“[Cjlaims brought under the Guarantee Clause are nonjusticiable.”
How later courts described this case
- “[Cjlaims brought under the Guarantee Clause are nonjusticiable.”
- though pro se pleadings are liberally construed, plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim
- requirements for establishing supervisory liability
- “Absolute immunity extends to agency officials when they preside over hearings, initiate agency adjudication, or otherwise perform functions analogous to judges and prosecutors.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 7 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARY JONES, No. 14-56614
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:13-cv-08789-DMG-SH
v.
MEMORANDUM*
EDMUND G. BROWN, Jr.; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dolly M. Gee, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 25, 2016**
Before: LEAVY, GRABER, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Mary Jones appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations arising from the denial of
her workers’ compensation claim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and we may affirm on any basis supported by the record.
Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Jones’ claims against defendant
Caplane as barred by judicial immunity. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Romano v.
Bible, 169 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Absolute immunity extends to agency
officials when they preside over hearings, initiate agency adjudication, or
otherwise perform functions analogous to judges and prosecutors.”).
The district court properly dismissed Jones’ claims against defendants
Brown and Schwarzenegger because Jones failed to state a plausible claim for
relief. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69 n.24 (1997)
(“State officers in their official capacities, like States themselves, are not amenable
to suit for damages under § 1983.”); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42
(9th Cir. 2010) (though pro se pleadings are liberally construed, plaintiff must
allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202,
1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011) (requirements for establishing supervisory liability);
California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1091 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[C]laims
brought under the Guarantee Clause are nonjusticiable.”).
2 14-56614
Jones’ contentions that the district court violated her due process rights by
granting defendants’ motions to dismiss without holding a hearing and that
Caplane’s motion to dismiss should have been treated as a motion for summary
judgment are unpersuasive.
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
3 14-56614