Gregory A. Snow v. Turney Center Disciplinary Board

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs October 4, 2016

GREGORY A. SNOW v. TURNEY CENTER DISCIPLINARY

BOARD, ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Hickman County

No. 15-CV-5638 Joseph Woodruff, Judge

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No. M2016-01148-COA-R3-CV – Filed December 22, 2016

___________________________________

An inmate was relocated from one cell to another in 2012 as part of a large-scale inmate

reassignment, and two knives were found in the door to the inmate‟s cell in 2015. The

inmate was charged with the possession of a deadly weapon and was found guilty by the

disciplinary board following a hearing. The inmate claimed he did not know anything

about the knives and that he did not believe the cell was searched prior to his

reassignment, as the prison policies require. The inmate exhausted his administrative

appeals before filing a petition for writ of certiorari. In an effort to prove his cell was not

searched prior to his reassignment and that the evidence did not support his conviction,

the inmate sought permission to discover documents from the State, which the trial court

denied. The trial court granted the writ of certiorari but denied the inmate any relief. The

inmate raises several issues on appeal. We affirm the trial court‟s judgment in all

respects.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

ANDY D. BENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CHARLES D. SUSANO,

JR., J., and J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., joined.

Gregory A. Snow, Only, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée Blumstein, Solicitor

General; and Madeline Bertasi Brough, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellees,

Turney Center Disciplinary Board, et al.

OPINION

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Gregory A. Snow is an inmate at Turney Center Industrial Complex (“TCIX”), a

division of the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). On August 4, 2015,

Corporal Robert Story and Officer Clint Zyla performed a search of Cell 2A-230 and

found two homemade knives inside the door to the cell. Mr. Snow was one of the

occupants of Cell 2A-230 at that time and was charged with the disciplinary infraction of

possession of a deadly weapon. Mr. Snow was transferred to segregation pending a

disciplinary hearing. Mr. Snow pleaded “not guilty” to the charge and was appointed an

inmate advisor to represent him at the hearing, which took place eight days after the

knives were discovered. The Disciplinary Report Hearing Summary contains the

following statement by Mr. Snow:

I‟ve been locked up since 06 and never had a disciplinary. I had no

knowledge of those knives. They haven‟t searched in a long time and I‟ve

never seen them check the door.

The disciplinary board was provided with the physical evidence and a Disciplinary

Report that described the two knives as “5ʺ and 9ʺ homemade knives” and identified their

status as “good condition.” The report also contained the following description of the

search:

On 08/04/15 at 12:15 pm a search of 2A 230 was performed by Corporal

Robert Story and Officer Clint Zyla. Two homemade knives were removed

from inside the door. One icepick style 5ʺ long and one flat metal

sharpened to a point 9ʺ long. Inmates Gregory Snow #410694 and [his

cellmate] are assigned to this cell, and are being charged with possession of

a deadly weapon and moved to Unit Five pending hearing. Captain

William Bishop approved this disciplinary report.

The disciplinary board found Mr. Snow “guilty based on report & evidence

presented of 2 knives found in the door of inmate Snow‟s cell.” Mr. Snow was found

guilty of a Class A disciplinary offense, possession of a deadly weapon, and sentenced to

a fine of five dollars, twelve-month package restriction, three months‟ loss of good time

credit, and ten days of segregation.

Mr. Snow appealed to the warden and to the commissioner of the TDOC. In his

appeal to the warden, Mr. Snow argued that the knives were placed in the door to his cell

before he was moved there and that the only reason the door to his cell was searched was

the receipt of confidential information. The warden affirmed the conviction and wrote:

“Inmate moved to the cell on 5-30-2012 where he remained until 8-4-2015. Shanks

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appeared relatively new.” In his appeal to the commissioner, Mr. Snow asserted a

violation of a TCIX policy requiring vacant cells to be searched and inspected before

being occupied by new inmates and further requiring unit staff to “enter all vacant cells

on TOMIS conversation LIBQ, Cell Search Request.”1 The commissioner affirmed Mr.

Snow‟s conviction, stating that Mr. Snow had failed to support his allegations that the

warden had reached an incorrect decision when reviewing his original appeal.

After exhausting his administrative appeals, Mr. Snow filed a petition for common

law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Hickman County. In his petition, Mr.

Snow asserted that there was a lockdown at TCIX on May 30, 2012, and all prisoners

were reassigned to housing units. Mr. Snow explained that he was not given a choice

about the cell reassignment and that he was relocated to a cell that had formerly been

occupied by a gang member. Mr. Snow also asserted that one of the knives found in the

door to his cell was made out of stainless steel bar, which came from old dust mops that

were removed from TCIX immediately following the 2012 cell reassignment. Mr. Snow

wrote, “Ironically enough, [these mops] were removed because so many knives were

being made out of them.”

In his petition, Mr. Snow alleged that the vacant cells were not searched during the

2012 lockdown and inmate reassignment, and he cited the following TDOC and TCIX

policies:

TDOC Policy 506.06, Section VI, I, 3, (b): There shall be a complete

search and inspection of each vacant room/cell before it is occupied by a

new inmate. The Warden/Designee shall enter all vacant cells on TOMIS

conversation LIBQ, Cell Search Request.

TDOC Policy 506.06, Section VI, I, 3, (c): The Warden/Designee shall

identify the number of occupied cells/rooms that are to be searched. The

cell search request shall be entered on TOMIS conversation LIBQ. The

employee designated to conduct the search shall enter the Cell Search

Results on TOMIS conversation LIBR within 48 hours of completing the

search.

TCIX Local Policy 506.06-1, Section VI, J, 7: . . .Vacant cells shall be

searched and inspected before [they are] occupied by a new inmate. Unit

staff shall enter all vacant cells on TOMIS conversation LIBQ, Cell Search

Request. Searching staff shall enter the Cell Search Results on

1

TOMIS is an acronym for the Tennessee Offender Management Information System, a database

maintained by the TDOC. The meaning of LIBQ could not be determined.

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TOMIS/LIBR.2

According to Mr. Snow, the disciplinary board acted arbitrarily and illegally in

convicting him of the charged offense in light of the fact that the TCIX personnel failed

to follow the TDOC and TCIX mandatory procedures of searching vacant cells before

relocating inmates. Mr. Snow further alleged in his petition that he was denied due

process of law because (1) the disciplinary board failed to make findings of fact to

support its decision to find him guilty of the charged offense; and (2) an informant told

TCIX officials about the location of the knives and the TCIX officers failed to write an

independent assessment of the confidential informant‟s reliability as required by the

TDOC Uniform Disciplinary Procedures Policy 502.01(VI)(L)(4)(g). Mr. Snow

requested the court to provide the following relief: issue the writ of certiorari; order the

State to file the certified record of the proceedings; and vacate his conviction for

possession of a deadly weapon, order the restoration of all sentence reduction credits, and

order the return of all monetary fees and other privileges taken away as a result of the

disciplinary conviction.

The State did not oppose the court‟s granting of the writ. The court entered an

order granting Mr. Snow‟s petition for the writ, and it directed the State to certify the

administrative record and provide it to the court. Mr. Snow then requested, pursuant to

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 34, that the State produce documents and that he be permitted to amend

his complaint based on the information gleaned from the documents produced. The

documents Mr. Snow sought included the following:

1) All records, computerized or otherwise, and preferably in print out

format, documenting all cell changes conducted on 29, 30, and 31 May

2012 at the Turney Center Industrial Complex;

2) All records, computerized or otherwise, and preferably in print out

format, documenting searches conducted on any or all cells in Units 1, 2, 3,

or 4 on 29, 30 or 31 May 2012;

3) A copy of the minutes from the TCIX Inmate Council Meeting for the

month of August 2015;

4) The TOMIS records listing the names and TDOC numbers of all inmates

who have been assigned to cell 2A-230 from January 2010 until 31 May

2012;

5) The disciplinary print screen listing the inmates‟ disciplinary records

2

The record contains the TDOC policies, but it does not include the TCIX local policy Mr. Snow

cites.

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generated from request 4, if that conviction resulted in the inmate being

moved out of the cell, either by being “locked up” prior to being found

guilty of a disciplinary offense, or being found guilty of a disciplinary

offense and then being locked up in HSA;

6) The gang status of the above listed inmates, whether they are

unaffiliated, suspected, associates or confirmed gang members and what

that affiliation is, i.e. Aryan Nation, WAR, etc.;

7) A copy of any and all memoranda issued by TCIX administrative staff

which detail, direct or order the seizure or confiscation of, or directing the

institution staff to gather and remove all stainless steel dust mop heads and

their constituent components; and

8) A copy of any documentation regarding the information that Corporal

Robert Story, a member of the Turney Center CERT (Correctional

Emergency Response Team) received and acted upon when he searched the

door of 2A-230, including any specific information regarding a description

of what contraband was expected to be discovered, or a statement from Cpl.

Story regarding the information that he received, as well as the context in

which he received it, i.e. a concerned citizen, a drug addict trading the

information for a pass on a positive drug screen, etc.

The State objected to Mr. Snow‟s request for documents, arguing that the trial

court is not entitled on a petition for a writ of certiorari to inquire into the intrinsic

correctness of the board‟s decision and that its review is limited to the record of the

administrative proceeding below. According to the State, the documents Mr. Snow

requested would not assist the court to determine whether the board acted illegally,

arbitrarily, or outside of its jurisdiction.

The trial court denied Mr. Snow‟s request for documents on May 16, 2016,

stating:

Discovery is not allowed in a writ of certiorari unless the documents sought

specifically show the arbitrariness or legality of the disciplinary hearing.

The requests made in Petitioner‟s motion are either not permissible, not

possible, or not needed.

After consideration of the request and the record as a whole the Court finds

the request is not well taken and is respectfully DENIED.

Then, on May 17, 2016, the court dismissed Mr. Snow‟s common law writ of

certiorari by Memorandum and Order. The court acknowledged Mr. Snow‟s contention

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that neither his cell nor the door to his cell were searched prior to his placement in cell

2A-230 and that an inmate who lived in the cell prior to him testified in his cellmate‟s

case that the knives were in the door before Mr. Snow was placed there. Despite Mr.

Snow‟s argument, the court wrote:

Petitioner makes and made compelling arguments. However, it is not

within the power of this Court to reweigh the evidence and second guess

the decision of the lower board. The duty of this Court is to determine

whether the decision was based on material evidence and that the decision

was not made fraudulently, arbitrarily, or illegally.

The court found that Mr. Snow was given his day in court at the disciplinary hearing and

noted that the disciplinary board determined the knives belonged to Mr. Snow “based on

the fact they were found in the door of his cell and looked relatively new.” The court

found the policies governing the searching of inmates‟ cells are not part of the Uniform

Disciplinary Procedures “and thus are not grounds for reversal.”

Turning to Mr. Snow‟s other arguments, the court wrote the following concerning

the confidential informant: “Due process does not require an independent write-up of an

informant‟s reliability nor does it require the Uniform Disciplinary Procedures be

followed.” With regard to the evidence the board relied upon in rendering its ultimate

decision, the trial court wrote:

Petitioner was punished by a fine and the loss of three months of

sentence reduction credits which implicate Due Process. Garrard v.

Tennessee Dep’t of Correction, 2014 WL 1887298, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2014). Petitioner alleges his Due Process rights were violated because he

alleged the board did not include a written statement indicating what

evidence the factfinder relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary

actions taken. In support of his allegations, Petitioner cites Garrard v.

Tennessee Department of Correction, where the Court of Appeals did hold

that a summary that only included the alleged policy violation and

punishment was constitutionally deficient. See id. at 10. However, that

case is distinguishable from the current case before the Court because the

summary in this case does state that [the] board relied upon the disciplinary

report attached in the record and the two knives found within the door of

Petitioner‟s cell. Thus, while the board did not write a lengthy report on its

findings of fact, it does state the evidence it relied upon in making its

decision.

Concluding that there was “no evidence that the hearing was conducted arbitrarily or

illegally,” the court explained that it could not substitute its judgment for that of the

board. As a result, the court dismissed Mr. Snow‟s common law writ of certiorari.

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Mr. Snow appeals the trial court‟s dismissal of his common law writ. He argues

the trial court erred by (1) denying him the opportunity to support his allegations through

discovery; (2) concluding that evidence introduced at the hearing supported the board‟s

determination that he was guilty of the charged offense by a preponderance of the

evidence; (3) failing to make findings of fact and entering them into the record to support

its ultimate decision to find Mr. Snow guilty and to impose the discipline that it did; and

(4) failing to comply with TDOC Policy 502.01(V)(L)(4)(g), regarding the use of

confidential information from an informant. Mr. Snow also argued he was denied due

process of law and a fair hearing because the board ignored the institutional staff‟s failure

to follow the internal policies requiring empty cells to be searched during a reassignment

before different inmates are assigned to the cells.

II. ANALYSIS

The common-law writ of certiorari is the procedural vehicle prisoners may use to

obtain a review of decisions by prison disciplinary boards, parole eligibility review

boards, and other similar administrative tribunals. Willis v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 113

S.W.3d 706, 712 (Tenn. 2003); see Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-101 (providing that the writ

may be granted where an inferior tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions

exceeds jurisdiction or acts illegally and no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy is

available); Davison v. Carr, 659 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tenn. 1983) (“Common law certiorari

is available where the court reviews an administrative decision in which that agency is

acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.”). Granting a petitioner‟s request for a writ

is not an adjudication; it is simply an order by the trial court directing the administrative

tribunal to file its record of proceedings to enable the court to determine whether the

petitioner is entitled to relief. State v. Lane, 254 S.W.3d 349, 354 (Tenn. 2008); Keen v.

Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., No. M2007-00632-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 539059, at *2 (Tenn.

Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2008); Hawkins v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 127 S.W.3d 749, 757 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 2002).

A reviewing court is not permitted to “(1) inquire into the intrinsic correctness of

the lower tribunal‟s decision, (2) reweigh the evidence, or (3) substitute [its] judgment for

that of the lower tribunal” when considering a petition for a common law writ of

certiorari. Keen, 2008 WL 539059 at *2 (citations omitted); see also Heyne v. Metro.

Nashville Bd. of Pub. Educ., 380 S.W.3d 715, 729 (Tenn. 2012); Willis, 113 S.W.3d at

712. Rather, the scope of review is limited to determining “whether the disciplinary

board exceeded its jurisdiction or acted illegally, fraudulently, or arbitrarily.” Willis, 113

S.W.3d at 712 (citing Turner v. Tenn. Bd. of Paroles, 993 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Tenn. Ct. App.

1999)); South v. Tenn. Bd. of Paroles, 946 S.W.2d 310, 311 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996)). This

involves a question of law, not of fact. Harding Acad. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville &

Davidson Cnty., No. M2004-02118-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 627193, at *4 (Tenn. Ct.

App. Sept. 25, 2006). „“The scope of review by the appellate courts is no broader or

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more comprehensive than that of the trial court with respect to evidence presented before

the Board.”‟ Id. (quoting Watts v. Civ. Serv. Bd. for Columbia, 606 S.W.2d 274, 277

(Tenn. 1980)).

A common law writ of certiorari can be used to correct “(1) fundamentally illegal

rulings; (2) proceedings inconsistent with essential legal requirements; (3) proceedings

that effectively deny a party his or her day in court; (4) decisions beyond the lower

tribunal‟s authority; and (5) plain and palpable abuses of discretion.” Willis, 113 S.W.3d

at 712 (citing State v. Willoughby, 594 S.W.2d 388, 392 (Tenn.1980)); see also

Abbington Ctr., LLC v. Town of Collierville, 393 S.W.3d 170, 175 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012).

In other words, a trial court‟s review is focused on the manner in which the lower

tribunal‟s decision was reached rather than its intrinsic correctness. Garrard v. Tenn.

Dep’t of Corr., No. M2013-01525-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 1887298, at *4 (Tenn. Ct.

App. May 8, 2014) (citing Powell v. Parole Eligibility Rev. Bd., 879 S.W.2d 871, 873

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1994)); Keen, 2008 WL 539059, at *2 (citing Hall v. McLesky, 83

S.W.3d 752, 757 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)). If the tribunal reaches its decision in a manner

that is either unlawful or unconstitutional, the decision is subject to judicial review.

Powell, 879 S.W.2d at 873.

A trial court‟s review of an inferior tribunal‟s decision is normally limited to the

record created at the tribunal level. Adams v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., No. M2013-00370-

COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 4536557, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2014). However, “new

evidence is admissible on the issue of whether the administrative body exceeded its

jurisdiction or acted illegally, capriciously or arbitrarily.” Davison, 659 S.W.2d at 363

(citing Watts, 606 S.W.2d at 276-77); see also Adams, 2014 WL 4536557, at *3; Moore

v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 205 S.W.3d 429, 435 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006); Hunter v.

Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, No. M2002-00752-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 315060, at *2

(Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2004). Our Supreme Court has stated that the terms “[a]buse of

discretion,” “arbitrariness,” “capriciousness,” and “unreasonableness” are often used to

mean the same thing. McCallen v. City of Memphis, 786 S.W.2d 633, 641 (Tenn. 1990)

(citing 8A E. McQuillen, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 25.310, at 562 (3d

ed. 1986)).

A. Mr. Snow‟s Request for Documents

We review the trial court‟s decision denying Mr. Snow‟s request for documents

under the abuse of discretion standard. Weaver v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 122

S.W.3d 781, 784 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). The Tennessee Supreme Court has described

this standard thusly:

A trial court abuses its discretion only when it “applie[s] an incorrect legal

standard, or reache[s] a decision which is against logic or reasoning that

cause[s] an injustice to the party complaining.” State v. Shirley, 6 S.W.3d

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243, 247 (Tenn. 1999). The abuse of discretion standard does not permit the

appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Myint v.

Allstate Ins. Co., 970 S.W.2d 920, 927 (Tenn. 1998).

Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001).

The administrative record in this case does not contain a transcript of the hearing

or any of the appeals, making it difficult for us to review the administrative procedures.

A document entitled “Disciplinary Report Hearing Summary” reflects that Corporal Story

was asked the following questions:

Q: On the door did you have to pry the paint loose?

A: No.

Q: How deep were the knives?

A: Bout a foot to the 1st and the 2nd was 8 inches.

Q: Did you have a reason to go there?

A: Yes.

Another document entitled “Disciplinary Report Appeal,” which is dated August

16, 2015, appears to be part of Mr. Snow‟s administrative appeal to the warden, and it

contains a section called “Grounds for Appeal.” In this section, Mr. Snow wrote:

The inside of cell doors are not inspected prior to inmates moving in them,

so it leaves the possibility that the items could have been inside the door

before he moved in the cell.

The only place searched in Mr. Snow‟s cell was his door and CERT Story

testified that it was confidential information which led them to the search.

Taking that into consideration it is a good possibility that the “confidential

source” is either responsible for the items found inside the door or knows

who is responsible for them.

Then, in another document entitled “Disciplinary Report Appeal,” dated August

27, 2015, Mr. Snow identified additional grounds for his administrative appeal to the

commissioner. In this document, Mr. Snow identified a TCIX policy requiring that

vacant cells to be searched and inspected before they are occupied by a new inmate and

that the cell search results be entered into the TOMIS system. He also stated:

During the hearing of [my cellmate] on this issue, Cpl. Story was asked

specifically if they search inside the doors, and when a cell becomes empty

before a new inmate is assigned, and his testimony was:

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“We do not typically do this.”

This was not done in this case. Hundreds of moves were made in 1 or 2

days. Their inaction caused me and my celly to be responsible beyond any

control of our own.

My record prior to this was perfect for 9 years. Shift commanders, unit

managers, even the Chief of Security knows this is not mine or my celly‟s.

When I asked how can I possibly protect myself from this, they said “There

is No Way.”

After filing his petition for writ of certiorari, Mr. Snow sought to discover

documents from the State to prove his allegations, inter alia, that the State failed to

follow its own policies and procedures regarding the search of empty cells before new

inmates were assigned to them. The State contends the trial court acted properly in

denying Mr. Snow‟s request for discovery because the documents requested “would only

be relevant to the intrinsic correctness of the conviction – whether Appellant was in fact

responsible for the presence of the deadly weapon in his cell.” We agree. The reason

Mr. Snow wanted the State to produce documents was to show that the prison employees

did not adhere to the prison‟s procedures pertaining to searches of empty cells for the

ultimate purpose of showing the knives found in the door to his cell did not belong to

him. However, under the common law writ of certiorari, the reviewing court is not

allowed to “inquire into the intrinsic correctness of the lower tribunal‟s decision.” Keen,

2008 WL 539059 at *2.

In support of his argument, Mr. Snow relies on the case Adams v. Tennessee

Department of Corrections, No. M2013-00370-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 4536557 (Tenn.

Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2014), in which the inmate/petitioner filed several motions, including

one seeking discovery at the trial court level, as here. Adams, 2014 WL 4536557, at *2.

The inmate in Adams sought the discovery in an effort to establish that the disciplinary

board acted arbitrarily, illegally, or capriciously in convicting him of assault by, inter

alia, violating policies mandated by the Uniform Disciplinary Procedures. Id. at *1, 3.

Unlike this case, however, the trial court in Adams neglected to rule on any of the

inmate‟s pending motions before dismissing his writ. Id. at *1. The Court of Appeals in

Adams reversed the trial court‟s dismissal of the inmate‟s writ based on its conclusion

that the outcome of the inmate‟s petition could have been affected “had the trial court

granted some or all of the motions.” Id. In this case, by contrast, the policy Mr. Snow

contends the prison employees violated did not pertain to the administrative proceedings,

and the trial court ruled on Mr. Snow‟s motion before dismissing his writ.

Although we are sympathetic to Mr. Snow‟s argument and desire to establish that

the prison employees did not follow the policies regarding searching empty cells, we

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have no basis to conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for

documents in this case.

B. Mr. Snow‟s Conviction by the Disciplinary Board

Mr. Snow maintains that the trial court did not address all of the issues he raised in

his trial brief. Without going through the issues in detail here, we have examined his trial

brief and the trial court‟s decision and are quite satisfied that the trial court left none of

the issues he raised unaddressed.

Mr. Snow next contends the disciplinary board erred in finding that the evidence

presented at the hearing established his guilt. In support of this argument, Mr. Snow

contends Corporal Story presented uncontradicted testimony that the cell doors are not

searched when inmates are relocated from one cell to another.3 Based on this evidence,

Mr. Snow argues the board erred in finding him guilty. The record in this case does not

indicate, however, that Corporal Story testified at Mr. Snow‟s disciplinary hearing. In his

administrative appeal to the commissioner, Mr. Snow asserted that Corporal Story

testified in his cellmate’s hearing. The disciplinary board that was presented with

evidence in Mr. Snow‟s case must base its decision on evidence presented in Mr. Snow‟s

hearing, not his cellmate‟s hearing. See TDOC Policy 502.01(VI)(L)(4)(k) (“the

disciplinary board/hearing officer shall base the decision solely on the information

obtained during the hearing process”). Even if the evidence is uncontradicted that the

cell doors were not searched, it does not establish that the knives did not belong to Snow.

Thus, we conclude this argument by Mr. Snow lacks merit.

Mr. Snow also argues that the disciplinary board erred in basing its decision on its

finding that the knife shanks “looked relatively new” and therefore must have been

placed in the door relatively recently. He calls this “pure supposition.” However, the

appearance of the knives is relevant and material. As we explained earlier, we are unable

to inquire into the “intrinsic correctness” of the disciplinary board‟s decision in a

common law writ of certiorari proceeding. We are not permitted to reweigh the evidence

presented at the hearing. If the record contains “any material evidence to support the

board‟s findings,” we must uphold the tribunal‟s decision. Jackson v. Tenn. Dep’t of

Corr., No. W2005-02240-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 1547859, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. June

8, 2006); see Abbington Ctr., LLC, 393 S.W.3d at 175-76 (holding that board‟s action

will be upheld “if „any possible reason exists‟”) (quoting McCallen, 786 S.W.2d at 641).

“If no evidence supports the action of the administrative board, then that action is

arbitrary.” Harding Acad., 222 S.W.3d at 363.

3

Corporal Story is listed as a witness in one document in the record. The quotation from

Story that Snow used in his brief is attributed in Snow‟s appeal documents to the Commissioner

as occurring in his cellmate‟s hearing.

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Evidence of the knives inside the door to Mr. Snow‟s cell along with their

appearance and the official report constitute material evidence to support the disciplinary

board‟s findings. Because we are precluded from inquiring into the intrinsic correctness

of the board‟s findings in the common-law writ of certiorari context, Mr. Snow cannot

prevail on his argument that the board‟s action was arbitrary or that the evidence was

insufficient to prove his guilt by a preponderance of the evidence.

C. Due Process

Mr. Snow next faults the disciplinary board for failing to make findings of fact and

set forth a statement of reasons for its decision convicting him of the charged offense.

We note that the TDOC Uniform Disciplinary Procedures only require the disciplinary

board to “stat[e] detailed reasons for [its] decision and summarize[e] the evidence which

led to such decision.” TDOC Policy 502.01(VI)(L)(4)(n)(5).

In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974), the United States Supreme

Court indicated that due process requires that inmates subjected to disciplinary

proceedings be afforded “a written statement from the tribunal for the disciplinary actions

taken.” See also Littles v. Campbell, 97 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). The

board in this case stated that Mr. Snow was “guilty based on report & evidence presented

of 2 knives found in the door of inmate Snow‟s cell.” Although the board did not provide

a lengthy explanation for its decision, we find it met the minimum requirements of stating

detailed reasons for its decision and summarizing the evidence it relied upon. The facts

here differ from those of Garrard v. Tennessee Department of Correction, No. M2013-

01525-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 1887298 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2014), upon which Mr.

Snow relies. In Garrard, the disciplinary board merely noted the portion of the Uniform

Disciplinary Procedures that Mr. Garrard allegedly violated, and it failed to set forth the

reasons for its decision. Garrard, 2014 WL 1887298, at *9-10.

Next we turn to Mr. Snow‟s argument regarding the use of confidential

information from an informant. Mr. Snow contends Corporal Story received information

from a confidential source that there were knives in the door of Mr. Snow‟s cell and that

the rules require Corporal Story to verify the informant‟s reliability before that

information can be used against him. The language of the Uniform Disciplinary Rules

upon which Mr. Snow relies states:

Whenever confidential information or confidential security sensitive

evidence is utilized by the disciplinary hearing officer/chairperson as a

basis for its decision, the TDOC Contemporaneous Record of Confidential

Informant Reliability, CR-3510, shall be completed to document the factual

basis for the disciplinary hearing officer‟s/chairperson‟s finding that the

informant and/or security sensitive evidence was reliable. At privately

managed facilities, the Commissioner‟s designee shall also review the

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confidential information and initial the form. This form shall be considered

confidential and kept as a non-public access record in an area designated by

the Warden.

TDOC Policy 502.01(VI)(L)(4)(g). The record does not reflect that the disciplinary

board relied on confidential information or confidential security sensitive evidence as a

basis for its decision. The TDOC policy Mr. Snow cites does not apply to the receipt of

confidential information that may lead to the discovery of contraband. Accordingly, Mr.

Snow‟s reliance on this TDOC policy does not advance his cause.

Finally, Mr. Snow contends he was denied due process because the TCIX

employees failed to comply with the policies requiring that searches be made of empty

cells before inmates are reassigned to them. “Due process” refers to whether or not Mr.

Snow received a fair hearing pursuant to the Uniform Disciplinary Procedures, which are

intended “[t]o provide for the fair and impartial determination and resolution of all

disciplinary charges placed against inmates . . . .” TDOC Policy 502.01(II)); see

generally Garrard, 2014 WL 1887298, at *6-10 (discussing due process rights to which

inmates subject to disciplinary proceedings are entitled). The Willis Court instructs us

that:

A prisoner seeking judicial review of a prison disciplinary proceeding states

a claim for relief under common-law writ of certiorari if the prisoner‟s

complaint alleges facts demonstrating that the disciplinary board failed to

follow the Uniform Disciplinary Procedures and this failure substantially

prejudiced the petitioner.

Willis, 113 S.W.3d at 713. As the trial court pointed out, the prison policies requiring

searches are not part of the Uniform Disciplinary Procedures and do not come into play

when determining whether Mr. Snow was denied due process.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the decision of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of

this appeal shall be taxed to the appellant, Gregory A. Snow.

_________________________________

ANDY D. BENNETT, JUDGE

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