The opinion
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2016 ME 174
Docket: Oxf-15-530
Submitted
On Briefs: September 29, 2016
Decided: December 1, 2016
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
FRYEBURG TRUST
v.
TOWN OF FRYEBURG et al.
GORMAN, J.
[¶1] The Fryeburg Trust appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court
(Oxford County, Clifford, J.) affirming, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B, the
decisions of the Town of Fryeburg Planning Board and Board of Appeals on
the Trust’s challenge to a Town decision allowing Fryeburg Academy to use a
parcel of land as an outdoor classroom. The Academy and Town of Fryeburg
cross-appeal from the same judgment vacating, also pursuant to M.R.
Civ. P. 80B, the Town’s decision to allow the Academy to use a building on a
second parcel of land to house administrative offices. The parties challenge
the interpretation of the definition of secondary school in Fryeburg’s Land Use
Ordinance. We affirm the decision of the Planning Board.
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I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The parties do not dispute the facts of this case. On
October 10, 2014, the Academy, a private secondary school, applied to the
Planning Board for permits authorizing changes in the use of two parcels of
leased land. The Academy proposed to use one parcel (the Land Lot), which
had previously been used for agricultural purposes, to teach—primarily
outdoors—environmental science, conservation studies, agricultural studies,
physical education, and recreation, and also for related storage. It proposed
to use another parcel (the House Lot), which had previously been used for
residential purposes, as offices for its admissions and advancement
departments and for related storage. The Academy asserted that each use
was permitted as an educational use pursuant to the Ordinance.
[¶3] Following a public hearing, the Planning Board approved the
Academy’s applications for both parcels. The Planning Board’s approvals
were based on its conclusions that the proposed uses qualified as secondary
school uses pursuant to the Ordinance and were, therefore, allowed in the
lots’ respective zoning districts. The Trust, which owns property abutting
both lots, appealed from the Planning Board’s decisions to the Board of
Appeals. The Board of Appeals denied both appeals.
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[¶4] The Trust filed two timely appeals in the Superior Court, pursuant
to M.R. Civ. P. 80B, in which it contended that the Planning Board had
committed an error of law in interpreting the definition of secondary school
contained in the Ordinance. The Superior Court affirmed the Planning Board’s
decision to grant the Land Lot permit, concluding that, pursuant to the
Ordinance, the proposed use of the Land Lot was an educational use because
classes would be taught there. The court vacated the Planning Board’s
decision to grant the House Lot permit, however, based on its conclusion that
the proposed use of the House Lot was not an educational use because classes
would not be taught there. The Trust timely appeals from the court’s decision
affirming the Land Lot permit. The Academy and Town timely cross-appeal
from the court’s decision vacating the House Lot permit.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶5] We review local land use decisions “for error of law, abuse of
discretion or findings not supported by substantial evidence in the record,”
and review local interpretations of local ordinances de novo as a question of
law.1 Aydelott v. City of Portland, 2010 ME 25, ¶ 10, 990 A.2d 1024 (quotation
1 Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B, we review, directly and without deference to intermediate
appellate decisions, the record of the last decision maker with de novo decision-making and
fact-finding authority. Rossignol v. Me. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 2016 ME 115, ¶ 6, 144 A.3d 1175;
Mills v. Town of Eliot, 2008 ME 134, ¶¶ 13-16, 955 A.2d 258. Here, because the Board of Appeals
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marks omitted). The characterization of proposed uses in applications for
local land use permits presents a “mixed question of law and fact.” Jordan v.
City of Ellsworth, 2003 ME 82, ¶ 8, 828 A.2d 768. Here, the parties dispute
whether the Academy’s proposed use of each lot falls within the Ordinance’s
definition of “School, Public or Private Elementary or Secondary” (hereinafter
“secondary school”).2 Fryeburg, Me., Land Use Ordinance § 25-17 (June 2014).
As always, we first evaluate the plain meaning of the Ordinance and, if the
meaning is clear, “need not look beyond the words themselves.” Wister v.
Town of Mt. Desert, 2009 ME 66, ¶ 17, 974 A.2d 903. We construe the terms of
an ordinance reasonably, considering its purposes and structure and to avoid
absurd or illogical results. See Dickau v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 ME 158, ¶ 21,
107 A.3d 621; Stewart v. Town of Sedgwick, 2002 ME 81, ¶ 6, 797 A.2d 27.
[¶6] In this case, the Ordinance3 defines a secondary school as a “place
where courses of study which are sufficient to qualify attendance as
and Superior Court each acted solely in an appellate capacity, we review the determinations of the
Planning Board directly. See Fryeburg, Me., Land Use Ordinance § 18-2 (June 2014) (stating that “a
hearing of an Administrative Appeal . . . shall be conducted by the Board of Appeals as an appellate
review and not de novo.”).
2 Secondary schools are permitted with prior authorization from the Planning Board in the
zoning districts of the Land and House Lots. Fryeburg, Me., Land Use Ordinance § 5-3.
3 We note that, during the pendency of this case, the Town amended its Ordinance to expand the
definition of “school.” The Ordinance in effect at the time of the Planning Board’s decision,
however, is controlling in this case. See 1 M.R.S. § 302 (2015); George D. Ballard, Builder, Inc. v. City
of Westbrook, 502 A.2d 476, 484 (Me. 1985). The text of the amended Ordinance is not before us.
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compliance with State compulsory education requirements for grades
Kindergarten through 12 are taught.” Fryeburg, Me., Land Use Ordinance
§ 25-17. The Ordinance does not provide any other guidance concerning this
definition.
A. The Land Lot
[¶7] We first consider the Trust’s argument regarding the use of the
Land Lot as an outdoor classroom. It contends that the proposed use of the lot
by the Academy is not permissible pursuant to the Ordinance because “[n]o
complete courses will be taught [there], much less all mandated courses.”
[¶8] Although the language of the Ordinance is clear that a secondary
school is a “place where courses of study . . . are taught,” the remainder of the
definition is less clear. Fryeburg, Me., Land Use Ordinance § 25-17. The
clause on which the Trust bases its contention states that the courses taught
at a place must be “sufficient to qualify attendance as compliance with State
compulsory education requirements for grades Kindergarten through 12” in
order for that place to be deemed a school. Fryeburg, Me., Land Use
Ordinance § 25-17. The Ordinance does not otherwise define or explain the
terms of the clause. The State of Maine requires that secondary schools
include “career and education development, English language arts, health
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education and physical education, mathematics, science and technology, social
studies, visual and performing arts and world languages” in their programs of
instruction. 20-A M.R.S. §§ 4721(1), 6209(2) (2015).
[¶9] Reading the plain language of the Ordinance together with the
State educational requirements, the Academy’s proposed use of the Land Lot
to teach courses, including physical education and science, to students
attending a secondary school fits squarely within the definition in question.
Nothing within the text of the Ordinance requires that all of the courses
required by the State or the entirety of those courses be taught on each piece
of property or in each building where a secondary school operates.
See Fryeburg, Me., Land Use Ordinance § 25-17. Reading the Trust’s suggested
restrictions into the Ordinance would create an absurd result, and we
interpret the language of ordinances to avoid such results. See Dickau,
2014 ME 158, ¶ 21, 107 A.3d 621 (“[W]e may reject any construction that . . .
creates absurd, illogical, unreasonable, inconsistent, or anomalous results if an
alternative interpretation avoids such results.”) For this reason, we affirm the
judgment of the Planning Board, as affirmed by the Superior Court.
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B. The House Lot
[¶10] We next consider the Academy’s and Town’s argument regarding
the use of the House Lot for school administrative offices. They contend that
the proposed use of the Lot by the Academy’s admissions and advancement
departments is so integral to the functioning of the school that it is
indistinguishable from the school and, therefore, permissible under the
Ordinance. We agree.
[¶11] Here, the Ordinance defines secondary school, in relevant part, as
a “place where courses of study . . . are taught.” Fryeburg, Me., Land Use
Ordinance § 25-17. Although a crabbed reading of that language could
preclude the Planning Board from allowing the Academy’s proposed use of the
House Lot, such an interpretation would also lead to an illogical result.
See Dickau, 2014 ME 158, ¶ 21, 107 A.3d 621. Here, the Planning Board
determined that schools comprise not only classrooms and teachers but also
administrators and administrative offices, which are integral to the
functioning of the school. We need not look beyond the plain language of the
Ordinance’s definition of secondary school to conclude that the Planning
Board’s determination is not clearly erroneous. See Wister, 2009 ME 66, ¶ 17,
974 A.2d 903; see also Dickau, 2014 ME 158, ¶ 20, 107 A.3d 621 (“A plain
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language interpretation should not be confused with a literal interpretation”);
Jordan, 2003 ME 82, ¶ 10, 828 A.2d 768 (“[W]e are not required to disregard
common sense when we interpret municipal ordinances.”); Underwood v. City
of Presque Isle, 1998 ME 166, ¶ 11, 715 A.2d 148 (concluding that “the
marketing aspect” of an agricultural school was “subordinate to and an
integral part of the [school]”).
[¶12] Although whether a proposed use falls within the terms of a
zoning ordinance is a question of law that we review de novo, nevertheless,
“in certain factual situations, even though the terms of the zoning ordinance
are . . . defined by the Court as a matter of law, whether or not the proposed
structure or use meets the definition in the application thereof may be a
matter of fact for initial Board determination.” Goldman v. Town of Lovell,
592 A.2d 165, 168 (Me. 1991) (quotation marks omitted). Where the
determination of whether a particular activity is part of a more
comprehensive use is premised on a relevant factual determination made by
the Planning Board—e.g., as here, whether the proposed use of the lot for the
school’s administrative offices is part of a secondary school’s educational
functions—we review the Board’s decision for clear error. See Boivin v. Town
of Sanford, 588 A.2d 1197, 1200 (Me. 1991). We afford substantial deference
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to the Planning Board’s ultimate characterization of a proposal under a local
land use ordinance. Jordan, 2003 ME 82, ¶ 9, 828 A.2d 768.
[¶13] The Planning Board interpreted the Ordinance to mean that a
“school” is more than just a collection of classrooms and then found that the
Academy’s proposed use fell within this more fulsome view of “school.” A
review of the administrative record shows that the Planning Board did not
clearly err in so determining. We therefore vacate the judgment of the
Superior Court and remand with instructions to affirm the decision of the
Planning Board.
The entry is:
Judgment of the Superior Court affirmed with
respect to the Land Lot. Judgment of the
Superior Court vacated with respect to the
House Lot and remanded with instructions to
affirm the decision of the Planning Board.
On the briefs:
Edward L. Dilworth, III, Esq., Dow’s Law Office, P.A.,
Norway, for appellant Fryeburg Trust
Mary E. Costigan, Esq., Bernstein Shur, Portland, for cross-
appellant Fryeburg Academy
The Town of Fryeburg did not file a brief
Oxford County Superior Court docket numbers AP-2015-03 & AP-2015-04
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY