Davis, Franklin

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. AP-77,031

FRANKLIN DAVIS, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

ON DIRECT APPEAL FROM CAUSE NO. F12-12630-Y

IN CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 7

DALLAS COUNTY

K EASLER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which K ELLER, P.J., and

M EYERS, J OHNSON, H ERVEY, R ICHARDSON, Y EARY, and N EWELL, JJ., joined. A LCALA,

J., concurred.

OPINION

On November 12, 2013, a jury convicted Franklin Davis of capital murder for the

September 2012 murder of Shania Gray in the course of committing or attempting to commit

obstruction.1 Pursuant to the jury’s answers to the special issues set forth in Texas Code of

1

TEX . PENAL CODE § 19.03(a)(2).

DAVIS—2

Criminal Procedure Article 37.071, §§ 2(b) and 2(e),2 the trial judge sentenced Davis to

death.3 Direct appeal to this Court is automatic.4 Davis raises forty-eight points of error.

After reviewing Davis’s points of error, we find them to be without merit. Consequently, we

affirm the trial court’s judgment and sentence of death.

In his eleventh and twenty-fourth points of error, Davis challenges the legal

sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and the jury’s affirmative answer to the

future dangerousness special issue. We shall address these claims first. The remaining

points of error will be addressed in the order presented in his brief.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In September 2010, when Shania Gray was fourteen years old, her mother, Sherri

Gray-James, arranged a babysitting job for her at the request of an acquaintance named

Jennifer Dibrell. Gray began babysitting Dibrell’s three children after school. One of those

three children was Davis and Dibrell’s daughter, Dezire. Gray-James would drop Gray off

at Dibrell’s apartment each time she was scheduled to babysit. In March 2011, Gray-James

noticed some text messages on Gray’s phone from a person named “Wish.” Gray-James had

met Davis and knew that “Wish” was his nickname. In one of the text messages, Wish asked

Gray why she was not coming to babysit anymore. In another message, Wish stated, “That’s

2

See TEX . CODE CRIM . PROC. art. 37.071, § 2(g).

3

Id. art. 37.071, § 2(g).

4

Id. art. 37.071, § 2(h).

DAVIS—3

foul. So I’m supposed to sit around and wait? Man. Whatever.” Gray responded, “Nope.

You[’re] getting mad for what? You got two for the price of one. What [are] you

complaining for? Tryna [sic] have your cake and eat it too.” Davis answered, “Just want you

but can’t fully have you yet.” When Gray-James asked Gray about the messages, Gray

became very upset and began crying.

Gray-James then drove to Dibrell’s apartment with Gray and showed Dibrell the

messages. Dibrell called Davis and told him that Gray-James was upset about the text

messages. Gray-James felt that Dibrell reacted in a “nonchalant” manner, and she demanded

to speak with Davis herself. Dibrell instructed her to call him the next day. When Gray-

James sent Davis a text message the next morning, he responded that Gray was lying. He

claimed that, when he sent the messages to Gray, he thought that someone was playing a

prank with the phone and did not know he was corresponding with Gray. Gray-James told

Davis that he was the liar and she would go to the police.

Davis preemptively called the police himself. He told the responding officer that,

when Gray texted him, he did not know who it was and he “did not know Shania had a cell

phone.” He said that he was just “playing around” with an unknown correspondent.

However, in a later interview with Detective Brandon Snyder, Davis changed his story and

admitted he knew he was corresponding with Gray. He said that his text message to Gray,

stating that he wanted her, was really intended to inform her that she was “too young” and

that was why he could not “see her.”

DAVIS—4

The day after Gray-James talked to Dibrell, Gray was visibly upset and crying at

school. She confided in two sisters who were her close friends. She told them that she had

been babysitting and this “guy” started “messing with her, touching her and stuff like that.”

Gray told the older sister that the sexual encounters had started out “as a habit,” but the man

had gotten “rough” with her. She told her that he threw her on the bed, threatened her with

a “[s]amurai sword,” and told her “If you tell, I’m going to kill you and your family.” The

sisters convinced her to come home with them after school and tell their mother what had

happened. Gray then revealed to their mother that she had been sexually assaulted multiple

times while she was babysitting. Their mother convinced her that she needed to tell her own

mother. Gray then told Gray-James about the sexual assaults.

Gray-James contacted the school resource officer at Gray’s school, Horn High School.

She also took Gray to the Mesquite Police Department and met with Detective Snyder.

Subsequently, she took Gray to the Dallas Children’s Advocacy Center (DCAC) for a

videotaped interview and then to the Children’s Medical Center for a physical examination.

In the DCAC interview, Gray described four separate sexual assaults in which Davis

penetrated her vagina when she fourteen years old—three at Dibrell’s apartment and one at

Davis’s apartment. Snyder obtained an analysis of the content of Gray’s phone and

discovered that she had Davis’s birthday listed in her phone’s calendar. He also viewed the

text message exchange between Wish and Gray that had distressed Gray-James.

Later, Davis was arrested for sexual assault and began having scheduled court dates.

DAVIS—5

Gray was planning to testify against Davis in his trial. Several months passed, during which

Gray’s family prepared to move from Mesquite to Carrollton, Texas, and Gray started

attending Hebron High School in Carrollton.

On September 6, 2012, Gray informed her mother that she was going to attend after-

school tutoring for her physics class, and Gray-James planned to pick her up at school after

the tutoring. During the tutoring session, Gray sent a text message to her mother telling her

that she was almost done. Gray-James parked in front of the school at around 4:00 p.m. and

waited for Gray, but Gray never came out to meet her. Gray-James called and sent text

messages to Gray repeatedly. She went to a nearby Starbucks and used her laptop to try to

locate Gray’s phone with no success. She returned to the school and found that the physics

classroom where Gray had gone for tutoring was locked and dark. She contacted the physics

teacher, who stated that Gray had left tutoring when it ended at 4:15 p.m. A group of

teachers and coaches helped Gray-James search the school and the nearby football stadium,

but they found no sign of Gray.

Gray-James contacted the Hebron High School resource officer, Officer Forest Cole

Langston. Officer Langston became very concerned when he spoke to the Horn High School

resource officer and learned that Gray was the named victim on four sexual assault

indictments and Davis was the defendant charged in those cases. Officer Langston reviewed

surveillance footage showing that Gray had exited Hebron High School through a back door

normally used by coaches. A still photo from a surveillance camera showed a gray Dodge

DAVIS—6

Stratus parked nearby. Further investigation indicated that this car matched the description

of a vehicle owned by Davis’s wife, Jawanna Arrington Davis (hereafter “Arrington”).

Meanwhile, on the evening of September 6th, Davis picked Arrington up after work

driving her Stratus. She noticed a strong smell of cologne in the car and wondered if Davis

was trying to cover up the smell of a woman. They drove to the hospital because Davis said

that he had injured his arm at the gym. However, he only waited about ten minutes and then

left before seeing a doctor. They went home and took a bubble bath together. Arrington said

Davis was being more affectionate than normal and they “were intimate” that night.

The missing person case was assigned to Detective Dena Williams of the Carrollton

Police Department. Gray-James gave Williams access to Gray’s cell phone records and the

passwords to her social media accounts. Officers discovered that the phone number that

Gray had communicated with immediately before and after she sent the last text message to

her mother had a 903 area code. Gray-James did not recognize this number. Williams

obtained call records for both Gray’s phone and the 903 phone number.

Detective Snyder testified that he tried to determine who had purchased the phone

with the 903 number but could not uncover this information. However, he determined that

the 903 phone number had contacted another number on the day of Gray’s disappearance.

Officers called this number and discovered that it belonged to Shakeema Morsley, a

coworker and friend of Arrington’s. Morsley gave police full access to her phone and text

messages. They discovered that the person using the 903 phone number had asked Morsley

DAVIS—7

to tell him where her new apartment was located. He had refused to tell Morsley his name,

but provided hints to his identity. Based on the various contextual clues, Morsley deduced

that this person was Davis. She refused to give him her new address.

Morsley also gave Arrington’s phone number to Detective Williams. Williams called

Arrington. Within a few minutes, Arrington handed the phone to Davis and he spoke with

Williams. Williams told him she was investigating a missing child. Davis acted very

concerned. Williams asked Davis if he knew anything about the 903 phone number. He

denied any knowledge of it.

Officers conducted surveillance on Davis and Arrington’s apartment and the Dodge

Stratus, which was parked in the apartment complex parking lot. While officers were

watching, Davis exited the apartment and began walking toward the officers. They

handcuffed him for their safety because he was known to be a bodybuilder and to carry a

pistol. They walked with him back to the apartment because he said his knees were hurting

and mosquitoes were biting him. They removed the handcuffs and requested that he follow

them to the police department to discuss Gray. Davis agreed to come with them and,

accompanied by Arrington, he drove to the police department in the Dodge Stratus.

Williams interviewed Davis at the police department. Davis said that he felt that Gray

had falsely accused him of sexual assault. He told Williams that he had text messages from

Gray on his phone proving that she had lied about the sexual assaults. He denied having any

knowledge of the 903 phone number or Gray’s current location and denied having any recent

DAVIS—8

communications with Morsley.

While Davis was being interviewed, Arrington gave consent for the police to retain

her Dodge Stratus for processing. Canine handlers brought a “cadaver dog” (trained to

search for the scent of a decaying body) and a dog trained to alert to Gray’s scent to the

parking lot at the police station. Both dogs displayed a positive reaction to the Dodge

Stratus. At some point after the interview with Williams, Davis was arrested on the basis of

outstanding traffic ticket warrants.

Detectives Edward Teniente and Jeremy Chevallier also assisted with the

investigation. They received cell phone tower data for Davis’s T-Mobile phone, which

showed that his phone was at or near Hebron High School at 4:01 p.m. on September 6th,

which was around the time that Gray had disappeared. Davis indicated to officers at the jail

that he wished to speak with detectives. Teniente and Chevallier brought Davis into an

interview room and read him his Miranda5 rights. In this interview, the detectives informed

Davis about the cell tower data. Davis admitted that he had been speaking with Gray on the

phone and recording their conversations to document discrepancies between what she said

on the phone and what she said in the police reports. He continued to deny having had any

contact with Gray on the day she disappeared. Davis was returned to the jail after this

interview.

About an hour and a half later, Davis indicated that he wanted to talk to Detective

5

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

DAVIS—9

Chevallier again. Chevallier and Teniente retrieved Davis from the jail for a third recorded

interview. They asked him if he remembered the rights Chevallier had read to him

previously. Davis said he did and then stated:

A lot of the information that y’all say y’all have, it’s not correct . . . .

Honestly, I felt like that with a lot of the information that you was [sic] saying

to me, that I would have been able to, been able to walk but I wouldn’t be able

to live with myself because I done it [sic].

Davis admitted to the officers that he had met Gray at the high school in the parking

lot on the day of the offense. He explained that, about two and one-half months before the

day he met Gray at the school, he adopted a false identity and began communicating with

Gray using a “go phone” with a 903 phone number. Davis had selected a young man’s

profile photo from Facebook that he thought Gray would like. He told Gray that this was a

photo of him and his nickname was “D.” Davis told Gray that he (“D”) had seen her on

Facebook and he was “looking for a new friend, someone to get to know.” He assured her

it was “nothing sexual.” Davis told the officers that he used this “D” alias to have telephone

conversations with Gray on the go phone and recorded those conversations using his T-

Mobile phone.

Posing as “D,” Davis persuaded Gray to trust him. He induced her to talk about the

first time she had sex and other personal matters. She eventually talked about the sexual

assaults. Davis insisted to the detectives that Gray’s account to “D” of the sexual assaults

was not the same as the account in the police report. He said that he felt he got what he

“needed” for his trial from the recorded conversations with Gray. He told the officers that

DAVIS—10

he had not talked to Gray in a while, but then he decided he wanted to talk to her “face-to-

face” and renewed contact with her on September 5th.

Davis recalled that, when Gray first saw him at the school on September 6th, she said,

“Oh, shit.” He said he reassured her that he was not going to hurt her and she got into the

car with him voluntarily. He then drove to a park area. He asked her “why she [had] lied and

said things that she did to get [him] in trouble.” Davis said Gray responded that her “mama

made her do it.” He said, “I told her I had been sitting outside her house and my demons was

[sic] weighing on me so bad to where I wanted to kill everybody in that house.” He said that

he called this part of him “Wish,” which was “the dark side of me that I let go years ago.”

Davis told the officers that he and Gray got out of the car at the park and started

walking down a trail. He said that he was “trying to tell her how much she had fucked up

[his] whole life with the lies that she told.” He said they walked off the trail, and he pulled

the gun out. He shot Gray, but he was not sure where he had hit her. She fell into the water.

He said Gray lay in the water for a second, “trying to act like she was dead.” He shot her

again. He said she cried and said, “[W]hy Wish?” He said he threw her jacket down to her

to get her out of the water. He explained: “I wanted to stop but . . . I felt like if I would have

stopped she would have told what had happened . . . . So I told her to lay [sic] down on the

grass. And she laid [sic] down on the grass . . . . I put my foot on her neck and I pressed

down.” Davis said Gray grabbed his leg for about three seconds, then let go. He said, “I

asked her to forgive me.” He then rolled her body into the water and left the park. He said

DAVIS—11

he drove out of the parking lot and then pulled back in because he wanted to go to help her,

but he knew it was too late. He told the detectives that he was sorry for what he had done.

Detective Teniente asked Davis if he always carried a gun. He shook his head “no.”

Davis said he initially obtained the gun to use it on himself. He was not sure when he

decided to use it on Gray. Davis said he threw the gun out the window while driving down

the highway. He said he also threw Gray’s cell phone and the go phone out the window. He

said he left Gray’s backpack with her body.

At the end of the interview, Gray agreed to accompany the officers to locate Gray’s

body. He rode with the officers in an unmarked vehicle. In the meantime, a bicycle officer

had already found Gray’s body floating in the Trinity River and found her backpack nearby.

When Chevallier and Teniente asked Davis to take them “to where it happened,” he led them

to the place where the crime scene team was already in the process of recovering Gray’s

body. He also led them to the locations where he had thrown the gun into a pond, where he

had thrown Gray’s phone into another pond, and where he had disposed of his shoes in a

sewer drain.

The autopsy revealed that Gray’s body had undergone a substantial amount of

decomposition while floating in the water. She had been shot once in the shoulder and once

in the back. She had further suffered forceful asphyxia to her neck. The medical examiner

recovered one bullet lodged in her body. The examiner ruled that the cause of Gray’s death

was homicidal violence, including the two gunshot wounds, asphyxia due to neck

DAVIS—12

compression, and possible drowning.

The police also located a Diamondback .380 pistol at the edge of a pond, Gray’s phone in

another pond, and Davis’s shoes in a sewer drain, where Davis told them they would be. Davis’s

go phone was never found. A senior forensic scientist specializing in firearms testified that the

Diamondback .380 pistol was compared to a bullet and two cartridge casings found near Gray’s

body, as well as the bullet recovered from her body. His analysis showed that the Diamondback .380

pistol fired the bullets and ejected the casings.

On September 9, 2012, after Detective Williams viewed the autopsy, she received a message

that Davis wanted to speak with detectives again. In this fourth interview, Davis told them where

he disposed of a soiled “Scarface” blanket from the car, the sweat pants he was wearing at the time

of the shooting, and the magazine for his gun. He again described the killing and how he had

contacted Gray using his go phone pretending to be a different person. Davis continued to insist that

he had never had sex with Gray. He said, when he picked Gray up on September 6th, she told him

she would tell the “truth,” meaning she would recant the sexual assault charges. Williams expressed

disbelief in Davis’s story. She asked him why he would kill Gray if she was planning to recant the

charges. Davis simply responded, “That’s what happened.” He asked Williams if “[t]his was a

capital murder.” After Williams confirmed that the charge would be capital murder, Davis stated,

“It should be.”

Secret Service Special Agent Jeff Shaffer used a digital forensic tool to analyze Davis’s T-

Mobile cell phone. He discovered that the 903 phone number for the go phone used to call Gray and

Morsley on September 6th was listed as a contact called “Throw Away” in Davis’s T-Mobile phone

and then later deleted. The phone also contained a photo of Gray in a bikini top and shorts which

DAVIS—13

was downloaded on July 13, 2012, and again on September 5, 2012.

Forensic analysis revealed that Davis had used his phone to log into Facebook under the

name “Jazmine Brown.” Using the Brown profile, he searched for and located Gray’s Facebook

page. Davis (posing as Brown) sent Gray a message on Facebook on May 1, 2012, saying “Hey,

Shania, I’m new in the city and trying to find a cool female to befriend without the drama. I like to

shop my butt off. LOL . . . . Get back at me if we have some things in common.”

On July 10, 2012, Davis hired a new defense attorney for the sexual assault case. On July

18, 2012, he used his T-Mobile phone to search the Internet for “Can you record a person without

them knowing in Texas” and “[b]est way to get off of a sexual assault charge.” Also on July 18th,

Davis searched for “with no proof that you did the murder can you still be held in jail[?]” The next

day, he searched for “can you voice record of [sic] minor over the phone in [T]exas” and “can tape

recorded conversation with a person story changing get you off a charge.” He performed similar

searches on July 23, 2012. He called and exchanged text messages with Gray hundreds of times

between July 17, 2012, and August 1, 2012, using the go phone.

On August 24, 2012, the trial judge formally scheduled Davis’s sexual-assault trial for

October 29, 2012. On August 27th, Davis installed on his T-Mobile phone an application called

“Fake Call & SMS & Call Logs.” On the same day, text messages appearing to be from Gray’s

phone were created on Davis’s phone, including the following messages:

Sorry I li3d on u but my momma mad3 m3 do it. If we go to court ima t3ll th3m u

never touched me. My momma go b3 mad @ m3 but fuck that bitch I can’t stand her

no ways. Please 4give me. . . .

I beli3v3 if I t3ll the truth sh3 will punish m3 for a long tim3 and I want to b3 able

to play basketball.

Andrew Hoog, a mobile forensics security expert, testified that he used specialized technology to

DAVIS—14

analyze Davis’s T-Mobile phone. Hoog determined that the above application was used to create

these messages on Davis’s phone.

On August 28, 2012, Davis used his T-Mobile phone to search for gun shows. On August

29, 2012, he made five calls using his T-Mobile phone to a contact named “Chris.” The next day,

he used his T-Mobile phone to search for prices on a Diamondback .380 pistol. Police used the

serial number on the Diamondback .380 pistol found in the pond and traced the firearm back to a

registered owner named Christopher Allen. Allen testified that he is the brother of Davis’s ex-

girlfriend, Linda Crawford. He said that Davis called him around August 28 or 29, 2012, and asked

about buying a handgun from him. Allen agreed to sell Davis the Diamondback .380 pistol for just

under $200. He sold the gun to Davis a few days later. Davis paid him in cash.

On the evening of September 5, 2012, Davis (posing as “D”) used the go phone to contact

Gray again. Phone records showed that, when he initiated these new communications with Gray,

the go phone was “hitting off” a cell tower close to her home. He told Gray, “I miss you” and “When

can I see you?” Gray asked for a “pic” of “D,” but Davis did not send her a photo. The next

morning, Davis and Gray continued exchanging text messages. He asked, “What time do you get

home from school?” Around lunchtime, Davis told her, “I’m going to be in your area today. I owe

you something too.” She asked, “Do you?” He responded, “Yep money money yeah yeah lol.” She

responded, “Lol yay.!!!” Twice, he asked whether Gray and her mother would be dropping off her

stepfather that day. She answered, “Nope.” At 1:53 p.m., Davis used his T-Mobile phone to search

for “hebron high school” and looked up the address of the school in the map “app” on his T-Mobile

phone. He also used the map app to look up Sam Houston Trail Park, where Gray’s body was

eventually found.

DAVIS—15

Around mid-afternoon, Gray told Davis: “You don’t have to come all inside the school.”

She sent a message to him at 3:46 p.m. asking, “Where are you?” He responded, “Kids park.” At

4:01 p.m. Davis’s T-Mobile phone “hit off” the cell tower that was right next to Hebron High

School, indicating that he was close to the school. At around 5:06 p.m., his phone and Gray’s phone

were both “hitting off” the cell tower near his apartment. After 5:17 p.m., Gray’s phone stopped

receiving and sending any data, indicating that it was no longer in contact with the network.

Similarly, after 5:15 p.m., Davis’s go phone stopped sending and receiving data. An expert testified

that this could happen when a phone was thrown into water.

Davis’s T-Mobile phone also contained a recorded conversation between Davis (posing as

“D”) and Gray. In this phone conversation, “D” asked Gray, “What about the person with your big

secret?” She responded, “He’s permanently locked up . . . . he is permanently in jail. We didn’t talk

in the first place.” He asked, “How did he get in jail if y’all [sic] didn’t talk.” She said, “It’s

complicated” and told him to change the subject, but he continued to ask her questions about it. He

asked her how he broke the law and she answered, “he committed a crime against me.” He asked,

“He raped you?” She said, “New subject. Damn it.”

Gray told “D” about her little brother’s autism and severe disabilities. She discussed her

feelings about her real father, who had died before she was born. Later, she returned to the subject

of the sexual assaults and their impact on her: “What happened, it fucked my mind up [sic]. It really

did . . . . He got inside my head.” “D” tried to get her to discuss the matter further. Gray said that

she was about to start therapy for this incident and she really did not want to talk about it. She told

him that the man who sexually assaulted her was in his late twenties and,

[He] got into my head. I mean – at first I was going to cover for him [–] that’s how

stupid I was. I don’t know what the hell I was thinking. I was going to cover up and

DAVIS—16

take all the blame. And then my mama caught us . . . . I had a babysitting job and

he was the father of the kids I was babysitting . . . . He think[s] he [is] going to run

away from that. Not like that. I was a child.

Gray explained how Davis would come to the apartment and harass her while she was

babysitting and Dibrell was not there. Gray said Dibrell did not provide adequate clothing, shoes,

or food for the children, so she started taking the children to the store for food whenever she would

babysit. She said the kids acted so happy when she came to babysit, that she “kind of felt trapped,

like, like [the] kids wasn’t [sic] going to have what they needed unless I came. And if I did come

over, I [ran] the risk of running into him again.” “D” asked her, “How many times did he sexually

assault you?” She said, “Probably three or four different times.”

She explained that she knew she would have to testify at the trial if Davis did not plead

guilty. She said she did not want to be at the trial and she wished that he would plead guilty and

make the case disappear. She felt that her mom was blaming her for what had happened and she,

too, began to think that it was her fault. After “D” prodded her for more detail about the assaults,

she told him about the first time Davis sexually assaulted her. She said Davis told the children to

go into the other room and not come out and then he “got what he wanted.” She said she was afraid

of Davis so she did not tell anyone about the sexual assaults. She explained that she was intimidated

by Davis, who was a large, muscular bodybuilder who took out his samurai swords and played with

them in front of her. She also did not tell anyone because she was afraid that people would blame

her. She said that she was a good student but, around the time of the sexual assaults, she could not

concentrate at school and her grades dropped.

“D” told Gray a story about his cousin whom, he claimed, a woman falsely accused of rape.

In his story, the accuser was eventually charged with “false imprisonment” and “they locked her up

DAVIS—17

that day.” He asked Gray if Davis had any information about her that he could use to discredit her

in that way. She said Davis did not. She explained to “D” that she had given depositions. He asked

her why she did not just tell everyone that she had lied, so that they would drop the charges. He said

that, because she was a minor, they would not be able to do anything to her. She said that her parents

had wanted her to file the charges, and she could not drop them. He suggested that Davis might have

a grudge against her and might come after her after he went to “the pen.” Gray simply responded,

“no.” She added that Davis had lied about some text messages. When the phone conversation

ended, Gray had not agreed to recant the charges, nor had she stated that she lied about the sexual

assaults.

After the State presented its case in chief, Davis took the stand in his own defense. Defense

counsel started off by asking him, “Frank, why is Shania dead?” Davis responded, “Because I killed

her.” Counsel asked, “Why did you kill her?” Davis answered, “Because she ruined my life.” Davis

said that Gray had a crush on him because he is a “charmer,” but he insisted that he never had sexual

relations with Gray. He described having sex one time with Dibrell after he got engaged to

Arrington. He said Dibrell had told Gray about this incident. He claimed that Gray’s text message

that he was trying to “have [his] cake and eat it too” actually referred to him having sex with his wife

and Dibrell.

Davis further testified that, after he was charged with sexual assault, he lost his job, he could

not provide for his family, and his wife looked at him like he was “less than a man.” He blamed this

misfortune on “Shania’s lies.” He was frustrated with his attorney’s lack of efforts on his behalf and

decided he needed to conduct his own “investigation.” Davis admitted creating the fake Facebook

page in the name of “Jazmine Brown” to try to access Gray’s Facebook page. Gray did not accept

DAVIS—18

the friend request from Jazmine Brown, so Davis asked his nephew, Dominique Elkins, for his

Facebook password. Davis sent a friend request to Gray while logged into Facebook as Elkins. Gray

accepted that friend request. Davis then obtained Gray’s mobile phone number from her Facebook

page. He searched on Facebook for a man with an attractive profile picture with light skin and a

muscular build. He found a young man meeting this description, then sent the man a message from

his Jazmine Brown alias telling him that a friend (i.e., Gray) might be trying to contact him but he

should not have any contact with her because she was too young. That night, Davis started sending

text messages to Gray using a go phone that he had purchased for this purpose. He told Gray through

text messages that he was the man with light skin and muscular build from Facebook.

Davis said he and Gray exchanged text messages for a while and then she began calling him.

He recorded their phone conversations using his T-Mobile phone by setting the go phone on the

“speaker[ ]phone” setting. He recorded about seven conversations, though two or three of them did

not have much content. He said Gray made statements in their phone conversations that he believed

were inconsistent with statements she made in the DCAC interview. For example, he said that, on

the phone, Gray only described three sexual incidents with him, yet she told the DCAC interviewer

they had sex four times. Also, Gray told him that, when she had sex with him in his apartment, it

occurred in his bedroom, but she told the DCAC interviewer that it occurred in his bathroom. (The

record shows that Gray explained in both interviews that Davis’s bathroom was connected to his

bedroom and he came into the bathroom to get her). He also pointed to her statement in the

recordings that she had had sex for the first time before her first encounter with him.

Davis said he took his recordings of the phone conversations to his lawyer, whose “judgment

was kind of iffy” about them. Davis said he decided he wanted to play the recorded phone calls for

DAVIS—19

Gray’s parents. He drove to Gray’s house the next day and sat for a while in his car watching Gray

playing basketball with her little brother at the nearby park. He debated whether to go inside and talk

to Gray’s parents. He called Linda Crawford, the mother of one of his children, and she told him

about an application that would generate fake text messages. Instead of talking to Gray’s parents,

he decided to use the application to make some fake text messages from Gray. He decided this

would give him a little “extra push” to get the prosecutor to dismiss the case against him. He

admitted creating the false text messages from Gray presented by the State. He said he also

mentioned to Crawford that he wanted to get a gun so he could go to the shooting range. She put

him in touch with her brother, Chris Allen. Davis bought the Diamondback .380 from Allen about

a week before he shot Gray with it.

Davis also admitted performing the Internet search asking whether a person would stay in

jail on a murder charge if investigators could not find the body. Davis stated that he did the last

search because of “the thoughts going through [his] head of wanting to do harm to Shania . . . she

ruined my life. I wanted to ruin hers.”

Davis said he shared his thoughts with his wife, Arrington, and she told him it was too much

for her to “deal with.” He said that was when it really started “eating at” him. He was “thinking

about hurting [himself], hurting other people,” specifically Gray. He said he drove out to Gray’s

home on or around September 5th with his new gun, intending to “kill everybody in the house.” He

sat outside for a while and “couldn’t get the thought out of [his] head.” He got out of his car and

went into their front yard, but he did not go inside. He thought about Gray’s innocent little brother

with his health issues. Davis decided against killing them and drove home.

Davis said he renewed contact with Gray around that time using the go phone and posing as

DAVIS—20

“D.” Davis explained the gap in their communications by telling Gray that he had been in school

and had turned off his phone to focus on his studies. He said he was “speaking of money so she

would want to meet up” with him. He arranged to meet her after school at Hebron High School.

They agreed to meet at the parking lot by the tennis courts. Davis said that, when Gray came out of

the school and saw him instead of “D,” she “froze up” and said, “Oh, shit.” He approached her and

assured her he was not going to hurt her. She walked with him to his car and got into the passenger

seat. He started the car and pulled away. She objected, saying that her mother was waiting for her

on the other side of the school. Davis said he continued driving because he wanted to kill her. He

placed the gun between his legs while he was driving.

Davis further testified that he took Gray to Sam Houston Trail Park. He ordered Gray to

delete the text message exchanges with “D” and then turn her phone off, and she complied. They

sat in the car for a while and he berated her for having a happy life. Davis said he was thinking of

how he was raped by both his grandfather and his brother and how his youngest daughter had holes

in her shoes because he could not provide for her. He told Gray to leave her phone in the car and

made her walk down the slope toward the river, and then he shot her. He was aiming for her head.

She fell into the water, and then he shot her again. He walked down the slope to make sure she was

dead. She asked, “Why, Wish[?]” and told him that the right side of her body was going numb. He

threw her the end of her jacket and pulled her out of the water, injuring his tricep muscle in the

process. He told her to lie down, then he stepped on her neck and held his foot there. She briefly

reached up and touched his ankle and then her hand fell. He rolled her into the water and then he

left.

Davis described the four police interviews he gave. He admitted that he lied in the first two

DAVIS—21

interviews and that he continued to lie about the fake text messages throughout all the interviews.

The defense presented two recordings of statements Davis made to the media. In these media

recordings, Davis tearfully admitted that he murdered Gray. He blamed the murders on a part of him

called “Wish,” which he described as a kind of evil alter ego. Davis repeatedly denied sexually

assaulting Gray and said he became increasingly obsessed with hurting people as his trial was

repeatedly delayed. He told one reporter that he had text messages in his phone showing that Gray

admitted she lied about the sexual assaults. The text messages he described to the reporter matched

the fake text messages he created to bolster his defense. Davis also told the reporter that he did not

intend to kill Gray when he went to meet her at her school. He said he just wanted to talk with her.

He said he had the gun with him only because he had owned it for a long time and carried it with him

all the time.

The State called Dibrell in rebuttal. Dibrell contradicted Davis’s testimony about whether

she told Gray about her sexual encounter with Davis. She said she never told Gray about it because

“[Gray] was a child, and I don’t discuss stuff like that with children.” Dibrell recalled that she had

argued with Davis about the excessive amount of time he was spending at her apartment when she

was not home. She was angry with Davis because, although he had refused to babysit the children

for her, he kept coming over when Gray was there watching the children. She testified that Davis

had asked her to provide a statement for his sexual assault trial asserting that her children said that

he was never alone with Gray. She refused to write that statement. Dibrell testified that Davis was

not always truthful.

At the punishment stage of trial, Linda Crawford testified that, when she was sixteen years

old and seven or eight months pregnant with Davis’s son, she walked in on Davis and another

DAVIS—22

woman at his apartment. Davis pushed her out, grabbed her by the throat, picked her up, and held

her against the building. He ordered her to leave and not come back. Later, when she was holding

their young son, Davis hit her with a coat hanger and cut her arm.

Similarly, Dibrell testified that Davis had been violent with her on multiple occasions during

their relationship. She said that these incidents had twice resulted in her nose bleeding. Once, Davis

“pulled a knife” on her. On another occasion, he shot her in the leg with a BB gun. When she was

pregnant with their daughter, she caught him with another woman and they argued. He grabbed her,

pinned her arms, and whispered into her ear that he hoped she would lose the baby.

Labrena Henderson, the mother of one of Davis’s sons, testified that she lived with Davis

from 1999 through 2001. She recalled that Davis once pushed her violently against a wall during

an argument. She also testified that she and Davis would fight when Davis would take her car at

night and use it to look for girls and break into other people’s cars.

The State introduced records revealing that Davis received a deferred adjudication in 1999

for theft of property valued between $1,500 and $20,000, and that his probation had been revoked

in January 2001 due in part to a subsequent burglary of a motor vehicle. Davis’s criminal record also

included convictions for evading arrest and failure to identify in February 2001, and fleeing or

attempting to elude a police officer in October 2007.

Deputy Steven Underwood testified that he was assigned to supervise Davis when Davis was

hospitalized during his incarceration while awaiting in this case. Davis, who was secured to the bed

with leg restraints and handcuffs, asked Underwood if he could take a shower before he was sent

back to the jail. Underwood agreed. As soon as Underwood unlocked the restraints, Davis said,

“I’m sorry, man,” grabbed Underwood, and backed him into the wall. As the two men struggled,

Davis grasped for Underwood’s gun. Underwood saw that Davis had some sort of sharp object in

DAVIS—23

his hand, but could not tell what it was. (Officers later located in the hospital room a Shasta can that

had been torn and pinched to form a sharp edge.) Underwood heard a “pop” and saw that his holster

had come off and Davis was holding his gun. Davis pulled away from Underwood and pointed the

gun at him. He pulled the slide back to make sure the gun was loaded and ordered Underwood to

“[g]et on the ground.” Underwood complied.

Davis then ran out of the hospital. He fled to a nearby residential area, where he tried to

convince a family to let him inside their home by claiming that someone was shooting at him. The

mother refused to let him in, but she offered to call 911 for him. Davis asked her not to call the

police, saying that he had “warrants,” and fled again. The family later found Underwood’s gun

stuffed inside a hospital sock in their front yard. They called the police, who came to the house and

discovered that there was a round in the pistol’s chamber. Davis was located while hiding in a red

van in a parking lot near the hospital. Over eighty officers surrounded the parking lot and Davis

eventually surrendered.

Arrington took the stand and testified about her relationship with Davis. She explained that,

on at least twenty occasions, he had become extremely angry with her and choked her. This would

usually happen whenever they argued, even over something minor. She said Davis would typically

“tussle” or wrestle with her first, and then push her up against the wall while choking her with both

hands. On approximately three of these occasions, he threatened Arrington with knives and he once

placed a gun against her head. He also once threw her against a brick fireplace, and she suffered

bruising. After these fights, Davis would apologize. He would talk to Arrington about the fact that

his mother was murdered and remind her that his family had placed him in foster care. Arrington

tearfully conceded that she did not reveal Davis’s assaultive conduct when initially questioned by

Detective Williams, she never called the police following these assaults, and she did not tell her

DAVIS—24

family. She said that she did not report the assaults because she loved Davis and did not want to

become one of the people who had “abandoned him, as he calls it.” Arrington said she felt ashamed

of her failure to report his abuse and intended to divorce him after the trial.

The defense offered testimony showing that, as a child, Davis lived with his six siblings,

mother, and grandfather in a small apartment in a poverty-stricken, crime-ridden neighborhood in

St. Louis, Missouri. Davis’s sister testified that their grandfather molested all of the children in the

house. Medical records suggested that Davis’s intellectually-disabled older brother had sex with his

younger siblings. After Davis’s mother shot another resident of the housing complex, Davis and his

six siblings were placed in foster care. When she was released from prison, Davis’s mother moved

to Texarkana, where the children were then living, and resumed her role as parent. However, she

was re-arrested for violating her parole and sent back to prison. She was brutally raped and then

murdered with a shotgun when Davis was a teenager. Davis’s foster mother, who raised him for one

year when he was fifteen or sixteen years old, testified that he was always obedient and he liked to

tell jokes. However, after Davis left her home and went to live with his sister, his foster mother

started hearing about him getting into trouble. Other caretakers who worked with Davis as a

teenager stated that he was respectful and polite. Latrice Brown, the mother of Davis’s oldest

daughter, Kurstyne, testified that Davis was a good father and took care of their daughter for over

three years while Brown was incarcerated. Kurstyne testified that she loves her father and has a

good relationship with him.

The defense further offered expert witness testimony that Davis would be a vulnerable inmate

lacking “juice” or power in the prison system due to the nature of the offense he committed. Frank

Au Buchon, a retired Texas prison classification official, testified that an offender sentenced to life

without parole could never receive a classification any less restrictive than level three in the general

DAVIS—25

population. Because Davis had attempted to escape, the least restrictive classification that Davis

would receive upon entering prison would be level four. And, because he had committed a violent

act against a staff member within the past year, he could be classified as level five, which is the most

restrictive general population classification. Moreover, considering the fact that Davis had

physically assaulted and disarmed an officer using a makeshift weapon during a premeditated escape

attempt, Au Buchon opined that Davis “needs to go to administrative segregation for a long time.”

Au Buchon acknowledged that he could only make an “educated guess” about how the prison system

would actually classify Davis. Au Buchon agreed that, if an inmate took a gun from a guard on one

occasion, he might be willing to do it again. Au Buchon also stated that Davis would have contact

with female guards in prison.

A Texarkana police officer testified that Davis reported to authorities that his uncle, Robert

Elkins, had admitted committing a robbery. Davis provided information that aided officers in

preventing Elkins from committing another robbery. On cross-examination, however, the State

elicited testimony that, two days before Davis provided information to police about Elkins, Davis

was arrested with Elkins for possession of criminal instruments. Further, Davis was a suspect in a

burglary committed during the same time period. After assisting the police, Davis was not

prosecuted for burglary or for possession of criminal instruments.

Gray-James took the stand again and described the effects of her daughter’s murder on her

family. She also described the terror she experienced when she learned that Davis had escaped from

custody.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In point of error eleven, Davis contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support

his conviction for capital murder. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all

DAVIS—26

of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of

fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.6 This

standard “gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the

testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate

facts.”7 Each fact need not point directly and independently to the defendant’s guilt, as long as the

cumulative effect of all the incriminating facts is sufficient to support the conviction.8 Motive is a

significant circumstance indicating guilt, and intent may be inferred from a defendant’s acts, words,

and conduct.9 In addition, attempts to conceal incriminating evidence, inconsistent statements, and

implausible explanations are probative of unlawful acts and circumstances indicative of guilt.10

Davis argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove the underlying offense of

obstruction. He admits that he intentionally shot and killed Gray, but he disputes the State’s

evidence concerning his motive for killing her. Texas Penal Code § 36.06 provides:

(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly harms or threatens to harm

another by an unlawful act:

...

(2) to prevent or delay the service of another as a:

(A) public servant, witness, prospective witness, or informant; or

(B) person who has reported or who the actor knows intends to report the occurrence

6

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979).

7

Id. at 319.

8

Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

9

Id. at 50.

10

Id.

DAVIS—27

of a crime.11

Chapter 36 does not define the term “prospective witness.” However, this Court has determined that

official court proceedings need not have been initiated in order for a person who has information

about a crime to be a “prospective witness” covered by this statute.12 A “central purpose” of § 36.06

is to encourage public servants, witnesses, prospective witnesses, and informants to perform vital

public duties, such as reporting criminal activities, testifying in official proceedings, and cooperating

with the government in criminal investigations, without fear of harm or physical injury.13

The record in this case shows—and Davis does not dispute—that Gray was “a person who

ha[d] reported . . . [t]he occurrence of a crime” and was a “prospective witness” in Davis’s upcoming

sexual assault trial. Further, the record indisputably shows that Davis intentionally and knowingly

harmed Gray by an unlawful act. In fact, Davis admitted to police, television reporters, and the jury

that he intentionally shot Gray twice with a firearm and then stepped on her neck until she stopped

struggling. And there is no dispute that Davis knew that Gray had accused him of sexually

assaulting her and knew that she intended to serve as a witness against him.

Thus, the only remaining element of obstruction at issue is whether Davis killed Gray for the

purpose of preventing or delaying her service as a witness, prospective witness, or person who

reported the occurrence of a crime. Davis argues that the State did not prove that he killed Gray in

order to prevent her from testifying, noting that he “never stated that was the reason he murdered her,

even though all the detectives tried to get him to admit this.” Davis emphasizes that he repeatedly

11

TEX . PENAL CODE § 36.06(a)(2).

12

Morrow v. State, 862 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).

13

Cada v. State, 334 S.W.3d 766, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

DAVIS—28

told the detectives that he murdered Gray out of anger and a desire for revenge because he believed

that she had ruined his life.

The record, however, contains ample evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude

that Davis killed Gray for the purpose of preventing her from testifying against him. Gray was the

named victim and the only eyewitness in the four sexual assault cases. Davis did not react violently

when Gray first brought the charges, when he was arrested, or even when he lost his job. Rather, as

Davis’s court date on the sexual assault charges approached, he became singularly focused on

combating the charges and targeting Gray. He concocted and executed an elaborate ruse whereby

he pretended to be a young man named “D” in order to gain Gray’s confidence, and he had hundreds

of communications with Gray. Davis claimed that he was confident that the recordings of his phone

conversations with Gray would bolster his defense, because they demonstrated that Gray had lied

about the sexual assaults. However, the one recorded conversation in which he and Gray discussed

the sexual assaults does not support his contention. In this conversation, Gray reluctantly described

the sexual assaults to “D,” explaining how Davis had intimidated and manipulated her. In response,

Davis attempted to cajole and frighten her into telling people that she had lied about the assaults, and

yet she refused. A reasonable juror could have deduced from this evidence that Davis did sexually

assault Gray and, knowing that she was an indispensable witness against him, actively attempted to

convince her not to participate in the trial and, failing that, murdered her.

Other evidence in the record suggests that Davis was very concerned about his upcoming

sexual assault trial, and he developed a plan to manufacture evidence and dispose of Gray as his trial

date approached. Over two weeks before he killed Gray, he used his T-Mobile phone to search for

“[b]est way to get off of a sexual assault charge” and “with no proof that you did the murder can you

DAVIS—29

still be held in jail[?]” Three days after the hearing at which the trial judge set his trial date, Davis

downloaded a fake text message application and used it to create text messages, purportedly from

Gray, saying she was sorry that she had lied about the sexual assaults. He additionally asked Dibrell

to manufacture statements (purportedly made by her children) to support his defense. The day after

he created the bogus text messages, he began actively seeking to purchase a gun. Shortly thereafter,

he obtained the Diamondback .380 pistol. Less than a week after he bought the gun, he assumed his

“D” persona again and contacted Gray. He began trying to convince her to meet with “D” after

school, making sure that her stepfather would not be present. He used his phone to search for the

location of her school and an isolated park where he would be able to kill her without being seen.

He enticed her to meet him behind the school by leading her to think that “D” planned to give her

something that might be “money money.” Davis brought a loaded gun with him to meet Gray at the

school. After killing her, he shoved her body in the river, then carefully disposed of the murder

weapon, their phones, and other incriminating evidence. Later that evening, he doused the car with

cologne before picking up his wife from work.

The jury was charged with weighing any conflicts in the evidence and evaluating the

credibility of the witnesses. The jurors had the opportunity to evaluate Davis’s credibility as he

testified at trial concerning his motive for the killing. They were free to believe or disbelieve some

or all of his testimony. They were also free to draw reasonable, yet adverse inferences from his acts,

words, and conduct, including his attempts to manufacture evidence and his inconsistent statements

and explanations. The jury could have reasonably inferred from the evidence that Davis intentionally

killed Gray to prevent her service as witness against him.

We hold that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is legally

DAVIS—30

sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that Davis intentionally murdered Gray in the course of

committing or attempting to commit the offense of obstruction. Davis’s eleventh point of error is

overruled.

In point of error twenty-four, Davis challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to

support the jury’s affirmative answer to the future dangerousness special issue.14 He argues that the

evidence was insufficient because he had no prior violent offense convictions and “the defense

witnesses testified that he essentially was a low risk for future dangerousness.”

When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s answer to the

future dangerousness special issue, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict

and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have believed beyond a reasonable doubt that

there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute

a continuing threat to society.15 In its determination of this special issue, the jury is entitled to

consider all of the evidence admitted at both the guilt and punishment phases of trial.16 This Court

has not required that the record contain evidence of prior violent offense convictions to support a

jury’s finding of future dangerousness.17 The circumstances of the offense and the events

14

See TEX . CODE CRIM . PROC. art. 37.071, § 2(b)(1).

15

Williams v. State, 273 S.W.3d 200, 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Jackson, 443 U.S. at

319.

16

Young v. State, 283 S.W.3d 854, 863 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

17

See Howard v. State, 153 S.W.3d 382, 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (stating that, in

light of the facts of the offense and the defendant’s disregard for authority, his prior assaultive

conduct, and his other illegal acts, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s answer to the

future dangerousness special issue, despite the defendant’s lack of prior convictions for criminal

violence).

DAVIS—31

surrounding it may alone be sufficient to sustain an affirmative answer to this special issue.18

The evidence admitted at the punishment phase of trial showed that Davis had committed

several adjudicated and unadjudicated criminal acts throughout his life including theft, evading

apprehension of law enforcement officers, and burglary of a vehicle. Armed with a home-made

weapon, he had executed a violent escape from custody in which he overpowered an officer and took

his firearm. Further, he had demonstrated a pattern of assaulting his intimate partners. Davis, who

is a bodybuilder, had thrown women up against walls, choked them, injured them, and threatened

them with knives and firearms. Some of these assaults were committed when young children were

present. Although Davis asserts that defense punishment witnesses “essentially” testified that he

presented a low risk for violent conduct, Frank Au Buchon testified that Davis might very well

attempt to take an officer’s firearm again and “need[ed] to go to administrative segregation for a long

time.”19 The jury also heard evidence of Davis’s sexual assaults of Gray and other threatening

conduct towards her when she was only fourteen years old, as well as the circumstances surrounding

the instant brutal, premeditated murder. Moreover, a rational jury could have given particular weight

to Davis’s admissions that, as his trial was repeatedly delayed, he had experienced persistent

thoughts of killing Gray’s entire family and had become increasingly preoccupied with hurting

people.

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the jury’s punishment verdict, the evidence

was sufficient to support the jury’s affirmative answer to the future dangerousness special issue. We

18

Devoe v. State, 354 S.W.3d 457, 462 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

19

See Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“[W]hen the record

supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the jury resolved the conflicts in favor of the

verdict, and we defer to that determination.”).

DAVIS—32

overrule Davis’s twenty-fourth point of error.

BATSON CHALLENGES

In Davis’s first, second, and third points of error, he contends that the trial judge erred in

overruling his objections that the State’s use of peremptory challenges against three African-

American prospective jurors violated Batson v. Kentucky.20 In Batson, the Supreme Court held that

the State violates the Equal Protection Clause when it excludes a veniremember based on his or her

race. A Batson challenge to the State’s use of a peremptory strike has three steps. First, the

opponent of the strike must establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination.21 Second, if the

opponent makes the requisite showing, the burden shifts to the proponent of the strike to articulate

a reason for the strike that is race-neutral on its face.22 Third, if a race-neutral explanation is offered,

then the trial judge must determine whether the opponent of the strike has shown purposeful

discrimination.23 “Whether the opponent satisfies his burden of persuasion to show that the

proponent’s facially race-neutral explanation for his strike is pre-textual, not genuine, is a question

of fact for the trial court.”24

Although the burden of production shifts after the opponent makes a prima facie case, the

burden of persuasion remains with the opponent of the strike to establish purposeful discrimination.25

20

476 U.S. 79 (1986).

21

Nieto v. State, 365 S.W.3d 673, 675-76 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

22

Watkins v. State, 245 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

23

Nieto, 365 S.W.3d at 675-76.

24

Watkins, 245 S.W.3d at 447.

25

See Ford v. State, 1 S.W.3d 691, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also TEX . CODE

CRIM . PROC. art. 35.261(a).

DAVIS—33

We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial judge’s ruling and will uphold the

ruling unless it is clearly erroneous. In determining whether clear error occurred, we look to the

entire record of the voir dire, not merely the passages highlighted by the parties.26

Davis compares three peremptorily-struck African-American veniremembers with non-

minority veniremembers who were not struck by the State. He argues that they gave “similar”

answers on the jury questionnaire. He contends that this comparative juror analysis provides

evidence of intentional discrimination based on race.27 However, a comparative juror analysis is

only one of several nonexclusive factors the Supreme Court has identified in determining whether

intentional discrimination occurred.28

Prima Facia Case

Davis argues that the State used three of its peremptory strikes to eliminate three of six (50%)

of the qualified African-American veniremembers within the strike range reached during voir dire:

Syrene Mitchell (No. 15), Louise Horsely (No. 27), and Freddie Watson (No. 34). At the pretrial

hearing on Davis’s Batson challenges, the State disputed Davis’s prima facie case. However, before

seeking a ruling on the prima facie case issue, the prosecutor moved directly to discussing his race-

neutral reasons for striking each of the complained-of jurors. Because the prosecutor did not seek

a timely ruling on Davis’s prima facie case or object to the trial judge’s failure to rule, the prima

26

Nieto, 365 S.W.3d at 675-76.

27

See Reed v. Quarterman, 555 F.3d 364, 370-76 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Miller-El v.

Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005)).

28

Watkins, 245 S.W.3d at 448-49 (citing Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 263-64).

DAVIS—34

facie case issue is now moot and cannot be raised by the State on appeal.29

Veniremembers Mitchell and Horsely

Based on Mitchell’s questionnaire answers, Davis asserts that Mitchell is the type of juror

that the State should have wanted on the jury. Davis notes that Mitchell answered “no” to the

question, “Do you have any moral, religious or personal beliefs that would prevent you from

returning a verdict which would result in the execution of another human being?” while one of the

seated jurors answered this question, “yes.” He points out that Mitchell agreed that intentional

murder during the course of obstruction should be a capital offense, “as [had] all jurors accepted by

the State,” and that Mitchell had not heard about the case, “as did sixteen jurors accepted by the

State.” He further observes that Mitchell ranked himself a six out of ten when asked how strongly

he believed in the death penalty, while five jurors accepted by the State ranked themselves a six or

lower on this question.

Davis contends that Horsely also had characteristics that would have benefitted the State,

including her intelligence, her military service, and her statement that she could make the decision

to assess the death penalty “under the right circumstances.” He states that her answers to certain

questions were similar to those given by others who were accepted as jurors. Davis argues the trial

judge failed to examine the validity of the State’s proffered reasons and the credibility of the

prosecutor. He contends the State’s reasons for the peremptory strikes were mere pretexts for

purposeful discrimination.

In his brief, Davis fails to focus on the specific race-neutral reasons enumerated by the State.

29

See Chambers v. State, 866 S.W.2d 9, 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (determining that,

when the prosecutor did not object to the trial judge’s failure to rule on the defendant’s prima

facie case, that issue became moot and could not be raised on appeal).

DAVIS—35

At the Batson hearing, the prosecutor explained that both Mitchell and Horsely had entered a value

of three in response to Question Two on the juror questionnaire, which read, “With reference to the

death penalty, which of the following statements best represents your feelings? (Circle only one.)”

Answer number three corresponded to the following statement: “Although I do not believe that the

death penalty should ever be imposed, as long as the law provides for it, I could assess it under the

proper set of circumstances.” The prosecutor stated that the State struck all veniremembers who

answered this question with a value of three or higher. Higher numbered answers became

progressively less favorable to the death penalty. The prosecutor also stated that Mitchell indicated

that he would hold the State to a higher burden of proof in a death penalty case. The trial judge

asked defense counsel if he had any response to the State’s explanations. Defense counsel did not

offer any further argument or dispute the State’s assertions about these jurors.30 The judge then

denied Davis’s Batson challenges to Mitchell and Horsely.

The State’s first asserted justification for its peremptory strikes—that Mitchell and Horsely

gave an answer on the questionnaire expressing that they did not believe in the death penalty—is the

type of reason we have held in the past to be facially race-neutral.31 Further, the record shows that

30

See Camacho v. State, 864 S.W.2d 524, 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (“The appellant,

having heard the apparently race-neutral explanation of the prosecutor[,] had nothing additional

to present in impeachment of or rebuttal to that explanation.”).

31

See, e.g., Camacho, 864 S.W.2d at 529 (acknowledging that prosecutor’s concern over

prospective juror’s questionnaire answers was a race-neutral justification for peremptory strike

where prospective juror circled, “Although I do not personally believe in the death penalty, as

long as the law provides for it, I could assess it under the proper set of facts and circumstances”);

Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 485 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (finding prospective juror’s

answer on questionnaire that “agreed with the proposition that she does not believe in capital

punishment, but it is not practically advisable to abolish it” to be a race-neutral reason for

peremptory strike).

(continued...)

DAVIS—36

none of the veniremembers accepted by the State answered Question Two with a three or higher.

In fact, all of the individuals seated as jurors or alternates answered this question with a two, which

corresponded to the following statement: “I believe that the death penalty is appropriate in some

murder cases, and I could return a verdict in a proper case which assessed the death penalty.”

Moreover, the record supports the prosecutor’s claim that the State peremptorily struck non-minority

veniremembers who, like Mitchell and Horsely, answered this question with a value of three or

higher.

In addition, the record shows that Mitchell indicated several times that he would hold the

State to a higher burden at the guilt-innocence phase in a death penalty case than in an ordinary

criminal case. For example, Mitchell was asked, “When the State of Texas is saying that person over

there needs to be killed based on his actions and based on what future actions he might do, then that

standard has to be higher than what we’re talking about in a normal burglary of a habitation case

. . . . Would you agree with that?” Mitchell responded, “Yes, I do.” Mitchell later responded, “I

don’t know that I’d make it any higher than a reasonable doubt,” but he then agreed that he is the

type of person who believes that, “if you’re going to charge someone with a death penalty [offense]

and seek the death penalty, the standard of proof is higher than . . . beyond a reasonable doubt.” He

stated that he believed the burden for death penalty cases “should be higher,” and he “would hold

the State to a higher burden.”

Mitchell equivocated upon cross-examination by defense counsel and questioning by the trial

judge. At one point, he stated that he would apply the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in a

death-penalty case. However, he also asserted that his beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard would

31

(...continued)

DAVIS—37

be higher in a capital murder case than it would in a burglary case. Although the trial judge denied

the State’s challenge for cause on this basis, Mitchell’s vacillation on this issue was nevertheless a

valid, race-neutral reason supporting the State’s peremptory strike.32

Davis has not shown that Mitchell and Horsely were treated differently from non-minority

veniremembers or that the prosecutor’s stated reasons for striking them were a pretext for

discrimination.

Veniremember Watson

Davis emphasizes that, during voir dire, Watson stated that killing a witness to keep her from

testifying should be capital murder and, when told what the two possible punishments for that crime

were, Watson stated, “[R]ight.” Similarly, Davis notes that Watson responded, “[R]ight,” as the

prosecutor explained how a person could post bond and the reasons for the bond requirement. Davis

maintains that Watson’s answers on other questions showed that he was a proponent of the death

penalty. He asserts that Watson’s answers were similar to the answers of non-minority

veniremembers who were seated on the jury. He submits that the State’s justifications for the

peremptory strike of Watson were implausible and merely a pretext for purposeful discrimination.

The prosecutor stated at the Batson hearing that he struck Watson for a combination of

reasons. First, on his questionnaire, Watson added a handwritten note after his answer to question

number twelve. Question number twelve read:

The crime of “Obstruction” means harming or threatening to harm another person to

prevent or delay the service of that person as a witness or prospective witness. The

law in the State of Texas says that the intentional murder of an individual during

the course of committing or attempting to commit the offense of “obstruction” is

32

See Chambers, 866 S.W.2d at 24 (observing that a prospective juror’s vacillation on an

issue related to the death penalty was a race-neutral explanation for the State’s peremptory strike

of the juror).

DAVIS—38

a capital offense, for which, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, a

sentence of life without parole or the death penalty may be imposed? [sic] Do you

agree with the punishment range outlined above?

Watson checked “yes” in response to this question but then wrote, “Life without parole would be

better for me.”

Second, at the end of his individual voir dire, Watson notified the trial judge that he had read

about the case in the newspaper. At this point, both sides had already interviewed Watson, and he

had stated on his questionnaire that he had not heard anything about the case in the media.

Third, on a question about the presumption of innocence, Watson added the notation:

“Should be set free until trial is over.” He also asked during voir dire why a defendant could not be

allowed to remain free in the community until the conclusion of his trial, suggesting that the

presumption of innocence should mandate his release. The prosecutor then explained the bond

process and the purpose for requiring a bond. At the Batson hearing, the prosecutor said Watson

seemed unsatisfied with this explanation.

The record shows that, after offering an extensive explanation of the bond process in

response to Watson’s concerns, the prosecutor asked Watson, “Is that okay?” Watson responded,

“Yeah, mostly. It answers the question, but it . . . still seems like to me that if a bond is set for a

person, there are still implications that that person is guilty.” Watson continued to indicate that he

believed forcing a defendant to pay a bond meant that the person was being presumed guilty, rather

than innocent. Thus, the record supports the prosecutor’s claim that Watson was not satisfied with

his explanation. Watson’s statements arguably indicated a bias against the State and for Davis.

Additionally, the State asserted at the Batson hearing that Watson was the only one of the

forty-five jurors questioned who wrote, “life without parole would be better for me,” and expressed

concern about why the defendant would not be released while awaiting the outcome of his trial. The

DAVIS—39

trial judge asked defense counsel for a response to the State’s race-neutral explanation. Counsel did

not respond to or contradict the prosecutor’s assertions. The burden of persuasion remained with

Davis’s counsel to establish that a prohibited motive lay behind the State’s peremptory strike.33 The

record supports the prosecutor’s assertions about the race-neutral reasons for the strike, and defense

counsel did not rebut them. Davis has not demonstrated that the State’s race-neutral reasons were

merely a pretext for discrimination.

The trial judge’s rulings denying Davis’s Batson challenges are supported by the record and

were not clearly erroneous. We overrule Davis’s first, second, and third points of error.

DISCHARGE OF DISABLED JUROR

In his fourth point of error, Davis argues that the trial judge abused his discretion in

discharging juror John Bigley due to a disability. Davis contends that the record contains “no

evidence” supporting the trial judge’s finding that Bigley suffered an emotional disability justifying

his discharge under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 36.29(b), which provides in relevant

part:

If alternate jurors have been selected in a capital case in which the state seeks the

death penalty and a juror dies or becomes disabled from sitting at any time before the

charge of the court is read to the jury, the alternate juror whose name was called first

under Article 35.26 of this code shall replace the dead or disabled juror.

On August 29, 2013, with counsel for both parties and Davis present, the trial judge

convened a hearing regarding Bigley “under the auspices” of Article 36.29(b). The judge explained

that the trial was originally set for August 19th, but at the request of the defense, he had continued

the trial to November 4th to allow the defense to develop “certain potentially mitigating evidence.”

Bigley had expressed “extreme reluctance” about the new trial date to court staff. The judge stated

33

See Camacho, 864 S.W.2d at 529.

DAVIS—40

that he called Bigley to discuss the matter. The judge said that Bigley “was adamant that because

of his work situation that he simply did not feel like he would be able to be fair and impartial to both

sides and to carefully weigh the evidence because his mind would be elsewhere.” The judge then

contacted Bigley’s boss in the Netherlands via email. The boss said that Bigley’s participation at

work from November 4th through November 18th was critical. Defense counsel objected to the trial

judge excusing Bigley from jury service.

The trial judge then called Bigley to the stand. Bigley explained that he is the only United

States employee for a company called In Continuum. He said that, due to the nature of his business,

all of his work setting up partnerships and relationships would be coming to fruition in the last

quarter of the year. Bigley testified that, if he was forced to serve as a juror in November, he would

have to work early mornings, trial breaks, lunch periods, and late nights during the trial to close deals

and he would be distracted during the trial. He said he would do his best to fulfill his duties as a

juror, but he would be thinking about the work he needed to do and he would be worried about

keeping his job. The judge asked him, “Is it fair to say that because of your emotional state, you’re

concerned that you would not be attentive during the trial?” Bigley answered, “That’s correct.” The

trial judge discharged Bigley from jury service and replaced him with one of the two alternate jurors.

The jury was subsequently sworn on November 4, 2013.

Although Article 36.29 was discussed at the pretrial hearing and in Davis’s brief, it was not

applicable in this case because the jury had not yet been sworn when Bigley was removed. This

Court has held that Article 36.29 applies only after the jury has been sworn.34 In this case, the trial

judge did not swear in the twelve jurors until after Bigley had been discharged and replaced with an

34

Broussard v. State, 910 S.W.2d 952, 957 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (citing Williams v.

State, 631 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)).

DAVIS—41

alternate juror. Although there is no statutorily defined procedure for discharging jurors that applies

to this particular situation, we have held that a trial judge does not err in following the process set

out in Article 36.29 and replacing a disabled juror with a duly-selected alternate juror.35

Article 36.29(b) sets out the process for replacing a juror who “becomes disabled from

sitting,” but it does not define the phrase “disabled from sitting.” Under Article 36.29, a trial judge

has discretion to determine whether a juror has become disabled and to replace that juror with an

alternate juror.36 We have interpreted the phrase “disabled from sitting” in Article 36.29 to require

that the juror must be suffering from a “physical illness, mental condition, or emotional state that

would hinder or inhibit the juror from performing his or her duties as a juror.”37 A disability in this

context is “not limited to physical disease, but also includes ‘any condition that inhibits a juror from

fully and fairly performing the functions of a juror.’”38

The trial judge’s decision is subject to a review for abuse of discretion and, absent such an

abuse, no reversible error will be found.39 When reviewing the dismissal of a juror, we will not

35

Id. at 958 (“Faced with the need to complete the jury, and having no specific statutory

directive, the trial court chose an acceptable option by replacing the disabled venireman with a

venireman who had already been qualified and accepted by both parties . . . . Had the court

simply waited until swearing the jury to dismiss the disabled venireman, the court would have

been absolutely required to replace him with the alternate.”).

36

Scales v. State, 380 S.W.3d 780, 783 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

37

Id.

38

Reyes v. State, 30 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see also Routier v. State,

112 S.W.3d 554, 588 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

39

Routier, 112 S.W.3d at 588.

DAVIS—42

substitute our judgment for that of the trial judge.40 Rather, we assess whether, after viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the trial judge’s ruling, the ruling was arbitrary or

unreasonable.41 We will uphold a trial judge’s ruling discharging a disabled juror if it is within the

zone of reasonable disagreement.42

The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial judge’s ruling, shows that, if

Bigley had been forced to serve as a juror in this capital murder trial, he would have been very

preoccupied with his work, unable to pay attention to the trial, and worried about keeping his job.

His emotional state would have inhibited him from fully and fairly performing the functions of a

juror.43 We hold the judge did not abuse his discretion in discharging Bigley under these

circumstances. Davis’s fourth point of error is overruled.

MOTION TO QUASH THE INDICTMENT

In Davis’s fifth point of error, he maintains that the trial judge erred in denying his motion

to quash the indictment. Davis argues that the indictment

fails to allege an offense against [him] with that degree of certainty that will give him

notice of the particular offense with which he is charged in violation of Art. 21.11

C.C.P. and fails to inform [him] of the nature and cause of the accusation against him

in violation of Art. I, Sec. 10 of the Constitution of the State of Texas, and the Sixth

40

Scales, 380 S.W.3d at 784.

41

Id.

42

Id.

43

See Ramos v. State, 934 S.W.2d 358, 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (finding that, where a

juror would be unable to concentrate due to the time pressures associated with moving and

starting a new job, the emotional pressures he suffered justified the trial judge’s decision to

discharge him under Article 36.29); see also Freeman v. State, 838 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi 1992, pet. ref’d) (finding no abuse of discretion in dismissing a juror

under Article 36.29, where the juror “was very concerned about being absent from his job and he

did not feel that he could be attentive during trial”).

DAVIS—43

Amendment and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the

Constitution of the United States[,] in that said indictment fails to specify the manner

and means by which he allegedly committed the offense of obstruction with

sufficient specificity to allow [him] to defend himself.

Davis contends that the indictment should have specified which part of Texas Penal Code § 36.06

(“Obstruction and Retaliation”) “he is supposed to have violated, who was obstructed, and why.”

When we review a trial judge’s decision to deny a motion to quash an indictment, we apply

a de novo standard of review.44 The right to notice is set forth in the Sixth Amendment of the United

States Constitution and Article I, § 10 of the Texas Constitution.45 A charging instrument must be

specific enough to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so that he may

prepare a defense.46 The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure prescribes that indictments must, in

ordinary and concise language, state everything that is necessary to prove the offense charged “with

that degree of certainty that will give the defendant notice of the particular offense with which he

is charged.”47 This Court has observed that it is a “rare exception” when an indictment containing

44

Lawrence v. State, 240 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); State v. Moff, 154

S.W.3d 599, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

45

Lawrence, 240 S.W.3d at 916.

46

Moff, 154 S.W.3d at 601.

47

See TEX . CODE CRIM . PROC. art. 21.03 (“Everything should be stated in an indictment

which is necessary to be proved.”); Id. art. 21.04 (“The certainty required in an indictment is

such as will enable the accused to plead the judgment that may be given upon it in bar of any

prosecution for the same offense.”); Id. art. 21.11 (“An indictment shall be deemed sufficient

which charges the commission of the offense in ordinary and concise language in such a manner

as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is meant, and with that degree of

certainty that will give the defendant notice of the particular offense with which he is charged,

and enable the court, on conviction, to pronounce the proper judgment.”); see also Moff, 154

S.W.3d at 601.

DAVIS—44

the language of the penal statute is not legally sufficient to provide notice of the offense charged.48

However, “[a]lthough an indictment which tracks the language and terms of the statute is ordinarily

sufficient, if the statutory language is not completely descriptive, so that particularity is required to

afford the defendant notice as required, merely tracking the language of the statute may be

insufficient.”49

Nevertheless, the State is not required to plead evidentiary facts which are not essential to

provide the requisite notice to the accused.50 And this Court has “repeatedly held that an indictment

need not allege the constituent elements of the underlying offense which elevates murder to capital

murder.”51 In addition, not every inadequacy of notice requires reversal of a conviction. Instead,

we examine whether, in the context of the case, the failure to provide notice affected “the

defendant’s ability to prepare a defense and, if so, how great an impact it was.”52 The due process

notice requirement may be satisfied by means other than the language in the charging instrument.

We have held that, “[w]hen a motion to quash [an indictment for lack of notice] is overruled, a

defendant suffers no harm unless he did not, in fact, receive notice of the State’s theory against

48

Daniels v. State, 754 S.W.2d 214, 218 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).

49

State v. Mays, 967 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Daniels, 754 S.W.2d at

218.

50

Daniels, 754 S.W.2d at 218.

51

Alba v. State, 905 S.W.2d 581, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); see also Ramirez v. State,

815 S.W.2d 636, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (“The indictment did not specifically allege which

burglarious intent appellant had when he committed this offense, nor was the State required to

plead the constituent elements of the offense constituting the aggravating feature of capital

murder.”).

52

Geter v. State, 779 S.W.2d 403, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).

DAVIS—45

which he would have to defend.”53

Davis’s indictment provided in relevant part:

Defendant, [o]n or about the 6th day of September, 2012 in the County of Dallas and

said State, did unlawfully then and there intentionally cause the death of SHANIA

GRAY, an individual, hereinafter called deceased, by SHOOTING THE

DECEASED WITH A FIREARM, A DEADLY WEAPON, AND BY

ASPHYXIATING THE DECEASED, and the defendant was then and there in the

course of committing and attempting to commit the offense of OBSTRUCTION.

At the pretrial hearing on the motion to quash, the court and counsel discussed a recent case

in which the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a trial judge did not err in denying a defendant’s

motion to quash a capital murder indictment for failure to allege the elements of the underlying

offense of obstruction/retaliation within the indictment.54 Defense counsel conceded that this

authority was “right on point” and contrary to the defense’s arguments. The trial judge additionally

asked defense counsel, “haven’t you received notice of what the obstruction is through other

pleadings and other discovery mechanisms . . . ?” Counsel responded: “Yes, in answer to your

question, we’ve had - - we have discovery. We know what the State’s position is in the case, and

what it is that they believe happened and why. But we just - - our position is that we need to have

that in the indictment so that we know specifically what it is we’re defending against.”

Davis argues that more detail should have been provided in the indictment in this case to

describe the underlying offense of obstruction because Texas Penal Code § 36.06 has eight different

elements with “distinct alternatives that may or may not be included in the indictment.” However,

other underlying offenses of capital murder, such as burglary, also have multiple elements and

53

Kellar v. State, 108 S.W.3d 311, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)

54

See Moreno v. State, No. 05-09-00700-CR (Tex. App.—Dallas May 11, 2011, no pet.)

(not designated for publication) (holding that the State was not required to allege the constituent

elements of the underlying offense of obstruction or retaliation in the indictment).

DAVIS—46

potential methods of commission. Davis cites no authority to support his argument that we should

treat indictments in capital murder cases involving the underlying offense of obstruction differently

from capital murders involving other underlying offenses. Moreover, any lack of detail in the

indictment did not harm Davis because, as his counsel’s statements to the trial judge reveal, the

defense received actual notice of the State’s theory of the case regarding the obstruction element.55

Davis, therefore, has not shown that the trial judge erred in denying his motion to quash the

indictment. We overrule point of error five.

MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE

In his sixth point of error, Davis contends the trial judge erred in denying his written motion

for continuance filed on November 1, 2013. He argues that the denial of the motion for continuance

violated his rights to due process of law and effective assistance of counsel under the Fourteenth and

Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

By the time Davis filed the motion for continuance that was denied, the trial judge had

already granted two previous motions for continuance. On October 8, 2012, on defense counsel’s

oral motion, the trial judge reset the trial to August 19, 2013. On August 8, 2013, defense counsel

filed a written motion for continuance stating that certain redacted government records showed it

was “obvious that sexual abuse was occurring” in Davis’s childhood home, though it was “not clear

what kind of abuse, by whom, upon whom.” In response to this motion, the trial judge postponed

Davis’s trial to November 4, 2013.

55

See Smith v. State, 297 S.W.3d 260, 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“The record in this

case clearly shows that appellant had actual notice of the capital charge upon which the State was

basing its allegations.”); Kellar, 108 S.W.3d at 314 (“Given the extensive and detailed discovery

that occurred prior to trial, the appellant had ample notice in addition to that provided by the

indictment.”).

DAVIS—47

Davis’s November 1st motion for continuance stated in relevant part:

It has come to the attention of defense counsel that the Defendant, Mr. Franklin

Davis, has an extensive history of sexual abuse perpetrated upon him. New evidence

has come to light as of the afternoon of October 31, 2013. This evidence is

paramount to the effective representation of Mr. Davis. This evidence must be

investigated for both guilt/innocence issues as well as possible mitigation evidence.

The November motion did not further explain the nature of the evidence, witnesses, or investigation

needed, the diligence used to procure the evidence, or why the evidence could not be procured from

another source, such as Davis himself. The copies of the motion and attached affidavit in the clerk’s

record were not signed by counsel or Davis. The only signature on the document is that of a notary

public who, curiously, certified that defense counsel had signed the unsigned affidavit.

The trial judge observed that the motion was “filed literally at the 11th hour.” The judge

noted that nearly fourteen months had passed since the case had been first assigned to his district

court and that he had already granted Davis two continuances. The judge said that Davis’s August

motion for continuance had stated essentially the same grounds as the instant motion: the need to

investigate newly discovered mitigating evidence suggesting Davis had been sexually abused as a

child. The judge also stated that Davis’s latest motion did not comply with Article 29.07, governing

subsequent motions for continuance by a defendant. The judge commented that the motion appeared

to have been filed for the purpose of obtaining cumulative testimony.

Defense counsel responded that, on October 31, 2013, he was speaking with Davis during

a visit and “things came to light about the defendant’s past which only the defendant could be able

to address specifically,” and these “things” were not contained in the records that were the basis for

the last motion for continuance. Counsel emphasized that “nobody else can testify directly as to

what has happened to Mr. Davis himself . . . . [O]nly he can speak about the acts, about the things

DAVIS—48

that were done to him by the people who did them to him.” Defense counsel explained that they

wanted to explore the psychological impact of the childhood abuse on Davis.

The trial judge confirmed that defense counsel intended to direct their investigators to

continue to investigate this issue throughout the week. The judge asked for daily reports on the

status of that investigation. He then denied the motion for continuance. Subsequently during trial,

before the State completed its presentation of evidence, the trial judge asked defense counsel about

their progress on this investigation. Defense counsel asked to speak to the judge in camera about

this matter. The judge then took a short recess. When the judge and parties returned to the

courtroom, there was no further discussion of the matter on the record and defense counsel did not

renew the request for a continuance.

An appellate court reviews a trial judge’s ruling on a motion for continuance for an abuse of

discretion.56 To establish an abuse of discretion, an appellant must show that he was actually

prejudiced by the denial of his motion.57 Generally, we will conclude that a trial judge’s denial of

a motion for continuance was an abuse of discretion “only if the record shows with considerable

specificity how the defendant was harmed by the absence of more preparation time than he actually

had.”58 In determining whether the denial of a motion for continuance is so arbitrary that it violates

due process, we look at the individual circumstances of each case, especially the reasons presented

56

See TEX . CODE CRIM . PROC. art. 29.06 (providing that the sufficiency of a motion for

continuance shall be addressed to the “sound discretion” of the court and “shall not be granted as

matter of right”); Heiselbetz v. State, 906 S.W.2d 500, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).

57

Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 468 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

58

Gonzales v. State, 304 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

DAVIS—49

to the trial judge at the moment the motion was denied.59

Davis also argues that the trial judge’s denial of his motion for continuance rendered his

attorneys’ performance constitutionally deficient on the issue of mitigation. To prevail on an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must prove: (1) trial counsel’s representation

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness (i.e., deficient performance); and (2) there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the result of the proceeding would have

been different (i.e., prejudice).60 A defendant bears the burden of proving an ineffectiveness claim

by a preponderance of the evidence.61 A reviewing court need not always address both prongs of the

inquiry, because the “[f]ailure to make the required showing of either deficient performance or

sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim.”62

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 29.08 provides that, “All motions for continuance

must be sworn to by a person having personal knowledge of the facts relied on for the continuance.”

Article 29.07 requires that a defendant’s subsequent motion for continuance must comply with all

the requirements for a first motion for continuance set out in Article 29.06, and further must state:

(1) that the testimony sought by the defense cannot be procured from any other source known to the

defendant; and (2) that the defendant has a reasonable expectation of procuring the testimony “at the

next term of the court.” “Mere conclusions and general averments are not sufficient for the court

to determine their materiality, and the motion for continuance must show on its face the materiality

59

Rosales v. State, 841 S.W.2d 368, 374 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).

60

Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812-13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

61

Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813.

62

Id.

DAVIS—50

of the absent testimony.”63 A defendant forfeits his appellate challenge to the trial judge’s denial of

his continuance motion by failing to comply with the procedural requirements set out in these

statutes.64 We have refused to recognize a due process exception to the rule requiring motions for

continuance to be written and sworn in order to be preserved on appeal.65

Davis’s November 1st motion for continuance was not sworn to by any person with personal

knowledge of the facts. Therefore, it did not comply with Article 29.08. In addition, as the trial

judge observed, the motion did not comply with Article 29.07, in that it did not state that the

testimony sought could not be procured from any other source known to the defendant or that the

defendant had a reasonable expectation of procuring the evidence “at the next term of the court.”

Further, the weight of the evidence in this case suggests that Davis did not suffer prejudice

as a result of the denial of his motion for continuance, and no due process violation occurred.

Although this case was undeniably complex, defense counsel and the defense investigator had over

a year to prepare for trial. Davis had already received two continuances, including a lengthy

continuance in part for the purpose of developing childhood sexual-assault evidence. There was no

testimony establishing that defense counsel’s performance was compromised or defense witnesses

were inconvenienced by the judge’s refusal to grant the third continuance. When the trial judge

asked defense counsel during the trial about the status of their investigation into the alleged sexual

abuse, counsel made no complaint on the record that the defense had not been able to progress in its

63

Harrison v. State, 187 S.W.3d 429, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

64

See Anderson v. State, 301 S.W.3d 276, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“Anderson

forfeited his appellate challenge to the trial judge’s denial of his unsworn oral continuance

motion by failing to comply with procedural requirements of Articles 29.03 and 29.08.”).

65

See Blackshear v. State, 385 S.W.3d 589, 591 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (citing

Anderson, 301 S.W.3d at 279).

DAVIS—51

investigation, nor did he renew his request for a continuance. Moreover, defense counsel conceded

that the testimony relevant to the November motion could only come from Davis himself. And when

Davis took the stand in his own defense, he testified that he was “raped” by his grandfather and his

“mentally retarded brother.” The defense also offered other evidence documenting sexual abuse in

Davis’s childhood home.

Under the circumstances, Davis has not demonstrated that he was deprived of due process

or the effective assistance of counsel. We conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion

in denying this motion for continuance, and we overrule Davis’s sixth point of error.

DENIAL OF MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

Search Warrants

In his seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth points of error, Davis contends that the trial judge

erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence obtained as a result of four search warrants for:

(1) photographs and a DNA buccal swab from Davis; (2) items from Arrington’s 2005 Dodge

Stratus; (3) items from Davis and Arrington’s apartment in Irving, Texas; and (4) digital information

from Davis’s T-Mobile phone.

On September 8, 2012, a magistrate signed three search warrants authorizing the search of

Davis’s body for a DNA sample and photographs, Arrington’s Dodge Stratus (which had been driven

by Davis), and Davis and Arrington’s apartment. At this time, officers had not yet found Gray’s

body and were investigating her disappearance as a kidnapping rather than a murder. Thus, the

search warrants alleged the penal offense of kidnapping. These three search warrant affidavits

contained the following factual allegations:

DAVIS—52

On Thursday, September 6, 2012, Shania Ambriehl Gray was last seen at Hebron

High School at 4207 Plano Parkway, Carrollton, Denton County, Texas. She was

attending an after school tutoring class and had received a telephone call from her

mother. Shania Ambriehl Gray told her teacher that she was going to meet her

mother, Sherry James. Shania left the classroom to walk out of the school and meet

her mother, who was waiting in a car. Shania Ambriehl Gray never arrived at her

mother’s car and has not been seen since her tutoring class . . . .

During the course of the investigation, Officers discovered that in 2011, Shania

Ambriehl Gray had reported several Sexual Assault cases to the Mesquite Police

Department. The suspect, Franklin Davis, . . . was arrested and is currently awaiting

trial for these offenses . . . .

Officers obtained Shania Ambriehl Gray’s cellular telephone information due to

exigent circumstances. While investigating the activity on Shania Ambriehl Gray’s

cellular telephone, officers found the telephone number 903-603-8786. During the

time period from September 5, 2012 to September 6, 2012, several calls and texts

were made from Shania Ambriehl Gray’s cellular telephone to cellular telephone

number 903-603-8786.

Officers obtained the cell data for 903-603-8786 due to exigent circumstances. One

of the numbers called by 903-603-8786 was 214-909-8567. Officers called 214-909-

8567 and spoke to Shakeema Morsley. Officers asked Shakeema Morsley if she

could tell them who had been calling her from 903-603-8786. Shakeema Morsley

said that she believed this person was Franklin Davis. Shakeema Morsley knows

Franklin Davis through her friend and work associate, Jawanna Arrington, who is in

a dating relationship with Franklin Davis. Shakeema stated that she strongly

believed this was Franklin Davis due to the content of the communications, which

would only be known to Franklin Davis.

Officers looked at the cellular telephone data for Shania Ambriehl Gray and the 903-

603-8786 [sic], which is believed to belong to Franklin Davis, and found that they

had been in proximity with each other during the same time frame on September 6,

2012. After 5:17 p.m. CST on September 6, 2012 it appears that Shania Ambriehl

Gray’s telephone was turned off.

The affiant further stated that Gray’s mother said Gray had never run away from home, was not

defiant or rebellious, and had indicated that she wanted to attend future school events and to “attain

goals with her family,” suggesting that it was unlikely that Gray had voluntarily left the school and

run away without contacting her mother.

Officers executed the search warrant for Davis and Arrington’s apartment on September 8,

DAVIS—53

2012. They seized two plastic bags of household trash, a black spiral notebook containing personal

writings, miscellaneous paperwork, a black Adidas shirt, black basketball shorts, and a pair of

weightlifting gloves. On September 10, 2012, officers executed the search warrant for the Dodge

Stratus, seizing a bank withdrawal receipt, some trace evidence, fingerprints, and DNA swabs.

Officers executed the warrant for Davis’s DNA sample and photos on September 11, 2012. They

obtained two buccal swabs and several photographs of Davis, including photos taken at the jail of

an injury to his arm and his shirtless chest displaying a “Wish” tattoo.

The fourth search warrant affidavit was signed by Detective Williams on September 12,

2012, after officers found Gray’s body and after Davis confessed to murdering Gray. Williams

stated in the affidavit that Davis voluntarily gave his T-Mobile phone to officers at the Carrollton

Police Department. Williams relied in large part on statements Davis had made during his interview

with Detective Chevallier, in which Davis admitted taking Gray from her school, shooting her, and

killing her. Williams said that Davis admitted in this interview that he adopted a false identity, used

a prepaid cell phone to talk to Gray, and recorded those conversations on his T-Mobile phone. This

warrant was used to obtain the contents of Davis’s T-Mobile phone, including digital images,

recordings, and internet search history.

Davis filed four motions to suppress all the evidence obtained through the four search

warrants. He argued that the warrants, the associated affidavits, and the execution and return of the

warrants violated his constitutional and statutory rights “under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments

to the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution, and Article 38.23”

because the affidavits did not show probable cause to conclude that “the alleged contraband would

be found in a particular place.”

In the hearing on Davis’s motions to suppress, Davis’s counsel maintained that the search

DAVIS—54

warrant affidavits were deficient because they did not allege facts showing that a crime had been

committed and did not allege that there was anything that could be used for comparison with Davis’s

DNA. Further, Davis’s counsel argued that the affidavits did not establish any basis for the police

“to believe that this individual, Shamica Mosley [sic], is credible or that what they [sic] tell them

actually helps them in any way.” He argued that the facts stated in the affidavits did not collectively

amount to probable cause. Finally, he argued, without elaboration, that the fourth warrant affidavit

relied on information unlawfully obtained through the first three search warrants.

The State responded that the affidavits alleged facts showing a kidnapping and that

investigators reasonably expected to compare Davis’s DNA to evidence obtained in the future. The

prosecutor pointed out that Shakeema Morsley personally knew Davis and “strongly believe[d]” that

he was the person who was using the 903 area-code number to contact her in September 2012. In

the event that the trial judge felt that the motions to suppress had merit, the prosecutor asked to be

allowed to call Arrington to testify that she gave consent to the searches of her Dodge Stratus and

their apartment. At trial, Arrington testified that she consented to allowing the police to retain her

Dodge Stratus for processing, but there is no indication that evidence establishing her consent to the

search was before the magistrate when he signed the warrants or the trial judge when he ruled on the

motions to suppress.

The trial judge entered findings of fact regarding Davis’s motions to suppress evidence,

including the following:

3. . . . . Detective D. Williams, who investigated the victim’s disappearance,

determined that the victim had previously reported several sexual assault cases to the

Mesquite Police Department by the Defendant, Franklin B. Davis. Based on the

existence of these charges, Detective D. Williams contacted Detective Cook to assist

with the investigation.

DAVIS—55

4. The victim’s mother informed the officers that the victim has never before run

away from home, even during the time that led up to her outcry about the alleged

sexual assaults by the Defendant. Her mother also indicated that she has never been

defiant or rebellious and that she had plans to attend future school events and to

attain goals with her family. Based on this information, the officers surmised that the

victim did not leave the school voluntarily.

5. Detective Cook, an experienced and seasoned officer, along with other officers

then obtained the cell phone records of the victim, including those calls made or

received the day before and the day of her disappearance. On both the day before

and the day of her disappearance the victim made several calls and texts to a cellular

number with a 903 area code. Officers then obtained the cell phone data for the cell

phone with the 903 area code and found that this phone had made phone calls to a

214 phone number. The Officers contacted the owner of the 214 area code cell and

determined that Shakeema Morsley, [sic] was the owner of the 214 area code phone.

Ms. Morsley informed officers that she had been receiving phone calls from Franklin

Davis on the 903 area code phone. Ms. Morsley knew the identity of Franklin Davis

because, at the time, he was dating a friend and work associate of Ms. Morsley. Ms.

Morsley based her identification of the Defendant on the content of the

communications with him.

6. Officers, while looking at the cellular phone data for the cell phone of the victim

and that of the Defendant, determined that the phones were in close proximity to each

other during the same time frame on the date of the victim’s disappearance.

Concluding that the affidavits stated probable cause supporting the search warrants, the judge denied

the motions to suppress the photographs of Davis, the items seized from the Dodge Stratus, the items

seized from the apartment, and the contents of Davis’s T-Mobile phone. The judge found that the

affidavit for the search warrant for Davis’s DNA sample did not provide probable cause for

obtaining the buccal swabs specifically, though the judge found that the affidavit did set forth

“sufficient facts to establish probable cause to show that . . . a specific offense had been committed.”

Thus, the judge ruled that the DNA buccal swab evidence would not be admitted at trial.

We have recently set out the law relating to the probable cause required for the issuance of

a search warrant:

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution mandates that “no

Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and

DAVIS—56

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be

seized.” Probable cause exists when, under the totality of the circumstances, there

is a fair probability or substantial chance that contraband or evidence of a crime will

be found at the specified location. It is a flexible and nondemanding standard.66

We also set forth the standard of review applicable to a trial judge’s ruling on a motion to suppress

evidence:

While an appellate court typically reviews a trial judge’s motion-to- suppress ruling

under a bifurcated standard, a trial court’s determination whether probable cause

exists to support a search warrant’s issuance is constrained solely to the affidavit’s

four corners. When we review a magistrate’s decision to issue a warrant, we apply

a highly deferential standard of review because of the constitutional preference for

searches conducted pursuant to a warrant over warrantless searches. Provided the

magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed, we will

uphold the magistrate’s probable-cause determination. The magistrate may interpret

the affidavit in a non-technical, common-sense manner and may draw reasonable

inferences solely from the facts and circumstances contained within the affidavit’s

four corners. Appellate courts should not invalidate a warrant by interpreting the

affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than a common-sense, manner. When in doubt,

the appellate court should defer to all reasonable inferences that the magistrate could

have made.67

If a trial judge’s ruling regarding a motion to suppress is reasonably supported by the record and is

correct under any theory of law applicable to the case, the reviewing court must affirm it.68

Davis contends on appeal that the affidavits associated with the search warrants for the DNA

sample and photographs, the Dodge Stratus, and the apartment did not set out sufficient facts

connecting him to Gray’s disappearance. He argues that the only connection between him and

Gray’s disappearance found in the four corners of the affidavits, other than the ongoing sexual

assault case, was the statement of Shakeema Morsley, a coworker of Arrington. Davis argues

66

Bonds v. State, 403 S.W.3d 867, 872-73 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (internal citations

omitted).

67

Id. at 873 (internal citations omitted).

68

Young, 283 S.W.3d at 873.

DAVIS—57

Morsley’s identification of him as the person who contacted her using the 903 area-code number was

not reliable. He complains Morsley merely deduced that he was the person who contacted her based

on the content of their “communications.”

Davis analogizes the information Morsley provided to a tip from an anonymous informant.

He emphasizes that the affidavit refers to a single telephone conversation between police and

Morsley in which “no one has any knowledge of who the person is that identifies themselves as Ms.

Morsley.” He contends that the information she provided must be corroborated because the record

suggests that she was not truthful, accurate, or reliable. Specifically, Davis points to the fact that

Morsley described his relationship with Arrington as a “dating relationship,” when he and Arrington

were actually married. Therefore, he argues, the trial judge should have suppressed the evidence

obtained from these three warrants.

Tips obtained “from anonymous or first-time confidential informants of unknown reliability

must be coupled with facts from which an inference may be drawn that the informant is credible or

that his information is reliable.”69 However, this requirement does not apply to information obtained

from citizens who freely share the information with police without withholding their names.70 The

latter type of witness, sometimes referred to as a “citizen-informer,” is “presumed to speak with the

voice of honesty and accuracy.”71

69

State v. Duarte, 389 S.W.3d 349, 357 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

70

West v. State, 720 S.W.2d 511, 513 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (“We decline the

invitation to view with the same suspicion usually reserved for anonymous police informants

with an unproven record of reliability information given by citizens who report a crime then

freely share what information they have with police without withholding their own names.”).

71

Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at 356; see also Esco v. State, 668 S.W.2d 358, 360-61 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1982) (“As the Court has consistently stated, where a named informant is a private

(continued...)

DAVIS—58

Morsley displayed none of the characteristics that we have held to render anonymous

informants suspect. Her involvement with this case was happenstance, based on the fact that Davis

chose to contact her, on or near the day Gray was abducted and killed, using the same phone with

which he contacted Gray. Morsley did not insist on remaining anonymous and, in fact, freely

identified herself by name when an officer called her on her phone. The affidavit contains her name

and her phone number. Davis has pointed to no evidence suggesting that Morsley had any motive

to falsely identify herself, to falsely implicate him, or to mislead police in their investigation.

Therefore, Morsley is the type of citizen informer to whom we generally accord a presumption of

honesty and reliability. We see no reason to abandon this presumption in this case.

Further, contrary to Davis’s assertions, Morsley’s identification of the 903 caller through the

content of their conversations, which would be known only to Davis, was not inherently unreliable.

We have long held that, when the content of a telephone conversation is offered into evidence, “the

identity of the speaker is sufficiently established if the message reveals that the speaker has

knowledge of facts that only the speaker would be likely to know.”72

Moreover, Detective Cook’s statement, that Morsley indicated that Davis and Arrington were

in a “dating relationship,” did not render the information that Morsley provided unreliable. The

record reflects that Davis and Arrington had only been married for approximately one month when

he was arrested for the sexual assaults. Evidence elsewhere in the trial record shows that Morsley

told the detectives about Arrington’s marriage to Davis. This fact suggests that the failure to

71

(...continued)

citizen whose only contact with the police is a result of having witnessed a criminal act

committed by another, the credibility and reliability of the information is inherent.”).

72

Earnhart v. State, 582 S.W.2d 444, 448-49 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).

DAVIS—59

mention their marriage in the affidavit was an oversight on the affiant’s part rather than a

misstatement by Morsley.73 However, this information was not known to the magistrate when he

signed these warrants, and we do not consider it in our review of the magistrate’s assessment of

probable cause. In any case, the reference to Arrington and Davis having a dating relationship was

not integral to the probable-cause determination. The affidavits made it clear that Morsley knew

Davis through her friend and coworker, Arrington, and was able to deduce from the content of their

conversations that he was the person using the 903 phone number.

In addition to Morsley’s identification of Davis as the 903 caller, the affidavits informed the

magistrate that Gray had disappeared suddenly from her high school campus, even though her

mother was waiting for her in front of the school. She was not a defiant child and had never before

run away from home. She had reported to the Mesquite Police Department that Davis had sexually

assaulted her on several occasions. Davis had been arrested on those charges, and he was awaiting

trial on them when Gray disappeared. Gray communicated through calls and text messages with the

903 number on the day of her disappearance and the previous day. Telephone records also showed

that the 903 phone and Gray’s phone had been in proximity to each other when some of those

communications occurred. Under the circumstances, the magistrate had a substantial basis for

concluding that probable cause existed to suspect that Gray had been kidnapped, that Davis was

involved in her abduction, and that evidence of that crime might be found in his apartment or in the

vehicle he drove. We conclude that the trial judge did not err in finding that these search warrant

affidavits stated probable cause.

73

See Dancy v. State, 728 S.W.2d 772, 783 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (“A misstatement in

an affidavit that is merely the result of simple negligence or inadvertence, as opposed to reckless

disregard for the truth, will not render invalid the warrant based on it.”).

DAVIS—60

Further, the only evidence obtained through the execution of the search warrant for the DNA

sample and photos was the buccal swabs and the photographs of Davis that were taken in the jail.

The trial judge granted Davis’s motion to suppress the buccal swab evidence, and defense counsel

affirmatively stated “no objection” when the State offered the photographs of Davis at trial. Even

when the witness described the particular photographs, defense counsel did not object or refer to his

pretrial motion to suppress. Under these circumstances, Davis has waived any error in their

admission.74

After Gray’s body was recovered, authorities obtained a search warrant for the digital

contents of Davis’s T-Mobile phone. Davis argues this warrant was invalid because the

accompanying affidavit was based on officers’ conversations with him which “pertained directly to”

evidence secured through executing the first three warrants. Davis, however, specifies no particular

facts or evidence, and provides no further explanation of what information in this affidavit was

allegedly derived from evidence seized in the first three searches. Thus, he has not adequately

briefed this claim.75

In any event, the warrant affidavit contains ample probable cause independent of any

evidence obtained through the execution of the first three warrants.76 The affiant, Detective

74

See Thomas v. State, 408 S.W.3d 877, 885-86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“[I]f from the

record as a whole the appellate court simply cannot tell whether an abandonment was intended or

understood, then, consistent with prior case law, it should regard the ‘no objection’ statement to

be a waiver of the earlier-preserved error . . . . [T]he affirmative ‘no objection’ statement will, by

itself, serve as an unequivocal indication that a waiver was both intended and understood.”).

75

See TEX . R. APP. P. 38.1; see also Busby v. State, 253 S.W.3d 661, 673 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2008) (holding that this Court has no obligation to “construct and compose” a party’s

“issues, facts, and arguments with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record”).

76

See Brown v. State, 605 S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (“[I]n cases where

(continued...)

DAVIS—61

Williams, relied in large part on statements made by Davis in his interviews with detectives. In these

interviews, Davis described the text messages on his T-Mobile phone—later shown to have been

generated by the fake text message application—and stated that he used his phone to record

conversations he had with Gray. In subsequent interviews, Davis confessed that he took Gray from

Hebron High School, shot her twice, and stepped on her neck. Therefore, the magistrate reasonably

surmised that Davis had murdered Gray and that evidence relevant to the murder would be found

on his T-Mobile phone.

The trial judge did not err in denying Davis’s motions to suppress the evidence obtained

through the execution of these search warrants. We overrule Davis’s seventh, eighth, ninth, and

tenth points of error.

Photographs of Gray’s Body

In Davis’s twelfth point of error, he complains that the trial judge erred in overruling his

objections to State’s Exhibits 40 and 41, which are photographs of Gray’s body. When the State

offered these exhibits, counsel argued that they were prejudicial and did not have probative value.

Counsel asked the trial judge to “do a 403 balancing test” with regard to these two photos.77 The

judge viewed the photos, stated that he found that their probative value substantially outweighed

their prejudicial effect, and overruled counsel’s objection.

Davis argues on appeal that these two photographs, which depict Gray’s body floating in the

river face down, were “extremely gruesome.” He asserts that the trial judge erred in allowing the

76

(...continued)

search warrants have been issued on the basis of an affidavit that included tainted information,

. . . the warrant is nonetheless valid if it clearly could have been issued on the basis of the

untainted information in the affidavit.”).

77

See TEX . R. EVID . 403.

DAVIS—62

State to introduce them because their introduction was “meant to appeal to emotion rather than the

fact[-]finding process.” He also contends that the prejudicial effect of these photographs “far

outweighed any possible probative value.” He emphasizes that Gray’s cause of death was not

controverted in this case.

The admissibility of a photograph is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.78 We have

held that a photograph is generally admissible if verbal testimony as to matters depicted in the

photographs is also admissible.79 In other words, if verbal testimony is relevant, photographs of the

same subject matter are also most likely relevant.80 Davis did not dispute the cause of death in this

case and admitted killing Gray. Nevertheless, his plea of “not guilty” to capital murder placed every

element of the offense in issue.81 Despite a defendant’s admission of various elemental facts, when

he pleads “not guilty,” the State retains the right—and indeed the burden—to endeavor to prove the

essential elements of the offense, including the victim’s cause of death, beyond a reasonable doubt.82

At the time of trial, Rule 403 provided, “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if

its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the

issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of

78

Sonnier v. State, 913 S.W.2d 511, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).

79

See Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

80

See Emery v. State, 881 S.W.2d 702, 710 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).

81

See TEX . CODE CRIM . PROC. art. 27.17 (“The plea of not guilty shall be construed to be

a denial of every material allegation in the indictment or information.”).

82

See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186-87 (1997) (“[T]he prosecution is

entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice, or, more exactly . . . a criminal defendant

may not stipulate or admit his way out of the full evidentiary force of the case as the Government

chooses to present it.”).

DAVIS—63

cumulative evidence.” Once a Rule 403 objection has been made, the trial judge is called upon to

weigh the probative value of the evidence against its potential for “unfair prejudice.”83 Rule 403

favors the admissibility of relevant evidence.84

A trial judge may consider several factors in determining whether the probative value of

photographs is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. These factors include the

number of exhibits offered, their gruesomeness, their detail, their size, whether they are black and

white or color, whether they are close-up, whether the body depicted is naked or clothed, and the

availability of other means of proof.85 Testimony and photographs of the crime scene can aid the

jurors in determining facts such as the manner and means of the victim’s death and the force used.86

The two photographs at issue appear to be approximately eight by ten inches in size. They

reveal the condition of Gray’s torso, her hair braids, and the clothes she was wearing when the

officer discovered her floating face down in the river. These photos are not unduly bloody or

gruesome. Gray is clothed and the photos do not show any part of her face or provide a close-up

perspective of her wounds. These two photographs essentially illustrate factual details concerning

Gray’s appearance, circumstances, location, and cause of death that the State also introduced through

the testimony of the officer who found the body and various other witnesses.87 Davis argued that

two other photos (State’s Exhibits 38 and 39), which were admitted without objection, adequately

83

Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh’g).

84

Long v. State, 823 S.W.2d 259, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (citing Montgomery, 810

S.W.2d at 389).

85

Williams, 958 S.W.2d at 196.

86

Id. at 195.

87

See Williams v. State, 301 S.W.3d 675, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

DAVIS—64

showed the terrain where the body was found and thus Exhibits 40 and 41 added no probative value.

However, in Exhibits 38 and 39, Gray’s body was distant and not clearly identifiable.

Davis refers us to our opinion in Wyatt v. State,88 but Wyatt does not support his contentions.

In Wyatt, we held that a trial judge did not err in admitting two pictures of the deceased child

victim’s anus. We noted that the photos showed the victim’s injuries and corroborated the

appellant’s confession.89 In this case, the complained-of photos similarly corroborated both the

investigating officers’ testimony and Davis’s confession, in which he admitted shooting Gray in a

park along the river and then rolling her into the river.

To the extent that Gray’s gunshot wound is visible and her body appears bloated in these

images, these aspects of the condition of the body were the direct result of Davis’s actions. We have

held that, “when the power of the visible evidence emanates from nothing more than what the

defendant has himself done we cannot hold that the trial court has abused its discretion merely

because it admitted the evidence.”90

Under the circumstances, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in deciding that the

probative value of the photographs substantially outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice. Davis’s

twelfth point of error is overruled.

EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE

In points of error thirteen through eighteen, Davis complains that the trial judge erred in

sustaining the State’s objections and refusing to admit certain recordings, which Davis refers to as

88

23 S.W.3d 18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

89

Id. at 29.

90

Sonnier, 913 S.W.2d at 519.

DAVIS—65

Defense Exhibits A, B, C, E, F, and G. (Davis does not contest the trial judge’s exclusion of

Defense Exhibit D.) Before Davis’s counsel offered these exhibits, the State had offered into

evidence—and played for the jury—a recording of a telephone conversation between Davis, posing

as a young man known as “D,” and Gray (State’s Exhibit 19A). Davis had secretly recorded the

conversation using his T-Mobile phone while speaking with Gray on the go phone he had purchased.

In State’s Exhibit 19A, “D” and Gray discussed the sexual assaults committed against Gray and their

impact on Gray’s life. Defense Exhibits A, B, C, E, F, and G were other surreptitiously-recorded

telephone conversations between Gray and Davis (pretending to be “D”) that were stored on Davis’s

T-Mobile phone. Davis argues that the judge’s refusal to admit these exhibits denied him his

constitutional right to due process and a fair trial.

The record initially received by this Court did not contain any exhibits labeled as Defense

Exhibits A, B, C, E, F, and G that matched the descriptions of the complained-of recordings in the

parties’ briefs and the reporter’s record. Upon a request by this Court for the exhibits at issue, the

Dallas County Clerk’s Office submitted State’s Exhibit 18, a DVD which was admitted by the trial

judge “for record purposes” only at trial. State’s Exhibit 18 contains an electronic file folder of

recordings that match the descriptions of the complained-of defense exhibits, though the recordings

are not labeled as Defense Exhibits A, B, C, E, F, or G. We will assume that the recordings

contained in State’s Exhibit 18 are the exhibits Davis complains were erroneously excluded from

evidence.91

91

See TEX . R. APP. P. 34.6(d) (“If anything relevant is omitted from the reporter’s record,

the trial court, the appellate court, or any party may by letter direct the official court reporter to

prepare, certify, and file in the appellate court a supplemental reporter’s record containing the

omitted items. Any supplemental reporter’s record is part of the appellate record.”); see also

Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 675 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“It was, however, appellant’s

(continued...)

DAVIS—66

In these recordings, Gray and “D” do not discuss the sexual assaults or Davis, but they do discuss

Gray’s romantic involvement with other men and other unrelated matters. Many of Gray’s

statements are not clearly audible or intelligible.

The record reflects that, during the cross-examination of Detective Williams, defense counsel

attempted to offer these recordings into evidence and the prosecutor objected. Defense counsel

responded that the recordings were relevant to statements made by Gray during the DCAC interview

that “the first time she ever had sex was with Franklin Davis.” The prosecutor disputed this

assertion. The trial judge asked the parties to try to “work something out” over the lunch hour. They

returned from lunch without reconciling their differences regarding the admissibility of these items.

The prosecutor then made specific objections to the six defense exhibits, including objections on the

basis of hearsay, lack of relevance, and violations of Rules 403 and 412. The trial judge considered

counsel’s arguments as to each of the six exhibits and ultimately sustained the State’s objections

with regard to all of them.92 Defense counsel then offered all of these exhibits “for the record” and

the trial judge admitted them for that limited purpose.

On appeal, Davis argues that all six of these recordings should have been admitted under

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.36(a) to explain the circumstances surrounding the

killing. In relevant part, Article 38.36(a) provides:

91

(...continued)

burden to bring forward a record on appeal sufficient to show that the trial court erred in his

ruling on the motion to suppress.”); Rowell v. State, 66 S.W.3d 279, 282-83 (Tex. Crim. App.

2001) (“The rule permits and requires each party to see that the reporter’s record contains all that

the appellate court needs,” and “the court of appeals was permitted to decide this appeal on the

basis of the record that the parties chose to file.”).

92

See Alford v. State, 400 S.W.3d 924, 929 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“[W]e uphold the

trial court’s ruling under any applicable theory of law supported by the facts of the case.”).

DAVIS—67

In all prosecutions for murder, the state or the defendant shall be permitted to offer

testimony as to all relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and the

previous relationship existing between the accused and the deceased, together with

all relevant facts and circumstances going to show the condition of the mind of the

accused at the time of the offense.

As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record must show that

the party “stated the grounds for the ruling that [he] sought from the trial court with sufficient

specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint.”93 Further, we have held that “it is not

enough to tell the judge that evidence is admissible. The proponent, if he is the losing party on

appeal, must have told the judge why the evidence was admissible.”94 Davis did not mention Article

38.36(a) when he argued for the admission of these recordings at trial. Although he argued that the

evidence would reveal Gray’s state of mind, he did not say that the proffered recordings concerned

his previous relationship with Gray or the condition of his mind at the time of the offense.

Therefore, his Article 38.36(a) claim on appeal does not comport with his arguments at trial and he

did not properly preserve this claim for our review.95

Further, evidence which is admissible under Article 38.36(a) may nevertheless be excluded

if its admission would violate Rule 403.96 The proffered recordings did not include any discussion

of the sexual-assault charges or reveal that Gray had any motive to testify falsely against Davis. The

trial judge could have reasonably concluded that this evidence was not material to the charged

93

TEX . R. APP . P. 33.1.

94

Reyna v. State, 168 S.W.3d 173, 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

95

See TEX . R. APP. P. 33.1(a).

96

See Smith v. State, 5 S.W.3d 673, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Jackson v. State, 160

S.W.3d 568, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“[In] Smith v. State . . . we stated that evidence

admissible under Article 38.36(a) may be excluded under Rule 403.”).

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offense and its probative value was low. Morever, because the conversations in the recordings

touched on Gray’s other sexual partners, her family life, and personal matters unrelated to the

offense at bar, the judge could have reasonably concluded that the danger of unfair prejudice,

confusing the issues, misleading the jury, and undue delay was high. Davis essentially admitted

during cross-examination that a key purpose for offering these recordings was to impugn Gray’s

character by revealing to the jury her sexual conduct with other men. The inflammatory and

prejudicial nature of this evidence substantially outweighed any minimal probative value it may have

had.

Davis also cites Saunders v. State,97 in which the Dallas Court of Appeals held under the

predecessor statute to Article 38.36 that the trial judge erred in excluding evidence of aggressive

conduct by the deceased against the defendant and words exchanged between them immediately

before the killing. Saunders offered that evidence at the punishment phase of the trial to explain the

circumstances surrounding the murder. Davis suggests that, like Saunders, he did not offer Gray’s

statements in the recordings for the truth of the matters asserted therein, but rather as proof that she

made the statements and to explain the circumstances surrounding the killing. Again, Davis did not

cite this case or the referenced statute as a ground for admitting the evidence at trial. Therefore, he

failed to preserve error.98

Additionally, Saunders is markedly distinguishable from the case at hand. The recordings

at issue were made weeks before Davis killed Gray. They do not include any discussion of Gray’s

relationship with Davis, evidence of an altercation between Davis and Gray, or any motive or bias

97

687 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, pet. ref’d).

98

See also McQuarrie, 380 S.W.3d at 153 (stating that this Court is not bound by

decisions of courts of appeals).

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Gray may have had against Davis. In short, the statements made by Gray in these recordings do not

illuminate the immediate circumstances surrounding Gray’s murder. Further, Davis’s testimony at

trial suggests that he intended to offer at least some of the remarks in the recordings for the truth of

the matters asserted. For example, he wanted the jury to believe the statements in these recordings

that Gray had sexual relationships with other men. By definition, the exhibits contained

inadmissible hearsay.99

With regard to Exhibit A, Davis insists that the exhibit was not submitted for the truth of the

matters asserted, but to show “[Gray’s] state of mind concerning her mindset as to its preoccupation

with sexual activity and contributed to show how she fabricated the accusations of sexual

misconduct” against him. Other than Gray’s pre-recorded voicemail greeting, Davis’s statement

announcing that he was calling Gray in order to “pretty much prove [his] innocence in this charge”

comprises the only substantive spoken content on this recording. As such, this exhibit consisted

primarily of a self-serving, out-of-court statement by Davis offered for the truth of the matter

asserted, i.e., his assertion that he was innocent of the sexual assault charges. The recording does

not contain any statement by Gray about her “then-existing state of mind” or her “emotional,

sensory, or physical condition.”100 Also, defense counsel did not respond to the State’s hearsay

objection by informing the trial judge that he was not offering the exhibit for the truth of the matter

asserted. Davis’s claim on appeal again does not comport with his argument at trial.101

With respect to the other exhibits at issue, Davis simply reproduces verbatim several pages

99

See TEX . R. EVID . 801, 802.

100

See TEX . R. EVID . 803(3).

101

See TEX . R. APP . P. 33.1(a).

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from the reporter’s record without elaboration on trial counsel’s legal arguments. To the extent that

Davis repeats trial counsel’s objections without further argument or citation, these claims are

inadequately briefed.102

We conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding the recordings and

Davis has not demonstrated any due process violation. However, even if the trial judge had erred

in excluding this evidence, Davis was not harmed by the judge’s ruling because the information

Davis sought to impart to the jury was admitted elsewhere.103 During cross-examination, the

prosecutor invited Davis to inform the jury of the “important” content of the excluded recordings.

Davis then testified without objection that Gray had sex with a boy while she was supposed to be

at a track meet, had a sexual relationship with a twenty-year-old man who was in the Army, and had

sex when she was thirteen years old. We overrule Davis’s thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth,

seventeenth, and eighteenth points of error.

In Davis’s nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first points of error, he argues that the trial judge

erred in sustaining the State’s objections to testimony from defense witnesses Pastor Arty Hayes,

Ashlye Sams, and Lamar Leggiton. Davis complains that the trial judge abused his discretion in

preventing these witnesses from testifying about his prior consistent statements. Davis contends that

102

TEX . R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the

contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”); Busby, 253

S.W.3d at 673.

103

See TEX . R. APP . P. 44.2(b); see also Brandley v. State, 691 S.W.2d 699, 707 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1985) (where appellant claimed error based on the exclusion of items found in a car,

any error was held to be harmless where a witness’s testimony established exactly what was

found in the car, with the exception of one item); Womble v. State, 618 S.W.2d 59, 62 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1981) (“We agree the statement was not admissible . . . but if we be wrong, the error

was harmless. This court has consistently held reversal is not required by exclusion of evidence

where the same testimony was later admitted without objection.”).

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the proffered out-of-court statements were not hearsay and were admissible under Rule 801(e)(1)(B).

Rule 613(c) mandates that a prior consistent statement of a witness “is inadmissible except

as provided in Rule 801(e)(1)(B).” Rule 613(c) essentially codifies the common law rule against

“bolstering,” which prohibits “the use of prior consistent statements of a witness for the sole purpose

of enhancing his credibility.”104 Rule 801(e)(1)(B) provides that a statement is not hearsay if the

declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination, and the statement is “consistent with

the declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant

of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.”

Reviewing courts employ a four-prong test to determine whether a prior consistent statement

is admissible under Rule 801(e)(1)(B):

(1) the declarant must testify at trial and be subject to cross-examination;

(2) there must be an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or improper

influence or motive of the declarant’s testimony by the opponent;

(3) the proponent must offer a prior statement that is consistent with the declarant’s

challenged in-court testimony; and,

(4) the prior consistent statement must be made prior to the time that the alleged

motive to falsify arose.105

To determine whether the cross-examination of a witness raises an implied charge of recent

fabrication or improper motive, the reviewing court focuses on the “purpose of the impeaching party,

104

See Rivas v. State, 275 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

105

Hammons v. State, 239 S.W.3d 798, 804 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Tome v.

United States, 513 U.S. 150, 156-58 (1995)).

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the surrounding circumstances, and the interpretation put on them by the [trial] court.”106 This Court

has explained that, although Rule 801(e)(1)(B) allows for the admission of prior consistent

statements to rebut allegations of improper influence or motive, a “statement made after the alleged

motive to fabricate arose does not rebut the allegation.”107 We review the trial judge’s determination

whether a prior consistent statement is admissible for abuse of discretion.108 The trial judge’s

decision will be upheld if it falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement.109

Defense counsel informed the trial judge that he anticipated Pastor Hayes would testify

“about what Franklin Davis did in the meantime after the sexual assaults arose but before the murder

case and what [Hayes] had done to counsel [Davis], what he had talked about with [Davis].” The

judge asked defense counsel, “How is the [witness] talking with the defendant not being offered by

the defendant and therefore subject to [the] hearsay rule?” Defense counsel responded that the

defense would not ask specifically what was said, but “what exactly happened.” Counsel explained:

“We don’t believe it’s hearsay because it’s his statements about exactly what he was going through

firsthand from the defendant.” Counsel further asserted that the proffer met each of the four prongs

in the test set out in Hammons v. State.110 With regard to the fourth prong, he specifically argued that

the prior consistent statements were made “prior to the time that the supposed motive to falsify arose,

which was the murder charge.”

106

Id. at 808.

107

Haughton v. State, 805 S.W.2d 405, 408 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).

108

Hammons, 239 S.W.3d at 806.

109

See Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 390-92.

110

Hammons, 239 S.W.3d at 808.

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The prosecutor objected that the defendant’s prior out-of-court declarations of innocence

were hearsay, and disputed whether the defense had met the required predicate to offer them as prior

consistent statements: “These denials have been throughout, so there’s no recent fabrication aspect

to it.” The prosecutor further objected on the basis of relevance to Hayes’s anticipated testimony

about Davis receiving counseling. The trial judge overruled the State’s relevance objection and

allowed Hayes to testify about providing counseling to Davis. However, he sustained the State’s

predicate objection and ruled that Hayes would not be permitted to testify about Davis’s prior

consistent statements.

The judge allowed the defense to put on an offer of proof showing the prior consistent

statement that Hayes would have recounted. Hayes testified outside the presence of the jury that he

was Davis’s sister’s husband. He said he had counseled Davis when Davis came to him for guidance

after being accused of four counts of sexual assault. Hayes said Davis told him that he did not

commit the sexual assaults. The trial judge warned Hayes not to testify before the jury about Davis’s

claims that he was innocent of the sexual assault charges.

However, Hayes then testified before the jury not only about providing counseling to Davis

concerning the pending sexual assault charges, but also about Davis’s claims of innocence.

Specifically, Hayes testified that, when Davis came to him for counseling after being accused of the

sexual assaults, “he was very disturbed about the situation and . . . just wanted to speak with us on

it and—and let us know, you know that[, ‘]I—I’m innocent[,] man. I’m innocent.’” The State did

not object to this testimony. The trial judge reprimanded the witness for testifying to matters he had

been warned not to speak about and cautioned him not to “do it again,” but did not instruct the jury

to disregard this testimony. Hayes went on to testify that he and another pastor had prayed with

DAVIS—74

Davis and his wife over this difficult situation and indicated that he felt sorry for Davis.

Ashlye Sams testified outside the presence of the jury that she had known Davis all of her

life. She said that Davis told her that he did not commit the sexual assaults. Lamar Leggiton

testified outside the presence of the jury that Davis was his best friend. He said that Davis told him

he was not guilty of the sexual assault charges. Leggiton further stated that Davis seemed more and

more distraught as time progressed. Davis could not find a job due to the pending sexual assault

charges and he was afraid of losing his wife. The prosecutor objected that the defense had failed to

lay a proper predicate for the prior consistent statements.

The judge sustained the State’s objections to Sams’s testimony in total and to the prior

consistent statements that Leggiton proposed to relay. The judge ruled that the defense would be

permitted to offer Leggiton’s other testimony concerning Davis’s increasingly distraught mental state

and his various stressors, noting that this evidence supported the defensive theory in the case. The

trial judge then granted defense counsel’s request for time to confer. Following an off-the-record

discussion, the defense proceeded with the presentation of unrelated evidence and then rested

without calling Leggiton to testify.

None of these proffered statements met the fourth prong of the Hammons test because they

were not made “prior to the time that the supposed motive to falsify arose.”111 First, the proffered

statements from these three witnesses were self-serving protestations by Davis that he was innocent

of the sexual-assault charges, not the murder charge. Thus, the relevant motive to fabricate arose

when Davis became aware of the sexual-assault allegations against him, not when he was charged

with murder. The record reflects that Davis made the statements to Hayes, Sams, and Leggiton after

111

See Haughton, 805 S.W.2d at 408.

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he was charged with the four sexual assaults, not after he was charged with the murder—the event

that Davis relies upon to define when the motive to fabricate arose.

Morever, even assuming that the trial judge erred in excluding the proffered testimony, that

error was effectively cured when Hayes violated the judge’s instructions and informed the jury of

Davis’s protestations of innocence. Hayes’s testimony before the jury, which was admitted without

objection, was substantially equivalent to the testimon

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