James Brunson v. Scott Murray

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 14-2877

JAMES BRUNSON and BRUNSON PACKAGE, INC.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

SCOTT MURRAY, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:12-cv-00225-NJR-DGW — Nancy J. Rosenstengel, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 24, 2016 — DECIDED DECEMBER 13, 2016

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit

Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff James Brunson owns a

package liquor store in Bridgeport, Illinois. He asserts that

city officials violated his constitutional rights by refusing to

renew his liquor license and orchestrating a campaign of har-

assment and outright violence. Brunson has offered evidence

that after he purchased the business, he was subjected to con-

tinued harassment by the defendants, including Max Schauf,

2 No. 14-2877

the town’s mayor and local liquor commissioner. When

Mayor Schauf refused to consider Brunson’s application for a

routine renewal of his liquor license, Brunson was forced to

close his business and to alert state authorities to reopen. A

few weeks later, while keeping watch over his store late at

night after vandalism incidents, Brunson was attacked by one

of Schauf’s associates. The two men fought until Brunson was

able to pin down the attacker and call police. Two weeks later,

Brunson was the one arrested for felony aggravated battery.

Brunson brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging

federal claims of false arrest, denial of equal protection, and

denial of due process, as well as several state-law claims. The

district court granted summary judgment on Brunson’s fed-

eral claims and dismissed the state-law claims without preju-

dice. We affirm in part and reverse in part. We affirm sum-

mary judgment for prosecutor Lisa Wade, who is protected by

absolute prosecutorial immunity for her role in this case. We

also affirm summary judgment for the City of Bridgeport and

for all remaining defendants as to Brunson’s false arrest claim.

But we reverse summary judgment on Brunson’s class-of-one

equal protection claim. We also reverse summary judgment

for Schauf and hold he is not entitled to absolute immunity on

Brunson’s due process claim for Schauf’s refusal to act on the

liquor license renewal.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On appeal from a grant of summary judgment to the de-

fendants, we construe the evidence in the light reasonably

most favorable to the plaintiffs and give them the benefit of

all reasonable inferences from that evidence, without vouch-

ing for the objective truth of this account. E.g., Chaib v. GEO

Group, Inc., 819 F.3d 337, 340–41 (7th Cir. 2016).

No. 14-2877 3

A. Brunson’s Liquor Store

In the summer of 2008, James Brunson purchased the only

liquor store in Bridgeport, Illinois. As part of the purchase, he

obtained a liquor license. Brunson’s store was one of only five

places to buy alcohol in Bridgeport.

Bridgeport Police Chief Scott Murray was a frequent visi-

tor to the shop. He often told Brunson that he was violating

state and local liquor laws. Brunson would try to track down

the laws Murray accused him of violating, only to find they

did not actually exist. On one occasion, Chief Murray told

Brunson that he had to be a Bridgeport resident to own a liq-

uor business. Brunson, finding this odd, called Bridgeport

Mayor Max Schauf, who was also the local liquor commis-

sioner. Schauf “confirmed” that such a law was on the books,

but it was not.

There is evidence that Schauf’s interest in Brunson’s busi-

ness was a matter of self-interest. First, Schauf had made a

competing offer to purchase the store and had lost out to

Brunson. Also, Schauf already owned or had an interest in

one of the other establishments in town that served alcohol—

Red Hills Veterans Club—by way of subterfuge. The Veterans

Club was ostensibly run by Beverley Pruez. An investigation

by the Illinois Liquor Control Commission revealed that

Pruez had a romantic relationship with Schauf, who had

owned the club and signed liquor license renewals under the

table for Pruez. And Schauf’s son Mark would open another

Bridgeport bar and restaurant called “The Place to Be.” Since

Schauf was the local liquor commissioner, this type of self-

regulation would of course be verboten.

4 No. 14-2877

B. 2010 Liquor License Renewal

In April 2010, Brunson applied to renew his liquor license

several weeks before it would expire. This is typically a simple

process. A licensee with no violations is entitled to a pro forma

license renewal. Instead, Chief Murray visited for an inspec-

tion. Brunson asked if there would be any trouble with the

license renewal. Chief Murray told him to hire a lawyer. Re-

ceiving no updates on the status of his application, Brunson

called Schauf the day his license was set to expire. Schauf told

Brunson that he would not be renewing the license in time

and did not know when he would make a decision. On May

1, with Mayor Schauf running out the clock, Brunson was

forced to shutter his business and hire counsel.

Brunson contacted the state Commission, which assigned

Special Agent Randal Mendenhall to investigate. Schauf told

Mendenhall that he was taking time to review Brunson’s li-

cense. Mendenhall pointed out that under state law, Schauf

did not have this type of discretion: Schauf could renew or not

renew the license, but he was not entitled to delay indefinitely.

The state Commission ordered that Brunson be allowed to op-

erate the store pending a hearing.

Brunson re-opened his store, prompting another visit

from Chief Murray to ask: “What makes you think you can

reopen your store when we say you can’t.” Brunson’s liquor

supplier also received a call from the city clerk saying it could

no longer sell to Brunson. Brunson showed Murray the Com-

mission’s order, and the supplier continued to sell to Brunson

when the city clerk could not give any specific reason for the

prohibition. Shortly before the Commission’s scheduled hear-

No. 14-2877 5

ing over Brunson’s license, Schauf renewed the license with-

out comment or explanation and backdated it to make it ap-

pear as if he had renewed it on time.

C. The Violent Events of August 7, 2010

Brunson’s experience as a store owner worsened still fur-

ther in the summer of 2010. One weekend in July, Brunson

discovered that someone had attempted to break into the

store by trying to remove the back door from its hinges. The

act appeared to be both premeditated and at least a little so-

phisticated. The vandal had left behind a flashlight and safety

glasses and had chipped away the door to get at the dead bolt.

Chief Murray visited the scene but dismissed the incident as

the work of teenagers. He did not file a police report. The fol-

lowing weekend, Brunson discovered that the compressor

outside his store had been vandalized. He again called police

but found no satisfaction.

Sensing a pattern, and finding little help from the local po-

lice, Brunson turned to self-help. He stood guard over his

store the next weekend, armed with a loaded gun. A little past

3:00 a.m. on August 7, Brunson noticed a car crawling back

and forth past his store. Then the car stopped, a man emerged,

and Brunson heard the store’s front windows shatter. He hur-

ried to the scene and found Jody Harshman—a convicted

felon, an off-and-on employee at Mayor Schauf’s businesses,

and a friend of the Schauf family.

Harshman raised a hammer and turned on Brunson, who

in turn raised his gun. Harshman thought Brunson was bluff-

ing and moved toward him. Brunson, who was not bluffing,

pulled the trigger but the gun jammed. Harshman threatened,

“Now you’re f***ing dead,” and swung the hammer at

6 No. 14-2877

Brunson. Brunson blocked the blow and the two men fought.

Brunson’s gun fired and Harshman fled.

Brunson did not disengage. Trailing Harshman at a dis-

tance, he called authorities. Before police arrived, Harshman

tossed his hammer away, and in doing so caught sight of

Brunson. Harshman charged at Brunson, who felled Harsh-

man with a blow to the face. When Harshman tried to get up,

Brunson knocked him down again with a kick. Brunson fixed

the jam on his gun and held Harshman at gunpoint until po-

lice arrived. Brunson also noticed a car parked nearby with

Mark Schauf—son of Mayor Schauf and a friend of Harsh-

man—inside. As Harshman was being placed in an ambu-

lance, Chief Murray reached the scene and took over the in-

vestigation. Brunson gave his account of the incident; he also

pointed Murray’s attention to Mark Schauf and asked

whether Murray should be involved in the investigation.

Another officer at the scene, Officer Dooley, later ex-

plained the significance of this exchange. There was no good

reason for Mark Schauf to have been at the scene in the early

hours of the morning. In Dooley’s opinion, there was a “like-

lihood that Mark Schauf may have been an accomplice in-

volved in planning or carrying out the crime,” a suspicion

Dooley said Murray shared. And given that Mark’s father was

Chief Murray’s boss, “Murray should not have investigated

this case himself.” Dooley believed that officers from a differ-

ent jurisdiction—preferably the state police—should take

over the investigation. Nonetheless, Chief Murray stayed on

the case.

Two weeks later, on August 20, both Harshman and

Brunson were arrested. Harshman was charged with criminal

damage to property and pled guilty to a misdemeanor.

No. 14-2877 7

Brunson was charged with felony aggravated battery. He pled

not guilty. At least at the time of the district court’s decision in

2014, that case was still pending.

D. Procedural History

Brunson’s § 1983 suit alleged violations of both federal and

state law by Mayor Schauf, Chief Murray, State’s Attorney

Lisa Wade, Harshman, the city of Bridgeport, and Lawrence

County. The three federal-law claims were: (1) false arrest, (2)

denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment,

and (3) denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amend-

ment. The three state-law counts were: (1) tortious interfer-

ence with business expectation, (2) conspiracy, and (3) tor-

tious supervisory liability against the city and county.

On defendants’ motions for summary judgment, the dis-

trict court first held that State’s Attorney Wade was absolutely

immune from liability for her role in prosecuting Brunson for

battery and that Lawrence County was entitled to summary

judgment because Brunson failed to respond to the county’s

motion. On the merits, the district court granted summary

judgment to all defendants on the false arrest claim (Count 1)

because there was probable cause to arrest Brunson for bat-

tery. The court granted summary judgment on the equal pro-

tection claim (Count 2) because Brunson did not have evi-

dence of similarly situated comparators. The court granted

summary judgment on the due process claim (Count 3) based

on Killinger v. Johnson, 389 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2004), where we

said that a local Illinois liquor commissioner had absolute ju-

dicial immunity even if his official actions were riddled with

errors. The district court declined supplemental jurisdiction

over the three state-law claims and dismissed them without

prejudice.

8 No. 14-2877

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. United

Central Bank v. KMWC 845, LLC, 800 F.3d 307, 310 (7th Cir.

2015). As noted, we construe the evidence in the light most

favorable to Brunson as the non-moving party and give him

the benefit of all reasonable inferences in his favor. Tolan v.

Cotton, 572 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 1861 (2014); Boston v. U.S. Steel

Corp., 816 F.3d 455, 462 (7th Cir. 2016). 1

II. Prosecutorial Immunity

Brunson claims that prosecutor Wade participated in his

false arrest and deprived him of the equal protection of the

laws. She is entitled to summary judgment based on absolute

prosecutorial immunity.

Wade’s first involvement with Brunson’s case came after

the violent August 7 incident. On August 11, after the Bridge-

port police finished their investigation, Chief Murray turned

the case file over to Wade. After Murray and Wade discussed

the case, Wade’s office prepared a formal charge of aggra-

vated battery and sought an arrest warrant, which was issued

on August 20. Before the arrest, Wade also spoke with Officer

Dooley, who confirmed that Chief Murray alerted her to Mark

Schauf’s presence at the scene. Wade also recognized Chief

1 Brunson’s co-plaintiff is the corporate entity, Brunson Package, Inc.,

through which Brunson purchased the package liquor store. The district

court and the appellate briefs did not differentiate between the two, nor

do we, though we presume the corporate plaintiff could have no claim for

false arrest. On remand, it may be necessary to look more carefully at the

two plaintiffs. See, e.g., Assaf v. Trinity Medical Center, 821 F.3d 847, 849

(7th Cir. 2016) (individual plaintiff could not assert claim for money that

should have been paid to professional corporation).

No. 14-2877 9

Murray’s possible conflict of interest. Wade would later ap-

pear on behalf of the State at Brunson’s probable cause hear-

ing.

Prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability “for

their core prosecutorial actions.” Lewis v. Mills, 677 F.3d 324,

330 (7th Cir. 2012), citing Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 261–

62 (2006) (prosecutor “is absolutely immune from liability for

the decision to prosecute”); see also Spiegel v. Rabinovitz, 121

F.3d 251, 257 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Under Illinois law, the State’s

Attorney … is vested with exclusive discretion in the initia-

tion and management of a criminal prosecution.”). When a

prosecutor performs investigative or administrative actions,

however, she receives only the qualified immunity afforded

to law-enforcement officers. Lewis, 677 F.3d at 330, quoting

Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 276 (1993). Core actions

covered by absolute prosecutorial immunity are those “inti-

mately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal pro-

cess.” Lewis, 677 F.3d at 330, quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at 270.

The issue is whether the prosecutor was acting as an of-

ficer of the court and performing actions related to the judicial

rather than investigative phase of the criminal process. Fields

v. Wharrie, 672 F.3d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 2012). For example, a

prosecutor is not absolutely immune when she swears to the

facts in a charging document—an investigative function—but

she is absolutely immune for signing the charging document

itself and initiating a prosecution. Olson v. Champaign County,

784 F.3d 1093, 1102–03 (7th Cir. 2015) (no immunity for Illinois

prosecutor swearing to allegedly false information to obtain

arrest warrant).

Absolute prosecutorial immunity covers Wade’s conduct

in this case. Wade’s decision to charge Brunson with battery

10 No. 14-2877

and her appearance at Brunson’s preliminary hearing were

core prosecutorial functions. Nor does Brunson allege that

Wade omitted exculpatory evidence in bad faith. Brunson ar-

gues, though, that Wade is not immune for her failure to call

for the state police to take over the investigation in light of

Chief Murray’s conflict of interest. We reject this argument.

The prosecutor’s choice to accept the police report and go for-

ward with the prosecution without seeking further investiga-

tion by the state police was not an investigative act. It was a

deliberate decision not to interfere with the investigation.

Wade’s work began after the police investigation had ended.

See Fields, 672 F.3d at 512 (“Prosecutors do not function as ad-

vocates before probable cause to arrest a suspect exists.”).

III. Equal Protection Claim

This leaves Brunson’s three federal claims against the re-

maining defendants: Mayor Schauf, Chief Murray, and the

City of Bridgeport. We focus first on Brunson’s most straight-

forward claim, that the defendants violated his Fourteenth

Amendment right to equal protection of the law. The crux of

this claim is that Mayor Schauf, with the aid of the other de-

fendants, harassed Brunson under color of state law in an at-

tempt to drive him out of business for Schauf’s own personal

gain or other illegitimate purposes. Brunson’s equal protec-

tion claim covers the entire campaign against him, including

Schauf’s arbitrary delay in renewing Brunson’s liquor license

as well as the harassment by law enforcement, the interfer-

ence in his business, the vandalism of his store, and the inves-

tigation of his violent encounter with Harshman.

The Equal Protection Clause guards against government

discrimination on the basis of race and other immutable char-

acteristics, but it also extends to protect people from so-called

No. 14-2877 11

“class-of-one” discrimination in which a government arbitrar-

ily and irrationally singles out one person for poor treatment.

Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 747 (7th Cir. 2012).

These class-of-one claims are designed to prevent govern-

ment actors from singling out a person for arbitrary abuse. See

Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Class-

of-one discrimination “is illustrated when a public official,

‘with no conceivable basis for his action other than spite or

some other improper motive … comes down hard on a hap-

less private citizen.’” Swanson v. City of Chetek, 719 F.3d 780,

784 (7th Cir. 2013), quoting Lauth v. McCollum, 424 F.3d 631,

633 (7th Cir. 2005) (alteration in original).

The district court determined that Brunson’s claim failed

for lack of evidence that defendants treated other similarly sit-

uated persons better than they treated him. Citing the Su-

preme Court’s decision in Village of Willowbrook, the court

wrote that a class-of-one claim requires a two-part showing:

first, that a plaintiff was intentionally treated worse than sim-

ilarly situated comparators, and second, that there was no ra-

tional basis for the different treatment. Brunson’s claim failed,

the court said, because he did not produce evidence of simi-

larly situated licensees in Bridgeport who had been treated

better during their own licensing processes. Instead, his claim

focused too heavily on prong two of the equal protection anal-

ysis. See Srail v. Village of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 945–46 (7th Cir.

2009) (granting summary judgment to defendants where

plaintiffs failed to raise genuine issue of material fact with re-

spect to similarly situated comparators). 2

2 Defendants did not assert absolute immunity against this claim.

12 No. 14-2877

The elements of class-of-one claims have remained unset-

tled since this court’s decision in Del Marcelle v. Brown County

Corp., 680 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc). In that case, the

en banc court produced three separate opinions in a tie vote

affirming the district court’s dismissal of the suit. The crux of

the disagreement was whether the plaintiff in a class-of-one

claim must demonstrate only that there is no possible justifi-

cation or rational basis for the defendant’s actions, id. at 900

(Easterbrook, C.J., concurring in the judgment), or if the plain-

tiff must demonstrate a lack of justification and also present

evidence of hostile intent or animus, id. at 889 (Posner, J., plu-

rality opinion), or if the plaintiff must demonstrate an absence

of rational basis, which can be satisfied with evidence of ani-

mus, id. at 913 (Wood, J., dissenting). Brunson’s class-of-one

claim survives summary judgment under all three standards.

The standard in Judge Easterbrook’s opinion gives motive

and intent in class-of-one suits “no role at all.” Id. at 900

(Easterbrook, C.J., concurring). Class-of-one claims must

simply address “whether a rational basis can be conceived, not

whether one is established on the record or occurred to a de-

fendant.” Id. Under that standard, the “only proper use of in-

tent in a class-of-one case is to show that discrimination ex-

ists.” Id.

The standard in Judge Posner’s plurality opinion requires

the plaintiff to demonstrate that “he was the victim of discrim-

ination intentionally visited on him by state actors who knew

or should have known that they had no justification, based on

their public duties, for singling him out for unfavorable treat-

ment—who acted in other words for personal reasons, with

discriminatory intent and effect.” Id. at 889 (Posner, J., plural-

ity opinion) (emphasis in original removed).

No. 14-2877 13

And the third standard, explained in Judge Wood’s dissent

joined by four additional judges, laid out four elements to a

class-of-one claim: “(1) plaintiff was the victim of intentional

discrimination, (2) at the hands of a state actor, (3) the state

actor lacked a rational basis for so singling out the plaintiff,

and (4) the plaintiff has been injured by the intentionally dis-

criminatory treatment.” Id. at 913 (Wood, J., dissenting). Un-

der this standard, “personal animus, illegitimate motives,

[and] inexplicable deviations from clear rules” illustrate the

kind of facts a plaintiff may rely upon to demonstrate that a

lack of rational basis is plausible. Id.

While we await a final resolution of the doctrinal debate,

Brunson’s claim survives summary judgment under all three

standards. First, while earlier cases cited by the district court

had required evidence of similarly situated comparators, see

Srail, 588 F.3d at 945 (7th Cir. 2009); Vision Church v. Village of

Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 1002 (7th Cir. 2006), our more recent

cases have made clear that such evidence is not always re-

quired. Evidence of similarly situated individuals is not re-

quired as part of a formalistic mandate, but such evidence

may help to establish disparate treatment: “if all principal

characteristics of the two individuals are the same, and one

received more favorable treatment, this may show there was

no proper motivation for the disparate treatment.” Swanson,

719 F.3d at 784. Some cases, however, present the circum-

stance where disparate treatment “is easily demonstrated but

similarly situated individuals are difficult to find.” Id. These

class-of-one claims are also viable. See, e.g., Miller v. City of

Monona, 784 F.3d 1113, 1120–21 (7th Cir. 2015) (collecting

cases).

14 No. 14-2877

For instance, in Geinosky v. City of Chicago, we reversed a

dismissal based on a plaintiff’s failure to identify and describe

comparators in his complaint. 675 F.3d at 748–49. The pattern

of the defendants’ conduct toward the plaintiff—two dozen

false parking tickets in fourteen months—demonstrated on its

own “the officers’ improper discriminatory purpose. …

[W]here the alleged facts so clearly suggest harassment by

public officials that has no conceivable legitimate purpose,”

the plaintiff did not need to identify comparators. Id. at 748.

Our later en banc decision in Del Marcelle found common

ground in supporting the Geinosky approach to comparators.

We said that if the allegations signal that the plaintiff alone

suffered the defendant’s harassment, there is no need to iden-

tify a comparator. 680 F.3d at 914–15 (Wood, J., dissenting);

see also id. at 898 (Posner, J., plurality opinion) (demonstrated

pattern against one individual “adds up to deliberate and un-

justified official harassment” even without comparators),

quoting Geinosky, 675 F.3d at 745.

Defendants argue here, and the district court agreed, that

because Brunson held the only Class B liquor license in

Bridgeport, he could not identify any similarly situated com-

parators. Bridgeport is a small town of 2,500, with just five

establishments selling or serving any liquor. Brunson owned

the only package liquor store and Class B liquor license. Thus,

as in many small communities, it would have been practically

impossible for Brunson to produce similarly situated compar-

ators among Class B liquor license holders as distinguished

from Class A restaurants and Class C clubs. In this case, re-

quiring Brunson to produce a comparator among Class B liq-

No. 14-2877 15

uor establishments “would not help distinguish between or-

dinary wrongful acts and deliberately discriminatory denials

of equal protection.” Geinosky, 675 F.3d at 748.

Brunson offered evidence of a pattern of discriminatory

behavior on the part of a government. As we recognized in

Geinosky, such a pattern can perform the same function as the

similarly situated requirement in other class-of-one claims.

Id. 3 As the district court noted, Chief Murray repeatedly vis-

ited “to inform Brunson that he and his store were in viola-

tion” of non-existent state and local liquor laws. Mayor Schauf

attempted to single Brunson out with a proposed local rule

that would have driven only him out of business. When

Schauf arbitrarily refused to act on his license renewal,

Brunson was forced to close his store and hire counsel. A city

official tried to intimidate Brunson’s liquor supplier in an at-

tempt to cut off Brunson’s receipt of product. Brunson also

3 Even if this were not the case, Brunson also provided the district

court with evidence of similarly situated comparators. The process of ob-

taining license renewal is identical for Class A, Class B, and Class C estab-

lishments. Brunson claims that no other business that needed to renew its

liquor license—including at least one Class C club in which Mayor Schauf

held an ownership interest—experienced the same harassment, scrutiny,

and delay that he and his store experienced. The district court could and

should have found sufficient evidence of similarly situated comparators.

See Swanson, 719 F.3d at 782, 785 (noting, in a case where a mayor used his

position to harass an abutting neighbor over the building of a fence, that

a resident in the same neighborhood whose property did not abut the

mayor’s property and who was treated better could be “helpful in indicat-

ing the norm governing the regulation of fences” in the town, and “could

be invoked as additional support for a direct showing of animus,” if the

direct evidence were less strong than in the present case).

16 No. 14-2877

produced an affidavit from Agent Mendenhall that reason-

ably described this behavior as harassment.

Brunson has also offered evidence sufficient to avoid sum-

mary judgment that there was no rational and legitimate basis

for Mayor Schauf to single out Brunson for discriminatory

treatment. He had no overwhelming number of license re-

newals to review nor insufficient resources to do so. The av-

erage was not even one renewal per month. According to the

State Commission’s Agent Mendenhall, Schauf had no discre-

tion to delay the pro forma renewal. As Brunson emphasizes in

his brief, even Schauf himself—from the time Brunson and

Agent Mendenhall first inquired until he submitted his appel-

late brief—has not offered a reason, “any reason, not even a

spurious reason, for his inaction.” A jury could find that

Schauf had no conceivable justification for his actions based

on his public duties as liquor commissioner. See Del Marcelle,

680 F.3d at 900 (Easterbrook, C.J., concurring in the judg-

ment).

Accordingly, Brunson has shown a lack of rational basis so

that his claim survives summary judgment under Judge

Easterbrook’s standard in Del Marcelle. Still, “something other

than the normal rational-basis test applies to class-of-one

claims,” id., even if that something has not been clearly delin-

eated. Brunson will need to address intent on remand. 4

4While the standard in class-of-one cases remains unsettled, district

judges may find it prudent to use jury instructions and verdict forms to

distinguish between findings of hostile animus and findings of objectively

arbitrary acts that lack justification based on public duties.

No. 14-2877 17

With regard to hostile intent and animus, whether the

standard requires it or only allows its use as evidence, the pat-

tern of harassment and discriminatory acts driven by Schauf’s

personal interests in Bridgeport is sufficient to satisfy both the

plurality and dissenting opinions in Del Marcelle. See id. at

889, 913. Brunson, supported by Mendenhall’s affidavit,

paints a clear picture of the motive for this pattern of behav-

ior: Schauf had a number of personal interests adverse to

Brunson’s store, and he sought to harass Brunson to drive him

out of business. Brunson has offered evidence of substantial

animus and a continuing misuse of power by government

agents akin to an “orchestrated campaign of official harass-

ment motivated by sheer malice” that we have said is suffi-

cient (though it may not be necessary) to support an equal

protection claim. Olech v. Village of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386,

388 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d,

528 U.S. 562 (2000).

Courts must handle class-of-one claims carefully to avoid

turning “every squabble over municipal services, of which

there must be tens or even hundreds of thousands every year,

into a federal constitutional case.” Id. But the severity and ex-

tent of the defendants’ harassment shown by Brunson’s evi-

dence convince us that this claim should go to trial.

IV. False Arrest

We turn to Brunson’s false arrest claim. Brunson was ar-

rested on August 20 on a warrant. Brunson argues that Mur-

ray participated in his arrest but lacked probable cause to be-

lieve he had committed the crime charged. Brunson contends

that clear evidence of self-defense defeated any probable

cause to support an arrest for aggravated battery. The district

court, reasoning that affirmative defenses play no part in the

18 No. 14-2877

probable cause determination, granted the defendants’ mo-

tion for summary judgment on the claim. We affirm but on a

different ground.

The key point is that Chief Murray arrested Brunson on

the basis of an arrest warrant. A state court issued the facially

valid warrant upon application by the prosecuting attorney.

Murray concluded his investigation and turned over his po-

lice report to State’s Attorney Wade. Wade then reviewed the

police report and determined there was probable cause to ar-

rest Brunson for aggravated battery. Her office prepared, and

she personally signed, a charging document for Brunson.

Chief Murray affirmed the factual allegations: that Brunson

committed a battery in that he “struck Jody Harshman in the

head and kicked Jody Harshman in the face, head, and chest.”

A court issued an arrest warrant for Brunson on August 20,

and Murray arrested Brunson that day.

When a person has been arrested as a result of such formal

legal processes, his claim is not for an unconstitutional false

arrest but (perhaps, if at all) for malicious prosecution, which

we leave to state law in Illinois. See Bianchi v. McQueen, 818

F.3d 309, 321 (7th Cir. 2016). 5 A police officer who receives a

facially valid arrest warrant is ordinarily expected to act upon

it, not to second-guess the court’s decision to issue it. The of-

ficer does not personally violate the Constitution by making

the arrest the court has authorized.

5The Supreme Court is now considering a case that may shed new

light on these doctrinal issues. See Manuel v. City of Joliet, 590 Fed. Appx.

641 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, No. 14-9496, 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016). The

Court heard oral argument in Manuel on October 5, 2016.

No. 14-2877 19

We have recognized a narrow exception to this rule where

a reasonable officer would have known that the evidence pro-

vided to support the warrant failed to establish probable

cause. Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 442 (7th Cir. 2013).

That exception does not apply here. Chief Murray was enti-

tled to investigate, to turn over the results to the prosecutor,

and to let the prosecutor and then the court figure out if there

was probable cause for the arrest or whether Brunson was

clearly acting in self-defense. This case therefore does not pre-

sent an issue concerning the scope of a police officer’s duty,

on the street, to evaluate available evidence of an affirmative

defense. See McBride v. Grice, 576 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 2009)

(officer may end investigation once he has probable cause, but

“may not ignore conclusively established evidence of the ex-

istence of an affirmative defense,” though Fourth Amend-

ment imposes no duty to investigate validity of defense),

quoting Hodgkins ex rel. Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355 F.3d 1048,

1061 (7th Cir. 2004).

A second narrow exception could apply if Murray himself

“knowingly or intentionally or with a reckless disregard for

the truth, made false statements to the judicial officer, and [if]

the false statements were necessary to the judicial officers’ de-

terminations that probable cause existed for the arrests.” See

Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, 320 F.3d 733, 742–43 (7th Cir.

2003), citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978).

This can include law enforcement deliberately or recklessly

failing to inform the judicial officer of facts negating probable

cause. Id. at 743. Brunson has not offered evidence that Mur-

ray deliberately or recklessly made any false statement or

omitted any critical fact. He has not identified anything in

Murray’s police report or in the factual portion of the applica-

tion for an arrest warrant that is demonstrably deceptive or

20 No. 14-2877

false. Accordingly, Brunson has not cleared the high bar to

support his false arrest claim.

V. Due Process and Mayor Schauf’s Immunity

We next address Brunson’s claim that he was deprived of

a property interest (his liquor license) without due process of

law when Mayor Schauf refused to act in a timely manner on

his application to renew the annual license. According to

Brunson, the license should have been renewed automatically.

Schauf’s refusal to act forced Brunson to close his business un-

til he could persuade the state Commission to step in and al-

low him to reopen. The district court granted summary judg-

ment to Schauf on this claim based on the defense of absolute

quasi-judicial immunity. The district court correctly limited

its discussion of immunity to Brunson’s due process claim. 6

The district court’s grant of absolute immunity for action

on a license renewal has support in our opinions in Killinger

v. Johnson, 389 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2004), and Reed v. Village of

Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1983), which hold or indicate

that absolute immunity is available not only for a local liquor

commissioner’s decisions to suspend or revoke licenses, but

also for actions on license renewals. On further consideration,

6Schauf’s absolute immunity defense does not affect Brunson’s

broader equal protection claim because his claim of harassment “extends

beyond [Schauf’s] conduct as local liquor control commissioner … to his

nonjudicial, nonlegislative conduct as mayor.” Reed v. Village of Shorewood,

704 F.2d 943, 951 (7th Cir. 1983) (reversing in part summary judgment for

defendant acting as both mayor and local liquor commissioner). As in

Reed, when a defendant is both mayor and local liquor commissioner, we

separate out claims that primarily concern the defendant’s actions in the

mayoral role. Id.

No. 14-2877 21

however, and in light of supplemental briefing on the ques-

tion, we conclude that those cases must be narrowed so as to

exclude license renewal decisions. The key holding expressed

in Reed based its grant of absolute immunity for license re-

newal decisions on a view of Illinois law that is no longer ac-

curate and on a broad view of absolute immunity that the Su-

preme Court has narrowed. We reverse the grant of absolute

immunity to the mayor with respect to the non-renewal of

Brunson’s liquor license.

We start the analysis with the Supreme Court’s approach

to the strong medicine of absolute immunity. Absolute im-

munity is a powerful shield attaching primarily to judicial

functions—not to the person or position. Cleavinger v. Saxner,

474 U.S. 193, 201 (1985), citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,

511 (1978). When a functional analysis of the responsibilities

at issue reveals that they are judicial in nature, the actor is en-

titled to absolute immunity from damages no matter how er-

roneous the act or injurious the consequences. Id. at 199–200.

If the functions are not judicial in nature, however, then abso-

lute immunity is not available. The official is left with the still-

important protection of qualified immunity, which defeats in-

dividual liability unless his or her actions were contrary to

clearly established law. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231

(2009).

Under the reasoning of Cleavinger and Butz, the action of

renewing or not renewing an Illinois liquor license is a bu-

reaucratic and administrative act—not a judicial act. Under

state law, a local liquor commissioner’s action on a license re-

newal lacks the procedural formalities and protections that

apply to the same official’s decision to suspend or revoke a

22 No. 14-2877

license. The differences are great enough to produce different

results for the availability of absolute immunity.

An overview of the state statute and facts of this case is

helpful here. Under the Illinois Liquor Control Act, a liquor

license holder is entitled to important procedural protections

when a local liquor commissioner acts to suspend or revoke a

license and/or to impose a fine. Those actions by a local liquor

commissioner require a public hearing, with at least three

days’ written notice. The licensee must have an opportunity

to be heard, and an official written record of evidence is re-

quired. Liquor Control Act of 1934, 235 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/7-5.

The Act also provides additional procedural safeguards, in-

cluding additional hearings and appeals. Id.; 235 Ill. Comp.

Stat. 5/7-9; see also Killinger, 389 F.3d at 770 (holding that local

liquor commissioner was entitled to absolute immunity for

actions in suspending license). The Act also allows emergency

suspensions of up to seven days without a prior hearing but

provides for expedited hearings to contest them. 235 Ill.

Comp. Stat. 5/7-5.

License renewal does not provide comparable procedural

protections. The Act provides that a license holder may renew

a license at its expiration, “provided he is then qualified to

receive a license and the premises for which such renewal li-

cense is sought are suitable for such purpose.” 235 Ill. Comp.

Stat. 5/6-1. The Act also gives the local liquor commissioner

the right to investigate any applicant for a local license re-

newal, including examining the applicant’s books and records

and taking testimony and evidence. 235 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/4-5.

However, the local application for Bridgeport renewal appli-

cants is a one-page, tick-the-box form, and Agent Mendenhall

No. 14-2877 23

testified that approval was virtually “automatic.” Most im-

portant for our purposes, the Act does not grant a right to no-

tice and a hearing in the event of a planned or actual decision

not to renew, nor does the Act require the commissioner to

state for the record any reasons for denying renewal. The li-

censee has the right to appeal a denial to the state Commis-

sion, the filing of which allows the licensee to continue its op-

erations. See 235 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/7-9. Such an appeal is quite

different from an appeal of a revocation or suspension, either

of which would require notice, a hearing, a record, and a rea-

soned decision. 7

In this case, Brunson submitted the pro forma application

for renewal three weeks before his license was set to expire.

Although the local ordinance required Schauf to review the

application within 15 days, he sat on it for seven weeks, forc-

ing Brunson to close his store. By simply not acting, Schauf

made it difficult for Brunson to appeal, which is a key safe-

guard against unlawful or unconstitutional acts. With no

other recourse available to him, Brunson sought the aid of

hired counsel and the state Commission. Only because

7 The Act also provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this

Section to the contrary, the mayor of a city with a population of 55,000 or

less … that has an interest in the manufacture, sale, or distribution of al-

coholic liquor must direct the council or board over which he or she pre-

sides to appoint, by majority vote, a person other than him or her to serve

as the local liquor control commissioner.” 235 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/4-2. This

provision may be relevant to Brunson’s argument that Schauf violated the

statute by holding, directly or indirectly, interests in liquor sales in Bridge-

port.

24 No. 14-2877

Brunson independently solicited the aid of the state Commis-

sion was he able to reopen his store with the involvement of

Agent Mendenhall.

Cleavinger offers a guide to assessing the relative im-

portance of these facts and statutory characteristics. 474 U.S.

at 201–02. Our functional analysis of the immunity issue is

aided by the six factors “characteristic of the judicial process”

set out in the decision, which are “to be considered in deter-

mining absolute as contrasted with qualified immunity”:

(a) the need to assure that the individual can perform

his functions without harassment or intimidation;

(b) the presence of safeguards that reduce the need for

private damages actions as a means of controlling

unconstitutional conduct;

(c) insulation from political influence;

(d) the importance of precedent;

(e) the adversary nature of the process; and

(f) the correctability of error on appeal.

Id. at 202, citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 512.

These factors weigh decisively against absolute immunity

for an Illinois local liquor commissioner’s action on whether

to renew a liquor license. First, while the risk of harassment

may be substantial when a local liquor commissioner makes

decisions to suspend or revoke licenses, the risk of harass-

ment is minimal where the decision to renew is “automatic”

and “not discretionary.” Second, while there are substantial

procedural safeguards available in cases of suspensions or

revocations, including notice, a prompt public hearing on an

official record, and a reasoned written decision, see 235 Ill.

No. 14-2877 25

Comp. Stat. 5/7-5, those protections do not apply to actions on

license renewals. Third, unlike many judges, the local liquor

commissioner is an elected mayor, not insulated at all from

political influence, though that factor applies equally to any

of the official’s actions. See 235 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/4-2. Fourth

and fifth, we have no indication that precedent is important

in the administrative renewal process, nor is the process ad-

versarial or even based on a record of evidence.

The sixth and only factor that tends to support absolute

immunity is that errors can be corrected on appeal to the state

Commission. That factor is limited to some extent, however,

because in the case of inaction on a license renewal, the appel-

lant must show there is a local commissioner’s “order or ac-

tion … having the effect of … denying a renewal application.”

235 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/7-9. When the local commissioner

simply refuses to act, as Mayor Schauf did here, the inaction

poses a further challenge to effective review.

We have applied absolute immunity under federal law

only when the official’s duties “are functionally comparable

to those of a judicial officer.” Tobin for Governor v. Illinois State

Bd. of Elections, 268 F.3d 517, 521 (7th Cir. 2001), citing Butz,

438 U.S. at 512–13; see also id. at 526 (absolute immunity for

election board members when “they rule on the validity of

nomination petitions”); Capra v. Cook County Bd. of Review, 733

F.3d 705, 709–10 (7th Cir. 2013) (absolute immunity for mem-

bers of county board of review for property tax appeals);

Heyde v. Pittenger, 633 F.3d 512, 518 (7th Cir. 2011) (absolute

immunity for members of a county board of review for quasi-

judicial functions, which required notice, a hearing, and oth-

erwise engaging in a judicial proceeding); Wilson v. Kelkhoff,

26 No. 14-2877

86 F.3d 1438, 1444 (7th Cir. 1996) (absolute immunity for mem-

bers of parole board when they “grant, deny, or revoke pa-

role,” quoting Walrath v. United States, 35 F.3d 277, 281 (7th Cir.

1994)).

However, where an official’s actions “do not involve acts

that are analogous to those performed by judges,” we have

rejected absolute immunity defenses. Dawson v. Newman, 419

F.3d 656, 662 (7th Cir. 2005) (no absolute immunity for parole

officers’ actions involving “day-to-day duties in the supervi-

sion of a parolee”); Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 288–89 (7th

Cir. 2004) (no absolute immunity for clerks of court whose

duty to “maintain the official record was purely ministerial,”

involving “none of the discretion that … is at the heart of ab-

solute judicial immunity”); Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430,

438 (7th Cir. 2001) (no absolute immunity for sheriffs or dep-

uties whose misconduct involved “the manner in which they

enforced the judge’s order,” which is an “executive, not judi-

cial, function”); Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 278–79

(7th Cir. 1988) (no absolute immunity for extra-judicial, pre-

trial investigations by government attorneys; absolute im-

munity available “only when such activities are intimately as-

sociated with the court-related duties”). See also Cleavinger,

474 U.S. at 201–02, 206 (no absolute immunity for members of

prison disciplinary committee).

The Cleavinger factors thus weigh heavily against extend-

ing absolute immunity to an Illinois local liquor commis-

sioner’s actions on whether to renew a license, even while

they weigh in favor of absolute immunity for decisions to re-

voke or suspend licenses. Denying absolute immunity runs

contrary to one holding in a pre-Cleavinger case, which was

repeated in dicta more recently. We therefore find it necessary

No. 14-2877 27

to overrule one holding in Reed v. Village of Shorewood and to

disapprove one phrase of dictum in Killinger v. Johnson.

To explain, in 1983 in Reed, we faced allegations of a pat-

tern of official harassment of a liquor licensee similar to the

harassment of Brunson in this case. The harassment in Reed

included harassment of customers and groundless suspen-

sions of the license, and eventually included denial of license

renewal. 704 F.2d at 947–48. We reversed in part the dismissal

of the licensee’s due process claim, holding first and foremost

that an Illinois liquor license is a property interest within the

meaning of the due process clause. Id. at 949. We also held that

the local liquor commissioner was entitled to absolute quasi-

judicial immunity for his actions in suspending and revoking

the license. Id. at 951–52. We agree with those holdings, which

are consistent with the later Supreme Court decision in Cleav-

inger.

In Reed we also extended that absolute immunity to ac-

tions to renew or deny renewal of a license. We reasoned that

even though the Illinois statute did not prescribe the same

procedural protections for denials of license renewals that it

does for suspensions and revocations, Illinois case law re-

quired those procedures. Id. at 948–49, citing City of Wyoming

v. Liquor Control Comm’n of Illinois, 362 N.E.2d 1080, 1084 (Ill.

App. 1977). We also read the Act as suggesting “that the Illi-

nois legislature expected most licenses to be renewed as a

matter of course.” Reed, 704 F.2d at 948–49.

More recently, in Killinger we considered a similar due

process claim based on two relatively brief suspensions of a

liquor license, including one summary suspension. We fol-

lowed Reed to hold that the local liquor commissioner was en-

28 No. 14-2877

titled to absolute immunity on those claims based on the sus-

pensions. 389 F.3d at 770. We repeated the Reed holding that

absolute immunity applied to decisions “to renew or revoke a

liquor license,” id. (emphasis added), though strictly speaking

the reference to renewal was dictum in Killinger, which pre-

sented no issue involving license renewals.

In this appeal, we invited the parties to file supplemental

briefs on whether the absolute immunity holding of Reed and

the dictum of Killinger on license renewals should be revisited.

The principles of stare decisis demand that we give significant

weight to our prior decisions unless supervening develop-

ments arise. See, e.g., Grandberry v. Keever, 735 F.3d 616, 617

(7th Cir. 2013); McClain v. Retail Food Employers Joint Pension

Plan, 413 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2005). While recognizing the

importance of stare decisis in general, we conclude that we

must narrow the Reed holding and disagree with the dictum in

Killinger. We must deny absolute immunity to local liquor

commissioners in decisions to renew licenses. We take this

step based on developments in both federal and state law. 8

The principal development in federal law is the Supreme

Court’s decision in Cleavinger, which laid out the factors dis-

cussed above for deciding when the rare grant of absolute im-

munity is required. See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,

807–08 (1982) (qualified immunity is the norm; absolute im-

munity is appropriate only when public policy so requires);

Saxner v. Benson, 727 F.2d 669, 675 (7th Cir. 1984) (Cudahy, J.,

concurring), aff’d sub nom. Cleavinger, 474 U.S. 193. Cleavinger

8

Because we overrule one holding in Reed, we have circulated this

opinion to all active judges under Circuit Rule 40(e). No active judge

voted to hear this case en banc.

No. 14-2877 29

was decided after Reed and was not cited in Killinger, which in

any event did not need to address whether absolute immun-

ity should apply to decisions whether to renew licenses.

The developments in Illinois state law are two-fold. First,

recently an Illinois appellate decision has rejected the City of

Wyoming holding that “nonrenewal is equivalent to a revoca-

tion or suspension.” Knoob Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Carbon-

dale, 948 N.E.2d 183, 186 (Ill. App. 2011). The court in Knoob

Enterprises found that the Act unambiguously distinguished

between the procedures for renewals and the procedures for

revocations and suspensions. Id. at 186–87. In the case, a liq-

uor licensee appealed the non-renewal of its license. The de-

cision turned on whether the licensee was appealing a sus-

pension or revocation on one hand or a non-renewal on the

other. The local government relied on City of Wyoming to ar-

gue that there was no difference, and the appellate court re-

jected that view, explaining that City of Wyoming “gives no

reason to depart from the plain language of the Act.” Id. at

186.

While it might be possible to treat Knoob Enterprises as an

inconclusive decision by another district of the Appellate

Court of Illinois, the opinion also pointed out that the Illinois

legislature had responded to City of Wyoming. It did so with a

statutory amendment to allow appeals of actions “having the

effect of … denying a renewal application,” but without im-

posing the sorts of procedural requirements that apply to lo-

cal liquor commissioners’ decisions to suspend or revoke li-

censes. 948 N.E.2d at 186–87, quoting Pub. Act 86–1279, § 1

(1991). That limited legislative response—to allow appeals of

non-renewals but without requiring the procedures critical to

absolute immunity—persuades us that Reed’s view of Illinois

30 No. 14-2877

law on this point is no longer viable, however sensible it

might have been.

Accordingly, the combination of Cleavinger, the Illinois leg-

islative response to City of Wyoming, and the more recent de-

cision in Knoob Enterprises convinces us that the key assump-

tion in Reed concerning non-renewals no longer applies. Ab-

solute immunity should no longer apply to non-renewal de-

cisions, which lack the hallmarks of a judicial act. Schauf has

not claimed qualified immunity, which would not apply in

any event if Brunson can prove his claims on the merits. We

reverse the district court’s grant of absolute immunity to

Schauf on the due process claim.

VI. Remaining Due Process Issues

A. City of Bridgeport

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment

to the City of Bridgeport on the due process claim. The city is

liable for Schauf’s actions only insofar as its municipal policy

caused a constitutional violation. Killinger, 389 F.3d at 771, cit-

ing Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).

The district court rejected Brunson’s argument that the city

was liable on the due process claim for Schauf’s actions as a

final policymaker for Bridgeport. The court’s conclusion

might well raise an eyebrow, see Reed, 704 F.2d at 953 (official

acts of municipal officials are acts of the municipality for pur-

poses of § 1983 liability, even if official is entitled to immunity

from individual liability), but Brunson has waived the point

by not arguing it on appeal.

Brunson instead hints briefly at an alternative theory of

due process liability for the city and the other defendants: that

the overall campaign of harassment deprived him of the value

No. 14-2877 31

of his liquor license. See id., at 949. But Brunson provides only

an underdeveloped argument, so that issue is also waived.

Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2012).

B. Defendants’ Parratt Defense to Due Process Claim

Defendants suggest that we affirm summary judgment on

Brunson’s due process claim based on Parratt v. Taylor, 451

U.S. 527 (1981). Parratt held that a claim under § 1983 for dep-

rivation of property without prior notice and an opportunity

for hearing fails where the property deprivation is the result

of random and unauthorized acts by state officials and where

a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available. See Easter

House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1396 (7th Cir. 1990), citing Hud-

son v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). The district court did not

consider this argument in granting summary judgment to de-

fendants. We decline to affirm summary judgment on this ba-

sis. Defendants have presented us with only black letter law

of the Parratt line of cases. They have not shown how that nar-

row exception would apply to the circumstances of this case. 9

9 We are skeptical in any event. Parratt is a rare exception to due pro-

cess norms. See Parratt, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517

(1984). It is “limited to a narrow category of due process cases where the

plaintiff claims he was denied a meaningful pre-deprivation hearing, but

under circumstances where the very notion of a pre-deprivation hearing

would be impractical and even nonsensical, and where the deprivation

was not carried out through established state procedures.” Armstrong v.

Daily, 786 F.3d 529, 539 (7th Cir. 2015). The procedures to protect

Brunson’s property interest in his liquor license were available and well-

established. A deliberate decision to prevent him from using those proce-

dures does not fit within the narrow Parratt doctrine, and certainly not

where there is no obvious and sufficient post-deprivation remedy avail-

able under state law.

32 No. 14-2877

VII. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Finally, the district court declined to exercise supple-

mental jurisdiction over Brunson’s state-law claims because it

had dismissed all of the federal claims over which it had orig-

inal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Because we rein-

state some of Brunson’s federal claims under § 1983, the dis-

trict court will need to revisit the question of supplemental

jurisdiction on remand. See McCullah v. Gadert, 344 F.3d 655,

662 (7th Cir. 2003).

***

To recapitulate, summary judgment for Wade on the basis

of prosecutorial immunity and summary judgment as to all

defendants on Brunson’s false arrest claim are AFFIRMED.

Summary judgment in favor of defendants Schauf, Murray,

and the City of Bridgeport on Brunson’s claim for denial of

equal protection is REVERSED. Summary judgment on

Brunson’s claim of denial of due process is also REVERSED as

to defendants Schauf and Murray, but AFFIRMED as to de-

fendant City of Bridgeport. The case is REMANDED to the

district court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.