The opinion
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
September 2016 Term FILED
_______________ November 15, 2016
released at 3:00 p.m.
RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK
No. 15-0842 SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
_______________ OF WEST VIRGINIA
MARTIN DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, INC., DAVID A. MARTIN,
MARLIENE A. MARTIN, AND MICHAEL D. MARTIN,
Petitioners Below, Petitioners
v.
MARK W. MATKOVICH, WEST VIRGINIA
STATE TAX COMMISSIONER,
Respondent Below, Respondent
____________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Berkeley County
The Honorable John C. Yoder, Judge
Civil Action No. 14-AA-7
AFFIRMED
____________________________________________________________
AND
_______________
No. 15-0857
_______________
BROWN FUNERAL HOME, INC., ROBERT C. FIELDS,
AND DONNA C. FIELDS,
Petitioners Below, Petitioners
v.
MARK W. MATKOVICH, WEST VIRGINIA
STATE TAX COMMISSIONER,
Respondent Below, Respondent
___________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Berkeley County
The Honorable John C. Yoder, Judge
Civil Action No. 14-AA-8
AFFIRMED
___________________________________________________________
AND
_________________
No. 15-0867
_________________
LOUIS A. LARROW,
Petitioner Below, Petitioner
v.
MARK W. MATKOVICH, WEST VIRGINIA
STATE TAX COMMISSIONER,
Respondent Below, Respondent
____________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jefferson County
The Honorable David H. Sanders, Judge
Civil Action No. 15-AA-2
AFFIRMED
___________________________________________________________
AND
________________
No. 15-0869
________________
DAVID M. HAMMER AND EUPHEMIA KALLAS,
Petitioners Below, Petitioners
v.
MARK W. MATKOVICH, WEST VIRGINIA
STATE TAX COMMISSIONER,
Respondent Below, Respondent
___________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jefferson County
The Honorable David H. Sanders, Judge
Civil Action No. 15-AA-1
AFFIRMED
__________________________________________________________
Submitted: October 25, 2016
Filed: November 15, 2016
Floyd M. Sayre, III, Esq. Patrick Morrisey, Esq.
Bowles Rice LLP Attorney General
Martinsburg, West Virginia L. Wayne Williams, Esq.
Attorney for the Petitioners Assistant Attorney General
Cassandra L. Means, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorneys for the Respondent
JUSTICE BENJAMIN delivered the Opinion of the Court.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. “In an administrative appeal from the decision of the West Virginia
Office of Tax Appeals, this Court will review the final order of the circuit court pursuant
to the standards of review in the State Administrative Procedures Act set forth in W. Va.
Code, 29A-5-4(g) [1988]. Findings of fact of the administrative law judge will not be set
aside or vacated unless clearly wrong, and, although administrative interpretation of State
tax provisions will be afforded sound consideration, this Court will review questions of
law de novo.” Syl. pt. 1, Griffith v. Conagra Brands, Inc., 229 W. Va. 190, 728 S.E.2d 74
(2012).
2. “When a statute is clear and the unambiguous and the legislative
intent is plain, the statute should not be interpreted by the courts, and in such case it is the
duty of the courts not to construe but to apply the statute.” Syl. pt. 5, State v. Gen. Daniel
Morgan Post 548, 144 W. Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959).
3. In order to be eligible to claim a tax credit under the 2011 version of
W. Va. Code § 11-6D-4(c) for constructing or purchasing and installing a qualified
alternative-fuel vehicle refueling infrastructure, the infrastructure must be owned by the
applicant for the tax credit, located in this State, not located in or on a private residence
or private home, and used for storing alternative fuels and for dispensing such alternative
fuels into fuel tanks of motor vehicles pursuant to W. Va. Code § 11-6D-2(e) (2011).
i
4. In order to be eligible to claim a tax credit under the 2011 version of
W. Va. Code § 11-6D-4(c) for constructing or purchasing and installing a qualified
alternative fuel vehicle home refueling infrastructure, the infrastructure must be owned
by the applicant for the tax credit, located in this State, located on a private residence or
private home, and used for storing alternative fuels and for dispensing such alternative
fuels into fuel tanks of motor vehicles or for providing electricity to plug-in hybrid
electric vehicles or electric vehicles pursuant to W. Va. Code § 11-6D-2(f) (2011).
5. “The Legislature, when it enacts legislation, is presumed to know of
its prior enactments.” Syl. pt. 12, Vest v. Cobb, 138 W. Va. 660, 76 S.E.2d 885 (1953).
6. “It is always presumed that the legislature will not enact a
meaningless or useless statute.” Syl. pt. 4, State ex rel. Tax Comm’r v. Veterans of
Foreign Wars, 147 W. Va. 645, 129 S.E.2d 921 (1963).
ii
Benjamin, Justice:
The instant proceeding consists of four consolidated appeals. In Appeal
Nos. 15-0842 and 15-0857, the issue is whether the alternative-energy infrastructures
installed by the petitioners for their businesses meet the definition of “qualified
alternative fuel vehicle refueling infrastructure” under W. Va. Code § 11-6D-2(e) (2011)
for the purpose of receiving an alternative-fuel infrastructure tax credit. In Appeal Nos.
15-0867 and 15-0869, the issue is whether the alternative-energy infrastructures installed
by the petitioners for their residences meet the definition of “qualified alternative fuel
vehicle home refueling infrastructure” under W. Va. Code § 11-6D-2(f) (2011) for the
purpose of receiving an alternative fuel-infrastructure tax credit. All of the petitioners
contend that the circuit court erred in affirming the final orders of the West Virginia
Office of Tax Appeals that denied the petitioners’ requests for alternative-fuel
infrastructure tax credits under W. Va. Code § 11-6d-4(c) (2011). Upon review of the
parties’ arguments, the relevant portions of the appendices, and the governing authority,
this Court affirms the circuit courts’ orders from which the petitioners appeal.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
We begin by separately presenting the pertinent facts of each of the four
consolidated appeals.
1
A. Martin Distributing Company, Inc., David A. Martin, Marliene A. Martin, and
Michael D. Martin v. Tax Commissioner, No. 15-0842
Martin Distributing Company, Inc. is a wholesale beer and wine distributor
located in Martinsburg, West Virginia. David Martin, Marliene Martin, and Michael
Martin are part owners of Martin Distributing Company, Inc. (collectively “Martin”). In
2011, Martin installed a sizable system of roof-mounted solar panels for its business
which generates electricity from solar energy.1 The solar panel system installed by Martin
does not include any physical storage tank and does not include any batteries to store
electricity produced by the solar panel system. Although Martin did not own any electric
powered vehicles as of July 30, 2013, the solar panel system has eight charging stations
located in the company parking lot which are available for public use 24 hours a day at
no charge. The electricity generated by the solar panel system is used for general
electrical purposes of operating the business.
B. Brown Funeral Home, Inc., Robert C. Fields, and Donna C. Fields v.
Tax Commissioner, No. 15-0857
Petitioner Brown Funeral Home, Inc. operates a funeral home located in
Martinsburg, West Virginia, and Robert Fields and Donna Fields are part owners of the
funeral home (collectively “Brown”). In 2011, Brown installed roof-mounted solar panels
1
The circuit court described this system as “a 61.1 kilowatt roof mounted solar
array consisting of 260 235-watt panels and a 50 kilowatt PV powered inverter and eight
Schneider EV charging stations.”
2
on its business for generating electricity.2 Brown’s solar panel system does not include
any batteries to store electricity produced by the system. Brown did not own any electric-
powered vehicles as of July 30, 2013. However, Brown’s solar panel system has four
charging stations located in the company parking lot which are available for public use 24
hours a day at no charge.
Based on the installations of the solar panel systems, the petitioners in these
two consolidated appeals claimed a tax credit for installing qualified alternative fuel
vehicle refueling infrastructures pursuant to W. Va. Code § 11-6D-4(c), but were denied
the tax credit by the State Tax Commissioner and the Office of Tax Appeals. The
petitioners now appeal the July 23, 2015, orders of the Circuit Court of Berkeley County
that affirmed the denial of the tax credit.
C. Louis A. Larrow v. Tax Commissioner, No. 15-0867
Petitioner Louis A. Larrow installed a solar panel system on his home
described as a 4.7 kilowatt roof mounted solar system, consisting of 20 235-watt solar
panels, 20 Enphase micro-inverters, and one AV electric vehicle charging station. The
circuit court below found that the 20 235-watt solar panels and 20 Enphase micro-
inverters are not required for the storage or dispensing of electricity to a hybrid vehicle or
electric vehicle. Instead, such functions only require the charging station and distribution
2
The circuit court described the solar installation as a 25.3 kilowatt roof mounted
solar array consisting of 108 235-watt panels, and 3800 inverters, and four Schneider EV
charging stations.
3
panel. Testimony at the administrative hearing indicated that the installation was
designed to produce more electricity than would be required to power the petitioner’s
entire house and car. In addition, the petitioner admitted below that he does not own an
electric or plug-in hybrid electric vehicle. Finally, the circuit court found that although
the petitioner’s installation is capable of dispensing electricity to a hybrid or electric
vehicle, it cannot store electricity as it lacks any on-site storage or batteries. Rather, the
installation is designed to provide the petitioner’s entire residence with power and to
transfer any excess electricity generated back to the grid.
D. David M. Hammer and Euphemia Kallas v.
Tax Commissioner, No. 15-0869
At their private residence in Shepherdstown, West Virginia, Petitioners
David M. Hammer and Euphemia Kallas installed a solar panel system described as a 9.4
kilowatt roof mounted solar system, consisting of 40 235-watt solar panels, 40 Enphase
micro-inverters, and one AV electric vehicle charging station. The 40 235-watt solar
panels and 40 Enphase micro-inverters are not required for the storage or dispensing of
electricity to a hybrid or electric vehicle. Such functions only require the charging station
and distribution panel. The petitioners’ infrastructure did not originally have a plug-in for
charging an alternative fuel vehicle. Although the installation is capable of dispensing
electricity to a hybrid or electric vehicle, it cannot store electricity as it lacks any on-site
storage or batteries. Rather, the infrastructure is designed to provide the entire residence
4
with power and transfer any excess electricity that it has created back to the grid. Finally,
the petitioners did not own an electric-powered vehicle until after 2011.
Based on the installations of the solar panel systems on their homes, the
petitioners in Appeal Nos. 15-0867 and No. 15-0869 claimed a tax credit for installing
qualified fuel vehicle home refueling infrastructures under W. Va. Code § 11-6D-4(c)
which was denied by the State Tax Commissioner and the Office of Tax Appeals. The
petitioners now appeal the July 23, 2015 and August 3, 2015, orders of the Circuit Court
of Jefferson County that affirmed the denial of the tax credit.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In these consolidated cases, this Court is called upon to review the final
orders of the circuit court which affirmed decisions of the Office of Tax Appeals. We
have held:
In an administrative appeal from the decision of the
West Virginia Office of Tax Appeals, this Court will review
the final order of the circuit court pursuant to the standards of
review in the State Administrative Procedures Act set forth in
W.Va.Code, 29A-5-4(g) [1988]. Findings of fact of the
administrative law judge will not be set aside or vacated
unless clearly wrong, and, although administrative
interpretation of State tax provisions will be afforded sound
consideration, this Court will review questions of law de
novo.
Syl. pt. 1, Griffith v. Conagra Brands, Inc., 229 W. Va. 190, 728 S.E.2d 74 (2012). In the
instant cases, the petitioners do not challenge the findings of fact of the Office of Tax
5
Appeals but rather the application of the law. Therefore, this Court’s review is de novo.
Having set forth the appropriate standard of review, we will now proceed to consider the
issues before us.
III. ANALYSIS
The issues in these four consolidated cases concern the alternative-fuel
infrastructure tax credits found in Article 6D of Chapter 11 of the West Virginia Code.
The petitioners in these four consolidated appeals seek an alternative fuel infrastructure
tax credit pursuant to W. Va. Code § 11-6D-4(c). Under this code section, “[a] taxpayer
is eligible to claim the credit against tax provided in this article if he or she: . . . . (c)
Constructs or purchases and installs qualified alternative fuel vehicle refueling
infrastructure or qualified alternative fuel vehicle home refueling infrastructure that is
capable of dispensing alternative fuel for alternative-fuel motor vehicles.” The term
“alternative fuel” is defined in W. Va. Code § 11-6D-2(a)(9) (2011) as “[e]lectricity,
including electricity from solar energy.” The Legislative findings and purpose for
enacting the tax credits are found in W. Va. Code § 11-6D-1 (2011) as follows:
[T]he Legislature hereby finds that the use of alternative fuels
is in the public interest and promotes the general welfare of
the people of this state insofar as it addresses serious concerns
for our environment and our state’s and nation’s dependence
on foreign oil as a source of energy. The Legislature further
finds that this state has an abundant supply of alternative fuels
and an extensive supply network and that, by encouraging the
use of alternatively-fueled motor vehicles, the state will be
reducing its dependence on foreign oil and attempting to
improve its air quality. The Legislature further finds that the
wholesale cost of fuel for certain alternatively-fueled motor
6
vehicles is significantly lower than the cost of fueling
traditional motor vehicles with oil based fuels.
However, because the cost of motor vehicles which
utilize alternative-fuel technologies remains high in relation
to motor vehicles that employ more traditional technologies,
citizens of this state who might otherwise choose an
alternatively-fueled motor vehicle are forced by economic
necessity to continue using motor vehicles that are fueled by
more conventional means. Additionally, the availability of
commercial and residential infrastructure to support
alternatively-fueled vehicles available to the public is
inadequate to encourage the use of alternatively-fueled motor
vehicles. It is the intent of the Legislature that the alternative-
fuel motor vehicle tax credit previously expired in 2006 be
hereby reinstated with changes and amendments as set forth
herein. Therefore, in order to encourage the use of
alternatively-fueled motor vehicles and possibly reduce
unnecessary pollution of our environment and reduce our
dependence on foreign sources of energy, there is hereby
created an alternative-fuel motor vehicles tax credit and an
alternative-fuel infrastructure tax credit.
The petitioners in the first two consolidated appeals seek a tax credit for
constructing a qualified alternative fuel vehicle refueling infrastructure. This type of
infrastructure is defined in W. Va. Code § 11-6D-2(e) (2011). The petitioners in the
second two consolidated appeals seek a tax credit for constructing qualified alternative
fuel vehicle home refueling infrastructure which is defined in W. Va. Code § 11-6D-2(f).
This Court will now proceed to discuss the first two consolidated appeals.
7
A. Martin and Brown Cases
In the Martin and Brown cases, the petitioners seek the “qualified
alternative fuel vehicle refueling infrastructure” tax credit for the installation of solar
panel systems on their businesses. This tax credit is defined in W. Va. Code § 11-6D-2(e)
as follows:
(e) “Qualified alternative fuel vehicle refueling
infrastructure” means property owned by the applicant for the
tax credit and used for storing alternative fuels and for
dispensing such alternative fuels into fuel tanks of motor
vehicles, including, but not limited to compression
equipment, storage tanks and dispensing units for alternative
fuel at the point where the fuel is delivered: Provided, That
the property is installed and located in this state and is not
located on a private residence or private home.
In affirming the decisions of the Office of Tax Appeals in the Martin and
Brown cases, the circuit court noted that the essence of the petitioners’ claims is that they
installed solar panel systems at their business locations which create electricity used to
power plug-in hybrid electric vehicles or electric vehicles. The circuit court then looked
to W. Va. Code § 11-6D-2(e) which defines “qualified alternative fuel vehicle refueling
infrastructure” in pertinent part as “property owned by the applicant for the tax credit and
used for storing alternative fuels and for dispensing such alternative fuels into fuel tanks
of motor vehicles.” Based on this definition, the circuit court found that the tax credit is
only available for property used for the storage and delivery of alternative fuels and not
for property used for the creation of electricity from solar energy. The circuit court
8
concluded that the petitioners do not own any equipment for storing alternative fuels, and
that their solar panel systems were used for general electrical purposes to operate the
businesses and not for dispensing alternative fuels into motor vehicles.3
In challenging the circuit court’s orders, the petitioners present several
arguments.4 First, the petitioners appear to maintain that they should receive the tax credit
for “providing electricity to plug-in hybrid electric vehicles or electric vehicles” as
provided for in W. Va. Code § 11-6D-2(f). The petitioners support their position by
asserting that the circuit court’s reasoning is inconsistent with the legislative purpose of
creating the alternative fuel infrastructure tax credit, and that W. Va. Code § 11-6D-2(e)
and (f) should be construed in favor of the taxpayers because the statutes’ intent is to
promote a social good.
W. Va. Code § 11-6D-4(c) provides the tax credit at issue for a “qualified
alternative-fuel vehicle refueling infrastructure” and for a “qualified alternative fuel
vehicle home refueling infrastructure.” Because the petitioners’ infrastructures were
constructed on their businesses, not their homes, they must claim the tax credit for the
“qualified alternative fuel vehicle refueling infrastructure,” which is defined in W. Va.
Code § 11-6D-2(e) as property “not located in or on a private residence or private home.”
3
The circuit court orders in the Martin and Brown appeals were entered by the
same circuit court judge and rely on essentially the same legal analysis and reasoning.
4
The petitions for appeal in the Martin and Brown cases were drafted by the same
attorney and make the same legal arguments.
9
The clause “providing electricity to plug-in hybrid electric vehicles or electric vehicles”
is not included under the definition of “qualified alternative fuel vehicle refueling
infrastructure” in W. Va. Code § 11-6D-2(e). Therefore, based upon the statutory
language upon which the claimed tax credit is based, the petitioners cannot claim that
their infrastructures constitute qualified alternative fuel vehicle refueling infrastructures
based upon the argument that they provide electricity to plug-in hybrid electric or electric
vehicles.
In addition, the petitioners contend that the circuit court erred in concluding
that their infrastructures are not eligible for the tax credit because they do not store
electricity nor dispense anything into fuel tanks pursuant to W. Va. Code § 11-6D-2(e).
The petitioners aver that they claim the tax credit pursuant to W. Va. Code § 11-6D-4(c)
which provides that a taxpayer is eligible for the tax credit if he or she “[c]onstructs or
purchases and installs qualified alternative fuel vehicle refueling infrastructure . . . that is
capable of dispensing alternative fuel for alternative-fuel motor vehicles.” The petitioners
contend that this statutory provision contains no requirement that an alternative-fuel
infrastructure has to store electricity in order to qualify for the tax credit. The petitioners
assert that the only evidence of record establishes that the infrastructures installed on
their businesses are capable of dispensing alternative fuel into alternative fuel motor
vehicles.
10
We disagree. While the tax credit for owning a qualified alternative fuel
vehicle refueling infrastructure is found in W. Va. Code § 11-6D-4(c), in order to
determine what constitutes a “qualified alternative fuel vehicle refueling infrastructure”
for the purpose of the tax credit, one must consult W. Va. Code § 11-6D-2(e). This
statutory provision defines “qualified alternative fuel vehicle refueling infrastructure,” in
pertinent part, as property “used for storing alternative fuels and for dispensing such
alternative fuels into fuel tanks of motor vehicles.” [Emphasis added.] This statutory
definition plainly requires that a qualifying alternative fuel vehicle refueling
infrastructure not only be capable of dispensing alternative fuels, but also that such a
system also be capable of “storing alternative fuels.” Therefore, the circuit court did not
err in determining that the petitioners’ infrastructures do not meet the definition of
“qualified alternative-fuel vehicle refueling infrastructure” because the infrastructures do
not store alternative fuels.
Although we agree, based upon the Legislative findings and purpose set
forth in W. Va. Code § 11-6D-1 (2011), that the Legislature views the development and
use of alternative fuel vehicles to be in the public interest, we must nevertheless give
effect to the statute as enacted by the Legislature. Under our law, “[w]hen a statute is
clear and unambiguous and the legislative intent is plain, the statute should not be
interpreted by the courts, and in such case it is the duty of the courts not to construe but to
apply the statute.” Syl. pt. 5, State v. Gen. Daniel Morgan Post 548, 144 W. Va. 137, 107
S.E.2d 353 (1959). The applicable code section, W. Va. Code § 11-6D-2(e), is plain and
11
this Court will apply it as written. Based on the plain language of the code section, this
Court now holds that in order to be eligible to claim a tax credit under the 2011 version of
W. Va. Code § 11-6D-4(c) for constructing or purchasing and installing a qualified
alternative fuel vehicle refueling infrastructure, the infrastructure must be owned by the
applicant for the tax credit, located in this State, not located in or on a private residence
or private home, and used for storing alternative fuels and for dispensing such alternative
fuels into fuel tanks of motor vehicles pursuant to W. Va. Code § 11-6D-2(e) (2011).
In the instant cases, the infrastructures constructed by Martin and Brown
did not have the capacity for storing alternative fuels and the infrastructures were used
primarily for providing energy to the petitioners’ businesses and not for dispensing
alternative fuels into motor vehicles. Therefore, we conclude that the infrastructures
constructed by Martin and Brown do not constitute qualified alternative fuel vehicle
refueling infrastructures under W. Va. Code § 11-6D-2(e).
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the circuit
court did not err in ruling the infrastructures that the petitioners installed on their
businesses do not constitute qualified alternative fuel vehicle refueling infrastructures for
the purpose of receiving tax credits under W. Va. Code § 11-6D-4(c). Having resolved
the issues in Appeal Nos. 15-0842 and 15-0857, we now turn to Appeal Nos. 15-0867
and 15-0869.
12
B. Larrow and Hammer Cases
In the Larrow and Hammer cases, the petitioners claim the “qualified
alternative fuel vehicle home refueling infrastructure” tax credit for the installation of
solar panel systems on their residences. This tax credit is defined in W. Va. Code § 11
6D-2(f) (2011) as follows5:
(f) “Qualified alternative fuel vehicle home refueling
infrastructure” means property owned by the applicant for the
tax credit located on a private residence or private home and
used for storing alternative fuels and for dispensing such
alternative fuels into fuel tanks of motor vehicles, including,
but not limited to, compression equipment, storage tanks and
dispensing units for alternative fuel at the point where the fuel
is delivered or for providing electricity to plug-in hybrid
electric vehicles or electric vehicles: Provided, That the
property is installed and located in this state.
In ruling against the petitioners, the circuit court acknowledged there is no
dispute regarding the petitioners’ eligibility for a tax credit; what is disputed is the extent
to which the petitioners are entitled to a tax credit. The petitioners argued before the
circuit court that the entirety of their solar panel system constitutes a qualified alternative
fuel vehicle home refueling infrastructure. In rejecting the petitioners’ argument, the
circuit court found that dispensing alternative fuel into motor vehicles is not the sole
function of the petitioners’ infrastructures. The circuit court reasoned that not all of the
components of the petitioners’ infrastructures are necessary for the functions of storing
5
West Virginia Code § 11-6D-4(c) was amended in 2013. The 2013 version of the
statute does not contain a tax credit for qualified alternative fuel vehicle home refueling
infrastructures constructed or purchased and installed on or after April 15, 2013.
13
and dispensing electricity. Were such storage and dispensing the primary function of all
components, said the circuit court, then the installation in its entirety would qualify for
the tax credit.
The circuit court next recognized that the legislative purpose for the
alternative fuel infrastructure tax credit is to encourage the use of alternatively-fueled
motor vehicles and possibly reduce unnecessary pollution of the environment. According
to the circuit court, this purpose does not support the argument for a tax credit for the
installation of an alternative fuel infrastructure, the main purpose of which is to power a
residence.
Finally, the circuit court found that tax credits for the installation of solar
panel systems is addressed separately in W. Va. Code § 11-13Z-1 to 3 (2009). The
circuit court reasoned that in light of the presumption that the Legislature is familiar with
all of the laws that it has enacted, it cannot be concluded that both the alternative-fuel
infrastructure tax credit and the residential solar energy tax credit apply to the solar panel
systems that power residences because such a reading would render one of the two tax
credits redundant.
The petitioners argue on appeal that the circuit court erred in concluding
that only a portion of the infrastructure purchased and installed by the petitioners
constitutes a qualified alternative fuel vehicle home refueling infrastructure under W. Va.
14
Code § 11-6D-2(f).6 The petitioners first rely on the definition of “alternative fuel” in W.
Va. Code § 11-6D-2(a)(9) as “[e]lectricity, including electricity from solar energy.” The
petitioners contend that it is undisputable that they installed equipment that could
dispense electricity, including electricity from solar energy. As the petitioners contend
additionally, the only evidence of record establishes that solar panels, wiring, inverter
boxes, meters and the plug-in are all used for the dispensing of the electricity from solar
energy.
Second, the petitioners assert they are seeking the tax credit set forth in W.
Va. Code § 11-6D-4(c) for a qualified alternative fuel vehicle home refueling
infrastructure that is capable of dispensing alternative fuel into alternative-fuel motor
vehicles. According to the petitioners, the evidence of record establishes that the
equipment which they installed on their residences is capable of dispensing alternative
fuel into alternative fuel motor vehicles. The petitioners assert that W. Va. Code § 11-6D
4(c) does not require a taxpayer to construct a storage and dispensing facility exclusively
designed for the fueling of alternative fuel motor vehicles nor does it require that at the
time of installation the taxpayer have an alternative-fuel motor vehicle.
Finally, the petitioners aver that a grant of the alternative fuel infrastructure
tax credit to each of them would be consistent with the legislative intent stated in W. Va.
6
The petitioner’s briefs in both the Larrow and Hammer cases were prepared by
the same attorney and present the same arguments.
15
Code § 11-6D-1 which is to encourage the construction of both commercial and
residential alternative energy infrastructures for the purpose of encouraging the use of
alternative fuel motor vehicles.
In order to be eligible to receive the alternative fuel infrastructure tax credit
provided for in W. Va. Code § 11-6D-4(c), the petitioners had to construct or purchase
and install a “qualified alternative fuel vehicle home refueling infrastructure.” This type
of infrastructure is defined in W. Va. Code § 11-6D-2(f), which requires, in pertinent
part, that the qualified infrastructure is “used for storing alternative fuels and for
dispensing such alternative fuels into fuel tanks of motor vehicles . . . or for providing
electricity to plug-in hybrid electric vehicles or electric vehicles.” Id. (emphasis added.)
As set forth in our discussion above regarding the similarly worded W. Va. Code § 11
6D-2(e) in the Martin and Brown cases, we cannot overlook the inclusion by the
Legislature of the conjunctive “and” in enacting this legislative section. To be a
“qualified alternative fuel vehicle home refueling infrastructure,” the need for “storing
alternative fuels” is plainly required by this statutory section. Therefore, we now hold
that in order to be eligible to claim a tax credit under the 2011 version of W. Va. Code §
11-6D-4(c) for constructing or purchasing and installing a qualified alternative fuel
vehicle home refueling infrastructure, the infrastructure must be owned by the applicant
for the tax credit, located in this State, located on a private residence or private home, and
used for storing alternative fuels and for dispensing such alternative fuels into fuel tanks
16
of motor vehicles or for providing electricity to plug-in hybrid electric vehicles or electric
vehicles pursuant to W. Va. Code § 11-6D-2(f) (2011).
Regarding the requirement that the qualified infrastructure be used for
storing alternative fuels and dispensing the fuels into motor vehicle tanks, the evidence
below indicates that the petitioners’ infrastructures do not have the capacity to store
electricity. Further, the evidence below indicates that the petitioners’ entire infrastructure
is not used for providing electricity to plug-in hybrid electric vehicles or electric vehicles.
For example, evidence adduced below indicated that the solar panels and micro-inverters
installed by the petitioners are not required for dispensing electricity to hybrid or electric
motor vehicles. Instead, such a function only requires a charging station and distribution
panel. Finally, the evidence indicates that the infrastructures installed by the petitioners
were designed to produce sufficient electricity to provide their entire residences with
power, and transfer any excess electricity that it generates back to the grid. Therefore, it
cannot be said that the petitioners’ entire infrastructures are used for providing electricity
to plug-in hybrid electric vehicles or electric vehicles.
With respect to the petitioners’ argument that granting them the alternative
fuel motor vehicle tax credit for their entire infrastructures is consistent with the
Legislature’s purpose for creating the tax credit., we observe that the Legislature clearly
stated its purpose in W. Va. Code § 11-6D-1as follows: “[I]n order to encourage the use
of alternatively-fueled motor vehicles and possibly reduce unnecessary pollution of our
17
environment and reduce our dependence on foreign sources of energy, there is hereby
created an alternative-fuel motor vehicles tax credit and an alternative-fuel infrastructure
tax credit.” This Court fails to see how installing a solar panel system, the primary
purpose of which is to provide power to a residence, promotes the use of alternatively-
fueled motor vehicles.
Finally, we find it significant that a residential solar energy tax credit was
available to taxpayers who install a solar energy system to power their residences at the
time the petitioners applied for the alternative fuel infrastructure tax credit. According to
W. Va. Code § 11-13Z-1 (2009):
Any taxpayer who installs or causes to be installed a
solar energy system on property located in this state and
owned by the taxpayer and used as a residence after July 1,
2009, shall be allowed a credit against the taxes imposed in
article twenty-one [§§ 11-21-1 et seq.] of this chapter in an
amount equal to thirty percent of the cost to purchase and
install the system up to a maximum amount of $2,000.
In order to receive this tax credit, the solar energy must be used to generate electricity,
heat or cool a structure, provide hot water in the structure, or to provide solar process
heat. See W. Va. Code § 11-13Z-2 (2009). This Court has held that “[t]he Legislature,
when it enacts legislation, is presumed to know of its prior enactments.” Syl. pt. 12, Vest
v. Cobb, 138 W. Va. 660, 76 S.E.2d 885 (1953). When the Legislature amended Article
6D, Chapter 11 of the Code in 2011 to make tax credits available for qualified alternative
fuel vehicle home refueling infrastructures, we presume that the Legislature knew of its
prior enactment of Article 13Z of Chapter 11 of the Code providing the residential solar
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energy tax credit. Further, “[i]t is always presumed that the legislature will not enact a
meaningless or useless statute.” Syl. pt. 4, State ex rel. Tax Comm’r v. Veterans of
Foreign Wars, 147 W. Va. 645, 129 S.E.2d 921 (1963). Having provided a tax credit for
solar energy systems that provide power to residences in W. Va. Code § 11-13Z-1 in
2009, we presume that the Legislature would not have provided the same tax credit in W.
Va. Code § 11-6D-4(c) in 2011.
Therefore, based on the reasoning above, we conclude that the circuit court
did not err in concluding that only a portion of the infrastructures purchased and installed
by the petitioners constituted qualified alternative fuel vehicle home refueling
infrastructures for the purpose of receiving tax credits under W. Va. Code § 11-6D-4(c).7
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, in Appeal Nos. 15-0842 and 15-0857, we
affirm the July 23, 2015, orders of the Circuit Court of Berkeley County that affirmed the
decision of the Office of Tax Appeals to deny the alternative fuel infrastructure tax
credits sought by the petitioners. Likewise, in Appeal Nos. 15-0867 and 15-0869, we
affirm the July 23, 2015 and August 3, 2015, orders of the Circuit Court of Jefferson
7
In a second assignment of error, the petitioners contend that the circuit court
erred in concluding that W. Va. Code § 11-6D-4(c) requires a qualified alternative fuel
vehicle home refueling infrastructure to store the electricity produced. Because we
addressed this issue in our analysis of the first two consolidated appeals, we do not find it
necessary to address it again.
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County that affirmed the decision of the Office of Tax Appeals to deny the alternative-
fuel infrastructure tax credits sought by the petitioners.
Appeal No. 15-0842, Affirmed.
Appeal No. 15-0857, Affirmed.
Appeal No. 15-0867, Affirmed.
Appeal No. 15-0869, Affirmed.
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