indicating that alter ego is shown from the total dealings of the corporation, and these are some factors included among those factors that courts examine in determining whether to pierce the corporate veil
How later courts described this case
- indicating that alter ego is shown from the total dealings of the corporation, and these are some factors included among those factors that courts examine in determining whether to pierce the corporate veil
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ACCEPTED
03-15-00447-CV
8040945
THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
12/1/2015 4:40:44 PM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
CLERK
NO. 03-15-00447-CV
In the Court of Appeals FILED IN
3rd COURT OF APPEALS
For the Third Judicial District of Texas AUSTIN, TEXAS
at Austin 12/1/2015 4:40:44 PM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
Clerk
BARBARA PAMPALONE,
Cross-Appellant
v.
ERIC HINOJOSA,
Cross-Appellee
On Appeal from the 419th Judicial District Court
Travis County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-14-003207
AMENDED CROSS-APPELLANT’S BRIEF
MCGINNIS, LOCHRIDGE & KILGORE, L.L.P.
Nelia J. Robbi
State Bar No. 24052296
Joe Lea
State Bar No. 24013257
Stephanie N. Duff-O’Bryan
State Bar No. 24087448
600 Congress Avenue, Suite 2100
Austin, Texas 78701
(512) 495-6000
(512) 495-6093 FAX
nrobbi@mcginnislaw.com
ATTORNEYS FOR BARBARA PAMPALONE
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Parties to the Trial Courts Judgment
Plaintiff: Barbara Pampalone
Defendants: Austin Capital Collision, LLC
Eric Hinojosa
Names and Addresses of Trial and Appellate Counsel
Counsel for Plaintiff: Nelia J. Robbi
nrobbi@mcginnislaw.com
Joe Lea
jlea@mcginnislaw.com
Stephanie N. Duff-O’Bryan
sduffobryan@mcginnislaw.com
600 Congress Avenue, Suite 2100
Austin, Texas 78701
(512) 495-6000
(512) 495-6093 FAX
Counsel for Michael Truesdale
Defendants: mike@truesdalelaw.com
801 West Avenue, Suite 201
Austin, Texas 78701
(512) 482-8671
(866)-847-8719 FAX
Adam Pugh
apugh@slaterpugh.com
8400 N. Mopac Expressway, Suite 100
Austin, Texas 78759
(512) 472-2431
(512) 472-0432 FAX
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ...................................................................... ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................... iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. vi
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................... 1
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ......................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ................................................................................... 2
ISSUE PRESENTED .......................................................................................................... 2
STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................................. 3
A. Overview and the parties. ......................................................................................... 3
B. The business: Capital Collision. ............................................................................... 5
C. The loan. ................................................................................................................... 5
D. The payments: 94 monthly payments over 8 years. ................................................. 7
E. The fraud. ................................................................................................................. 8
1. Eric Hinojosa wholly owned and controlled Capital Collision. .................... 9
2. Mr. Hinojosa formed a new company, also called Capital
Collision, which he also wholly owned and controlled. ............................... 9
3. After his new company took over the business of the old
company, Mr. Hinojosa terminated the old company. ................................ 10
4. Mr. Hinojosa did not tell Dr. Pampalone that he had terminated
the company she had loaned money to........................................................ 10
5. Mr. Hinojosa terminated the old company to “close old debt,”
but continued to send and receive correspondence related to the
debt using the old company’s address. ........................................................ 11
iii
6. Unbeknownst to Dr. Pampalone, Mr. Hinojosa transferred
payments on the loan to an account held in the name of the old
company that he had terminated and funded that account with
money from the new company and his own personal funds. ...................... 12
7. Three years after terminating the company to which Dr.
Pampalone had made the loan, Mr. Hinojosa stopped paying. ................... 13
F. The litigation. ......................................................................................................... 13
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ................................................................................ 14
ARGUMENT..................................................................................................................... 17
A. De Novo Standard of Review ................................................................................. 17
B. The trial court judgment should be reformed to impose liability on Eric
Hinojosa because the trial court erred in failing to impose alter ego
liability based on its factual findings and the undisputed evidence. ...................... 17
1. The trial court correctly found that Eric Hinojosa completely
owned and controlled both companies during the relevant time
periods. ........................................................................................................ 20
2. The trial court correctly found that Eric Hinojosa commingled
personal and corporate assets and obligations............................................. 22
3. Limiting liability would work an injustice because it is
undisputed that Eric Hinojosa emptied the original debtor to
make a new company without telling anyone. ............................................ 25
4. The requirement of fraud is established by the trial court’s
findings and the undisputed evidence at trial because the
findings and undisputed evidence established as a matter of law
(a) a fraudulent transfer under Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §
24.006(a), and (b) that Eric Hinojosa intentionally used the
companies to deceive his creditor for his personal benefit. ........................ 27
a. Eric Hinojosa effected a fraudulent transfer under Section
24.006 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code ........................ 28
b. Eric Hinojosa used the companies to deceive his creditor
for his personal benefit ..................................................................... 30
C. The proper remedy is to reform and render the judgment. ..................................... 32
iv
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 33
PRAYER ........................................................................................................................... 33
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .......................................................................................... 35
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ................................................................................ 36
APPENDIX ....................................................................................................................... 37
v
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Castleberry v. Branscrum, 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986) ..................... 18, 19, 28, 30
Dick’s Last Resort of West End, Inc. v. Market/Ross, Ltd., 273 S.W.3d 905 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied) ..........................................................................30
Dodd v. Savino, 426 S.W.3d 275 (Tex. App.—Houston [14 Dist.] 2014, no pet.) .23
Farr v. Sun World Savings Ass’n, 810 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. App.—El Paso).... 20, 28,
30, 32
Harco Energy, Inc. v. Re-Entry People, Inc., 23 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
2000, no pet.) ................................................................................................. 20, 28
Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper, 802 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. 1990) ............................. passim
MBR & Associates, Inc. v. Lile, 02-11-00431-CV, 2012 WL 4661665, (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Oct. 4, 2012, pet. denied) ......................................................22
Phillips v. Carlton Energy Group, LLC, No. 12-0255, 2015 WL 2148951 (Tex.
May 8, 2015) ............................................................................................. 1, 17, 18
Remington Arms Co., Inc. v. Luna, 966 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
1998, pet. denied) .................................................................................................17
Schlueter v. Carey, 112 S.W.3d 164 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet.
denied) ........................................................................................................... 22, 23
Spring Street Partners-IV, L.P. v. Lam, 730 F.3d 427 (5th Cir. 2013) ...................30
SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Investments (USA) Corporation, 275 S.W.3d 444
(Tex. 2008) .................................................................................................... 26, 27
Cappuccitti v. Gulf Industrial Products, Inc., 222 S.W.3d 468 (Tex. App. —
Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no pet.)............................................................... 24, 25
Stewart & Stevenson Services, Inc. v. Serv-Ttech, Inc., 879 S.W.2d 89 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, pet denied) ....................................................19
vi
Statutes
Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 24.006(a), and (b) ........................................ iv, 27, 28, 37
Tex. Bus. Org. Code § 11.052 ......................................................................... 31, 37
Tex. Bus. Org. Code § 11.356 ................................................................... 26, 31, 37
Tex. Bus. Org. Code § 21.223 ......................................................................... 19, 37
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 51.012 ...................................................2
Rules
Tex. R. App. P. 43.3.......................................................................................... 32, 37
TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(e) ...............................................................................................36
TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1) ...........................................................................................36
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 38.1, 39.1, and 39.2 .........................................1
Other Authorities
6 McDonald & Carlson Tex. Civ. Prac. App. Prac. § 33:10 ...................................32
vii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: Cross-Appellant, Barbara Pampalone, sued Appellant,
Austin Capital Collision, LLC and Cross-Appellee,
Eric Hinojosa, for breach of contract.
Parties: Cross-Appellant/Plaintiff is Barbara Pampalone
Cross-Appellee/Defendant is Eric Hinojosa
Trial Court: The Honorable Todd Wong, 419th Judicial District
Court, Travis County, Texas.
Trial Court’s Disposition: After a bench trial on June 8, 2015, the trial court
granted judgment in favor of Barbara Pampalone and
against Austin Capital Collision, LLC. The trial court
found that Eric Hinojosa was not individually liable
under the theory of piercing the corporate veil alleged
by plaintiff. Austin Capital Collision, LLC and
Barbara Pampalone filed timely notices of appeal on
July 29, 2015, and on July 7, 2015, the trial court
issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 38.1, 39.1, and 39.2, Cross-
Appellant requests oral argument before this Court of Appeals. Cross-Appellant
believes oral argument will assist the Court, as this appeal requests that this Court
apply the standard of review adopted very recently by the Texas Supreme Court in
Phillips v. Carlton Energy Group, LLC, No. 12-0255, 2015 WL 2148951, at *15
(Tex. May 8, 2015) in determining whether the trial court erred by not piercing the
corporate veil.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code § 51.012.
ISSUE PRESENTED
1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to pierce the corporate veil and
hold Eric Hinojosa individually liable for breach of contract.
2
TO THE HONORABLE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS:
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case presents the precise factual scenario that the alter ego doctrine was
created to prevent. This is a story about a businessman, Eric Hinojosa, who found
himself mired in debt that he did not want to pay, whose business was flagging,
and who saw a simple way out: to go down to the Texas secretary of state, create a
new LLC, and walk away debt-free, with his business still intact. 2RR:111-12,
124-25, 175-76, 217-19, 222-24, 232-34; PX-5; PX-14; Appx:2, ¶29. And at least
one of Eric Hinojosa’s creditors—Barbara Pampalone, a semi-retired dentist who
obtained a second mortgage so that she could make an $80,000 loan to Mr.
Hinojosa’s first company—was none the wiser. 2RR:52-53. But, hiding behind
his new LLC, Eric Hinojosa now claims that he owes Barbara Pampalone nothing.
A. Overview and the parties.
The parties to this appeal—Barbara Pampalone and Eric Hinojosa—have
known each other since Eric Hinojosa was just a boy. 2RR:53-54. Dr. Pampalone
is a widow and semi-retired dentist who has been living in Chatsworth, California
for almost 40 years. 2RR:52-53; Appx:2, ¶6. Dr. Pampalone’s youngest child,
Erik Pampalone, and Eric Hinojosa were childhood friends—they went to
elementary and high school together before Mr. Hinojosa moved to Texas with his
family. 2RR:95-96. Erik and Eric remained close and, in approximately 2003,
3
they went into business together. 2RR:54-55, 96-97; Appx:2, ¶7. That business
was an auto body repair shop known as “Capital Collision.” Appx:2, ¶7. In 2005,
Dr. Pampalone loaned Capital Collision $80,000. Appx:2, ¶9. In accordance with
the terms of the agreement between Dr. Pampalone and the company, the company
immediately began repaying the loan. Appx:2, ¶18.
Two years later, in 2007, Erik Pampalone exited the company completely,
and the company, now run exclusively by Eric Hinojosa, continued to repay the
loan as agreed for another 6 years. 2RR:13; Appx:2, ¶¶22, 23, 27, 31. Only—
unbeknownst to Dr. Pampalone— the company she loaned the money to in 2005
was terminated by Eric Hinojosa in 2010, but not before Mr. Hinojosa had first
formed a new company (still run exclusively by him) in 2009 to take over the
business and assumed name of the old company. PX-20; PX-24; Appx:2, ¶¶30, 24,
26, 29. Eric Hinojosa never told Dr. Pampalone that he had terminated the
company she had loaned money to—and he certainly did not tell her that the
reason he was terminating that old company was to “close old debt.” 2RR:175-76;
Appx:2, ¶28. Instead, he kept the old company’s bank accounts open, funded those
accounts with money from the new company and with his own money, and
continued to quietly repay the loan to Dr. Pampalone until the statutory wind up
period for the old company had expired, leaving Dr. Pampalone with, presumably,
no one to sue. 2RR:194-203, 248-49; Appx:2, ¶¶29, 31, 33. Dr. Pampalone had
4
no reason to ever suspect anything was amiss until, in April 2013, the monthly
payments ceased. Appx:2, ¶37; Appx: 8.
B. The business: Capital Collision.
The business, Capital Collision, was formed by Eric Hinojosa in
approximately 2002 and was structured as two corporations—Hinojosa Auto Body
& Paint Inc. (Nevada) and Hinojosa Auto Body & Paint, Inc. (Texas)—operating
as a general partnership—Capital Collision, GP—and had an assumed name
certificate on file for and did business simply as “Capital Collision.” 2RR:97-99:
2RR:171-72; Appx:2, ¶7; PX-19; PX-24; PX-27.
Mr. Hinojosa was the president and a 50% shareholder of each of the
Hinojosa Auto Body & Paint, Inc. entities. 2RR:100-02; Appx:2, ¶7; PX-27; PX-
28; PX-29. Mr. Pampalone joined as the vice president and other 50% shareholder
of those entities. 2RR:100-02; Appx:2, ¶7; PX-27; PX-28; PX-29. Because Mr.
Pampalone was still living in California, he was not involved in the day-to-day
operations of the business. 2RR: 103.
C. The loan.
In early 2005, the business had an option to purchase the land it was
operating on but lacked the funds necessary to do so. 2RR:105, 176; Appx:2, ¶10.
Mr. Hinojosa and Mr. Pampalone, in their capacities as corporate
officers/directors, discussed the issue, and Mr. Pampalone suggested to Mr.
5
Hinojosa that he could ask his mother, Dr. Pampalone, to loan the funds to the
business. 2RR:105-06; Appx:2, ¶10. Mr. Hinojosa agreed that Mr. Pampalone
should ask Dr. Pampalone to make a loan to the business. 2RR:106, 110-11;
Appx:2, ¶10.
Accordingly, in his capacity as vice-president of Capital Collision, Mr.
Pampalone approached Dr. Pampalone and proposed that she loan the sum of
$80,000 to Capital Collision and, in exchange, Capital Collision would repay the
$80,000 over a twenty-year period, plus annual interest at 7%. 2RR:59, 60, 106-
07; Appx:2, ¶11.
Dr. Pampalone specifically understood this to be a loan to the business—not
to her son personally—and further understood that the funds would be used for
business purposes, including the possible purchase of land. 2RR:57, 59; Appx:2,
¶12. Dr. Pampalone had previously loaned funds to Capital Collision for business
purposes in 2003 and, at the time of the loan at issue, was being repaid by Capital
Collision as agreed. 2RR:61-62; Appx:2, ¶13.
Dr. Pampalone agreed to loan the $80,000 to Capital Collision, and she
performed under the terms of the agreement by paying the funds to Capital
Collision in two installments: $50,000 on or about March 24, 2005, and the
remaining $30,000 on or about April 13, 2005. 2RR:58-9, 107-10, 158-59; PX-1;
PX-2; PX-3A; Appx:2, ¶14. The loaned funds were deposited into Capital
6
Collision’s bank account, a Bank of America Account held in the names of
“Capital Collision” and “Eric Hinojosa.” 2RR:107-10; PX-1; PX-2; PX-3A;
Appx:2, ¶15. Dr. Pampalone had to take a second mortgage on her home in order
to advance the $80,000 to the business. 2RR:57.
Although there was no signed promissory note for the loan, the terms of the
loan were evidenced in yearly amortization schedules generated by Mr. Pampalone
on Dr. Pampalone’s behalf and sent to Mr. Hinojosa and the business. 2RR:59-60,
62; Appx:2, ¶16.
D. The payments: 94 monthly payments over 8 years.
Beginning in May 2005, Capital Collision began performing under the
agreement by making monthly payments to Dr. Pampalone in accordance with the
agreed upon terms. 2RR:64-65, 112; Appx:2, ¶18. The parties stipulated that
between May 2005 and April 2013, Dr. Pampalone received 94 monthly payments
from two different Bank of America accounts as summarized in Plaintiff’s Exhibit
3. CR:41-47; Appx:2, ¶19; Appx: 8; PX-3, PX-3A. From May 2005 through
approximately March 2010, these payments were made from the Bank of America
Account held in the names of “Eric Hinojosa” and “Capital Collision” (hereinafter,
the “Capital Collision Account”). PX-3; PX-3A; Appx:2, ¶32; Appx: 8.
Thereafter—and without missing a payment during the transition—payments were
made from a Bank of America account held in the names of “Eric Hinojosa” and
7
“Capital Collision GP” (hereinafter, the “Capital Collision GP Account”). PX-3;
PX-3A; Appx.2, ¶32. However, because the payments were being electronically
deposited into Dr. Pampalone’s account, she never noticed that there was any
change in the bank account making the payments to her. 2RR:66, 79; Appx:2, ¶32.
Erik Pampalone began the process of leaving the business in 2006 and
formally resigned in approximately April 2007. 2RR:113; Appx:2, ¶22. After
resigning, Mr. Pampalone assisted Dr. Pampalone with oversight of repayment of
the loan, which involved corresponding by telephone and email with his friend and
former business partner, Mr. Hinojosa, and other Capital Collision employees
concerning the loan, and the payments on the loan continued following his exit.
2RR:115; PX-3; PX-3A; PX-5; PX-6; PX-8; PX-9; PX-10; PX-14; PX-15; Appx.2,
¶22.
E. The fraud.
With regular monthly payments hitting her bank account each month, as
agreed, Dr. Pampalone never suspected that Eric Hinojosa, a man she had known
since he was a child and someone she trusted, was actively defrauding her.
2RR:61, 79.
8
1. Eric Hinojosa wholly owned and controlled Capital
Collision.
Following Mr. Pampalone’s resignation from Capital Collision, Mr.
Hinojosa became and remained the sole officer/corporate director of the Hinojosa
Auto Body & Paint, Inc. entities that comprised Capital Collision, GP d/b/a Capital
Collision. 2RR:173; Appx:2, ¶23. Capital Collision became, according to Mr.
Hinojosa’s own testimony, “essentially just [him].” 2RR:173. And that company
continued to repay the loan to Dr. Pampalone as agreed and exactly as it had been
doing. 2RR:67, 113; PX-3; PX-3A; Appx:2, ¶23. But change was afoot.
2. Mr. Hinojosa formed a new company, also called Capital
Collision, which he also wholly owned and controlled.
In June 2009, Mr. Hinojosa formed a new company, one of the named
defendants in the trial court: Austin Capital Collision, LLC. 2RR:173-74; PX-20;
Appx:2, ¶24. The new company, like the old company, was also “basically just
[him].” 2RR:174; Appx:2, ¶27. Mr. Hinojosa had a 99% ownership interest in
Austin Capital Collision, LLC (his wife holding the other 1%), and he was the
managing member. 2RR:173-74; Appx.2, ¶27. Austin Capital Collision, LLC,
became the owner of the Capital Collision business and, like the first business had
done, filed an assumed name certificate for “Capital Collision.” Appx:2, ¶24, PX-
21, PX-22.
9
3. After his new company took over the business of the old
company, Mr. Hinojosa terminated the old company.
There was no asset purchase agreement between Eric Hinojosa’s old
company and his new company. 2RR:176. But his new company engaged in the
same business as his old company, and his new company continued to use the same
exact assumed name (2RR:174-75; PX-14), business email address
(cptlcollision@aol.com) (2RR:217-18, 222-23; PX-5; PX-14), and email signature
block (with the same name and physical address) (2RR:224; PX-14) as the old
business. Appx:2, ¶29. Additionally, Austin Capital Collision, LLC, retained
some of the same employees (2RR:219, 124-25, 223-24; Appx:2, ¶29), and took
control of the Capital Collision Account and Capital Collision GP Account
(Appx.2, ¶29). After Austin Capital Collision, LLC, was formed, the old company
was left with nothing. 2RR:176:7-13. Thereafter, in July 2010, Mr. Hinojosa
terminated the old company. 2RR:173; Appx.2, ¶26; PX-24.
4. Mr. Hinojosa did not tell Dr. Pampalone that he had
terminated the company she had loaned money to.
Mr. Hinojosa did not tell Dr. Pampalone (or Erik Pampalone, who Mr.
Hinojosa claimed was like a “brother” to him, 2RR:241) any of this—and he
certainly did not provide her with any statutory notice that the company she had
loaned money to had been terminated and that “Capital Collision” was now being
operated as a brand new entity. 2RR:79, 127, 247. Instead, Mr. Hinojosa simply
10
continued to do business and repay Dr. Pampalone as Capital Collision, the only
name Dr. Pampalone ever knew the business by. 2RR:55; Appx:2,¶31.
5. Mr. Hinojosa terminated the old company to “close old
debt,” but continued to send and receive correspondence
related to the debt using the old company’s address.
Why the secrecy? Because the old company was failing. It had “a ton of
debt” that Mr. Hinojosa was eager to leave behind, so he terminated the old
company and formed the new company to, in his own words, “close old debt, and
whatever, from our previous company and relationships.” 2RR:175-76, 232-34.
Mr. Hinojosa testified that he took steps to wind up the old company, including
paying some debts—but not the debt to Dr. Pampalone. 2RR:236.
Instead, Mr. Hinojosa, in his capacity as the managing member of Austin
Capital Collision, LLC, continued to direct that payments be made to Dr.
Pampalone on the loan. 2RR:240-41; Appx:2, ¶31. Employees and
representatives of Austin Capital Collision, LLC, communicated with Dr.
Pampalone and Erik Pampalone on Austin Capital Collision, LLC’s, behalf,
acknowledging the existence of the loan and Austin Capital Collision, LLC’s,
indebtedness thereunder. Appx:2, ¶¶34-36. Erik Pampalone, acting on his
mother’s behalf, sent correspondence concerning the loan to the
cptlcollision@aol.com email address and, in response, Austin Capital Collision,
LLC, continued to make payments on the loan. 2RR:127; Appx:2, ¶34; PX-12a,
11
PX-13, PX-14. Indeed, in September 2012 (years after the old company had been
terminated), when Mr. Pampalone sent an email to the cptlcollision@aol.com
address requesting that Mr. Hinojosa change where he was sending the monthly
payments on the loan, Mirium Matta—Mr. Hinojosa’s sister-in-law and an
employee of Austin Capital Collision, LLC—responded from the
cptlcollision@aol.com email address with “received and updated.” 2RR:123-24;
PX-14; Appx:2, ¶35. And the payments continued. PX-3; PX-3A.
6. Unbeknownst to Dr. Pampalone, Mr. Hinojosa transferred
payments on the loan to an account held in the name of the
old company that he had terminated and funded that
account with money from the new company and his own
personal funds.
In March 2010, just a few months before terminating Capital Collision, GP,
Mr. Hinojosa switched the monthly payments on the loan to the Capital Collision
GP Account. 2RR:196-98; PX-3; PX-3A; Appx: 9. Around this same time, he
also began transferring funds from the Capital Collision Account into the Capital
Collision GP Account to cover the payments coming out of that account.
2RR:193-98; PX-3A; Appx:2, ¶32; Appx: 9. Mr. Hinojosa testified that he also
put his own personal funds into the Capital Collision GP account to cover the
payments being made from that account to Dr. Pampalone. 2RR:248-49; Appx:2,
¶33. Of note, the payments from both accounts were overwhelmingly described on
the bank statements as “Barbara Pampalone Bill Payment.” PX-3A.
12
7. Three years after terminating the company to which Dr.
Pampalone had made the loan, Mr. Hinojosa stopped
paying.
Indeed, in early 2013, paying the loan to Dr. Pampalone was just about the
only thing that the Capital Collision GP account was doing. 2RR:209-12; PX-3A;
Appx. 10. In short, Mr. Hinojosa arranged for payments on the loan to be
transferred from a bank account held in the name of a company that was still in
existence (“Capital Collision” now belonging to Austin Capital Collision, LLC) to
a bank account held in the name of company that was defunct (Capital Collision
GP) and had no assets. Appx. 9. And when he stopped paying on the loan—three
years later—the period of limited survival for the old company had expired.
2RR:212-13:18; PX-3; PX-3A; Appx:2, ¶¶37-38; Appx. 10.
F. The litigation.
When the payments ceased, Dr. Pampalone—still unaware that the company
she had made the loan to had been terminated—made demand for payment, but
Eric Hinojosa failed and refused to cure the default. Appx.2, ¶39. The lawsuit in
the trial court ensued in which Dr. Pampalone sued both Austin Capital Collision,
LLC, and Eric Hinojosa for breach of contract. CR:28-40. The case was tried to
the bench on June 8, 2015. The parties stipulated at the trial that the amount due
and owing on the loan as of the date of trial was $56,758.68. CR:41-47; Appx.2,
¶41.
13
The trial court found in favor of Dr. Pampalone and rendered judgment
against Austin Capital Collision, LLC, for breach of the loan agreement. 2RR:252-
53; Appx:1. The trial court did not find Eric Hinojosa individually liable for
breach of contract based on piercing the corporate veil. 2RR:253. However, the
trial court specifically found that Mr. Hinojosa lacked credibility, especially in
light of the fact that he was wholly unprepared for his corporate representative
deposition, having not reviewed a single document or talked to any employees or
representatives regarding the designated topics, and that he demonstrated a
repeated inability to provide substantive responses on his own behalf or on behalf
of Austin Capital Collision, LLC. 2RR:252; Appx:2, ¶48. Further, the trial court
found that, at trial, Mr. Hinojosa tried to change many of the answers he had
provided at his deposition just one month prior. Appx:2, ¶48.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Eric Hinojosa, Defendant and Cross-Appellee, had a company (Capital
Collision GP) doing business as “Capital Collision.” In 2009, he wholly owned
and controlled that company, and business was not good. The company had, by
Mr. Hinojosa’s own admission, a “ton of debt,” including an $80,000/20year loan
it owed to Dr. Barbara Pampalone. Mr. Hinojosa saw a clear way out: he formed a
new company (Austin Capital Collision, LLC), and this company essentially took
over the old company—it used the same assumed name (“Capital Collision”), the
14
same email address, had some of the same employees, and used the same bank
accounts. Most importantly, the new company was also exclusively controlled by
Mr. Hinojosa. In sum, he formed the new company as a way to shake the old
company’s debt.
Among the debt he sought to avoid was that of Dr. Pampalone. In a
carefully orchestrated charade, Mr. Hinojosa tried to get rid of the debt to Dr.
Pampalone by changing the source of the monthly payments on the loan to a bank
account held specifically in the name of the old company (“Capital Collision GP”),
terminating that old company, failing to provide Dr. Pampalone with notice of that
termination, and then secretly funding that old company’s account and quietly
continuing to make payments to Dr. Pampalone from that account until the
statutory period for suing a terminated entity expired, leaving her with—
presumably—no one to sue.
But Eric Hinojosa’s efforts were too little, too late. Not only did his new
company, Austin Capital Collision, LLC, assume the loan to Dr. Pampalone (as the
trial court correctly found and concluded), but, as a matter of law, Eric Hinojosa is
liable on the loan in his individual capacity, too: the trial court’s findings of fact
and the undisputed evidence establish that, as the managing member and 99%
owner of Austin Capital Collision, LLC, the separation between both companies
15
and Eric Hinojosa had ceased to exist, and Mr. Hinojosa further caused each
company to be used to perpetrate a fraud against Dr. Pampalone.
In satisfaction of this last point, the findings of fact and undisputed facts
show that Eric Hinojosa used the corporate form to intentionally defraud Dr.
Pampalone. He lulled her into a sense of normalcy as she received regular monthly
payments from “Capital Collision” for years, and without any clue that the
company for which she had mortgaged her house in order to make an $80,000 loan
had been terminated, and a brand new company had taken over. This is exactly the
type of controlling, misleading behavior that the alter ego theory is intended to
prevent.
And moreover, even if this Court concludes that Eric Hinojosa’s deceit was
not intentional, such a conclusion is not fatal to a piercing claim. Rather,
intentionality is not needed for the limited purposes of showing “actual fraud”
under the alter ego theory where the elements of the Texas fraudulent transfer
statute are also satisfied. Here, the findings of fact and undisputed facts indeed
satisfy the elements of a fraudulent transfer, as they show, more simply, that (a)
Eric Hinojosa’s new company took control of the assets of the old company, and
(b) (by Mr. Hinojosa’s own admission), the old company was insolvent at the time
of its termination.
16
ARGUMENT
A. De Novo Standard of Review
Under Texas law, factual disputes related to the bases for alter ego liability
are questions of fact for the factfinder. Phillips v. Carlton Energy Group, LLC,
No. 12-0255, 2015 WL 2148951, at *15 (Tex. May 8, 2015). However, as the
Texas Supreme Court has recently made clear, once the factfinder has resolved
those disputes, or when the facts are not disputed, the imposition of alter ego
liability becomes a matter of law for the court. Id. 1
Where, as here, the trial court’s factual findings are adequately supported, an
appellate court should accept those factual findings as true, but review the trial
court’s application of the law to those findings de novo. Remington Arms Co., Inc.
v. Luna, 966 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied). By
contrast, in those few places where the trial court made no findings of fact, this
Court should look to the undisputed evidence presented at trial. Phillips, 2015 WL
2148951, at *15.
B. The trial court judgment should be reformed to impose liability
on Eric Hinojosa because the trial court erred in failing to impose
alter ego liability based on its factual findings and the undisputed
evidence.
1
Applying this standard in Phillips, the Texas Supreme Court both affirmed a jury verdict
finding alter ego liability, and explicitly declared that such liability was established by the
evidence as a matter of law. Phillips, 2015 WL 2148951.
17
Here, this Court should defer to the findings of fact that the trial court did
make, which explicitly support the conclusions of law made by the trial court and
additionally support disregarding the corporate fiction and holding Eric Hinojosa
liable individually on the breach of contract claim. Phillips, 2015 WL 2148951, at
*15. And to the extent that the trial court made no finding of fact, this Court
should look to the undisputed evidence in the trial record. Id.
Courts will pierce the corporate veil and hold an individual shareholder
personally liable for the acts of a corporation where the evidence shows that a
corporation is organized and operated as a mere tool or business conduit of the
shareholder. Castleberry v. Branscrum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 271 (Tex. 1986),
superseded by statute on other grounds. The touchstone of a successful alter ego
claim is a “blurring of identities, or a blurring of lines of distinction, both formal
and substantive, between two corporations or between an individual and a
corporation.” Hideca Petroleum Corp. v. Tampimex Oil Intern., Ltd. 740 S.W.2d
838, 843 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ). In other words, a finding
of “alter ego” is justified when “there is such a unity between the corporation and
individual . . . that the separateness between the two has ceased, and holding only
the corporation or just one of the corporations liable would result in injustice.” Id.
Importantly, an alter ego relationship may be shown from the total dealings of the
18
corporation and the individual. Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper, 802 S.W.2d 226, 228
(Tex. 1990).
Since Castleberry, three elements requisite for setting aside the corporate
form and holding an individual liable on the basis of the alter ego doctrine have
emerged: (1) The defendant must have some financial interest, ownership, or
control of the corporation, Stewart & Stevenson Services, Inc. v. Serv-Ttech, Inc.,
879 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, pet denied); (2) There
must be such a unity between the corporation and the individual that the
separateness of the single corporation has ceased, see Tex. PJC 108.2; Mancorp,
802 S.W.2d at 228; and (3) It would result in an injustice to hold only the
corporation liable, id. 2
Furthermore, where the underlying cause of action for which the plaintiff
seeks to hold the defendant liable is based on or relates to a contract, the plaintiff
must show that the defendant: (4) Caused the corporation to be used for the
purpose of perpetrating an actual fraud; and (5) Perpetrated an actual fraud on the
plaintiff primarily for the defendant’s direct personal benefit. TEX. BUS. ORG.
CODE § 21.223(b)3; Tex. PJC 108.2. However, in this limited context, there are
2
See also O’Connor’s Texas Causes of Action, Chapter 38-F, Principal-Agent Liability, Piercing
the Corporate Veil, § 2 (2015) (outlining the three elements of an alter ego claim).
3
Section 21.223(b) of the Texas Business Organizations code provides that liability of “any
affiliate of the corporation” will be limited with respect to “any contractual obligation of the
corporation or any matter relating to or arising from the obligation on the basis that the . . .
affiliate is or was the alter ego of the corporation,” unless the plaintiff demonstrates that the
19
multiple ways in which a plaintiff can show “actual fraud,” and a plaintiff need not
necessarily prove that the defendant had an actual intent to defraud the plaintiff.
But rather, where the plaintiff can merely show that the elements of the Texas
fraudulent transfer statute are satisfied (none of which call for a particular mental
state), the actual fraud requirement of an alter ego claim is likewise satisfied.
Harco Energy, Inc. v. Re-Entry People, Inc., 23 S.W.3d 389, 393 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2000, no pet.).
1. The trial court correctly found that Eric Hinojosa
completely owned and controlled both companies during
the relevant time periods.
The findings of fact explicitly note that “[a]t the time of termination of the
HABP [Hinojosa Auto Body & Paint, Inc.] Entities and the formation of Austin
Capital Collision, LLC, all entities were operated solely by Defendant Eric
Hinojosa.” Appx:2, ¶29. And even Mr. Hinojosa himself expressly admitted his
exclusive control of the old company:
Q: And at the time the [old] company was terminated,
you were the sole shareholder, right?
A: Correct.
Q: And you’re also the sole officer and director?
A: Correct.
....
Q: So the company was essentially just you?
A: Correct.
“affiliate caused the corporation to be used for the purpose of perpetrating and did perpetrate an
actual fraud on the oblige primarily for the direct personal benefit of the . . . affiliate.”). See also
Farr v. Sun World Savings Ass’n, 810 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. App.—El Paso), no writ).
20
2RR:173 (emphasis added).
Mr. Hinojosa further testified as to his exclusive control of the new
company, Austin Capital Collision, LLC:
Q: Now, Austin Capital Collision, LLC was formed in
June of 2009; is that correct?
....
A: Yes.
Q: And you’re the managing member of that company?
A: Yes.
Q: You have a 99 percent ownership?
A: Correct.
Q: And your wife has 1 percent?
A: Correct.
Q: So the company is, basically, you?
A: Correct.
2RR:173-74 (emphasis added).
Moreover, the trial court found that Mr. Hinojosa’s new company, Austin
Capital Collision, LLC, took control over the bank accounts of his old company,
Capital Collision GP. Appx:2, ¶29. Additionally, the trial court made the factual
finding that Mr. Hinojosa intentionally put money into one of the bank accounts
owned and controlled by Austin Capital Collision (the account held in the names of
“Eric Hinojosa” and “Capital Collision, GP”) to pay Dr. Pampalone on the loan
made to the old company. Appx:2, ¶33. These findings of fact and the undisputed
evidence supporting these findings establish, as a matter of law, that Mr. Hinojosa
had some “financial interest, ownership, or control of the corporation.” See
21
Schlueter v. Carey, 112 S.W.3d 164, 170 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet.
denied). In Schlueter, the Court held that the defendant exercised “control” over a
corporation where the defendant owned all of the stock in the corporation, was one
of its only two officers, and had personally signed a lease on behalf of the
corporation that was now being sued for premises liability. Id.
Applying a similar threshold for “control,” Mr. Hinojosa clearly controlled
both the old and new companies. Appx:2, ¶27. He was the only shareholder,
officer, and director of the old company, and he was the majority owner and
managing member of the new company. 2RR:173-74. Furthermore, as the
managing member of Austin Capital Collision, LLC, he controlled all of the loan
payments being made to Dr. Pampalone. These facts are very similar to those
warranting a finding in Schlueter that the defendant “controlled” the corporation
for the purposes of piercing the veil and reaching the defendant’s personal assets. 4
2. The trial court correctly found that Eric Hinojosa
commingled personal and corporate assets and obligations.
Courts look to a number of factors in deciding whether there exists such a
unity between a defendant and the corporation that the separateness of the two has
4
Other courts examining similar facts have more recently reached the same conclusion. For
instance, in MBR & Associates, Inc. v. Lile, 02-11-00431-CV, 2012 WL 4661665, (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth Oct. 4, 2012, pet. denied), the court of appeals found that the following factors
supported an alter ego finding: that the defendant’s individual property was not kept separate
from the corporation’s, that the corporation was used for the personal purpose of holding the
defendant’s home, and that “the defendant was the sole shareholder and owner of the
corporation.” Id., at *6.
22
ceased: (1) whether there is a commingling of corporate and personal funds,
Mancorp, 802 S.W.2d at 228; (2) the amount of control the individual maintains
over the corporation, id.; (3) whether the corporation has been used for individual
purposes, id.. Furthermore, evidence serving as proof of alter ego can include: (1)
“payment of alleged corporate debts with personal checks or other commingling of
funds,” Dodd v. Savino, 426 S.W.3d 275, 291 (Tex. App.—Houston [14 Dist.]
2014, no pet.); (2) “representations that the individual will financially back the
corporation,” id.; (3) “diversion of company profits to the individual for the
individual’s personal use,” id.; (4) “inadequate capitalization,” id.; and (5) “any
other failure to keep corporate and personal assets separate,” id. No single factor
or combination of factors is necessarily dispositive and the list is not exclusive.
Dodd, 426 S.W.3d at 291 (indicating that alter ego is shown from the total dealings
of the corporation, and these are some factors included among those factors that
courts examine in determining whether to pierce the corporate veil).
Additionally, the Schlueter court found the fact that the individual defendant
often referred “to himself and [the corporation] interchangeably” to be persuasive
evidence, along with other evidence, that “there was a unity between them that the
separateness of [the corporation] had ceased and [the defendant] operated the
corporation as a mere business tool or conduit for himself.” 112 S.W.3d 164, 170
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied).
23
The courts’ prior rulings in at least two cases should persuade this Court to,
as a matter of law, pierce the veil and hold Mr. Hinojosa individually liable. In
Mancorp v. Culpepper, a seminal Texas Supreme Court case on alter ego liability,
the Court affirmed a jury finding of alter ego liability on a breach of contract claim
where the following evidence was presented to the jury: (a) checks showing
payment of corporate debts with the individual defendant’s personal funds; (b) the
individual’s business card, which bore words that might show he considered
himself to be indistinguishable from the corporation (specifically, the card read
“Culpepper Properties, Inc., John C. Culpepper, Jr., his self”); and (c) evidence that
he had personally guaranteed the loan in question and had behaved in such a way
that showed he personally backed the loan made. 802 S.W.2d at 228.
In Cappuccitti v. Gulf Industrial Products, Inc, a case very similar to the one
at hand, Cappuccitti, the individual defendant and president of the corporation,
Minerec, had signed an agreement with the plaintiff in his capacity as president.
222 S.W.3d 468 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). At some point
during his time as president of Minerec, the defendant paid at least one debt of
Minerec’s with a personal check. Id. at 475. He then later transferred ownership
of Minerec’s assets to a company called Flottec, leaving the first company
insolvent and unable to pay its debt on the agreement to the plaintiff. Id. at 476.
He was the sole owner of the new company, Flottec, which was a 90% owner of
24
the old company, Minerec. Id. at 482. The court found that this, in addition to the
fact that Cappuccitti had originally backed Minerec with a personal line of credit,
sufficient for finding that the old company, new company, and individual
defendant were so intertwined that piercing the corporate veil was justified.
Cappuccitti, 222 S.W.3d 468.
Similarly, in the instant case, the findings of fact and undisputed evidence
show that Mr. Hinojosa commingled corporate and personal funds (2RR:248-49),
held two bank accounts in both his name and the company name (one in the name
of “Eric Hinojosa” and “Capital Collision,” and a second in the name of “Eric
Hinojosa” and “Capital Collision GP”) (Appx:2, ¶33), paid alleged corporate debts
with personal funds (id.; 2RR:248-49), completely controlled both companies
(Appx:2, ¶29), and admitted at trial that both companies were just him (2RR:173-
74). These facts are more than sufficient to pierce the corporate veil as a matter of
law.
3. Limiting liability would work an injustice because it is
undisputed that Eric Hinojosa emptied the original debtor
to make a new company without telling anyone.
“Where a corporate entity is owned or controlled by an individual who
operates the company in a manner indistinguishable from his personal affairs and
in a manner calculated to mislead those dealing with him to their detriment, the
corporate fiction may be disregarded in order to prevent injustice.” Mancorp, 802
25
S.W.2d at 229 (internal quotation omitted). But as the Texas Supreme Court has
explained, “injustice” does not require “a subjective perception of unfairness by an
individual judge or juror”; rather, it is merely a “shorthand reference[] for the kinds
of abuse . . . that the corporate structure should not shield—fraud, evasion of
existing obligations, circumvention of statutes, monopolization, criminal conduct,
and the like.” SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Investments (USA) Corporation, 275
S.W.3d 444, 454-55 (Tex. 2008).
In the instant case, Mr. Hinojosa’s penchant for deceit and dishonesty was
readily apparent to the trial court, which noted that Mr. Hinojosa lacked credibility,
especially in light of his attempt to change so many of his answers at trial. Appx:2,
¶48. And the trial court’s findings of fact and the undisputed evidence establish
that Mr. Hinojosa laid behind the log, maintaining regular payments to Dr.
Pampalone while silently terminating the company she had loaned the money to in
an effort to wipe away that company’s debts. Appx:2, ¶ 22-39; 2RR:175-6. Mr.
Hinojosa continued payments to Dr. Pampalone for the three-year statutory period
for winding up, made one final, lump sum payment, and then—with the old
company Dr. Pampalone had originally loaned the money to officially off the
books—disavowed the debt. Appx:2, ¶26, 33,38; 2RR:239-42; TEX. BUS. ORG. §
11.356. Because these actions were undertaken by Mr. Hinojosa, it would be
unjust to hold only Austin Capital Collision, LLC, which assumed the debt, liable.
26
Mr. Hinojosa’s actions and conduct misled Dr. Pampalone as to the status of
the first company and her rights as a creditor. 2RR:78-79. And even the trial court
explicitly noted in its findings of facts that Barbara Pampalone had no reason to
suspect that the old company had been terminated and a new company had been
formed. Appx:2, ¶30. Further, it is undisputed that Dr. Pampalone cannot be paid
back by the old company, as that company no longer exists. As a matter of law,
these undisputed facts warrant piercing the corporate veil in order to prevent
injustice on Dr. Pampalone. Mancorp, 802 S.W.2d at 229; SSP Partners, 275
S.W.3d at 454-55.
4. The requirement of fraud is established by the trial court’s
findings and the undisputed evidence at trial because the
findings and undisputed evidence established as a matter of
law (a) a fraudulent transfer under Tex. Bus. & Com. Code
§ 24.006(a), and (b) that Eric Hinojosa intentionally used
the companies to deceive his creditor for his personal
benefit.
Section 21.223 of the Texas Business Organizations Code requires that
before the corporate form can be disregarded in a breach of contract action, a
plaintiff must establish the defendant used the corporate form to perpetrate actual
fraud for his or her own benefit. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 21.223(b). A defendant
commits actual fraud when the defendant, among other things, either (a) makes a
fraudulent transfer under Section 24.006 of the Texas Business and Commerce
27
Code, Harco Energy, Inc. 23 S.W.3d at 393;5 or (b) commits actual fraud as
defined by the Supreme Court in Castleberry, Farr, 810 S.W.2d at 297-98.
a. Eric Hinojosa effected a fraudulent transfer under
Section 24.006 of the Texas Business and Commerce
Code
Section 24.006(a) provides:
A transfer made . . . by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made .
. . if the debtor made the transfer . . . without receiving a
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer .
. . and the debtor was insolvent at that time or the debtor
became insolvent as a result of the transfer . . . .
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 24.006(a).
Here, the trial court judge found, and the undisputed evidence established,
that Eric Hinojosa transferred all of the assets of his old company to the new
company without any consideration or asset purchase agreement (and, tellingly,
without informing the creditors of his old company). The transfer of assets left the
old company insolvent, to the extent it was not already. Indeed, as Mr. Hinojosa
himself explained it:
Q: You don’t have an asset purchase agreement, do you,
between Austin Capital Collision, LLC, and Hinojosa
Auto Body & Paint, Inc. Texas or Nevada?
A: There were no assets.
5
See also O’Connor’s Texas Causes of Action, Chapter 38-F, Principal-Agent Liability-Piercing the Corporate Veil,
§ 2 (2015).
28
Q: And there’s—so there’s no asset purchase agreement
at all, is there?
A: There were no assets, no.
2RR:176.
Similarly, the trial court found that Mr. Hinojosa’s new company took
control of the assets of his old company—including the bank accounts, name,
goodwill, and general business—“although there was no formal purchase or
transfer of assets between Austin Capital Collision, LLC, and the HABP Entities.”
Appx:2, ¶29.
By his own admission, the old company was insolvent at the time Mr.
Hinojosa left. 2RR:176. Moreover, the trial court found that he in fact took over
not only the bank accounts of the old company, but essentially the goodwill of the
old company, as it assumed the same business name (Capital Collision), the same
email address, retained some of the same employees, and “operated the same
general business.” 2RR:57; Appx:2, ¶57. Accordingly, the trial court’s finding of
facts coupled with the undisputed evidence show that Mr. Hinojosa effected a
fraudulent transfer of the assets of the old company, as he (a) (according to the trial
judge’s findings), took control of those assets to use for the new company, and (b)
(by his own admission), apparently left the old company with no assets. And as if
this was not enough and although certainly not a necessary fact on this point even
Mr. Hinojosa himself stated during his deposition (introduced at trial) that there
29
was only one reason to create the new company: “to close” his “old debt.”
2RR:176.
b. Eric Hinojosa used the companies to deceive his
creditor for his personal benefit
Additionally, the findings of fact and undisputed evidence are sufficient, as a
matter of law, to set aside the corporate fiction on the grounds that Mr. Hinojosa
committed actual fraud. For purposes of piercing, actual fraud “involves
dishonesty of purpose or intent to deceive.”6 Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 273.
Furthermore, it does not require findings on the traditional common law elements
of fraud by misrepresentation or omission. Dick’s Last Resort of West End, Inc. v.
Market/Ross, Ltd., 273 S.W.3d 905, 908-10 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied).
Fraudulent intent may be deduced from all of the facts and circumstances. Spring
Street Partners-IV, L.P. v. Lam, 730 F.3d 427, 443 (5th Cir. 2013).
The findings of fact coupled with the undisputed facts show, as a matter of
law, that Eric Hinojosa was dishonest regarding his purpose and personal
intentions for the companies’ uses, that he intended to deceive Dr. Pampalone, and
6
While “intent to deceive” is not clearly defined anywhere, in Farr v. Sun World Savings
Association, the El Paso Court of Appeals found that the following facts gave rise to “an intent to
deceive”: (1) the defendant, a mortgage company, had been transacting with a third party, Fannie
Mae, despite not conforming to government regulations for engaging in such transactions; (2) the
mortgage company was in bad standing with two other banks in town; (3) the individual
defendant operating the mortgage company did not follow Texas laws governing the accounting
and holding of funds received from plaintiff; (4) proceeds that the mortgage company received
were used to pay other obligations, including some of the individual defendant’s personal
obligations, as opposed to plaintiff; and (5) the individual defendant was “running behind,” so it
knew when it took plaintiff’s money that it would not be repaying plaintiff. 810 S.W.2d 294,
297 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1991, no writ).
30
that he did so for his personal gain. Mr. Hinojosa himself admitted that he
exercised complete control over both companies, and that the old company did not
have the money to repay Dr. Pampalone. 2RR:173-74, 176. But money was owed
to Dr. Pampalone, so Eric Hinojosa personally made deposits into a bank account
held in the old company’s name, and from that account made monthly payments to
Dr. Pampalone for up to three years following the dissolution of the old company.
Appx:2, ¶26, 33,38; 2RR:239-42. Three years, of course, is the length of time that
a domestic filing entity survives for the limited purposes of suing and being sued
following termination. TEX. BUS. ORG. § 11.356. By continuing payments on the
loan from a bank account that belonged to a defunct entity for three years
following that entity’s termination, Mr. Hinojosa was clearly hoping to nullify the
debt. Tellingly, however, Mr. Hinojosa never gave notice to Dr. Pampalone that
he was winding down his old company. TEX. BUS. ORG. § 11.052 (requiring
written notice of winding up by the corporate general partners). Furthermore, he
continued to receive her loan statements at the same email address he had always
used, even once responding to one of her inquiries from that same email address.
2RR:125-27, 223-25. Accordingly, as the trial court found, Dr. Pampalone had no
reason to suspect anything was awry. Appx:2, ¶30. In the meantime, Hinojosa’s
new company took control of the old company’s accounts, business operations,
goodwill, and employees, and continued to operate without a hitch. Appx:2, ¶29.
31
Exactly three years after he “terminated” the old company, exactly when the
statutory wind-down and look-back period was up, Eric Hinojosa ceased all
payments to Ms. Pampalone. See, e.g., Farr v. Sun World, 810 S.W.2d 294, 297
(Tex. App.—El Paso 1991, no writ) (finding that where an individual defendant
knew or should have known ahead of time that he would not be paying a plaintiff
because the company was behind on its payments, this supported finding that the
defendant had an “intent to deceive” the plaintiff when it took plaintiff’s money).
As 99% shareholder, Eric Hinojosa personally profited from his scheme, as
he essentially, and intentionally, effected his own bankruptcy completely outside
of the court system, and in the process scraped off at least one major creditor (if
not more), Barbara Pampalone.
C. The proper remedy is to reform and render the judgment.
Because the issue before the court is a question of law, rather than a question
of fact, this Court should reform and render the judgment to pierce the corporate
veil and hold Eric Hinojosa liable, rather than remand the question to the trial
court. Generally, on finding that the trial court’s judgment should be reversed, the
court of appeals must render the judgment the lower court should have rendered,
except where remanding to the lower court for further proceedings is necessary.
Tex. R. App. P. 43.3; see also 6 McDonald & Carlson Tex. Civ. Prac. App. Prac. §
33:10 (2d ed.). Here, there is nothing that must by necessity be determined by the
32
trial court, as it has made the factual findings sufficient for this Court to render a
judgment against Eric Hinojosa individually.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, applying the alter ego doctrine, this Court should as a
matter of law pierce the corporate veil and hold Eric Hinojosa personally liable for
the debt owed on the loan made by Ms. Pampalone to Capital Collision. The
factual findings and undisputed facts show that Hinojosa controlled both
companies, that the separation between the companies and Hinojosa had long-
ceased to exist, that it would be unjust to hold only Austin Capital Collision liable
for the debt owed to Ms. Pampalone, that Eric Hinojosa never intended to pay Ms.
Pampalone the full amount of loan at the time he formed Austin Capital Collision,
and that Eric Hinojosa effected a fraudulent transfer of assets, leaving the old
company unable to pay off its obligations.
PRAYER
For the foregoing reasons, Cross-Appellant Barbara Pampalone respectfully
requests that this Court reform and render judgment against Cross-Appellee Eric
Hinojosa individually. Cross-Appellant Barbara Pampalone further requests this
Court grant it such other and further relief to which it may be entitled in law or in
equity.
33
Respectfully submitted,
MCGINNIS, LOCHRIDGE & KILGORE,
L.L.P.
Nelia J. Robbi
State Bar No. 24052296
Joe Lea
State Bar No. 24013257
Stephanie N. Duff-O’Bryan
State Bar No. 24087448
600 Congress Avenue, Suite 2100
Austin, Texas 78701
(512) 495-6000
(512) 495-6093 FAX
nrobbi@mcginnislaw.com
/s/ Nelia J. Robbi
Nelia J. Robbi
State Bar No. 24052296
ATTORNEYS FOR BARBARA
PAMPALONE
34
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of November, 2015, I electronically
filed the foregoing Amended Brief of Cross-Appellant Barbara Pampalone, with
the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of
such filing to the following:
Michael Truesdale
mike@truesdalelaw.com
801 West Avenue, Suite 201
Austin, Texas 78701
(512) 482-8671
(866)-847-8719 FAX
Adam Pugh
apugh@slaterpugh.com
8400 N. Mopac Expressway, Suite 100
Austin, Texas 78759
(512) 472-2431
(512) 472-0432 FAX
Attorneys for Eric Hinojosa
/s/ Nelia J. Robbi
Nelia J. Robbi
Joe Lea
Stephanie N. Duff-O’Bryan
Attorneys for Barbara Pampalone
35
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that the foregoing Amended Cross-Appellant’s Brief was prepared
with Microsoft Word 2007, and that, according to that program’s word-count
function, the sections covered by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1) contains 7,417 words. I
further certify that this brief complies with the typeface requirements of TEX. R.
APP. P. 9.4(e).
/s/ Nelia J. Robbi
Nelia J. Robbi
Joe Lea
Stephanie N. Duff O-Bryan
Attorneys for Barbara Pampalone
Date: November 25, 2015
36
APPENDIX
1. Final Judgment
2. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
3. TEX. BUS ORG. CODE § 11.052
4. TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE § 11.356
5. TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE § 21.223
6. TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE § 24.006
7. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.3
8. Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3 (summary of payments)
9. Excerpts of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3A (transfers)
10. Excerpts of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3A (end of payments)
11. Stipulation of the Parties
37
APPENDIX
1
DC BK15175 PG1024
Filed in The District Court
of Travis County, Texas
JUN 1 8 2015 Cf).
At 02/ 4-lJJ. ~M.
Velva L. Prlco, District C~rk
NO. D-I-GN-14-003207
BARBARA PAMP ALONI;, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
§
Plaintiff, §
§
V. § TRA VIS COUNTY, TEXAS
§
ERIC IIINOJOSA AND AUSTIN §
CAPITAL COLLISION, LLC, §
§
Defendants. § 419TII JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FINAL JUDGMENT
On June 8,2015, this case was called for trial. Plaintiff Barbara Pampalone appeared in
person and announced ready for trial. Defendant Eric Hinojosa appeared in person and
announced ready for trial. Defendant Austin Capital Collision, LLC, appeared through its
representative, Eric Hinojosa, and announced ready for trial.
All matters in controversy, legal and factual, were submitted to the Court for its
determination. The Court heard the evidence and arguments of counsel and announced its
decision for Plaintiff Barbara Pampalone.
The Court orally RENDERED judgment for Plaintiff Barbara Pampalone and against
Defendant Austin Capital Collision, LLC, on June 8, 2015, and this written judgment
memorializes that rendition.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff recover the following from Defendant
Austin Capital Collision, LLC:
1. Actual damages in the amount of$56,758.68;
2. Plus reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees in the amount of$43,241.32; plus
3. Post-judgment interest at the rate of 5.0%, compounded annually from the date this
judgment is entered until all amounts are paid in full.
1111111111\\ 11\\\ 111\\ 11\1\ 11\11 11111 11\\111111 \\1\ 111\
004080302
50
DC BK15175 PG1025
It is further ORDERED that Defendants take nothing.
It is further ORDERED that if Defendant Austin Capital Collision, LLC, unsuccessfully
appeals this judgment to an intermediate court of appeals, Plaintiff Barbara Pampalone will
additionally recover from Defendant Austin Capital Collision, LLC, the amount of $20,000.00,
representing the anticipated reasonable and necessary fees and expenses that would be incurred by
Plaintiff in defending the appeal.
It is further ORDERED that if Defendant Austin Capital Collision, LLC, unsuccessfully
appeals this judgment to the Texas Supreme Court, Plaintiff Barbara Pampalone will additionally
recover from Defendant Austin Capital Collision, LLC, the amount of $20,000.00, representing the
anticipated reasonable and necessary fees and expenses that would be incurred by Plaintiff in
defending the appeal.
It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff may have all writs, orders and executions necessary
for collection of this judgment, which may issue immediately.
It is further ORDERED that except as specifically provided herein, all relief not expressly
granted is hereby DENIED.
This judgment finally disposes of all parties and all claims and is appealable.
SIGNED this \<'$ day of June, 2015.
2
DC BK15175 PG1026
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND SUBSTANCE:
McGINNIS LOCHRIDGE
600 Congress A venue, Suite 2100
Austin, Texas 78701
::~~~
(512) 495-6065
Joe Lea L~
State Bar No. 12082000
jlea@mcginnislaw.com
Nelia J. Robbi
State Bar No. 24052296
nrobbi@mcginnislaw.com
Jordan K. Mullins
State Bar No. 24070308
jmullins@mcginnislaw.com
ATTORNEYS FOR BARBARA PAMP ALONE
APPROVED AS TO FORM ONLY:
SLATER PUGH,Ltd. LLP
8400 N. Mopae Expressway
Suite 100
Austin, Texas 78759
Telephone: (512)472-2431
Telecopier: (512) 472-0432
/~ (
./ ! Ill!
'\ /
By'. l ~"I _
Cu-,-\ .. [ " I "
Adam Pugh
State Bar No. 24044341
apugh@slaterpugh.com
3
2
FiI;~ in The District Court
o ravlS COunty, Texas
JUL - 7 2015 (~
NO. D-I-GN-14-003207
At_ .3,'4u 0
Velva L p . () M.
. nco, District derk
BARBARA PAMPALONE, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
§
Plaintiff, §
§
V. § TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS
§
ERIC HINOJOSA AND AUSTIN §
CAPITAL COLLISION, LLC, §
§
Defendants. § 419TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Introduction
On June 8, 2015, this case was called for trial, and all matters in controversy, legal and
factual, were submitted to the Court for its determination, In addition to all other findings
necessary to support the Judgment rendered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Austin
Capital Collision, LLC, in this cause, the Court hereby makes and files the following specific
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Any finding of fact that should be construed as
conclusion of law is hereby adopted as such. Any conclusion of law that should be construed as
a finding of fact is hereby adopted as such.
II. Findings of Fact
A. Procedural History.
1. Plaintiff Barbara Pampalone ("Plaintiff') filed her original petition on August 26, 2014,
alleging causes of action for breach of contract against Defendant Eric Hinojosa and Defendant
Austin Capital Collision, LLC.
2. This is an expedited action under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 169.
3. This case was called for bench trial on June 8, 2015, and the parties appeared and
announced ready for trial. At the close of trial, judgment was rendered in favor of Plaintiff and
1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
004108045
against Defendant Austin Capital Collision, LLC. Judgment was signed on June 18,2015.
4. Defendants requested findings of fact and conclusions oflaw on June 18,2015.
B. The Parties and Associated Persons/Entities.
5. Defendant Eric Hinojosa is a resident of Texas. Eric Hinojosa previously lived in
California where he and Plaintiff's son, Erik Pampalone, became friends.
6. Plaintiff is a semi-retired dentist who resides in Chatsworth, California.
7. In 2005, when the loan at issue in this lawsuit was made, Eric Hinojosa was the president
and a 50% shareholder of Hinojosa Auto Body & Paint, Inc. (Texas), and Hinojosa Auto Body &
Paint, Inc. (Nevada), (collectively, the "HABP Entities"). Plaintiff's son, Erik Pampalone, was
the vice president and other 50% shareholder of the HABP Entities. The HABP Entities were the
general partners of Capital Collision, G.P., and the business-auto body repair shop--operated
under the assumed name filed by Eric Hinojosa of Capital Collision [Exh. P-19]. The HABP
Entities were terminated in July of 2010 and, accordingly, the general partnership of Capital
Collision, G.P. was also terminated.
8. Prior to the termination of the HABP Entities in 2010, Eric Hinojosa formed Defendant
Austin Capital Collision, LLC, in June of 2009. Eric Hinojosa is the sole managing member and
99% owner of Austin Capital Collision, LLC, which is also engaged in auto body repair. On the
same day that Austin Capital Collision, LLC, was formed, Defendant Eric Hinojosa filed an
assumed name certificate on behalf of Austin Capital Collision, LLC, for the name "Capital
Collision." Austin Capital Collision, LLC, continues to conduct business today as Capital
Collision.
C. The Loan Agreement.
9. Around March of 2005, Plaintiffloaned the principal sum of $80,000.00 to the owners of
2
the Capital Collision business which, at the time, were the HABP Entities as general partners of
Capital Collision, G.P. The owners of the Capital Collision business are referred to herein as
"Capital Collision."
1O.At the time, Capital Collision had an option to purchase the land it was renting but lacked
the necessary funds. Erik Pampalone and Eric Hinojosa, as corporate officers/directors,
discussed the issue, and Erik Pampalone suggested to Eric Hinojosa that he could ask his mother,
Plaintiff, to loan the funds to Capital Collision. Eric Hinojosa agreed that Erik Pampalone
should ask Plaintiff to loan funds to Capital Collision.
11. Erik Pampalone, in his capacity as Vice-President of Capital Collision, approached
Plaintiff and proposed that Plaintiff loan Capital Collision the sum of $80,000.00 and, in
exchange, Capital Collision would repay the $80,000.00 over a twenty year period, plus annual
interest at the rate of 7%.
12. Plaintiff understood, and Capital Collision agreed, that the loaned funds would be used
for business purposes, including the possible purchase of land.
13. Plaintiff had previously loaned funds to Capital Collision for business purposes in 2003
and, at the time of the loan at issue in this lawsuit, was being repaid by Capital Collision as
agreed.
14. Plaintiff agreed to loan $80,000.00 to Capital Collision. Plaintiff performed under the
terms of the agreement and paid the funds to Capital Collision in two installments: $50,000.00
on or about March 24, 2005, and the remaining $30,000.00 on or about April 13,2005. [Exhs. P-
I, P-2].
15. The loaned funds were deposited into Capital Collision's bank account, a Bank of
America account held in the names of "Capital Collision" and "Eric Hinojosa."
3
16. The parties have stipulated that there is no signed promissory note for the loan. However,
the terms of the loan were evidenced in yearly loan amortization schedules generated by Erik
Pampalone and sent to Defendants and their representatives. [Exhs. P-5, P-7, P-9, P-12, P-12A,
P-13, P-15, P-16, P-17].
17. The statute of frauds does not bar the agreement, even though it is not in writing, because
Plaintiff fully performed under the agreement, and Defendant Austin Capital Collision, LLC,
partially performed.
D. Payments on the Loan.
18. Thereafter, beginning on or about May 20, 2005, Capital Collision began performing
under the agreement by making monthly payments on the loan pursuant to the agreed upon terms.
Payments were made by electronic bill payment from Capital Collision's Bank of America
account held in the names of "Eric Hinojosa" and "Capital Collision" into Plaintiff's bank
account.
19. The parties stipulated that from May 2005 through April 2013, Plaintiff received 94
monthly payments on the loan. [Exhs. P-3, P-3A].
20. The 94 monthly payments were made by Capital Collision to Plaintiff as repayment on
the loan.
21. During this time period, there was email correspondence among the parties and persons
acting on their behalf acknowledging the existence of the loan and Defendants' indebtedness to
Plaintiff thereunder. [Exhs. P-5, P-7, P-8, P-9, P-10, P-ll, P-12, P-12A, P-13, P-15, P-16, P-17].
E. Defendant Austill Capital Collision's Assumption of the Loan.
22. Erik Pampalone began the process of leaving Capital Collision in 2006, and he formally
resigned in approximately April of 2007. After resigning, Erik Pampalone assisted Plaintiff in
4
56
oversight of repayment of the loan, corresponding by telephone and email with Defendant Eric
Hinojosa and other Capital Collision employees concerning the loan.
23. Following Erik Pampalone's resignation, Defendant Eric Hinojosa became and remained
the sole officer/director of Capital Collision. Capital Collision continued to repay the Loan to
Plaintiff pursuant to the agreed upon terms.
24. In June of 2009, Defendant Eric Hinojosa formed a new company, Defendant Austin
Capital Collision, LLC, [Exh. P-20] which became the owner ofthe Capital Collision business and
filed an assumed name of "Capital Collision." [Exhs. P-21, 22].
25. Following its formation, Defendant Austin Capital Collision, LLC, assumed the loan to
Plaintiff.
26. Approximately one year later, in July of 2010, Defendant Eric Hinojosa terminated the
HABP Entities (and, accordingly, the general partnership). [Exh. P-24].
27. At the time of termination of the HABP Entities and formation of Austin Capital Collision,
LLC, all entities were operated solely by Defendant Eric Hinojosa.
28. Defendant Eric Hinojosa did not provide notice-statutory or otherwise-to Plaintiff or
Erik Pampalone that he was terminating the HABP Entities or that Capital Collision was owned or
being operated by a new entity, Austin Capital Collision, LLC.
29. Although there was no formal purchase or transfer of assets between Austin Capital
Collision, LLC, and the HABP Entities, Austin Capital Collision, LLC, continued to use the same
assumed name, business email address (cptlcollision@aol.com) and email signature block (with the
same name and physical address) as the as the HABP Entities [Exh. P-14]. Austin Capital
Collision, LLC, also retained some of the same employees, took over control of the bank accounts
of the HABP Entities, and operated the same general business as the HABP Entities.
5
57
30. Prior to institution of this lawsuit, neither Plaintiff nor Erik Pampalone was aware or had
any reason to be aware that the HABP Entities had been terminated or that a new entity, Austin
Capital Collision, LLC, was operating the business and using the assumed name of Capital
Collision.
31. Following formation of Austin Capital Collision, LLC, and termination of the HABP
Entities, Austin Capital Collision, LLC, d/b/a Capital Collision continued to make payments to
Plaintiff pursuant to the agreed upon terms ofthe loan.
32. Austin Capital Collision, LLC, d/b/a Capital Collision made its payments from the Bank of
America account held in the names of "Eric Hinojosa" and "Capital Collision" until approximately
March of 2010 when the payments began being made from a Bank of America account held in the
names of "Eric Hinojosa" and "Capital Collision GP." Because the payments were electronically
deposited into Plaintiff's bank account, Plaintiff was not aware of any change in the bank account
making the payments to her.
33. Defendant Austin Capital Collision, LLC, d/b/a Capital Collision was operating the Bank of
America accounts making the payments to Plaintiff. Its sole managing member and majority
owner, Defendant Eric Hinojosa, intentionally put money into the Bank of America account held in
the names of "Eric Hinojosa" and "Capital Collision, OP" to cover the monthly bill payments to
Plaintiff on the loan.
34. After Austin Capital Collision, LLC, was formed, Erik Pampalone, acting on behalf of
Plaintiff, continued to send correspondence concerning Plaintiffs loan to the
cptlcollision@aol.com email address. [Exhs. P-12a, P-13, P-14]. In response, Austin Capital
Collision, LLC, d/b/a Capital Collision continued to make payments on the loan as agreed. [Exhs.
P-3, P-3A].
6
35. In September of 2012, Erik Pampalone, acting on behalf of Plaintiff, sent an email to
cptlcollision@aol.com requesting that Eric Hinojosa change where he was sending the monthly
deposits to Plaintiff on her loan to Capital Collision. [Exh. P- 14]. In response, Mirium Matta, Eric
Hinojosa's sister-in-law and an employee of Austin Capital Collision, LLC, responded from the
cptlcollision@aol.com email with "received and updated." [Exh. P-14].
36. Austin Capital Collision, LLC, acknowledged the loan to Plaintiff and its indebtedness
thereunder through its conduct and course of performance.
F. Austin Capital Collision, LLC's, Default on the Loan.
37. Defendant Austin Capital Collision, LLC, d/b/a Capital Collision made its last regular
monthly payment on the loan in April of2013. [Exhs. P-3, P-3A].
38. In October of2013, Austin Capital Collision, LLC, d/b/a Capital Collision made a payment
of $6,000.00 to Plaintiff. [Exhs. P-3, P-3A]. No further payments have been made to Plaintiff.
Austin Capital Collision, LLC, d/b/a Capital Collision has breached and defaulted on the loan to
Plaintiff.
39. Plaintiff made demand for payment upon Defendants, but Defendants failed and refused to
cure the default on the loan. [Exhs. P-16, P-25].
G. Plaintiff's Damages.
40. As a result of Defendant Austin Capital Collision, LLC's, default on the loan to Plaintiff,
Plaintiff has suffered damages.
41. The parties stipulated that the amount due and owing on the loan as of the date of trial is
$56,758.68.
H. Attorneys' Fees.
42. As a result of Defendants' default, Plaintiff was compelled to file the instant lawsuit and
7
59
incur attorneys' fees and costs associated with same.
43. Through April 2015, Plaintiff incurred attorneys' fees in the amount of $44,950.30. [Exh.
P-18]. Plaintiffs fees incurred through trial are in excess of $90,000.00. These fees are reasonable
and necessary in Travis County, Texas.
44. The parties stipulated to Ms. Robbi's qualifications to present attorneys' fees testimony and
the reasonableness of the hourly rates being charged.
45. Plaintiffs attorneys were required to expend significant time engaging m discovery,
drafting and filing a motion to dismiss claims asserted by Defendants, compelling discovery from
Defendants, attempting to subpoena documents from Defendants' accountant, preparing for and
attending depositions and mediation, attending hearings on Defendants' special exceptions and
motion for continuance, preparing for and attending trial, and drafting pre-trial motions, including a
motion to exclude the testimony of Defendant's corporate representative, Eric Hinojosa, who was
wholly unprepared for his deposition in which it was agreed he would provide answers in his
individual capacity and as the corporate representative for Defendant Austin Capital Collision,
LLC.
46. Plaintiffs reasonable and necessary fees for Travis County in the event of an unsuccessful
appeal by either Defendant to the Court of Appeals are $20,000.00.
47. Plaintiffs reasonable and necessary fees for Travis County in the event of an unsuccessful
appeal by either Defendant to the Texas Supreme Court are $20,000.00.
L Other Findings by the Court.
48. Defendant Eric Hinojosa lacks credibility, especially in light of the fact that Eric Hinojosa
was wholly unprepared for his corporate representative deposition, had not reviewed a single
document produced in the lawsuit or otherwise talked to any Austin Capital Collision, LLC,
8
60
employees or representatives regarding the designated deposition topics, and demonstrated a
repeated inability to provide substantive responses on his own behalf or on behalf of Austin Capital
Collision, LLC. Further, at trial of this cause, Eric Hinojosa tried to change many of the answers he
provided at his deposition which occurred approximately one month before trial.
III. Conclusions of Law
A. Breach of Contract.
49. Plaintiff and Capital Collision ("Capital Collision," as indicated, supra, referring to the
owners of the Capital Collision business which, at the time, were the HABP Entities as the general
partners of Capital Collision, G.P.) intended to and did enter into an agreement whereby Plaintiff
would loan the sum of $80,000.00 to Capital Collision and, in exchange, Capital Collision would
repay the loan over 20 years at 7% interest.
50. This agreement constitutes a valid, enforceable contract.
51. The statute of frauds does not bar the agreement, even though it is not in writing, because
Plaintiff fully performed under the agreement, and Defendant Austin Capital Collision, LLC, d/b/a
Capital Collision partially performed.
52. Plaintiff fully performed under the terms of the agreement, paying the sum of $80,000.00 to
Capital Collision.
53. Capital Collision performed on the agreement prior to the termination of the HABP Entities
by making monthly payments on the loan as agreed.
54. Austin Capital Collision, LLC, d/b/a Capital Collision assumed the loan from the HABP
Entities though its conduct and course of performance, including by continuing to make payments
on the loan in accordance with the terms of the agreement.
55. Austin Capital Collision, LLC, d/b/a Capital Collision partially performed on the agreement
9
by continuing to make payments on the loan to Plaintiff in accordance with the terms of the
agreement.
56. Austin Capital Collision, LLC, defaulted on the loan.
57. As a result of Austin Capital Collision, LLC's, default, Plaintiff suffered damages in the
amount of $56,758.68. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to recover the sum of $56,758.68 from
Defendant Austin Capital Collision, LLC.
58. Plaintiff is entitled to post-judgment interest at the rate of 5%.
B. Attorneys' Fees.
59. Because this is an expedited action under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 169 and Plaintiff
cannot recover more than $100,000.00 inclusive of attorneys' fees, Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys'
fees in the amount of$43,241.32 which fees are reasonable and necessary in Travis County, Texas.
60. Plaintiff is entitled to a conditional award of $20,000.00 in the case of an unsuccessful
appeal by either Defendant to the Court of Appeals. This sum is reasonable and necessary in Travis
County, Texas.
61. Plaintiff is entitled to an additional conditional award of $20,000.00 in the case of an
unsuccessful appeal by either Defendant to the Texas Supreme Court. This sum is reasonable and
necessary in Travis County, Texas.
C. Defendants' Affirmative and Other Defenses.
62. All of Defendants' affirmative or other defenses as alleged in its Fourth Amended Original
Answer, Verified Denial and Special Exceptions lack merit and any relief associated with same is
expressly denied.
63. Any conclusion oflaw deemed a finding of fact is hereby adopted as such.
10
62
SIGNED this 1~ day of July, 2015.
DWONG
11
63
3
§ 11,052, Windinfj Up Procedures, TX BUS ORG § 11,052
Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Business Organizations Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 1. General Provisions (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 11. Winding up and Termination of Domestic Entity
Subchapter B. Winding up of Domestic Entity
V.T.C.A, Business Organizations Code § 11.052
§ 11.052. Winding Up Procedures
Effective: September 1, 2013
Currentness
(a) Except as provided by the title of this code governing the domestic entity, on the occurrence of an event requiring winding up
of a domestic entity, unless the event requiring winding up is revoked under Section 11.151 or canceled under Section 11.152,
the owners, members, managerial officials, or other persons specified in the title of this code governing the domestic entity
shall, as soon as reasonably practicable, wind up the business and affairs of the domestic entity. The domestic entity shall:
(1) cease to carryon its business, except to the extent necessary to wind up its business;
(2) if the domestic entity is not a general partnership, send a written notice of the winding up to each known claimant against
the domestic entity;
(3) collect and sell its property to the extent the property is not to be distributed in kind to the domestic entity's owners or
members; and
(4) perform any other act required to wind up its business and affairs.
(b) During the winding up process, the domestic entity may prosecute or defend a civil, criminal, or administrative action.
Credits
Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 182, § I, eff.Jan, 1, 2006. Amended by Acts 20]3, 83rd Leg., ch. 9 (S.B. 847), § 3, eff Sept. 1. 2013.
:'ole'> of Decisions (5)
V. T. C. A., Business Organizations Code § 11.052, TX BUS ORO § 11.052
Current through the end of the 2015 Regular Session of the 84th Legislature
t, 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original ( .S. Govcrnmcru \\ orb
4
§ 11.356. Limited Survival After Termination, TX BUS OFW § 11.356
Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Business Organizations Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 1. General Provisions (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 11. Winding up and Termination of Domestic
Subchapter H. Claims Resolution on Termination
V.T.C.A., Business Organizations Code § 11.356
§ 11.356. Limited Survival After Termination
Effective: January 1, 2006
Currentness
(a) Notwithstanding the termination of a domestic filing entity under this chapter, the terminated filing entity continues in
existence until the third anniversary of the effective date of the entity's termination only for purposes of:
(1) prosecuting or defending in the terminated filing entity's name an action or proceeding brought by or against the terminated
entity;
(2) permitting the survival of an existing claim by or against the terminated filing entity;
(3) holding title to and liquidating property that remained with the terminated filing entity at the time of termination or
property that is collected by the terminated filing entity after termination;
(4) applying or distributing property, or its proceeds, as provided by Section 11.05.3; and
(5) settling affairs not completed before termination.
(b) A terminated filing entity may not continue its existence for the purpose of continuing the business or affairs for which the
terminated filing entity was formed unless the terminated filing entity is reinstated under Subchapter E. 1
(c) If an action on an existing claim by or against a terminated filing entity has been brought before the expiration of the three-
year period after the date of the entity's termination and the claim was not extinguished under Section 11.359, the terminated
filing entity continues to survive for purposes of:
(1) the action until all judgments, orders, and decrees have been fully executed; and
(2) the application or distribution of any property of the terminated filing entity as provided by Section 11.053 until the
property has been applied or distributed.
§ 11.35(:;' Limited Survival After Termination, TX BUS ORG § 11.356
Credits
,\c(s 2003, 781h Leg" ch. 182, S I, eff Jan. 1.2006.
Footnotes
V. lr, ..'\.. Business Ori!ani/alions Code ~ II.lOl ct seq.
V. T. C. A., Business Organizations Code § 11.356, TX BUS ORO § 11.356
Current through the end of the 20 IS Regular Session of the 84th Legislature
(30vern!Ylent \lVork~:;,
5
§ 21,22::1. Limitation of for TX BUS ORG § 21,223
'Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Business Organizations Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 2, Corporations (Refs & Annes)
Chapter 21. For-Profit Corporations (Refs & Annos)
Sllbcbapter K Shareholder Rights and Restrictions
V.T.C.A., Business Organizations Code § 21.223
§ 21.223. Limitation of Liability for Obligations
Effective: September 1, 2007
Currentness
(a) A holder of shares, an owner of any beneficial interest in shares, or a subscriber for shares whose subscription has been
accepted, or any affiliate of such a holder, owner, or subscriber or of the corporation, may not be held liable to the corporation
or its obligees with respect to:
(1) the shares, other than the obligation to pay to the corporation the full amount of consideration, fixed in compliance with
Sections 21,157-21,162, for which the shares were or are to be issued;
(2) any contractual obligation of the corporation or any matter relating to or arising from the obligation on the basis that
the holder, beneficial owner, subscriber, or affiliate is or was the alter ego of the corporation or on the basis of actual or
constructive fraud, a sham to perpetrate a fraud, or other similar theory; or
(3) any obligation of the corporation on the basis of the failure ofthe corporation to observe any corporate formality, including
the failure to:
(A) comply with this code or the certificate of formation or bylaws of the corporation; or
(B) observe any requirement prescribed by this code or the certificate of formation or bylaws of the corporation for acts
to be taken by the corporation or its directors or shareholders.
(b) Subsection (a)(2) does not prevent or limit the liability of a holder, beneficial owner, subscriber, or affiliate if the obligee
demonstrates that the holder, beneficial owner, subscriber, or affiliate caused the corporation to be used for the purpose of
perpetrating and did perpetrate an actual fraud on the obligee primarily for the direct personal benefit of the holder, beneficial
owner, subscriber, or affiliate.
Credits
Acts 2003, 78th Leg" ch. 182, § L eff Jan, 1,2006. Amended by Acts 2007, 80th Leg" ch. 688, § 74, eff. Sept 1,2007,
,'\Oles of Decisions (2 J 3)
§ 21.223. Limitation of Liability for Obligations, TX BUS ORG § 21.223
V. T. C. A., Business Organizations Code § 21.223, TX BUS ORG § 21.223
Current through the end of the 2015 Regular Session of the 84th Legislature
6
§ 24.006, Transfers Fraudulent as to Present Creditors, TX BUS s COM § 24,006
KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment
Unconstitutional or Preempted Negative Treatment Vacated by Gullcv v. Sunbclt Sav., F.S.IL 5th Cir.f'Tex.), June 01, 1990
Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Business and Commerce Code (Refs &: Annes)
Title 3, Insolvency, Fraudulent Transfers, and Fraud
Chapter 24. Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (Refs & Annos)
V.T.C.A., Bus. & C. § 24.006
Formerly cited as V.T.C.A., Bus. & C. Code § 24.03
§ 24.006. Transfers Fraudulent as to Present Creditors
Currentness
(a) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was
made or the obligation was incurred if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving a reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation and the debtor was insolvent at that time or the debtor became
insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.
(b) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made if the transfer
was made to an insider for an antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at that time, and the insider had reasonable cause to
believe that the debtor was insolvent.
Credits
Amended by Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 1004, § I, eff Sept. 1, 1987.
Notes of Decisions (253)
V. T. C. A., Bus. & C. § 24.006, TX BUS & COM § 24.006
Current through the end ofthe 2015 Regular Session of the 84th Legislature
End of Document
7
43.3. Rendition TX R !\PP Ru!e 43.3
Vernon's Texas Rules Annotated
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure
Section Two ..Appeals from Trial Court Judgments and Orders (Ret's & Annos)
Rule 43. Judgment oftho Court of Appeals (Refs &. Annos)
TX Rules App.Proc., Rule 43.3
43.~i. Rendition Appropriate Unless Remand Necessary
Current ness
When reversing a trial court's judgment, the cOUlimust render the judgment that the trial court should have rendered, except
when:
(a) a remand is necessary for further proceedings; or
(b) the interests of justice require a remand for another trial.
Credits
Eff. Sept. 1, 1997.
Notes of Decisions (52)
Rules App. Proc., Rule 43.3, TX R APP Rule 43.3
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of Evidence, and Rules of Appellate Procedure are current with amendments received through
September 1, 2015. Bar Rules, Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, Code of Judicial Conduct, and Rules of Judicial Administration
are current with amendments received through September 1, 2015. Other state court rules and selected county rules are current
with rules verified through June I, 2015.
8
CAUSE NO. D-I-GN-14-003207
BARBARA PAMP ALONE, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS
§
ERIC HINOJOSA AND AUSTIN §
CAPITAL COLLISION, LLC, §
§
Defendants. § 419TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
Summary of Payments Made by Defendants to Plaintiff
No. Date Amount Bank Account
1. 05/20/2005 $675.09
2. 06/20/2005 $675.09
3. 07/20/2005 $675.09 Bank of America Business Advantage
4. 08/1912005 $675.09 Checking Account No. XXXX XXXX
5. 09/2012005 $675.09 9118
6. 10/20/2005 $675.09
7. 11118/2005 $675.09 Capital Collision
8. 12/20/2005 $675.09 Eric A. Hinojosa
9. 01120/2006 $675.09
10. 02/17/2006 $675.09
11. 0312012006 $675.09
12. 04/2012006 $675.09
13. 05/1912006 $675.09
14. 06120/2006 $675.09
15. 07/20/2006 $675.09
16. 08/18/2006 $675.09
17. 09/2012006 $675.09
18. o 10/20/2006 $675.09
19. 11120/2006 $675.09
20. 12120/2006 $675.09
21. 01119/2007 $675.09
22. 02/2012007 $675.09
23 .: 03/20/2007 $675.09
24. 0412012007 $675.09
25. 05/18/2007 $675.09
26. 0612012007 $675.09
27. 0712012007 $675.09
28. 08/06/2007 $505.07
08/20/2007 $170.02
r- No. Date Amount Bank Account
\
29. 09/2012007 $675.09
30. 10/1912007 $675.09
31. 11/20/2007 $675.09
32. 1212012007 $675.09
33. 01118/2008 $675.09
34. 02/20/2008 $675.09
35. 03/20/2008 $675.09
36. 04/18/2008 $675.09
37. 05120/2008 $675.09
38. 06/20/2008 $675.09
39. 07/18/2008 $675.09
40. 08/20/2008 $675.09
41. 09119/2008 $675.09
42. 10/20/2008 $675.09
43. 11120/2008 $675.09
44. 12/19/2008 $675.09
45. 01/20/2009 $675.09
46. 02/20/2009 $675.09
47. 03/20/2009 $675.09
48. 04/20/2009 $675.09
49. 05/20/2009 $675.09
50. 06/19/2009 $675.09
51. 07/20/2009 $675.09
52. 08/20/2009 $675.09
53. 09118/2009 $675.09
54. 10120/2009 $675.09
55. 11120/2009 $675.09
56. 12/20/2009 $675.09
57. 01120/2010 $675.09
58. 02119/2010 $67S.09
59. 03119/2010 $675.09
60. 04/20/2010 $675.09 Bank of America Business Advantage
61. OS/20/2010 $675.09 Checking Account No. XXXX XXXX
62. 06118/2010 $675.09 4193
63. 0712012010 $675.09
64. 08120/2010 $675.09 Capital Collision GP
65. 09120/2010 $67S.09 Eric A. Hinojosa
66. 1012012010 $67S.09
67. 11119/2010 $675.09
68. 12/20/2010 $675.09
69. 01120/2011 $675.09
70. 02/18/2011 $675.09
03/--/2011 --
04/--/2011 --
Page 2 of3
r No. Date
051--/2011
Amount
--
Bank Account
71. 06/1012011 $675.00
72. 06/20/2011 $675.00
73. 07/20/2011 $675.00
74. 08/19/2011 $675.00
75. 09120/2011 $675.00
76. 10/20/2011 $675.00
77. 11/18/2011 $675.00
78. 12/2012011 $675.00
79. 01120/2012 $675.00
80. 02/17/2012 $675.00
81. 03/2012012 $675.00
82. 04/20/2012 $675.00
83. 05/1812012 $675.00
84. 0612012012 $675.00
85. 07/2012012 $675.00
86. 08/20/2012 $675.00
87. 09/20/2012 $675.00
88. 10/19/2012 $675.00
89. 1112012012 $675.00
90. 12/2012012 $675.00
91. 01118/2013 $675.00
92. 02120/2013 $675.00
93. 03120/2013 $675.00
94. 04/19/2013 $675.00
051--/2013
06/--/2013
07/--/2013
08/--/2013
09/--/2013
95. 10/25/2013 $6,000.00
r:
Page 3 of3
9
H
:'.~.
Il>nk of Amer ica , !'I.A. "'.)~t-, Page I or 4
1'.0. no, 2~IIU Statement Period
"IoIIIP3. f t, n(,2~·5IllS O~.'Oi:HJ Ill: ougll U:' ~:j I\.
"0 l' I'll 0); 48 OI4UC)')
Enctosu res 0
Account ~umbcl
It :0,11 I.,!i,: ,,. III••,1,111" ,1.11:uI. IIt .1,I.: \'\11 1••1.'
I:
01059 001 SCM999 I ~ 4 0
CAPITAl, COJ,!.ISION
ERIC A HINOJOSA
4)04 BURCH DR
DEL VALLE T'l< 78617-3273
Our free Online nankiug service allow. you (0 cll.C~ balances, \tad: account ,clivily. pay bill' and more.
Willi On ltne B~nkillt: you can Dbo vi ... "I' 10 13 month. of Ibis s t nt e m e nt on line.
Enroll al www.bankefamer ic a,e onll$m.llbusin.ss.
We recently made changes to our Overdraft Protection Transfer Fee to better serve you. Effective
immediately. when we determine your account is overdrawn by a lotal amount less than $10 for a day
and we transfer runds Irom your linked savings account or line of credit to cover it. we will not charge an
Overdraft Protection Transfer Fee. Overdraft Protection lets you link your checkinq account to another
account to help avoid overdrafts. If you haven't already signed up. call the number on your statement or
visit your nearby banl~ing center and an associate can help you.
Stay ahead of your bills - such as rent. mortgage. credit card or utility payments - by setting up
automatic reminders to be sent right to your e-mail or smart phone. With Payment Reminders from Bank
of America®. it's easy to know when a payment is due.
Get starte<:l at bantcofamerlca.com/sctutlons tOday.
I
~
==J
H
paze 2 of 4
Statement Period
CAPITAL COl.L1S10l' 02101110 thrcugh 02128110
E.RIC 1\ lIlNOJ OSA EO P Pc. OE 48
Enclosures 0 _
Account Number
Business Advantage Checking
CAPiTAL COLI.lSION ERIC A IIINOJOSA
Yuur Account ut II Gln nc e
Account Number Statement Reginning Balance 53,711.24
Statement Period 02101/10 through 02/28/10 Amount of Deposits/Credits S7,002.90
Number of Deposits/Credits I; Amount of Withdrawals/Debits SIO,501.42
Number of WithdrawalslDcbits 21 Statement Ending Ba lance $212.72
Number of Deposited Items 6
Average Ledger Balance $2,174.17
Number of Days in Cyctc 28 Service Charge SO.OO
Your account has overdraft protection provided by Line of Credit number 6871 1022 401299.
Your Business Pricing Relationship
Account Qualifying Type of
Name Balance Balance Date
Business Advantage Checking 2,549.01 Average 02-25
Total Qualifying Balance $2,549.01
Please note that the balances in your account(s) are below the minimum required to avoid the monthly maintenance fee. To give
you time to make adjustments. we have waived the monthly maintenance ree for this statement cycle ending 02/28/10. If you have
questions about your account or would like to discuss how you may avoid the monthly fee. please call us at the number listed
above.
J)eposits nnd Credits
nte IlIt
I'o~ted Amount ($) Descrintion Reference
02104 2,022.19 Deposit 813204730657492
02/05 1,756.00 Deposit 813204730902628
02109 1,628.46 Deposit 813204730269247
~iUtl:+/I~) 3.¥.!2~1
11:*16. Deposit 813204730526383
_f)~2:.:./,/.;6~) .....;6>:.7:..'i~:O~9J.:IOnline
Banking transfer from Chk 4193 957202167505928
Confirmationa 0136551719
02119 300.00 Overdraft Protection From 68711022401299 080602190005922
02122 100.00 Overdraft Protection From 68711022401299 0806022200 I1991
02125 200.00 Bank Card Dcs:Merch Sell 10:430134840051477 902556010903684
IndniCaph al Collision Co 1D:1210001923 Ccd
H
Page 3 0(4
SI~I"mCnl Period
CAPITAl. COLLISION 02101110 rhrouch 0212&1)0
EIlIC " HINOJOSA HI I' PE ()~ 48
CndCl$UrCS 0 _
ACCOUIII Number
Withdrawals lind Dcblts
OlItCI' Debits
Date Uank
Posted Amount (S) J)cscripi ion Reference
02101 436.45 Mitchell International Bill Pavmcnt 943202010008790
02/01 71.15 l3ankCard DcstMer ch Fccs ID:1I3013'184()OSln7 902532006926873
Indn:Capital Collision Co 1D:321U001923 Ccd
02101 6.47 Milchel! International Bill Payment ~43202010003800
02/02 39.95 Discover Network DcstScu lcmcnt 1D:601101323c;56387 902532010206729
Indn:Eric A. Hinojosa, Dba Co 10:1510020270 C~U
02/04 l,!lOO.UO Online Banking transfer to Chk 419. 957102:)47530162
Confirmntionfi 3932735010
02/04 700.00 H orne Depot Dcs:Onlinc Pint 1D:56002S980320388 902534010998444
Indn:Capitul Collision Gr Co ID:Citiccsweb Web
02/05 500.00 Ge Money Des.Payment 1O:504662UI4 152661 902535005381136
Indn:Hinojosa,Eric Co 10:1061537262 Web
02/05 200.00 Mbna Credit Cards Rill Payment 943202050008802
02/03 516.35 Exxonmobil Comm Dcs:Onlinc Pmt 10:560030703322458 902536010818361
l.ndn:Capilnl Collision Co ID:Cilioilweb Web
02109 1,600.00 Online Banking transfer to Ch k 4193 957202097591378
Confirmn tionll 03757641;44
02116 3,211.69 Online Banking transfer 10 Chic 4193 957302167513449
Confirmation# 6228127454
02116 1,146.06 2 Pawnee Lensing Des.Lease Pmt 1D:320955 902547007520285
Indn:Capitul Collision G.P. Co ID:3840884553 Ppd
r IV>
J
02122
'16
10.00
Dell Commercial Credit Bill Pavment 943202160008797
943202190008795
080602190005923
080602220011992
Card Account
02{01
02101
/I
t.Ji
8.04
905701291164022
905701290007749
02104 79.80 905702020337081
02104 43.24 905702020739800
02122 121.22 905702200677744
Subto tut 278.21
Dully Ledger Batanc es
Dale Balance (5) Date Balance ($) Dalc Balance ($)
02101 3,163.22 02108 3,862.07 02/19 43.94
02/02 3,123.27 02109 3,890.53 02/22 12.72
02/04 3,322.42 02111 4,211.69 02/25 212.72
02105 4,378.42 02/16 429.03
• ".,
..
...
83nk of Amer ica, N .11.
P.O. DOl< 1511&
T~mp3, FL 13622·~1IS
Page I
Slatemeni
4 or
Period
02/01/10 through 02'28110
1:0 p ra
OIl 44
H
0372574
IIcCOUII' Number _
1111111•• 1..II..11,111,111•• 11... 1.1I1I.1111111.lu I.1111111:I
CAPITAL COLLISION GP
ERIC ]).HINOJOSA
4304 BURCH DR
DEL V])'LLETX 78617-3273
Our free Online nonking service 3110w. you 10 check bobncos. If.ek account .clivil),. P')' bills 3nd more.
With Onllne IIDa"ing you e un .1'0 vi.,,· up 10 III munlh, of Ihb "3Iemenl e ntln e,
Enroll r.1 www.ban).oor.:amerlca.c(.Ii1\\/tIoUlDllbus1ncss .
. ".,
"\
We recently made changes to our Overdraft Protection Transfer Fee to better serve you. Effective
immediately, when we determine your account is overdrawn by a total amount less than $10 for a day
and we transfer funds from your linked savings account or line of credit to cover it. we will not charge an
Overdraft Protection Transfer Fee. Overdraft Protection lets you link your checking account to another
account to help avoid overdrafts, If you haven't already signed up. call the number on your statement or
visit your nearby banking center and an associate can help you.
Stay ahead of your bills· such as rent. mortgage. credit card or utility payments· by setting up
automatic reminders to be sent right to your e-mail or smart phone. With Payment Reminders from Bank
of Amerlca®. It's easy to know whon a payment is due.
Get started at bankofamerica,com/solutions today.
H
rage 2 of 4
SIO' tcmcn l I' er ind
CAPITAL COLLISION GI' 02101110 throuuh 0212:1110
ERIC A HINOJOSA no I' PU OU 44
Account Number _
\. :." '.' ..
I :'.- ::',
Business [.l.dv(;1n!ageCI,~cl~ing
CAPITA.L COLLISION GP ER.IC A HINOJOSA
Your Account at a Gh!R~C
Account Number __ Statement Beginning Balnnce S2,524.30
Statement Period 02101110 th~ Amount of Deposits/Credits 528,160.08
Number of Deposits/Credits 7 Amount of WithdrawalsfDebils :523,675.12
Number of Wijhdrawa ls/Debit s 38 Statement Eliding Balance S7,009.76
Number of Deposit ed items 7
Average Ledger Be lance $6,6\3.07
Number of Days in Cycle 28 Service Charge S29.95
,'""
Help &vold Overdrar. & ~ISF: Returned Item fees. use Alerts to get messages by email or text to inform yeu when you; balance Is
low. Use Ovardr<~n Protection \0 transfer available funds Irom linlced savings. credit card. or credit Iin9 to your ch:!dli;1g account to
tt ielp cover items tl12l would ollerdraw your account. Call us for details..
You r Bus in es s
Account
Na re Date
Business Advantage Checking 02-25
Bnsed on your eomblncd balance of $6.129.33, your Businoss Advantage account has boon charged a monthly maintenance foe.
You can avoid tills fetl In tho fULUr:t by m.:intainlng 535,000 in comb in ad balances.
Deposits an d Credits
ale an
Posted Amounl (S) Rescription Reference
02102 5,000.00 Online Banking advance from Loc 1299 957102027580889
Conlirmation# 3915169063
02/0'1 1,000.00 On liuc Bunking transfer from Chk 9111\ 957102047530163
Cllnlirmationll 3932735010
02f09 1,600.00 Online Banking transfer from Chk 9\1~ 957202097591379
Con firmation# 0375764844
02116 3,21 \.69 Online Banking tr ansfcr from ChI; 911S 957302167513450
Confirmation# 6228127454
02117 11,872.04 Deposit 313204830622344
02117 1,164.60 Deposit 813204830622343
02123 4,311.75 Deposit 813204730584475
"'"
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PORe 3 of 4
Statement Per iod
CAPITAl. COLLISION 01' 02101!10 Ihruu:;h 02ll8l1O
eRIC A HlHO) OSA 1;0 P 1'0 011 4.\ 0312576
Withdrllwnls an d De blt s
Checks
Check Dale Balik Check Date Bank
Number A,';u\lo: (Sl Posted Reference :t:!u..,h-:r Amount {~) Po<,,,d R!:f""'cl1c~
5095 551.40 02101 l:I 301}')\l923%654 20148 2.20 02/04 813009692604239
5097° 550.00 02/12 813009892284554 20149 2352 0210S 813006892470800
5103" IS·Ul! 02/16 813009292032928 20150 92.31 02117 813009292693306
20061° 95.(0 02/03 813009392452621 20151 215.57 02117 813009292693305
20088" 340.{lO 02103 313009392452626 20\52 69.99 02111 813009692786278
20091° 12.98 02108 813001179267653I 20153 830.00 02110 813006592162010
20123° 500.I!O 02lH; 813204730039963 20154 150.00 02116 813008992748692
20129$ 71.00 02/01 813001>1:926905116 20156" 261.63 02124 813009592563760
20131" 95JiO 02/05 III 3009R92 124599 20157 178.14 02/23 813009292733366
20139" 671.25 02/0S 813003892194461 20159· 6.109.14 02122 813008992027080
20140 116.65 02102 313005992002173 20161° 2.198.63 02122 313006092750085
20141 747.:;1 02104 813009592350002 20\62 406.48 02125 813004092553813
20143° 600.('.0 02l0ll 813008792668691 20163 1.829.41 02122 813002992359349
20144 3.272.55 02/0S &13007692811653 20164 360.80 02122 813204730398781
20145 172.00 02/08 813008792910492 20170" 192.57 02f26 813009992586446
20147° 64.88 ()2112 813009992791685
Of h er Debits
Dale Bank
Posted Amount (S) DcscriQI ion Reference
02104 303.00 Oal;! Check DesRcdcpchcek ID:020085 902535001904590
IndnCapiral Collision Gp Co 10:1261961596 Rck
02104 32.48 Data Check Des:NSF Fee 10:020085 902535001904592
Indn:Capital Collision Gp Co 10:1261961596 Ppd
02109 400.00 Online Bunking ~~~mcnl to l.oc 1299 957302095105249
Q"f!6 ti7~ 02 8~1~;mJ:!~ok,,;fn,,<;: m!?~QChk QI13 I 957202167505927
Conlirmationfl 01365517]9
02125 663.31 Trail Creek love Dcs:Note Pmt ID:Capilal Collis; 902555005209896
In dn .Cnpital Collision Co 1D:3262646872 Ccd
02126 600.00 Millin Line Of Credit Bill Payment 943202260005105
02126 29.9$ MOlllhly Maintenance Fee
Total OVerdl'aCt Fees nud NSF: Returned Item Fees
:.l'oll!! 101' Total
"'h'
1 IS P crro
. d Y"nt.to·Dat
Total ver dr a It Fees SO.OO $35.00
Total NSF: Returned Hem fee' SO.OO s 05.00
Udly Ledger Balances
Date /3;! la nee (S) D:nc Balance (S) Dale Balance (S)
02101 1,896.40 02/09 2,611.96 02f18 15,528.07
02f02 6,779.75 02/10 1,781.96 02122 5.030.09
02103 6.344.75 02111 1.711.97 02123 9.163.70
02104 6.259.26 02112 1,097.09 02124 8.902.07
02105 6,164.26 02116 3,299.31 02125 7,832.28
r 02108 1,411.96 02117 16.028,07 02126 7.009.76
H
~
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Balfli~{at America .....
'-
Bank of America, N.A. ~ I'asc I of 4
I'.0. Box 2~us ':tIr' Statement Period
Tamp'. ~'L 33622·5118 03/31/10
03101{1O through
EO P PE OE 43 0132656
Enclosures e _
Account Number
11,"11 ••1.. 11"111 111... 1••1111.1.11,"11111.1.1 .. 1.1.. 1••1.1
CAPITAl. COLLISION
ERIC A HINOJOSA
4304 BURCH DR
DEL VALLE TX 78617-3273
Our free Online Bank in g service nllow$ you to check bala nces, rr ack account activitjl. pay bills and more,
Willi Online IInnldnll you can o!so vlew uplo la t""ntln or tllll ,taum"nl online.
Enroll Ot www.b:\nkofamcrica.com/smallbu$incu .
-, ""
\.
BUsiness Advantage Checking
CAPITAL COLLISION ERIC A HlNOJOSA
______________________________ ~~~u~I~lt~n~t~n~G~,~ln~n~c~e------------------ ___
Account Number Statement Beginning Balance $212.72
Statement Period 03/01110 through 03/31/10 Amount of Deposits/Credits SI4.318.31
Number of Deposits/Credits 5 Amount of Withdrawals/Debits $)4.531.03
Number of Withdrawals/Debits 8 Statement Ending Balance SO.OO
Number or Deposited Items 0
Average Ledger Balance 5961.76
Number of Days in Cycle 3) Service Charge SO.OO
Your account has overdral\ pr ot ect ion provided by Line of Credit number 6871 1022401299.
~
\
H
~
\. Page 2 of 4
Statement Period
CAI'ITAL COLl.ISION 03/01/10 through 03131110
FoRIe A HINOJOSA EO P PI! OE 48
Enclosures 0 _
Account NUll1ber
Your Business Advnnt:lge Pricing Relationship
Account Account QualifYing Type of
Name Number Balance S Ba lance D te
Business Advantage Checking 922.81 Average 03-30
Total Qualifying Balance $922.81
Please note that the balances in your account(s) are below the minimum required to avoid the monthly maintenance fee. We have
waived the monthly maintenance fee for an additional cycle in case you need time to make balance adjustments. If your balances
are below the minimums next month you'll still enjoy all the many benefits that Come with your Business Advantage account, but
the monthly maintenance fee will apply. Please call us at the number listed above If you have questions about your account.
Deposits and Cre dtts
ate an
Posted Amount (S) Description Reference
03/04 2,658.42 Sf Mutual Des:A25SroOOI lD:xxxxx6250Ka0301 902562006583464
lndn.Capttnl Collision Co 1D:9A25Sro001 Ccd
Pmt In fo:Nte"zzz*xxxxx6250K a0301 1370533100
\
03/17 2,797.16 Sf Mutual Dcs:A25SfOOOI ID:xxxxx1236Ka0312 902575003591285
ludnCapit al Collision Co 1D:9A25SfO001 Ccd
Prnt 1nfo:Nlc"zzz·xxxxx 1236Ka03121370533100
\
18 7,316.73 Sf Mutual Des:A25SroOOI ID:xxxxx17S4Ka031S 902576008234102
Indn:Capital Collision Co ID:9A25SroOOl cea
Pmt Info:Nte$zzz*x.xxxx 1784Ka031513705331oo
\
03/26 805.00 Bank Card Des:Merch Setl ID:430134840051477 902585006694446
Indn:Capital Collision Co ID:1210001923 Ccd
03/29 741.00 Online Banking transfer from Chk 4]93 957303297562545
Confirmation# 5288477014
Wlth dra wa ls and Debits
Other Debits
Date Bank
Posted Amount (S) Dcscr int ion Reference
03/01 67.85 Bank Card Dcs:Merch Fees 10:430134840051477 902560012434131
indn:Capilal Collision Co ID:3210001923 Ccd
03/02 89.90 Discover Network Dcs.Sctt lcment 10:601101323656387 902560015685838
Indn:Eric A. Hinojosa, Dba Co 10:1510020270 Ced
03/04 794.00 Home Depot Dcs:Online Pmt 10:560053172331112 902562007188203
Indn:Cnpilal Collision Gp Co ID:Citiccsweb Web
03/08 100.00 Mbna Credit Cards Bill Payment 9432030S00088()4
03118 11,342.43 Online Banking transfer 10 Chk 4193 957203187554340
Confirmat iouu 0692331669
03126 805.00 Online Banking transfer to Chk 4193 957103267571096
Confirmationll 3762903721
03/31 741.00 Home Depot Dcs:Online Prnt 10:560076464300917 902589010785632
Card Account ##
•• I111••••• W'dlp.Fa Pital Collision Gp Co 1D:Citicesweb Web
03/17 S90.8S Check Card 0316 Enrerpeise Rcnt-A-Cnr 90570':11(d UW>29
H
"
" CAPITAl. COI.L1SION
ERIC A HINOJOSA
Page 30f4
Statement Period
tl3/01110 Ihrough
EO I' PE OF. 48
03131110
Ilnc10surcs ()
Account Number
Withdrawals and Debits - Co n t lu ucd
Ot h er Debits
Date Bank
Posted Amount (S) Description Reference
Suhtolul 590.85
Daily Ledger Balances
Dale Balance ($) Date Baln nce ($) D:J.tc Balance ($)
03/01 144.87 03/01l 1.819.39 03/29 741.00
03/02 54.97 03117 4,025.70 03/31 0.00
03/04 1,919.39 03/18 0.00
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B.nk of Amodeo, N.A. rage I of4
1'.0. Box 25118 Statement Period
1·"mI'3. FL 33622·5 lIS OllOl/11l through 03131/10
ue P PB Oil 44 03.18980
Account Numb., _
11'1\11"1.. 11",, ,111... 1.,II! ,.I,lIull .. ll. I. 1,.1.1.. 1.. 1.'
o l05~ 001 SG!~39 ri 0
CAPITAL COLLISION GP
ERIC A HINOJOSA
4304 BURCH DR
DEL VALLE TX 78617-3273
Our (ree: Online Bank ing service aUnw$ yun (0 check bulances, tr3ck account ;lcliv1ly. P3Y bills and mor e.
With O"lIne Banking you CUD ~h(\ vi~,y up 10 18 months or Ihis SlQI~mcnl .. nl\n~.
Enroll at www.b;.nl:of3mCTica.co.nlsmallbusiM.~.
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Business Advantage Checking
CAPITAl. COLLISION Gl' ERIC A HINOJOSA
al a Glance
Account Number Statement Beginning Balance 57,009.76
Statement Period 03/011 Amount of Deposits/Credits 516.351.41
Number of Deposits/Credits Amount of Wilhdrawals/Debits 521;525.79
Number of Withdrawals/Debits Statement Ending Balance SI,841.38
Number of Deposited Items
Average: Ledger Balance 53.195.62
Number of Days in Cycle 31 Service Charge 529.95
Help avoid Overdraft & NSF: Rcwmcd Item fees. Use Alerts to get messages by email or text to inform you when your balance is
low. Usc Overdraft Protection to transfer available funds from linked savings. credit card. or credit line to your checking account to
help cover items that would overdraw your account. Call us for details.
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