Roselyne Marikasi v. Loretta Lynch

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 16a0260p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

_________________

ROSELYNE MARIKASI, ┐

Petitioner, │

│

> No. 16-3281

v. │

│

│

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General, │

Respondent. │

┘

On Petition for Review from the

Board of Immigration Appeals.

No. A 096 155 535.

Decided and Filed: October 20, 2016

Before: KEITH, McKEAGUE, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Larisa I. Schneider, Florence, Kentucky, for Petitioner. Alexander J. Lutz,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

DAMON J. KEITH, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Roselyne Marikasi (“Marikasi”) appeals

the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an Immigration Judge’s

(“IJ”) denial of her asylum petition. On August 20, 2014, an IJ denied Marikasi’s application for

asylum, withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) 8 U.S.C.

§ 241(b)(3) and withholding of removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).

The IJ determined that Marikasi was not a credible witness due to inconsistencies in her

testimony and her failure to sufficiently corroborate her claims. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial

1

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of Marikasi’s applications for asylum and withholding of removal on all counts and ordered

Marikasi removed to her native country of Zimbabwe. Marikasi timely appealed the BIA’s

decision on March 24, 2016. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).

For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the BIA.

I. BACKGROUND

Marikasi, a native citizen of Zimbabwe, legally entered the United States on January 19,

2002 on a non-immigrant visitor’s visa with an expiration date of July 18, 2002. On November

25, 2002, Marikasi filed a form I-589 application for asylum and withholding of removal. Since

she had overstayed her visa, her application was referred to the Immigration Court, and on

September 25, 2003, the Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings

alleging that she was in violation of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). On July 11, 2005,

Marikasi filed an amended Form I-589 application for asylum and withholding of removal.

In her initial application from 2002, when asked whether she had suffered from harm or

mistreatment in the past, Marikasi stated the following:

I got married to a very abusive husband it all started when I kept having

miscarriages and that was when beatings and death threats started from a man I

was living woth [sic] everyday [sic]. He use [sic] to sleep with a knife under the

pillow and he was accusing me of cheating on him and I was causing all the

miscarriages.

She did not check the box provided for “political opinion” as a reason for seeking asylum, but

instead checked “nationality” and “membership in a particular group.” This initial application

made no mention that her husband was a government agent in Zimbabwe or that she or her

husband were members of any political party. In the portion of the application that asked

whether Marikasi had been a member of any organization, such as a political party in Zimbabwe,

she mentioned only the Musasa Project for battered women.

In the 2005 amended application for asylum, Marikasi provided a different answer. In

this application, when asked whether she had suffered from harm or mistreatment in the past,

Marikasi stated:

No. 16-3281 Marikasi v. Lynch Page 3

I was tortured and mistreated by my husband who was a Government agent [in

Zimbabwe] and by members of the ZANU PF [the leading party] because I

belonged to the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) [the opposition party].

My brother was brutalized and killed in 2002 by ZANU PF members because of

my political activities in the MDC.

This time, Marikasi checked the box provided for “political opinion,” “membership in a

particular group,” and “torture convention” as reasons for seeking asylum, but did not check the

box for “nationality.” In response to the question concerning whether she had been involved in

any organizations, such as a political party, Marikasi stated that she belonged to the MDC,

Movement for Democratic Change in Zimbabwe and actively organized meetings, campaigns,

and rallies.

Following the submission of these asylum applications and several corroborating

documents, a hearing was first held before an IJ in 2006. The IJ found that Marikasi was not a

credible witness. The IJ said her story “developed wings,” transitioning from a battered wife’s

story of domestic abuse at the hands of her husband to a political asylum story from an anti-

government activist. As such, the IJ denied Marikasi’s claim for asylum due to its lack of

credibility and deemed her removable.

On appeal in 2011, the BIA remanded the case for further factual development regarding

Marikasi’s claim of domestic abuse.

Following remand in 2014, an IJ once again denied Marikasi asylum and withholding of

removal under the INA and CAT. The 2014 IJ made the following findings concerning

Marikasi’s testimony: (1) Marikasi was inconsistent regarding the number of times she went to

the hospital, when she went to the hospital, and what caused her husband to beat her so badly she

had to go to the hospital; (2) Marikasi was inconsistent with regard to whether she reported the

abuse she suffered; (3) Marikasi was inconsistent regarding her involvement with the Musasa

Project for battered women; (4) Marikasi’s testimony that she went into hiding from her husband

in either April 2001 or October 2001 was inconsistent with evidence in both her initial asylum

application and her amended asylum application; and (5) Marikasi was inconsistent in describing

the reason or reasons why her husband would abuse her. Because domestic abuse was the

No. 16-3281 Marikasi v. Lynch Page 4

central reason for her asylum application, the 2014 IJ held that her inconsistencies, and her stated

explanations for them, warranted an adverse credibility determination.

In addition, the 2014 IJ held that Marikasi did not sufficiently corroborate her claims to

meet her burden of proof on the issue of past persecution. Relevant corroborating documents

included a medical record showing that there was a “scuffle” with her husband, an affidavit from

a former co-worker to whom Marikasi confided regarding the alleged domestic abuse, a letter

from an American psychologist reporting anxiety related to domestic abuse and a diagnosis of

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”), and a letter from a doctor in Zimbabwe reporting

“political violence” she allegedly suffered in 2001. The BIA affirmed the IJ after according

limited weight to the individualized evidence of corroboration proffered by Marikasi.

The 2014 IJ, however, made the following determinations in Marikasi’s favor: (1) the

Zimbabwean government is unable or unwilling to control domestic violence, and (2) women

who suffer from domestic violence in Zimbabwe at the hands of a domestic partner and are

unable to leave are sufficiently “particular” and therefore meet the requisite “social distinction”

for asylum purposes. However, the 2014 IJ found that Marikasi was unable to demonstrate that

her status in the domestic relationship with her husband was or is immutable because she could

not show that she was unable to leave the abusive relationship and therefore failed to show that

she was a member of this “particular social group.”

Next, the 2014 IJ held that Marikasi also did not meet the higher burden of proof for

showing fear of future persecution. Similarly, the 2014 IJ found that she could not meet the

higher burden required for withholding of removal under the INA or CAT.

Marikasi appealed the 2014 IJ decision to the BIA, which affirmed the IJ and dismissed

the appeal. The BIA concluded that the 2014 IJ’s adverse credibility determination was not

clearly erroneous. The BIA also agreed that Marikasi failed to present sufficient corroborative

evidence to rehabilitate her discredited testimony or independently satisfy her burden of proof.

Further, it held that Marikasi waived the issue of whether she could avoid future persecution by

relocating to another part of Zimbabwe and that she was not a member of an immutable group

No. 16-3281 Marikasi v. Lynch Page 5

based on marital status because she did not show that she was unable to leave the marital

relationship. Accordingly, the BIA dismissed the appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

This court has jurisdiction to review a final order of removal from the BIA pursuant to

8 U.S.C. § 1252. “The agency’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, and

questions of law are reviewed de novo.” Abdurakhmanov v. Holder, 735 F.3d 341, 345 (6th Cir.

2012) (citing Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 2009)). “The BIA’s decisions are

final agency determinations for purposes of judicial review, and we are also empowered to

review the IJ’s opinion to the extent that the BIA adopts that opinion.” Gaye v. Lynch, 788 F.3d

519, 526 (6th Cir. 2015).

“Credibility determinations are considered findings of fact, and are reviewed under the

substantial evidence standard.” Sylla v. I.N.S., 388 F.3d 924, 925 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Yu v.

Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 700 (6th Cir. 2004)). “This is a deferential standard: A reviewing court

should not reverse simply because it is convinced that it would have decided the case

differently.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). Rather, findings of fact, such as adverse credibility

determinations, are “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to

conclude to the contrary.” Liti v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 631, 636 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Yu,

364 F.3d at 702). However, “[a]n adverse credibility finding must be based on issues that go to

the heart of the applicant’s claim.” Id. at 637 (quoting Sylla, 388 F.3d at 926).1 Adverse

credibility determinations “cannot be based on an irrelevant inconsistency.” Daneshvar v.

Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 615, 619 n. 2 (6th Cir. 2004). “If discrepancies cannot be viewed as attempts

by the applicant to enhance [her] claims of persecution, they have no bearing on credibility.” Id.

1

We note that there is a new standard of review for credibility determinations, which was created by the

REAL ID Act of 2005. Under the REAL ID Act, considering the totality of the circumstances and all relevant

factors, a fact finder in an asylum claim may base an adverse credibility determination on an inconsistency,

regardless of whether the inconsistency goes to the “heart of the claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(1)(B)(iii). However,

when an application for asylum is filed before May 11, 2005, the REAL ID Act of 2005 does not apply. See

Abdurakhmanov, 735 F.3d at 345 n.3. Here, Marikasi’s application for asylum was filed in 2002. Thus, the

inconsistencies on which the adverse credibility determination was made must go to the “heart of the applicant’s

claim.” See Sylla, 388 F.3d at 926.

No. 16-3281 Marikasi v. Lynch Page 6

at 623 (quoting Shah v. INS, 220 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000)). Even where several

inconsistencies cited by the IJ are irrelevant or do not go to the heart of the applicant’s asylum

claim, only one relevant inconsistency is required to uphold an adverse credibility determination.

See Sy v. Holder, 337 F. App’x 487, 495 (6th Cir. 2009).

B. Legal Standard

Under the INA, “the Attorney General may grant asylum to an alien who has applied for

asylum” if it is determined that “such an alien is a refugee.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(1)(A).

The applicable definition for refugee includes a person away from her home country “who is

unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the

protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on

account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political

opinion.” Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A). When interpreting the INA, this court defers to the BIA’s

judgment. Castellano-Chacon v. I.N.S., 341 F.3d 533, 546 (6th Cir. 2003) (“we recognize the

deference due the BIA’s interpretation of the INA insofar as it reflects a judgment that is

peculiarly within the BIA’s expertise”) holding modified on other grounds by Almuhtaseb v.

Gonzales, 453 F.3d 743 (6th Cir. 2006).

“The burden of proof is on the applicant to establish that the applicant is a refugee[.]”

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). This burden can be carried “‘either because [s]he has suffered

actual past persecution or because [s]he has a well-founded fear of future persecution.’”

Mikhailevitch v. I.N.S., 146 F.3d 384, 389 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a)-(b)

(1997)). “The applicant’s testimony, if credible, ‘may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof

without corroboration.’” Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (a) (1997)). If past persecution is shown,

“[a]n applicant . . . [establishing] such past persecution shall also be presumed to have a well-

founded fear of persecution on the basis of the original claim.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1).

The INA does not define persecution, but this court has held that it “does not encompass

all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.”

Lumaj v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 574, 577 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation omitted). We have

interpreted “persecution” to require “physical punishment, infliction of harm, or significant

No. 16-3281 Marikasi v. Lynch Page 7

deprivation of liberty.” Mikhailevitch, 146 F.3d at 390. Further, persecuted individuals are those

who are “specifically targeted by the government for abuse based on a statutorily protected

ground and . . . not merely a victim of indiscriminate mistreatment.” Gilaj v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d

275, 285 (6th Cir. 2005).

Likewise, membership in a “particular social group” is statutorily undefined, “but several

[BIA] decisions have refined and articulated the requirements to include: (1) a shared immutable

or fundamental characteristic; (2) social visibility; (3) particularity; and (4) the group cannot be

defined exclusively by the fact that its members have been subject to harm.” Kante v. Holder,

634 F.3d 321, 327 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation and citations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

1) Adverse credibility determination

Marikasi challenges each of the inconsistencies on which the 2014 IJ based the adverse

credibility determination. Because only a single relevant inconsistency that goes to the heart of

the applicants claim, and that “plausibly could be viewed as incredible” or “could be viewed as

inconsistent” need support an IJ’s adverse credibility determination, we will not review each of

these in detail. Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 954 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Sy, 337 F. App’x

at 495. We conclude that Marikasi’s inconsistent statements provide substantial evidence on the

record that “plausibly could be viewed as incredible” or “could be viewed as inconsistent.”

Regarding whether any of these inconsistencies are relevant and go to the heart of

Marikasi’s claim, “[i]f discrepancies cannot be viewed as attempts by the applicant to enhance

. . . claims of persecution, they have no bearing on credibility.” Daneshvar, 355 F.3d at 623.

The hospitalizations recounted by Marikasi were allegedly caused by either her husband’s abuse

or a group of pro-government youths who attacked Marikasi for organizing a political opposition

rally. The BIA found that Marikasi was inconsistent regarding the number of times she was

hospitalized, the dates of her hospitalization, and the reasons for the abuse that led to the

hospitalization. Marikasi also did not mention being hospitalized in her initial asylum

application. Her asylum claim is based on abuse from her husband, who she alleged was a

Central Intelligence Officer for the leading party in Zimbabwean government, the ZANU-PF.

No. 16-3281 Marikasi v. Lynch Page 8

Marikasi’s initial asylum application alleged persecution based on “membership in a particular

social group,” and her amended asylum application alleged persecution on basis of “political

opinion.” These hospitalizations can be viewed as attempts to “enhance [her] claims of

persecution” because evidence of hospitalization can show the “physical punishment, infliction

of harm, or significant deprivation of liberty” required in the context of an asylum claim.

Mikhailevitch, 146 F.3d at 390. If credible, hospitalizations resulting from Marikasi’s domestic

abuse or her political activities would bolster her asylum application and thus her inconsistencies

concerning those hospitalizations go to the heart of her claim. Accordingly, we find that

substantial evidence on the record supported an adverse credibility determination in this case and

we will not disturb those findings on appeal.

Additionally, we agree with the BIA that other important factual inconsistencies between

Marikasi’s asylum application and her testimony supported an adverse credibility determination.

In Marikasi’s initial asylum application, she reported the following:

I got married to a very abusive husband it all started when I kept having

miscarriages and that was when beatings and death threats started from a man I

was living woth [sic] everyday [sic]. He use [sic] to sleep with a knife under the

pillow and he was accusing me of cheating on him and I was causing all the

miscarriages.

Yet, as the BIA noted, Marikasi claimed in her declaration and testimony upon remand that her

husband physically abused her and she subsequently suffered two miscarriages. This differs

significantly from the claim in her first asylum application that the miscarriages predated the

abuse. This inconsistency in the timeline of domestic abuse is relevant and at the heart of

Marikasi’s asylum claim because domestic abuse forms the very basis for her claim. It is of no

moment that Marikasi expressed varying reasons as to why her husband abused her. Yet, alarm

bells rightly toll on account of her variant stories as to when such tragic miscarriages transpired.

Thus, Marikasi’s testimony surrounding her miscarriages “plausibly could be viewed as

incredible” and support IJ’s adverse credibility determination. Pilica, 388 F.3d at 954.

No. 16-3281 Marikasi v. Lynch Page 9

2) Corroborating evidence

The BIA concluded that Marikasi did not present sufficient corroborative evidence to

rehabilitate her discredited testimony or independently satisfy her burden of proof. Marikasi

raises several arguments in response to this determination.

First, Marikasi claims that the BIA ignored the medical records reflecting Petitioner’s

hospitalization in 1999 resulting in her miscarriage due to her beating by her husband. However,

this claim is without merit. In regard to the 1999 medical records, the IJ found that the records

corroborated only the fact that Marikasi was abused by her husband in 1999, but failed to

provide sufficient details to allow the court to determine that the abuse qualified as persecution

under asylum standards. Considering that, oddly, Marikasi failed to discuss the account of the

abuse in 1999 in her initial application or her 2006 hearing, we agree that this medical record,

which reported a “scuffle at home with her husband,” does little to corroborate domestic abuse

rising to the level of persecution, which requires evidence of physical punishment, infliction of

harm, or significant deprivation of liberty. Mikhailevicht, 146 F.3d at 390. Nor does the medical

record clear up the credibility concerns stemming from Marikasi’s inconsistent statements.

In her remaining arguments concerning corroboration, Marikasi essentially argues that

the corroborating evidence should have been afforded more weight. However, the role of this

court is not to weigh the evidence. See Gray v. SLC Coal Co., 176 F.3d 382, 387 (6th Cir. 1999)

(stating that “[w]e should not re-weigh evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the

[factfinder]”). Our role here is to ensure that substantial evidence on the record supported the

BIA’s fact-finding. In this regard, the letters, affidavits, and reports cited in Marikasi’s brief do

not sufficiently corroborate her underlying asylum claim because they fail to fill significant,

relevant gaps in her testimony.

Additionally, Marikasi cites to a Third Circuit case, Fiadjoe v. Attorney Gen. of U.S.,

411 F.3d 135, 137 (3d Cir. 2005), to argue the impact that PTSD can have on the accurate

testimony of women who have been subjected to domestic or sexual violence. However,

comparison to this case is inapposite. Fiadjoe involved a victim later recalling sexual abuse

from when she was seven years old. Id. at 137. The adverse credibility determination in that

No. 16-3281 Marikasi v. Lynch Page 10

case turned in part on allegedly improper conduct by the IJ at her hearing. See id. at 155. In

addition, some of the inconsistencies were based on testimony that was given to an INS officer in

the airport very shortly after she suffered abuse. Id. at 159. Marikasi had a significant amount of

time—almost a year—between her arrival in the United States and filling out her asylum

application, and she claims no partiality or abuse on the part of the IJ. Further, her

psychologist’s note provides no particularized explanation for how PTSD played a role in

Marikasi’s varying accounts of the events in Zimbabwe. Thus, none of the pressures or

circumstances that existed in Fiadjoe are present here, and the BIA did not err in finding that

Marikasi failed to corroborate a litany of outstanding inconsistencies in her statements.

3) Past Persecution - “Particular social group”

Lastly, Marikasi contests the IJ and BIA determination that she did not meet the standard

for an abused spouse seeking asylum. Under the INA, a refugee includes a person away from

her home country “who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail

himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear

of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,

or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). In Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388

(BIA 2014), the BIA reviewed the issue of whether spouses escaping an abusive domestic

relationship can obtain asylum on refugee grounds and concluded in the affirmative.

This court has held that a “particular social group” is a group of individuals who share a

common, immutable characteristic that is one that members of the group either cannot change, or

should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or

consciences. Umana-Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 667, 671 (6th Cir. 2013); Kante v. Holder,

634 F.3d 321, 327 (6th Cir. 2011). The group may not be circularly defined by the fact that it

suffers persecution, and the group must be both particular and socially visible. Umana-Ramos,

724 F.3d at 671. In this case, the BIA determined that, while victims of an abusive domestic

relationship can qualify as a particular social group, Marikasi did not prove that she was part of a

group with the requisite common, immutable characteristic. We agree.

No. 16-3281 Marikasi v. Lynch Page 11

“Marital status” is an immutable characteristic when the “the individual is unable to leave

the relationship.”2 Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 392. As further explained:

A determination of this issue will be dependent upon the particular facts and

evidence in a case. A range of factors could be relevant [in a domestic abuse

situation], including whether dissolution of a marriage could be contrary to

religious or other deeply held moral beliefs or if dissolution is possible when

viewed in light of religious, cultural, or legal constraints.

Id. at 393.

The BIA distinguished Marikasi’s case in the following important respects from Matter

of A-R-C-G-: (1) when Marikasi went into hiding with the Musasa Project, she did not have any

contact with her husband; (2) after she left the Musasa Project, she stayed with friends and never

returned to her husband; (3) a substantial period of time had passed since Marikasi went into

hiding and she remained out of contact with her husband; and (4) she remained out of contact

with her husband after leaving Zimbabwe. In addition, we note that because of her ability to

freely move through the country and avoid her husband, Marikasi failed to substantiate any

religious, cultural, or legal constraints that prevented her from separating from the relationship in

Zimbabwe or moving to a different part of that country.3 See Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N.

Dec. at 393. Furthermore, Marikasi’s case illustrates that she had a substantial network of

family, friends, and co-workers who showed willingness and ability to help her within

Zimbabwe and she did not credibly show any particular actions or complicity by the government

which would have rendered her unable to avail herself of that country’s protection.

Thus, Marikasi failed to carry her burden because she failed to prove that she could not

leave the relationship or that she could not relocate to another part of Zimbabwe.

2

At least one sister circuit has utilized this analysis in a domestic abuse asylum claim. Vega-Ayala v.

Lynch, No. 15-2114, 2016 WL 4205890, at *3 (1st Cir. Aug. 10, 2016) (denying petition for review because

petitioner, who was not married to the abusive man, could not prove immutability or social distinction).

3

We note that this analysis is based on Marikasi’s demonstrated ability to escape the abusive relationship

and survive safely within her native country. The facts of Matter of A-R-C-G- dictate that asylum applicants who

allege that they cannot leave the relationship under this rule are not precluded from relief merely because they were

able to escape the relationship and arrive in the United States. The petitioners in Matter of A-R-C-G- were “natives

and citizens of Guatemala who entered the United States without inspection.” Id. at 389. Thus, it would be

inappropriate to use the fact that Marikasi was able to escape her country and arrive in the United States to defeat

her asylum claim, as this undercuts the very purpose of asylum.

No. 16-3281 Marikasi v. Lynch Page 12

4) Fear of Future Persecution

Having found that Marikasi did not show past persecution, consequently, there is

no presumption that she faces a well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.13(b)(1)(ii); see also Mapouya v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 396, 412 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating

that where an applicant proves past persecution, “there is a presumption of a well-founded fear of

future persecution”). Marikasi argues that the burden of proof was improperly placed on her by

the BIA. However, because we agree with the BIA that she has not shown past persecution, the

burden is properly on her to show future persecution. Mikhailevitch, 146 F.3d at 390.

Having made a determination that Marikasi has not suffered past persecution, we must

determine whether the evidence would compel a reasonable factfinder to conclude that there is a

reasonable possibility of Marikasi suffering future persecution if she were to return to

Zimbabwe. Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(i)(B). Our inquiry requires reasonably specific

information showing a “real threat of individual persecution,” and a general, speculative

assertion of fear is not enough to compel such a conclusion. Mapouya, 487 F.3d at 412

(emphasis added). Marikasi cites primarily to a State Department Report that discusses the

difficulties the government of Zimbabwe has with controlling domestic violence in support of

her claim. This report, however, does not support Marikasi’s individual claim of persecution.

Further, despite her general expression of fear that her husband will resume the abuse upon her

return, Marikasi failed to explain why she cannot move to another part of Zimbabwe, where she

could avoid contact with her husband. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii). Therefore, we are not

compelled to conclude that the BIA erred in failing to find a reasonable probability of future

persecution.

For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the BIA’s determination that Marikasi’s has

not met her burden of proof to establish eligibility for asylum.

5) Withholding of Removal

Because Marikasi has not met her burden of proof on her eligibility for asylum, she

accordingly cannot satisfy the more demanding standard that there is a clear probability of

persecution required for withholding of removal under the Act. Liti, 411 F.3d at 641.

No. 16-3281 Marikasi v. Lynch Page 13

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the order of the BIA.