far from clear that the Fourth Circuit

requires an affirmative demonstration of administrative feasibility as a

separate prerequisite to class certification. Even the Third Circuit has

cabined its administrative feasibility rule in recent cases. See In re Cmty.

Bank of N. Va. Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., 795 F.3d 380, 396–97

(3d Cir. 2015) (distinguishing Carrera as addressing particular

“evidentiary problems”), cert. denied sub nom. PNC Bank v. Brian W.,

136 S. Ct. 1167 (2016); Byrd, 784 F.3d at 164 (clarifying that Carrera

did not create a “records requirement” at the class certification stage and

instead “only requires the plaintiff to show that class members can be

identified” (quoting Carrera, 727 F.3d at 308 n.2 (emphasis added))).

12 BRISENO V. CONAGRA FOODS

v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 162–63 (3d Cir. 2015);

Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 306–08 (3d Cir.

2013). The Third Circuit justifies its administrative

feasibility requirement not through the text of Rule 23 but

rather as a necessary tool to ensure that the “class will

actually function as a class.” Byrd, 784 F.3d at 162. The

Third Circuit suggests that its administrative feasibility

prerequisite achieves this goal by (1) mitigating

administrative burdens; (2) safeguarding the interests of

absent and bona fide class members; and (3) protecting the

due process rights of defendants. See Carrera, 727 F.3d at

307, 310. The Seventh Circuit soundly rejected those

justifications in Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654

(7th Cir. 2015), and the Sixth Circuit followed suit, see Rikos

v. Procter & Gamble Co., 799 F.3d 497, 525 (6th Cir. 2015)

(citing Mullins in declining to follow Carrera). We likewise

conclude that Rule 23’s enumerated criteria already address

the interests that motivated the Third Circuit and, therefore,

that an independent administrative feasibility requirement is

unnecessary.

1

One rationale the Third Circuit has given for imposing

an administrative feasibility requirement is the need to

mitigate the administrative burdens of trying a Rule 23(b)(3)

class action. Courts adjudicating such actions must provide

notice that a class has been certified and an opportunity for

absent class members to withdraw from the class. See Wal-

Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 362 (2011); accord

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). The Third Circuit largely

justifies its administrative feasibility prerequisite as

necessary to ensure that compliance with this procedural

requirement does not compromise the efficiencies Rule

BRISENO V. CONAGRA FOODS 13

23(b)(3) was designed to achieve. 7 See Shelton v. Bledsoe,

775 F.3d 554, 562 (3d Cir. 2015); Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307.

But Rule 23(b)(3) already contains a specific,

enumerated mechanism to achieve that goal: the

manageability criterion of the superiority requirement. Rule

23(b)(3) requires that a class action be “superior to other

available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the

controversy,” and it specifically mandates that courts

consider “the likely difficulties in managing a class action.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D).

Moreover, as the Seventh Circuit has observed, requiring

class proponents to satisfy an administrative feasibility

prerequisite “conflicts with the well-settled presumption that

courts should not refuse to certify a class merely on the basis

of manageability concerns.” Mullins, 795 F.3d at 663; see

also In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig.,

280 F.3d 124, 140 (2d Cir. 2001) (Sotomayor, J.) (holding

that refusal to certify a class “on the sole ground that it would

be unmanageable is disfavored and ‘should be the exception

rather than the rule’” (quoting In re S. Cent. States Bakery

Prods. Antitrust Litig., 86 F.R.D. 407, 423 (M.D. La.

1980))), overruled on other grounds by In re IPO Sec. Litig.,

471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006), and superseded by statute on

other grounds as stated in Attenborough v. Constr. & Gen.

Bldg. Laborers’ Local 79, 238 F.R.D. 82, 100 (S.D.N.Y.

2006). This presumption makes ample sense given the

variety of procedural tools courts can use to manage the

7

Because the notice requirement is mandatory only for Rule

23(b)(3) classes, the Third Circuit has declined to extend its

“ascertainability” prerequisite, which includes its administrative

feasibility requirement, to Rule 23(b)(2) classes. See Shelton, 775 F.3d

at 562–63. We understand ConAgra’s arguments here to be similarly

limited to Rule 23(b)(3) class actions.

14 BRISENO V. CONAGRA FOODS

administrative burdens of class litigation. For example, Rule

23(c) enables district courts to divide classes into subclasses

or certify a class as to only particular issues. FED. R. CIV. P.

23(c)(4), (5); see also In re Visa Check/MasterMoney,

280 F.3d at 141 (listing “management tools available to”

district courts).

Adopting a freestanding administrative feasibility

requirement instead of assessing manageability as one

component of the superiority inquiry would also have

practical consequences inconsistent with the policies

embodied in Rule 23. Rule 23(b)(3) calls for a comparative

assessment of the costs and benefits of class adjudication,

including the availability of “other methods” for resolving

the controversy. By contrast, as the Seventh Circuit has

emphasized, a standalone administrative feasibility

requirement would invite courts to consider the

administrative burdens of class litigation “in a vacuum.” See

Mullins, 795 F.3d at 663. That difference in approach would

often be outcome determinative for cases like this one, in

which administrative feasibility would be difficult to

demonstrate but in which there may be no realistic

alternative to class treatment. See id. at 663–64. Class

actions involving inexpensive consumer goods in particular

would likely fail at the outset if administrative feasibility

were a freestanding prerequisite to certification.

The authors of Rule 23 opted not to make the potential

administrative burdens of a class action dispositive and

instead directed courts to balance the benefits of class

adjudication against its costs. We lack authority to substitute

our judgment for theirs. See Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at

620 (“[T]he Rule as now composed sets the requirements

[courts] are bound to enforce.”).

BRISENO V. CONAGRA FOODS 15

2

The Third Circuit has also justified its administrative

feasibility requirement as necessary to protect absent class

members and to shield bona fide claimants from fraudulent

claims.

A

With respect to absent class members, the Third Circuit

has expressed concern about whether courts would be able

to ensure individual notice without a method for reliably

identifying class members. See Byrd, 784 F.3d at 165;

Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307. We believe that concern is

unfounded, because neither Rule 23 nor the Due Process

Clause requires actual notice to each individual class

member.

Rule 23 requires only the “best notice that is practicable

under the circumstances, including individual notice to all

members who can be identified through reasonable effort.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added). In other

words, “[t]he rule does not insist on actual notice to all class

members in all cases” and “recognizes it might be impossible

to identify some class members for purposes of actual

notice.” Mullins, 795 F.3d at 665. And courts have long

employed cy pres remedies when some or even all potential

claimants cannot be identified. See Six (6) Mexican Workers

v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1990)

(“In a majority of class actions at least some unclaimed

damages or unlocated class members remain. The existence

of a large unclaimed damage fund, while relevant to the

manageability determination, does not necessarily make a

class action ‘unmanageable.’” (citation omitted)). The

notion that an inability to identify all class members

16 BRISENO V. CONAGRA FOODS

precludes class certification cannot be reconciled with our

court’s longstanding cy pres jurisprudence. See id.

Likewise, the Due Process Clause does not require

actual, individual notice in all cases. See Silber v. Mabon,

18 F.3d 1449, 1453–54 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Mullins,

795 F.3d at 665 (explaining that when individual notice by

mail is “not possible, courts may use alternative means such

as notice through third parties, paid advertising, and/or

posting in places frequented by class members, all without

offending due process”). Courts have routinely held that

notice by publication in a periodical, on a website, or even

at an appropriate physical location is sufficient to satisfy due

process. See, e.g., Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., Inc.,

731 F.3d 672, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that sticker

notices on two allegedly offending ATMs, as well as

publication in the state’s principal newspaper and on a

website, provided adequate notice to class members in an

action challenging ATM fees); Juris v. Inamed Corp.,

685 F.3d 1294, 1319 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that notice to

unidentified class members by periodical and website

satisfied due process).

Moreover, the lack-of-notice concern presumes that

some harm will inure to absent class members who do not

receive actual notice. In theory, inadequate notice might

deny an absent class member the opportunity to opt out and

pursue individual litigation. But in reality that risk is

virtually nonexistent in the very cases in which satisfying an

administrative feasibility requirement would prove most

difficult—low-value consumer class actions. Such cases

typically involve low-cost products and, as a result,

recoveries too small to incentivize individual litigation. At

the same time, an administrative feasibility requirement like

that imposed by the Third Circuit would likely bar such

actions because consumers generally do not keep receipts or

BRISENO V. CONAGRA FOODS 17

other records of low-cost purchases. Practically speaking, a

separate administrative feasibility requirement would

protect a purely theoretical interest of absent class members

at the expense of any possible recovery for all class

members—in precisely those cases that depend most on the

class mechanism. Justifying an administrative feasibility

requirement as a means of ensuring perfect recovery at the

expense of any recovery would undermine the very purpose

of Rule 23(b)(3)—“vindication of ‘the rights of groups of

people who individually would be without effective strength

to bring their opponents into court at all.’” Amchem Prods.,

521 U.S. at 617 (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory

Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969)).

B

The Third Circuit has also expressed concern that

without an administrative feasibility requirement,

individuals will submit illegitimate claims and thereby dilute

the recovery of legitimate claimants. See Carrera, 727 F.3d

at 310.

The fraud concern may be valid in theory, but “in

practice, the risk of dilution based on fraudulent or mistaken

claims seems low, perhaps to the point of being negligible.”

Mullins, 795 F.3d at 667. This is especially true in class

actions involving low-cost consumer goods. Why would a

consumer risk perjury charges and spend the time and effort

to submit a false claim for a de minimis monetary recovery?

And even if consumers might do so, courts “can rely, as they

have for decades, on claim administrators, various auditing

processes, sampling for fraud detection, follow-up notices to

explain the claims process, and other techniques tailored by

the parties and the court” to avoid or minimize fraudulent

claims. Id.

18 BRISENO V. CONAGRA FOODS

As to the dilution concern specifically, consistently low

participation rates in consumer class actions make it very

unlikely that non-deserving claimants would diminish the

recovery of participating, bona fide class members. 8 See id.

“It is not unusual for only 10 or 15% of the class members

to bother filing claims.” Christopher R. Leslie, The

Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and

Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 119 (2007).

Moreover, if certification is denied to prevent dilution,

deserving class members “will receive nothing, for they

would not have brought suit individually in the first place.”

Mullins, 795 F.3d at 668. As the Seventh Circuit put it,

“[w]hen it comes to protecting the interests of absent class

members, courts should not let the perfect become the enemy

of the good.” Id. at 666.

3

Finally, the Third Circuit has characterized its

administrative feasibility requirement as necessary to protect

the due process rights of defendants “to raise individual

challenges and defenses to claims.” Carrera, 727 F.3d at

307. The gravamen of this due process concern seems to be

8

Theoretically, if there were non-legitimate claimants, they would

dilute a cy pres fund. But that outcome would not impact bona fide

claimants, who would have already received distributions. See Nachshin

v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that, after

distributions have been made to any claimants, “[t]he cy pres doctrine

allows a court to distribute unclaimed or non-distributable portions of a

class action settlement fund to the ‘next best’ class of beneficiaries”

(emphasis added)). Nor would it affect the defendant, whose liability

will already have been determined. See Six (6) Mexican Workers,

904 F.2d at 1307 (“The use of cy pres or fluid recovery to distribute

unclaimed funds may be considered only after a valid judgment for

damages has been rendered against the defendant.”).

BRISENO V. CONAGRA FOODS 19

that defendants must have an opportunity to dispute whether

class members really bought the product or used the service

at issue. 9 See id. (stating that a defendant has a “due process

right to challenge the proof used to demonstrate class

membership”); Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d

583, 594 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Forcing [defendants] to accept as

true absent persons’ declarations that they are members of

the class, without further indicia of reliability, would have

serious due process implications.”).

As an initial matter, defendants plainly can mount such

challenges as to the named class representatives. Class

representatives must establish standing by, for example,

showing that they bought the product or used the service at

issue. See Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 666 F.3d

581, 595 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that class representatives

who allegedly paid more for or purchased a product due to a

defendant’s deceptive conduct have suffered an “injury in

fact” that establishes Article III standing); Bates v. United

Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating

that “[t]he plaintiff class bears the burden of showing” that

“at least one named plaintiff” meets the Article III standing

requirements). At the class certification stage, the class

9

Relatedly, ConAgra argues that an administrative feasibility

requirement would protect its ability to meaningfully assert a res

judicata defense in future actions asserting the same claims. But

determining whether a plaintiff in that future action was a member of this

class precluded from relitigating would be possible so long as the class

definition in this action was clear (and ConAgra does not dispute that it

is). If a future plaintiff were to assert a claim challenging the “100%

Natural” label on Wesson oil purchased during the class period in one of

the eleven states at issue, that would show that she was a member of the

class bound by the judgment. This would be so regardless of how

“administratively feasible” it was to prove the entirety of the

membership at the class certification stage in this action. See Geoffrey

C. Shaw, Note, Class Ascertainability, 124 YALE L.J. 2354, 2374–78

(2015).

20 BRISENO V. CONAGRA FOODS

representatives bear the burden of demonstrating

compliance with Rule 23. See Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at

350 (“A party seeking class certification must affirmatively

demonstrate his compliance with the Rule.”). And if the case

proceeds past the certification stage, the plaintiff class must

carry the burden of proving every element of its claims to

prevail on the merits. See id. at 351 n.6 (observing that, in a

securities fraud class action, “plaintiffs seeking 23(b)(3)

certification must prove that their shares were traded on an

efficient market, an issue that they will surely have to prove

again at trial in order to make out their case on the merits”

(citation omitted)); id. at 367 (“[T]he Rules Enabling Act

forbids interpreting Rule 23 to ‘abridge, enlarge or modify

any substantive right.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)));

Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A., v. Allstate Ins. Co.,

559 U.S. 393, 408 (2010) (“A class action. . . . leaves the

parties’ legal rights and duties intact and the rules of decision

unchanged.”). Defendants can oppose the class

representatives’ showings at every stage. Indeed, in

litigating class certification, ConAgra took discovery of the

class representatives, challenged whether they bought

Wesson oil products, attacked their credibility, and disputed

whether they relied on the label at issue. As the case

proceeds, ConAgra will have further opportunities to contest

every aspect of Plaintiffs’ case.

Defendants will have similar opportunities to

individually challenge the claims of absent class members if

and when they file claims for damages. At the claims

administration stage, parties have long relied on “claim

administrators, various auditing processes, sampling for

fraud detection, follow-up notices to explain the claims

process, and other techniques tailored by the parties and the

court” to validate claims. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 667. Rule 23

specifically contemplates the need for such individualized

BRISENO V. CONAGRA FOODS 21

claim determinations after a finding of liability. See FED. R.

CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment

(explaining that certification may be proper “despite the

need, if liability is found, for separate determinations of the

damages suffered by individuals within the class”); see also

Levya v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 513–14 (9th Cir.

2013) (reaffirming, after Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,

133 S.Ct. 1426 (2013), that the need for individualized

damages determinations after liability has been adjudicated

does not preclude class certification). ConAgra does not

explain why such procedures are insufficient to safeguard its

due process rights. 10

Given these existing opportunities to challenge

Plaintiffs’ case, it is not clear why requiring an

administratively feasible way to identify all class members

at the certification stage is necessary to protect ConAgra’s

due process rights. As the Seventh Circuit put it, “[t]he due

process question is not whether the identity of class members

can be ascertained with perfect accuracy at the certification

stage but whether the defendant will receive a fair

opportunity to present its defenses when putative class

members actually come forward.” Mullins, 795 F.3d at 670.

ConAgra may prefer to terminate this litigation in one fell

swoop at class certification rather than later challenging each

individual class member’s claim to recovery, but there is no

due process right to “a cost-effective procedure for

challenging every individual claim to class membership.”

Id. at 669.

10

District courts also have discretion to allow limited discovery

from absent class members if the particular circumstances of a specific

case justify it. See WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS

ACTIONS § 9:13 (5th ed. 2013) (“[C]ertain forms of limited discovery

from absent class members may be permitted in certain circumstances.”).

22 BRISENO V. CONAGRA FOODS

If the concern is that claimants in cases like this will

eventually offer only a “self-serving affidavit” as proof of

class membership, it is again unclear why that issue must be

resolved at the class certification stage to protect a

defendant’s due process rights. If a Wesson oil consumer

were to pursue an individual lawsuit instead of a class action,

an affidavit describing her purchases would create a genuine

issue if ConAgra disputed the affidavit, and would prevent

summary judgment against the consumer. See Mullins,

795 F.3d at 669; accord FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Given

that a consumer’s affidavit could force a liability

determination at trial without offending the Due Process

Clause, we see no reason to refuse class certification simply

because that same consumer will present her affidavit in a

claims administration process after a liability determination

has already been made.

Moreover, identification of class members will not affect

a defendant’s liability in every case. For example, in this

case, Plaintiffs propose to determine ConAgra’s aggregate

liability by (1) calculating the price premium attributable to

the allegedly false statement that appeared on every unit sold

during the class period, and (2) multiplying that premium by

the total number of units sold during the class period. We

agree with the Seventh Circuit that, in cases in which

aggregate liability can be calculated in such a manner, “the

identity of particular class members does not implicate the

defendant’s due process interest at all” because “[t]he

addition or subtraction of individual class members affects

neither the defendant’s liability nor the total amount of

damages it owes to the class.” Mullins, 795 F.3d at 670; see

also Six (6) Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d at 1307 (“Where the

only question is how to distribute damages, the interests

affected are not the defendant’s but rather those of the silent

class members.”). The defendant will generally know how

BRISENO V. CONAGRA FOODS 23

many units of a product it sold in the geographic area in

question, and if the defendant is ultimately found to have

charged, for example, 10 cents more per unit than it could

have without the challenged sales practice, the aggregate

amount of liability will be determinable even if the identity

of all class members is not. The Third Circuit recognized as

much in Carrera. See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 310

(acknowledging but not addressing the argument that “[the

defendant’s] total liability” would not be “affected by

unreliable affidavits”).

For these reasons, protecting a defendant’s due process

rights does not necessitate an independent administrative

feasibility requirement.

C

In summary, the language of Rule 23 neither provides

nor implies that demonstrating an administratively feasible

way to identify class members is a prerequisite to class

certification, and the policy concerns that have motivated the

Third Circuit to adopt a separately articulated requirement

are already addressed by the Rule. We therefore join the

Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits in declining to adopt an

administrative feasibility requirement. See Sandusky

Wellness Ctr., LLC, v. Medtox Sci., Inc., 821 F.3d 992, 995–

96 (8th Cir. 2016) (recognizing that some courts have

imposed an administrative feasibility requirement, but

declining to do so); Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co., 799 F.3d

497, 525 (6th Cir. 2015) (“We see no reason to follow

Carrera.”); Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654,

658 (7th Cir. 2015) (rejecting the administrative feasibility

requirement as incompatible with Rule 23 and “the balance

of interests that Rule 23 is designed to protect”).

24 BRISENO V. CONAGRA FOODS

III

For the forgoing reasons, the district court did not err in

declining to condition class certification on Plaintiffs’

proffer of an administratively feasible way to identify

putative class members.

AFFIRMED.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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