Opinion

Unwired Planet L.L.C. v. Google, Inc.

  • 660 F. App'x 974
Court
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Filed
Nov 21, 2016
Status
Unpublished
Author
Stoll
On the bench
Wallach, Hughes, Stoll
Cited by
2 cases
Authority
More cited than 49.1%

The opinion

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

UNWIRED PLANET L.L.C.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

GOOGLE, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2015-1966

______________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

District of Nevada in No. 3:12-cv-00504-MMD-VPC, Judge

Miranda M. Du.

______________________

Decided: November 21, 2016

______________________

PHILLIP AURENTZ, McKool Smith, PC, Dallas, TX, ar-

gued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by

THEODORE STEVENSON III; KEVIN LEE BURGESS, JOEL

LANCE THOLLANDER, Austin, TX.

GREGORY PAUL STONE, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP,

Los Angeles, CA, argued for defendant-appellee. Also

represented by FRED ANTHONY ROWLEY, JR., ADAM R.

LAWTON, PETER GRATZINGER; PETER ANDREW DETRE, San

Francisco, CA.

2 UNWIRED PLANET LLC v. GOOGLE, INC.

______________________

Before WALLACH, HUGHES, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

STOLL, Circuit Judge.

Unwired Planet, L.L.C. appeals from a stipulated

judgment of noninfringement following adverse claim

construction and indefiniteness rulings from the United

States District Court for the District of Nevada. For the

reasons that follow, we affirm-in-part, vacate the court’s

grant of summary judgment, and remand for proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

Unwired originally asserted ten patents against

Google, Inc. in the district court, although only three are

at issue here on appeal: U.S. Patent Nos. 6,662,016,

6,895,240, and 6,684,087. Following the court’s claim

construction order concerning those patents and its inval-

idation of claims 17 and 31 of the ’087 patent for indefi-

niteness, Unwired stipulated to a judgment of

noninfringement.

The court granted the parties’ joint motion for sum-

mary judgment. The parties agreed that, with respect to

the ’016 patent, the court’s construction of “server node”

entitled Google to summary judgment of noninfringement

for claims 1–5. J.A. 57. For the same patent and asserted

claims, the parties further agreed that the court’s con-

struction of “network location information regarding a

mobile resource location” entitled Google to summary

judgment of noninfringement with respect to its accused

product My Location. J.A. 57. The parties further agreed

that, with respect to the ’240 patent, the court’s construc-

tion of “proxy server” / “proxy server module” entitled

Google to summary judgment of noninfringement for

claims 1–3, 5, 6, 13, 15–18, 27, 28, and 30. J.A. 56. Also

with regards to that patent, they agreed that the court’s

UNWIRED PLANET LLC v. GOOGLE, INC. 3

construction of “user account” entitled Google to summary

judgment of noninfringement for claims 6, 27, 28, and 30

of the ’240 patent. J.A. 56. And finally, with respect to

the ’087 patent, the parties agreed that the court’s con-

struction of “reduced image” entitled Google to summary

judgment of noninfringement for claims 1, 17, 27, and 31.

J.A. 57.

Unwired appealed. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

“The ultimate construction of the claim is a legal

question and, therefore, is reviewed de novo.” Info-Hold,

Inc. v. Applied Media Techs. Corp., 783 F.3d 1262, 1265

(Fed. Cir. 2015). We review a district court’s claim con-

struction based solely on intrinsic evidence de novo, while

we review subsidiary factual findings regarding extrinsic

evidence for clear error. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v.

Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015).

Claim construction seeks to ascribe the “ordinary and

customary meaning” to claim terms as a person of ordi-

nary skill in the art would have understood them at the

time of invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,

1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citing Vitronics Corp.

v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).

“[T]he claims themselves provide substantial guidance as

to the meaning of particular claim terms.” Id. at 1314. In

addition, “the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed

to read the claim term not only in the context of the

particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but

in the context of the entire patent, including the specifica-

tion.” Id. at 1313. But “[w]hile we read claims in view of

the specification, of which they are a part, we do not read

limitations from the embodiments in the specification into

the claims.” Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755

F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

4 UNWIRED PLANET LLC v. GOOGLE, INC.

On appeal, Unwired challenges seven claim construc-

tions and the court’s indefiniteness ruling. Of the seven

challenged constructions, we disagree with the district

court on three and agree on four. We disagree with the

court’s construction of the terms “marker info” and “server

node” in the ’016 patent. We also disagree with its con-

struction of “user account” in the ’240 patent. We agree

with the remainder of the challenged constructions,

including all of the challenged constructions in the ’087

patent. Finally, we affirm the court’s ruling that claims

17 and 31 of the ’087 patent are invalid as indefinite.

I.

We begin with Unwired’s argument that the district

court misconstrued the terms “marker information,”

“network location information,” and “server node” in the

’016 patent. 1 The ’016 patent describes technology for

transmitting and displaying location information of a

mobile device. The specification describes particular

methods and systems for the “delivery of graphical loca-

tion information regarding mobile resources.” ’016 patent

col. 2 ll. 25–26. In the claimed method, a “server node”

separately sends “mapping information” and “marker

information” to a “client node,” which processes the “map-

ping information” and “marker information” to “generate

a graphical display indicating said mobile resource loca-

1 We adopt the parties’ shorthand for the first two

terms. The parties use the shorthand “marker infor-

mation” to refer to the construed term “processing said

network location information regarding said mobile

resource location, at said server node, to generate marker

information defining a graphical representation of said

mobile resource location.” The shorthand “network loca-

tion information” stands for “network location information

regarding a mobile resource location.”

UNWIRED PLANET LLC v. GOOGLE, INC. 5

tion.” Id. col. 12 l. 61 – col. 14 l. 4. Claim 1 is representa-

tive and is reproduced below:

1. A method for use in providing location infor-

mation regarding mobile resources in a data ena-

bled network, comprising the steps of:

providing a server node associated

with at least one wireless communication

network assisted location finding system;

said server node being in selective

communication with a client node via the

data enabled network;

receiving, at the server node, network

location information regarding a mobile

resource location, said network location in-

formation being obtained using said at

least one network assisted location finding

system, wherein said network location in-

formation is based on the location of said

mobile resource in relation to at least one

fixed ground-based wireless network

structure having a known geographic loca-

tion;

accessing at the server node, geograph-

ical mapping information for an area in-

cluding said mobile resource location;

processing said network location in-

formation regarding said mobile resource

location, at said server node, to generate

marker information defining a graphical

representation of said mobile resource loca-

tion, wherein said marker information

represents said network location infor-

mation so as to permit graphical combina-

tion of said marker information with said

mapping information;

6 UNWIRED PLANET LLC v. GOOGLE, INC.

first transmitting in a first message

set, said mapping information from said

server node to said client node;

second transmitting in a second mes-

sage set, said marker information from

said server node to said client node; and

wherein said mapping information

and said marker information can be com-

bined at said client node to generate a

graphical display indicating said mobile

resource location.

Id. col. 12 l. 57 – col. 14 l.4 (emphases added).

A.

Unwired argues that the court’s construction of

“marker information” in the ’016 patent improperly

imports a graphical output requirement into the claim,

and we agree. 2 The central dispute between the parties

was whether marker information must be information

“sufficient to render” a graphical marker on a screen, as

Google argued, or whether the marker information simply

“permits rendering” of an identifier on a map, as Unwired

proposed. Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., No. 3:12-

CV-00504, 2014 WL 7012497, at *27–28 (D. Nev. Dec. 12,

2014). The court adopted Google’s construction of the

term, finding that the claim requires the following: “at

said server node, processing said network location infor-

2 The entire disputed “marker information” term

requires “processing said network location information

regarding said mobile resource location, at said server

node, to generate marker information defining a graphical

representation of said mobile resource location.”

’016 patent col. 13 ll. 10–13.

UNWIRED PLANET LLC v. GOOGLE, INC. 7

mation regarding said mobile device location to generate

graphical location information sufficient to render an

identifier and including coordinates indicating the posi-

tion of said mobile device on a map.” Id. at *27, *29. In

short, the court found that marker information defines a

graphical representation and must include information

sufficient to render a graphical identifier. We disagree.

The specification defines the term “marker” as the

“cursor or other identifier, indicating the position of a

mobile resource.” ʼ016 patent col. 1 ll. 41–42. In contrast,

the specification describes “marker information” as in-

cluding “information identifying the mobile resource

location.” Id. col. 9 l. 66 – col. 10 l. 1. The specification

states that “the marker information includes information

sufficient to define a graphical representation of the

mobile resource location” and that “such information may

simply include coordinates which may be represented by a

cursor, cross hairs, a point or other identifier or the

location information may include coordinates which an

uncertainty radius or other defined uncertainty region.”

Id. col. 10 ll. 13–19.

While “marker information” may include a graphical

representation, the specification and prosecution history

make clear that “marker information” need not always

include graphical information. Rather, the intrinsic

evidence confirms that “marker information” may be

information about the mobile resource’s location, without

graphical information. The specification describes, for

example, non-graphical “marker information,” such as

coordinates and uncertainties. Id. col. 10 ll. 14–19. The

prosecution history further supports an interpretation of

“marker information” that need not include a graphical

representation. And in response to an office action, the

applicant explained that marker information may simply

reflect coordinates: “The marker information represents

the network information so as to permit combination with

the mapping data, e.g., the marker information may

8 UNWIRED PLANET LLC v. GOOGLE, INC.

reflect a longitude and latitude coordinate with an uncer-

tainty parameter.” J.A. 2683. With these remarks, the

applicant explained unequivocally that marker infor-

mation may simply represent coordinate values.

Read in the context of the prosecution history and the

specification, we conclude that marker information need

not include a graphical representation. We thus disagree

with the district court and adopt Unwired’s proposed

construction, construing the term as follows: “at said

server node, processing said network location information

regarding said mobile device location to generate location

information that permits rendering on the client node an

identifier indicating the position of said mobile device on a

map.” Unwired, 2014 WL 7012497, at *27.

B.

Unwired also disputes the meaning of the term “net-

work location information regarding a mobile resource

location” in the ’016 patent. In the district court, the

parties disputed whether location information may be

general coordinates, i.e., from a GPS, or whether location

information must provide the mobile resource’s location

within a network. The district court found that the

network location information must be “information

providing the location of a mobile device within a net-

work.” Unwired, 2014 WL 7012497, at *29–30.

Unwired argues that, to the contrary, network infor-

mation must only be “information relating to the location

of a mobile resource” and that Google’s construction

introduced redundancy into the claims. Id. at 29. We

disagree. The district court correctly determined that

network location information, as used in the patent

claims and specification, requires reference to the loca-

tion’s device within a network. The prosecution history

confirms this interpretation. There, the applicant distin-

guished the patented invention from a reference using

GPS-based location systems. The applicant stated that,

UNWIRED PLANET LLC v. GOOGLE, INC. 9

in contrast to GPS-based systems, the claimed “network

location information provides a mobile resource location

that is based at least in part upon the location of that

mobile resource relative to one or more fixed ground-

based wireless network structures that have a known

geographic location.” J.A. 2683. The applicant therefore

made clear that network location information must in-

clude information about a mobile resource within a net-

work. It cannot now seek a different interpretation.

Thus, we agree with the court’s construction.

C.

Finally, we turn to Unwired’s argument that the dis-

trict court misconstrued “server node” in the ’016 patent

by improperly importing a limitation into the claims. On

appeal, Unwired argues that the claim permits the server

node to comprise one or more computers or programs.

The district court construed the term “server node” as

“one or more computers, each performing the receiving,

accessing, processing, and transmitting services specified

in the claims.” Unwired, 2014 WL 7012497, at *32. The

court’s construction thus required that each computer

perform each and every one of the claimed functions—

receiving, accessing, processing, and transmitting.

Google responds that extrinsic evidence supports the

district court’s requirement that the server node consist of

computers where each performs all of the claimed func-

tions. It argues that, under Teva, we owe the district

court deference on its factual findings. Appellee Br. 48

(citing Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 842). While Google is correct

that we owe deference to factual findings, the district

court made no such findings here. In resolving the par-

ties’ dispute as to the meaning of “server node,” the court

discussed each party’s submitted evidence. Google offered

a 1999 technical dictionary, and Unwired offered contrary

testimony concerning the implementation of the patented

technology. Unwired, 2014 WL 7012497, at *32. The

10 UNWIRED PLANET LLC v. GOOGLE, INC.

court explained that these sources of evidence conflicted,

but did not resolve this conflict of evidence. Indeed, the

only other mention of extrinsic evidence came by way of

the court’s concluding sentence: “Considering the intrinsic

and extrinsic evidence, the Court adopts, in part, both

parties’ proposed constructions.” Id. The court’s adop-

tion-in-part of both parties’ constructions left the conflict

between the parties’ extrinsic evidence unresolved. In

turn, the district court’s opinion on this claim term con-

tains no reviewable factual findings. So although we owe

deference to the district court’s factual findings as a

general matter, Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 842, we cannot lend

such deference here.

On the merits of the claim construction dispute, we

agree with Unwired’s contention that the district court

improperly imported a limitation into the claim. See Hill-

Rom Servs., 755 F.3d at 1371. The claim requires the

server node to perform receiving, accessing, processing,

and transmitting services. It does not specify that the

node must be one or more computers with each perform-

ing every one of the computers’ functions. Nor does the

claim rule out multiple computers or programs working in

concert to operate as the claimed server node. The claim

merely requires that a single server node perform every

claimed function.

Moreover, the specification does not require that the

server node be a single computer, nor does it rule out an

embodiment where the node consists of a collection of

computers. For instance, figure 1 and its accompanying

text describe a “server,” but none of this text describes a

server or server node as consisting solely of a single

computer. ’016 patent col. 9 ll. 14–61. The server acts as

“a common platform for supporting services in various

operating environments.” Id. col. 9 ll. 60–61. But the text

does not limit this feature-set to a particular hardware

configuration. And it certainly does not limit this feature-

set to one computer. Thus, the district court’s construc-

UNWIRED PLANET LLC v. GOOGLE, INC. 11

tion improperly imported a limitation into the claim. We

agree instead with Unwired’s proposed construction, in

which a server node is “one or more computers or pro-

grams that provide access to resources to client nodes.”

II.

We turn next to the ’240 patent, where Unwired chal-

lenges the district court’s construction of “proxy server”

and “user account.” The ’240 patent generally describes a

system for facilitating communication between the wired

internet and mobile phones, referred to by the specifica-

tion as “landnet” and “airnet,” respectively. ’240 patent

col. 4 ll. 36–39, col. 5 ll. 6–9. The specification provides an

example of such a system in figure 1, reproduced below:

As shown in figure 1, landnet 100 communicates with

airnet 102 through a proxy server 114. The specification

explains that “[g]enerally, the communication protocol in

airnet 102 is different from that in landnet 100.”

’240 patent col. 5 ll. 33–34. For example, in one embodi-

12 UNWIRED PLANET LLC v. GOOGLE, INC.

ment the communication protocol on the landnet is “the

well known HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) or

HTTPS,” while the airnet’s protocol is “Handheld Device

Transport Protocol (HDTP).” Id. col. 5 ll. 41–58. “Hence,

one of the functions proxy server 114 performs is to map

or translate one communication protocol to anoth-

er, thereby mobile station 106 coupled to airnet 102 can

communicate with any of the devices coupled to landnet

100 via proxy server 114.” Id. col. 5 ll. 35–39.

In the claimed system, a proxy server “enable[s]”

communication between a wireless network and a land-

net. Representative claim 1 is reproduced below:

1. A system comprising:

a proxy server coupled to a wireless

network, to enable a plurality of mobile

stations on the wireless network to com-

municate with processing systems on a

landnet, the proxy server communicating

with the mobile stations over the wireless

network; and

a fleet server coupled to communicate

with the proxy server, to store and control

access to fleet data, and to authenticate a

request from a provisioning entity to push

the fleet data to the plurality of the mobile

stations;

wherein the proxy server pushes the

fleet data to the plurality of mobile sta-

tions over the wireless network only if the

request is authenticated by the fleet serv-

er.

Id. col. 13 ll. 49–62 (emphases added). Claim 6, which

ultimately depends from claim 1, adds the requirement

that “the proxy server comprises an account manager to

manage a plurality of user accounts, each corresponding

UNWIRED PLANET LLC v. GOOGLE, INC. 13

to one of the mobile stations, wherein the proxy server

pushes the fleet data to the plurality of mobile stations

over the wireless network only if the request is authenti-

cated by the provisioning interface and verified by the

account manager.” ’240 patent col. 14 ll. 22–28 (emphasis

added). Claim 27 is an independent claim that similarly

involves “verifying the plurality of the mobile stations

against a plurality of user accounts using the fleet server.”

Id. col. 16 ll. 16–28 (emphasis added).

A.

Unwired argues that the district court’s claim con-

struction of “proxy server” improperly imported a limita-

tion into the claims. The court construed “proxy server” 3

to require “mapping or translation functions to enable

communication between two networks that could other-

wise not communicate.” Unwired, 2014 WL 7012497, at

*7. Unwired concedes that the specification describes

proxy servers as enabling otherwise incompatible net-

works to communicate. But Unwired argues that the

proxy server need not be limited to this role. Rather, it

contends the proxy server may connect two networks that

use the same protocol. It explains that the specification

does not rule out the airnet and landnet operating with

the same protocol. It argues that, while the specification

states that “[g]enerally,” the communication protocols are

different, id. col. 5 ll. 32–33, the use of the term “general-

ly” implies that the landnet and airnet might employ the

same communication protocol.

3 During the Markman hearing, the parties agreed

that the Court’s construction of “proxy server” would

control the construction of “proxy server module.” Un-

wired, 2014 WL 7012497, at *1 n.3.

14 UNWIRED PLANET LLC v. GOOGLE, INC.

We disagree with Unwired’s claim construction argu-

ment. The district court properly found that a person of

ordinary skill would understand “proxy server,” as used in

the context of the ’240 patent claims, to enable communi-

cation between otherwise uncommunicative networks.

The claim expressly requires the “proxy server” to “enable

a plurality of mobile stations on the wireless network to

communicate with processing systems on a landnet.” Id.

col. 13 ll. 50–52. If the wireless network and landnet

were already able to communicate—i.e., without the proxy

server—the claim language “enable communication”

would have no meaning. The claims could have recited

“facilitating communication” or “assisting communica-

tion,” but the patent owner instead limited the proxy

server to enabling communication, which, in the context

of the patent specification, requires mapping or transla-

tion functions. Indeed, as the specification describes, “one

of the functions proxy server 114 performs is to map or

translate one communication protocol to another, thereby

mobile station 106 coupled to airnet 102 can communicate

with any of the devices coupled to landnet 100 via proxy

server 114.” Id. at col. 5 ll. 35–36.

Unwired nevertheless contends that the court’s con-

struction renders claim 7 meaningless and thus violates

the doctrine of claim differentiation. Appellant Br. 58

(citing Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898,

910 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). “As this court has frequently stat-

ed, the presence of a dependent claim that adds a particu-

lar limitation raises a presumption that the limitation in

question is not found in the independent claim.” Liebel-

Flarsheim, 358 F.3d at 910. Claim 7, which ultimately

depends from claim 1, adds a mapper that performs

protocol mapping between a first and second communica-

tion protocol. The claim adds the following limitations:

“wherein the proxy server comprises a mapper to perform

protocol mapping from the first communication protocol to

the second communication protocol and from the second

UNWIRED PLANET LLC v. GOOGLE, INC. 15

communication protocol to the first communication proto-

col.” ’240 patent col. 14 ll. 29–33. Unwired argues that

the court’s construction imports these limitations into

claim 1. But Google responds that claim 7 also requires

“a mapper,” a limitation not present in claim 1 or the

district court’s construction. We agree. The district

court’s construction, which we adopt, does not render

claim 7 meaningless, as claim 7 does not simply require

that the proxy server enable communications between two

otherwise uncommunicative networks. At minimum,

claim 7 adds a mapper requirement.

B.

Finally, Unwired challenges the court’s construction

of “user account” in claims 6 and 27 of the ’240 patent.

The court construed “user account” to mean “an estab-

lished relationship between a user of a mobile device and

a wireless carrier authorizing the mobile device to use the

carrier’s network.” Unwired, 2014 WL 7012497, at *16.

Unwired argues that a “user account” need not be limited

to accounts of mobile devices with wireless carriers, but

rather could include other accounts, such as those be-

tween mobile devices and corporations, businesses, or

even individuals.

Google defends the court’s construction on the basis

that a person of ordinary skill in the art would under-

stand the claims to describe user accounts associated with

a wireless carrier. It reasons that the specification de-

scribes a verification process that ensures the mobile

stations receive data sent over a wireless network.

Google points to the specification’s description of an

embodiment where a user account includes a “device ID”

that is assigned to a mobile device, and a “subscriber ID”

that is “typically initiated and authorized by a carrier in a

proxy server device 240 as part of the procedures to

activate a subscriber account for a mobile station.”

’240 patent col. 8 l. 66 – col. 9 l. 2. The user ID enables

16 UNWIRED PLANET LLC v. GOOGLE, INC.

the system to determine whether the customer has an

account with a wireless carrier before pushing the infor-

mation out to that user. The specification further de-

scribes this process of verifying the user’s identification

with the carrier. It explains that “the selected mobile

stations are determined if all are authorized and serviced

by the proxy server. Typically, the selected mobile sta-

tions are examined against their corresponding user

accounts.” ’240 patent col. 13 ll. 25–28. Google argues

that these embodiments suggest that a “user account” is

limited to mobile accounts with wireless carriers.

We agree with Unwired, however, that the district

court’s claim construction improperly excludes at least

one disclosed embodiment in the specification. For exam-

ple, one embodiment describes corporations having mobile

fleets that employ corporate user accounts. Id. col. 6 l. 66

– col. 7 l. 4. The specification explains that there will be

times where corporations wish to directly communicate

with particular mobile devices through these accounts.

Id. col. 1 ll. 47–48. The corporation may wish, for exam-

ple, “to update a call list to a selective group of [] mobile

devices” or “to propagate an urgent proprietary message

to its sales team.” Id. col. 1 ll. 47–58. In this embodi-

ment, corporations directly communicate with mobile

users by utilizing “user accounts.” This embodiment

envisions user accounts that do not correspond to the

relationship between the mobile user and the carrier. As

such, the district court erred by incorrectly limiting the

term “user account” to accounts with carriers. We instead

adopt Unwired’s construction of “user account” as “an

established account with a user of a mobile device.”

III.

We turn last to Unwired’s contention that the district

court misconstrued the terms “reduced image” and “key in

the mobile device corresponding to a subarea in the

reduced image” in the ’087 patent. The ’087 patent gen-

UNWIRED PLANET LLC v. GOOGLE, INC. 17

erally discloses a method of using a mobile device to

display and navigate images having “larger dimensions

than that of the [device’s] display screen.” ’087 patent

col. 1 ll. 12–13. The patent discusses “transform[ing]” the

image into a “reduced version that fits well into the

screen,” and that “reduced version is displayed on the

mobile device.” Id. col. 2 ll. 13–19. Claim 1 is reproduced

below:

1. A method for recursively displaying on a

screen of a mobile device an image having dimen-

sions much larger than the dimension of the

screen; the method comprises:

displaying on the screen of the mobile

device a reduced image forwarded from a

server device, the reduced image trans-

formed from the image with respect to a

set of parameters associated with the

screen;

generating a new request when a key

in the mobile device corresponding to a

subarea in the reduced image is activated;

and

receiving a detailed image of the sub-

area from the server device when the

server device renders the new request.

’087 patent col. 9 ll. 27–39 (emphases added).

A.

The district court construed “reduced image” to mean

“an uncropped version of the image with smaller dimen-

sions.” Unwired, 2014 WL 7012497, at *24. The court

adopted this construction over Unwired’s proposed con-

struction, which would have defined “reduced image” as

“a version of the image with smaller dimensions.” Id.

at *23. The court explained that, while the patent does

18 UNWIRED PLANET LLC v. GOOGLE, INC.

not explicitly define the term “reduced image,” “the claims

and specification discuss a reduced image in the context of

preprocessing or transforming an original image for

display on a mobile device.” Id. (internal quotation marks

and alterations omitted). The court found that “[t]he

intrinsic evidence, however, does not specify whether a

reduced image may be produced by cropping an original

image.” Id. The court then looked to extrinsic evidence in

the form of an inventor’s testimony as to the scope of the

term. The inventor testified that “reduced image” did not

mean cropping. Id. at *24. In light of both the extrinsic

and intrinsic evidence, the court adopted Google’s pro-

posed construction.

We first note that the district court wrongly relied on

the inventor’s testimony about his subjective understand-

ing of the meaning of “reduced image.” “[I]nventor testi-

mony as to the inventor’s subjective intent is irrelevant to

the issue of claim construction.” Howmedica Osteonics

Corp. v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc., 540 F.3d 1337, 1347

(Fed. Cir. 2008). Because this testimony is irrelevant as a

matter of law, we do not review the court’s findings on

this evidence.

We nevertheless agree with the district court that the

correct construction of “reduced image” is “an uncropped

version of the image with smaller dimensions.” Unwired,

2014 WL 7012497, at *24. We find that the claims and

specification make clear that the image cannot be reduced

by cropping. As the court noted, the claimed method

reduces the size of a large image so that the mobile device

can display the reduced image. The specification de-

scribes transforming the size of an image by “prepro-

cessing . . . to reduce or decimate [the] image” to a smaller

pixel size. ’087 patent, col. 7 ll. 17–18. This transfor-

mation shrinks a larger image for display on a small

screen, but it does not crop out portions of that image.

Read in the context of the specification, we find no indica-

tion that the term “reduced image” incorporates a cropped

UNWIRED PLANET LLC v. GOOGLE, INC. 19

image. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. We thus agree

with the district court’s construction of “reduced image.”

B.

The court also construed “key in the mobile device

corresponding to a subarea in the reduced image” as

Google had suggested, requiring it to be “a button, either

physical or depicted on the screen, corresponding to

a subarea of the reduced image.” Unwired, 2014 WL

7012497, at *24. Unwired argued that, to the contrary,

the key should simply be “a button or touch input corre-

sponding to a subarea of the reduced image.” Id. But the

district court explained that the specification describes

keys as buttons, rather than touch inputs generally. It

quoted portions of the specification stating that “some of

the mobile devices sometimes have no physical keys at all,

such as those palm-size computing devices that . . . use

soft keys or icons for users to activate them by using a

finger or a pseudo-pen.” ’087 patent col. 4 ll. 40–43. The

court then explained that “[t]he specification goes on to

clarify that ‘unless otherwise specifically described, keys

or buttons are generally referred to as either the physical

keys or soft keys.’” Unwired, 2014 WL 7012497, at *24

(quoting ’087 patent col. 4 ll. 43–45). The court concluded

that, “[a]lthough these statements indicate that ‘key’

covers more than a physical button or physical key, they

do not suggest that a ‘key’ includes any form of touch

input, as Unwired contends.” Id. Thus, the court adopted

Google’s construction for this term. We agree with the

court’s construction.

C.

Finally, with respect to the ’087 patent, Unwired chal-

lenges the district court’s judgment that claims 17 and 31

are invalid as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112. The court

held the preamble term “an image having dimensions

much larger than the dimension of the screen” indefinite.

Unwired limits its dispute on appeal to the district court’s

20 UNWIRED PLANET LLC v. GOOGLE, INC.

determination that this term has patentable weight. It

does not dispute that this term renders the claim indefi-

nite if it has patentable weight. Claim 17 is reproduced

below:

17. A method for recursively displaying on a

screen of a mobile device an image having dimen-

sions much larger than the dimension of the

screen, the mobile device having a keypad includ-

ing a number of keys; the method comprises:

fetching the image from a resource on

a landnet according to a request from the

mobile device; the request comprising an

address identifier identifying the resource;

generating from the image an image

hierarchy starting with a reduced image

equally divided into a number of subareas,

each of the subareas pointing to a detailed

version thereof; and

forwarding the reduced image to the

mobile device for display.

’087 patent col. 10 l. 61 – col. 11 l. 6 (emphases added).

Claim 31 is reproduced below:

31. An apparatus for recursively displaying on

a screen of a mobile device an image having

dimensions much larger than the dimension of

the screen; the mobile device having a keypad

including a number of keys; the apparatus

comprises:

a memory for storing code for a server

module; and

a processor coupled to the memory ex-

ecuting the code in the memory to cause

the server module to:

UNWIRED PLANET LLC v. GOOGLE, INC. 21

fetch the image from a resource on a

landnet according to a request from the

mobile device; the request comprising an

address identifier identifying the resource;

generate from the image an image hi-

erarchy starting with a reduced image

equally divided into a number of subareas,

each of the subareas pointing to a detailed

version thereof; and

forward the reduced image to the mobile

device for display.

’087 patent col. 12 ll. 25–42 (emphases added).

As we have explained, a term has patentable weight

where it “recites essential structure or steps, or if it is

necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality to the claim.”

Proveris Sci. Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 739 F.3d 1367,

1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the preamble introduces the term “an image.” The

term provides antecedent basis for a term in the body of

the claims, “the image.” As the claims describe, an appa-

ratus fetches the image from the landnet and then, from

the image, generates an image hierarchy that includes a

reduced image that is forwarded to the mobile device for

viewing. As the district court noted, without the pream-

ble term, there is no requirement in the claims that the

image be much larger than the dimension of the screen.

The court explained that, absent the term, “[t]he claims

fail to indicate that the image hierarchy—or the reduced

image that it starts with—is a smaller version of the

image, or that the image had been reduced in size accord-

ing to the mobile device’s screen.” Unwired Planet LLC v.

Google Inc., 111 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1128 (D. Nev. 2015). It

explained that the term is “‘essential to understand

limitations or terms in the claim body’—namely, the size

difference between an image and the screen of a mobile

device.” Id. (quoting Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsav-

22 UNWIRED PLANET LLC v. GOOGLE, INC.

ings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). We

agree. Not only does “an image” provide antecedent basis

for “the image” later in the claims, it also “recites particu-

lar structure or steps that are highlighted as important by

the specification.” See Proveris, 739 F.3d at 1372. We

thus agree with the court’s finding that this has patenta-

ble weight.

Because Unwired does not challenge the court’s find-

ing that the term is indefinite once given patentable

weight, we affirm the court’s finding that claims 13 and

17 of the ’087 patent are invalid as indefinite.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we modify the court’s con-

structions with regard to the “marker information” and

“server node” terms in the ’016 patent and agree with the

district court’s constructions of the remaining challenged

terms in that patent. We modify the district court’s

construction of “user account” in the ’240 patent and

agree with its construction of the remaining challenged

terms. We agree with all of the court’s challenged con-

structions with regard to the ’087 patent. And we affirm

the court’s finding that claims 17 and 31 of the ’087

patent are invalid. Thus, we vacate the court’s grant of

stipulated summary judgment and remand for proceed-

ings consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, VACATED-IN-PART, AND

REMANDED

COSTS

No costs.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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