Spokane Lefcu v. Marcella Barker

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IN RE MARCELLA LEE BARKER, AKA No. 14-60028

Marci Barker, AKA Marci Vanni

Barker, BAP No.

Debtor, 13-1393

SPOKANE LAW ENFORCEMENT OPINION

FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,

Appellant,

v.

MARCELLA LEE BARKER; ROBERT

DRUMMOND, Chapter 13 Trustee;

OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC,

Appellees.

Appeal from the Ninth Circuit

Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

Pappas, Kurtz, and Jury, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 3, 2016

Seattle, Washington

Filed October 27, 2016

Before: William A. Fletcher, Ronald M. Gould,

and N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge N.R. Smith

2 IN RE BARKER

SUMMARY*

Bankruptcy

The panel affirmed the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s

affirmance of the bankruptcy court’s decision to disallow a

creditor’s late-filed claims in a Chapter 13 proceeding.

Agreeing with the Seventh Circuit, the panel held that if

a creditor wishes to participate in the distribution of a

debtor’s assets under a Chapter 13 plan, it must file a timely

proof of claim under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure

3002. The debtor’s acknowledgment of debt owed to the

creditor in a bankruptcy schedule does not relieve the creditor

of this affirmative duty.

COUNSEL

Quentin M. Rhoades (argued) and Francesca di Stefano,

Sullivan Tabaracci & Rhoades P.C., Missoula, Montana, for

Appellant.

Robert Drummond (argued), Great Falls, Montana; Kraig C.

Kazda, Kazda Law Firm P.C., Great Falls, Montana; for

Appellees.

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

IN RE BARKER 3

OPINION

N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

If a creditor wishes to participate in the distribution of a

debtor’s assets under a Chapter 13 plan, it must file a timely

proof of claim. The debtor’s acknowledgment of debt owed

to the creditor in a bankruptcy schedule does not relieve the

creditor of this affirmative duty.

BACKGROUND FACTS

On September 6, 2012, debtor Marcella Lee Barker filed

a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in the United States

Bankruptcy Court for the District of Montana. Later that day,

in response to the filed petition, the bankruptcy court issued

an Official Form B9I, titled “Notice of Chapter 13

Bankruptcy Case, Meeting of Creditors, & Deadlines”

(“Notice”). The Notice stated that the deadline for creditors1

to file a proof of claim was January 8, 2013. On September

8, 2012, the Bankruptcy Noticing Center sent the Notice to

the Appellee, Spokane Law Enforcement Federal Credit

Union (“Credit Union”), by first class mail. On September

19, 2012, Barker timely filed her Chapter 13 plan with the

bankruptcy court.2 According to her attached certificate of

1

As noted in the Notice, a different deadline applies to a proof of

claim filed by a “governmental unit.” See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c)(1).

This alternative deadline is not relevant in this case as Appellee is not a

governmental unit.

2

A Chapter 13 debtor must file a Chapter 13 plan within fourteen

days after filing a Chapter 13 petition. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3015(b).

4 IN RE BARKER

mailing filed with the court, the plan was also sent to the

Credit Union that day via first class mail.

On September 19, 2012, Barker also properly filed

schedules of her assets and liabilities.3 In these schedules,

Barker listed the Credit Union as a secured creditor holding

a $6,646.00 purchase money security interest in a 2004 Ford

F-150. Barker also listed the Credit Union as an unsecured

creditor holding a $47,402.00 claim that had previously been

secured by an unidentified automobile, which Barker’s ex-

husband had sold.

Barker moved to amend and modify the Chapter 13 plan

several times over the next few months. Each time such a

motion was filed, Barker sent a notice to the Credit Union. In

addition, each time the bankruptcy court entered an order

confirming the amended plan, the Bankruptcy Noticing

Center notified the Credit Union.

On May 30, 2013, more than four months after the

deadline to file a proof of claim expired, the Credit Union

filed three claims with the bankruptcy court: a secured claim

for $5,490.78 and unsecured claims for $28,293.94 and

$24,587.47.4 In accordance with the Local Bankruptcy Rules

3

In 2012, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure required

Chapter 13 debtors to list their assets and liabilities on Official Form B6,

and its subparts. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9009. On December 1, 2015,

Official Form B6 was replaced by Official Form B 106. 6 West’s Fed.

Forms, Bankruptcy Courts § 1:20 (4th ed.).

4

The copies of the proofs of claims submitted in the excerpts of

record appear to assert two unsecured claims for $28,293.94 and

$24,587.47. These numbers are inconsistent with the Appellant’s brief

IN RE BARKER 5

for the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of

Montana, the Trustee sent a “Notice of Late Filed Claims” to

the Credit Union on June 7, 2013.5 On June 10, 2013, the

Credit Union requested a hearing “to contest the tardy

response.” In this request, the Credit Union asserted that the

claims were belated, because a “disgruntled employee” failed

to timely file the claim. On July 31, 2013, the Credit Union

filed a formal motion with the bankruptcy court requesting

the court to allow the three claims. The court held a hearing

on the matter on August 2, 2013. The court denied the Credit

Union’s motion and disallowed the claims because the proofs

of claims were not timely filed.

On August 12, 2013, the Credit Union filed a notice of

appeal with the bankruptcy court, and the appeal was taken to

the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”). On

which list the amount of the unsecured claims as $28,293.84 and

$24,597.47.

5

Rule 3002-1 of the Local Bankruptcy Rules for the United States

Bankruptcy Court for the District of Montana provides as follows:

Late filed proofs of claim in Chapter 12 or 13 cases

shall be deemed disallowed, without need for formal

objection by the trustee or a hearing, if the trustee sends

a notice to the late filing creditor using Mont. LBF 21.

If a creditor files a response and requests a hearing

within thirty (30) days of the date of the notice, then the

creditor shall notice the contested matter for hearing

pursuant to Mont. LBR 9013-1 . . . . If the creditor fails

to file a written response to the objection to the late

filed claim within thirty (30) days of the date of the

notice provided by Mont. LBF 21, the failure to

respond shall be deemed an admission that the

objection should be sustained by the Court without

further notice or hearing.

6 IN RE BARKER

March 28, 2014, the BAP affirmed the bankruptcy court’s

decision to disallow the late filed claims. On April 24, 2014,

the Credit Union filed a timely notice of appeal to this court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Whether a claim may be disallowed in a bankruptcy

proceeding on the ground that the proof of claim was not

timely filed pursuant to Rule 3002(c), Fed.R.Bankr.P., is a

question of law subject to de novo review.” IRS v. Osborne

(In re Osborne), 76 F.3d 306, 307 (9th Cir. 1996) (italics

omitted). Whether the Credit Union has asserted an informal

proof of claim is also a question of law subject to de novo

review. See Wright v. Holm (In re Holm), 931 F.2d 620, 622

(9th Cir. 1991).

DISCUSSION

In order to fully understand the intricacies of the legal

questions presented in this case, a short summary of Chapter

13 bankruptcy proceedings is helpful.

A petition filed under Chapter 13 helps overextended

debtors reorganize their debt—while allowing them to keep

their assets—by using “current and future income to repay

creditors in part, or in whole, over the course of a three-to

five-year period.” HSBC Bank USA, Nat’l Ass’n v.

Blendheim (In re Blendheim), 803 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir.

2015). A Chapter 13 case begins, like all other bankruptcy

cases, “with the filing of a petition and the creation of an

estate, which comprises the debtors’ legal and equitable

interests in property.” Id. at 484 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541; Fed.

R. Bankr. P. 1002(a)). As soon as a debtor files a bankruptcy

petition, all entities are immediately prohibited from further

IN RE BARKER 7

pursuing collection efforts against the debtor or the debtor’s

estate. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362). Along with the petition,

a debtor must also file a schedule of assets and liabilities and

a statement of financial affairs. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007(b)(1).

In order to collect a debt from a debtor filing a Chapter 13

bankruptcy petition, an unsecured creditor must file a valid

“proof of claim,” which has gone through the “allowance

process set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 502.” In re Blendheim,

803 F.3d at 484–85. A secured creditor, who wishes to

receive distributions under a Chapter 13 plan, must also file

a valid proof of claim. See id. at 485; see also Schlegel v.

Billingslea (In re Schlegel), 526 B.R. 333, 342–43 (B.A.P.

9th Cir. 2015). However, a secured creditor, who does not

wish to participate in a Chapter 13 plan or who fails to file a

timely proof of claim, does not forfeit its lien. In re

Blendheim, 803 F.3d at 485 (“A creditor with a lien on a

debtor’s property may generally ignore the bankruptcy

proceedings and decline to file a claim without imperiling his

lien, secure in the in rem right that the lien guarantees him

under non-bankruptcy law: the right of foreclosure.”).

A bankruptcy court may disallow a claim for many

reasons, including if the proof of claim was untimely.

11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(9); In re Blendheim, 803 F.3d at 485. In

order for a proof of claim to be timely, a creditor generally

must file it within “90 days after the first date set for the

meeting of creditors.”6 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c). If a

creditor fails to file a timely proof of claim, a debtor or

trustee may file a claim on the creditor’s behalf within thirty

6

There are a handful of exceptions to the deadline for filing proofs of

claims, none of which apply here.

8 IN RE BARKER

days after the creditor’s ninety-day clock has expired. Fed.

R. Bankr. P. 3004.

The Credit Union admits that it filed its proofs of claims

late. Thus, the bankruptcy court properly rejected the claims.

However, it argues that the bankruptcy court still should have

allowed it to participate in the Chapter 13 plan, because

Barker listed the debt she owed the Credit Union in her

bankruptcy schedules. We disagree.

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure clearly

provide that, in the Chapter 13 context, “[a]n unsecured

creditor or an equity security holder must file a proof of claim

or interest for the claim or interest to be allowed.” Fed. R.

Bankr. P. 3002(a) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit has

made it clear that this straightforward language should be

given its “plain meaning” and enforced accordingly.

Gardenhire v. IRS (In re Gardenhire), 209 F.3d 1145, 1148

(9th Cir. 2000). In addition, “in a highly statutory area such

as bankruptcy,” the Ninth Circuit prescribes “[c]lose

adherence to the text of the relevant statutory provisions.” Id.

(“[I]n a Chapter 13 proceeding: ‘Where the statutory

language is clear, our “sole function . . . is to enforce it

according to its terms.”’” (quoting Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S.

464, 471 (1993)). A plain reading of the applicable statutes

and rules places a burden on each Chapter 13 creditor to file

a timely proof of claim. A claim will not be allowed if this

burden is not satisfied.

There is other evidence, besides the plain language of the

statute, that indicates Congress intended to place such a

burden on the creditor. Specifically, a creditor in the Chapter

11 context is not always required to file a proof of claim.

Varela v. Dynamic Brokers, Inc. (In re Dynamic Brokers,

IN RE BARKER 9

Inc.), 293 B.R. 489, 495 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003). Both the

Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and the federal

statutes governing Chapter 11 bankruptcy make clear that “in

chapter 11 cases ‘it shall not be necessary for a creditor’ to

file a proof of claim unless the claim is either not scheduled

or is scheduled as disputed, contingent or unliquidated.” Id.;

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3003(c)(2); 11 U.S.C. § 1111(a). Similar

language (relieving a creditor of the burden of filing a proof

of claim if the debtor has scheduled the claim) is absent from

the rules and statutes governing Chapter 13 bankruptcy. This

purposeful omission indicates Congress’s intent to require all

creditors wishing to enforce their claims to file a proof of

claim in the Chapter 13 context. See Russello v. United

States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here Congress includes

particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in

another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that

Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate

inclusion or exclusion.” (quoting United States v. Wong Kim

Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)).

Bankruptcy schedules serve multiple purposes

independent of a proof of claim and are as vital to the

bankruptcy plan as the proof of claim. Bankruptcy courts use

debtors’ schedules to determine whether debtors are eligible

for the particular relief they seek. Guastella v. Hampton (In

re Guastella), 341 B.R. 908, 918 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006) (“The

debtors’ schedules should be the starting point to a

determination of the debtor’s aggregate debts. . . . However,

the schedules are not dispositive. If the debtors’ schedules

were dispositive, then eligibility could be created by improper

or incomplete scheduling of creditors.” (omission in original)

(quoting Quintana v. IRS (In re Quintana)), 107 B.R. 234,

238–39 n.6 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1989), aff’d, 915 F.2d 513 (9th

Cir. 1990)). Creditors also “rel[y] on the schedules to

10 IN RE BARKER

determine what action, if any, they [will] take in the matter.”

Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 785

(9th Cir. 2001). A creditor may chose not to pursue a claim

after evaluating all of a Chapter 13 debtor’s debts and the

proposed repayment plan. Perry v. Certificate Holders of

Thrift Sav., 320 F.2d 584, 589 (9th Cir. 1963) (“There are

many cases where creditors, although listed on the books of

a bankrupt as such, will not be able to participate on an equal

basis with other general creditors.”). The proof of claim

plays the important role of “alert[ing] the court, trustee, and

other creditors, as well as the debtor, to claims against the

estate,” and the creditor’s intention to enforce the claims. In

re Daystar of Cal., Inc., 122 B.R. 406, 408 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.

1990); see also Adair v. Sherman, 230 F.3d 890, 896 (7th Cir.

2000). Simply put, “[t]he requirement that creditors be

scheduled is not a substitute for the further provision . . . that

creditors’ claims be proved.” Perry, 320 F.2d at 589.

A variety of courts have disallowed creditors’ late filed

claims despite the fact that they were listed on the debtor’s

bankruptcy schedules. See, e.g., Bowden v. Structured Invs.

Co. (In re Bowden), 315 B.R. 903, 907 (Bankr. W.D. Wash.

2004); In re Greenig, 152 F.3d 631, 632–34 (7th Cir. 1998)

(disallowing late filed claim even though debtor listed the

debt in a bankruptcy schedule and the bankruptcy court

confirmed the debtor’s reorganization plan, which included

the debt at issue). We agree with these courts. In a Chapter

13 case, a creditor must file a timely proof of claim in order

to participate in the distribution of the debtor’s assets, even if

the debt was listed in the debtor’s bankruptcy schedules.

IN RE BARKER 11

I. Whether or not Barker’s listing of debt owed to the

Credit Union was a judicial admission, it is not

sufficient to meet the Credit Union’s burden of

affirmatively filing a timely proof of claim.

The Credit Union argues first that, under the doctrine of

judicial admissions, Barker must pay all the debts she listed

in her bankruptcy schedules. The Ninth Circuit has

acknowledged the doctrine of judicial admissions. See Am.

Title Ins. Co. v. Lacelaw Corp., 861 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir.

1988). “Judicial admissions are formal admissions in the

pleadings which have the effect of withdrawing a fact from

issue and dispensing wholly with the need for proof of the

fact.” Id. (quoting Dery v. Gen. Motors Corp. (In re Fordson

Eng’g Corp.), 25 B.R. 506, 509 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982)).

Judicial admissions are “conclusively binding on the party

who made them.” Id.

Although we have acknowledged this doctrine, we have

never declared that a bankruptcy schedule constitutes the

“formal admission” required for the application of the

doctrine. We need not reach this question here either. As

outlined above, a creditor who wishes to participate in a

Chapter 13 plan has an affirmative duty to file a proof of

claim. A debtor’s acknowledgment of debt in a bankruptcy

schedule—whether or not that is a judicial admission—does

not satisfy this affirmative duty. Congress chose to require

Chapter 13 creditors to file proofs of claims that demonstrate

their intent to enforce their claims; a judicial admission by a

debtor does not fulfill this strict requirement or its purpose.

12 IN RE BARKER

II. Barker’s listing of debt owed to the Credit Union in

her bankruptcy schedules does not constitute an

informal proof of claim.

Creditors, failing to file a timely formal proof of claim,

often assert that an informal proof of claim can function to

establish the creditor’s claims. See Cty. of Napa v.

Franciscan Vineyards, Inc. (In re Franciscan Vineyards,

Inc.), 597 F.2d 181, 183 (9th Cir. 1979). The Ninth Circuit

has two requirements for a document to qualify as an

informal proof of claim: (1) the document “must state an

explicit demand showing the nature and amount of the claim

against the estate,” and (2) the document must “evidence an

intent to hold the debtor liable.” Sambo’s Restaurants, Inc.

v. Wheeler (In re Sambo’s Rests., Inc.), 754 F.2d 811, 815

(9th Cir. 1985). Examples of an informal proof of claim are

“demands against the estate” or “correspondence between a

creditor and the trustee or debtor-in-possession which

demonstrate an intent on the part of the creditor to assert a

claim against the bankruptcy estate.” Sullivan v. Town &

Country Home Nursing Servs., Inc. (In re Town & Country

Home Nursing Servs., Inc.), 963 F.2d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir.

1991).

The Credit Union argues that Barker’s listing of debt she

owed to the Credit Union in her bankruptcy schedules

constitutes an informal proof of claim, which is sufficient to

preserve its claims. More specifically, the Credit Union

asserts that there is no requirement that the writing

establishing the informal proof of claim must come from the

creditor.

The Credit Union’s argument ignores the explicit

requirement that the creditor must somehow demonstrate its

IN RE BARKER 13

intent to hold the debtor liable. As explained above, the filing

of a proof of claim (which evidences the creditor’s decision

to hold the debtor liable) plays an important role in Chapter

13 bankruptcy proceedings. This function applies equally to

an informal proof of claim. In order to establish an informal

proof of claim, a creditor must have taken some affirmative

action to assert its claim within the statutorily prescribed time

frame. In re Bowden, 315 B.R. at 907 (rejecting argument

that debtor’s schedules alone suffice to establish an informal

proof of claim). The Credit Union has failed to cite any legal

authority that has held that a debtor’s bankruptcy schedules

alone qualify as an informal proof of claim. Moreover, in all

of the cases the Credit Union cites in support of its position,

the creditors took some sort of affirmative action to

demonstrate their intent to enforce their claims prior to the

filing deadline. See, e.g., Fyne v. Atlas Supply Co., 245 F.2d

107, 108 (4th Cir. 1957) (“We agree that mere knowledge on

the part of the trustee or of the referee in bankruptcy as to the

existence of a claim is not sufficient basis for allowing the

filing of an amended claim nor is the listing of the claim in

the bankrupt’s schedules sufficient. Here, however, there is

much more than this.”); Scottsville Nat’l Bank v. Gilmer (In

re Pitts), 37 F.2d 227, 229 (4th Cir. 1930) (allowing late filed

claim where “the trustee conferred with the officers and the

attorney for the bank frequently with regard to matters

connected with the estate”); Clapp v. Norwest Bank Hastings,

N.A. (In re Clapp), 57 B.R. 921, 924 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986)

(allowing late filed claim where creditor “clearly and

frequently asserted its intention to pursue its claim” in letters

to the debtor’s attorney and in interactions with the court).

Barker’s bankruptcy schedules simply do not meet either

of the prongs required to establish an informal proof of claim.

The Barker-drafted documents are not an explicit demand and

14 IN RE BARKER

do not demonstrate the Credit Union’s intent to hold Barker

liable for the listed debt. Accordingly, we affirm the

bankruptcy court’s conclusion that the informal proof of

claim doctrine does not apply in this case.

III. Barker’s listing of debt owed to the Credit Union

in her bankruptcy schedules does not constitute a

debtor’s proof of claim.

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3004 and 11

U.S.C. § 501(c) provide that, if a creditor does not file a

timely proof of claim, the debtor or trustee may file a proof

of claim for the creditor. The Bankruptcy Rules specifically

require that the debtor’s proof of claim be filed in the thirty

day period immediately following the creditors’ deadline to

file their proofs of claims. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3004. In this

case, the Credit Union’s deadline to file was January 8, 2013.

Therefore, Barker, or the Trustee, had from January 9, 2013,

until February 7, 2013, to file a proof of claim on behalf of

any creditors.

The Credit Union argues that Barker’s bankruptcy

schedules constitute a debtor’s proof of claim. This argument

is not persuasive. First, the bankruptcy schedules

(acknowledging the debt at issue) were not filed within the

applicable thirty-day time frame. Thus, just considering the

issue of timing, Barker’s bankruptcy schedules do not meet

the requirements of Rule 3004.

Timing aside, Barker’s bankruptcy schedules do not

qualify as a debtor’s proof of claim. Congress adopted Rule

3004 in addition to the Rules requiring Chapter 13 debtors to

file schedules of their assets and liabilities. Therefore, Rule

3004 requires that debtors make an additional showing of

IN RE BARKER 15

their desire to include an unasserted claim in their Chapter 13

plan after receiving notice of which creditors intend to

enforce their claims. Barker never made this additional

showing. Therefore, the filing requirements of Rule 3004

have not been satisfied, and Barker’s bankruptcy schedules

do not constitute a debtor’s proof of claim.

IV. The principles of equity do not permit the

bankruptcy court to retroactively extend the

deadline for the Credit Union to file its proofs of

claims.

Finally, the Credit Union argues that equity favors

allowing its claims. Specifically, the Credit Union argues

that, if its claims are not allowed, it will suffer a severe loss

while the other creditors receive an undeserved windfall.

While this may be true, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held

that the deadline to file a proof of claim in a Chapter 13

proceeding is “rigid,” and the bankruptcy court lacks

equitable power to extend this deadline after the fact. In re

Gardenhire, 209 F.3d at 1148 (“Our precedents support the

conclusion that a bankruptcy court lacks equitable discretion

to enlarge the time to file proofs of claim; rather, it may only

enlarge the filing time pursuant to the exceptions set forth in

the Bankruptcy Code and Rules.”); In re Osborne, 76 F.3d at

308; Zidell, Inc. v. Forsch (In re Coastal Alaska Lines, Inc.),

920 F.2d 1428, 1431–33 (9th Cir. 1990); Ledlin v. United

States (In re Tomlan), 102 B.R. 790, 792, 796 (E.D. Wash.

1989), aff’d, 907 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1990).

Further, allowing the bankruptcy court to retroactively

extend the deadline in this case would thwart the purpose of

Chapter 13:

16 IN RE BARKER

The purpose of Chapter 13 is ‘to serve as a

flexible vehicle for the repayment of part or

all of the allowed claims of the debtor.’

(Emphasis added.) Sen.Rept. No. 95–989,

Pub.L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 95th Cong., 2d

Sess. (1978), p. 141, reprinted in U.S. Code

Cong. & Admin.News 1978 at 5787, 5927. In

order to effectuate this purpose, it is essential

that all unsecured creditors seeking payment

under the plan file a proof of claim. A date

certain for such filings is crucial to the ability

to determine the full extent of the debts and

evaluate the efficacy of the plan in light of the

debtor’s assets and foreseeable future

earnings.

In re Tomlan, 102 B.R. at 792 (alteration in orginal).

Barker’s Chapter 13 plan will only be successful if she and

the Trustee “know, early on, what claims must be paid.” Id.

at 794 (quoting In re Goodwin, 58 B.R. 75, 77 (Bankr. D. Me.

1986)). Barker will not get the “fresh start” she seeks if

creditors are continually allowed to add additional claims far

after the deadline to file has expired. Id. (quoting In re

Goodwin, 58 B.R. at 77).

CONCLUSION

In order to participate in distributions of Barker’s assets

under her Chapter 13 plan, the Credit Union was required to

file a proof of claim by the prescribed deadline. Because the

Credit Union’s proof of claims were untimely, the bankruptcy

court properly rejected them.

AFFIRMED.