The opinion
ACCEPTED
03-14-00094-CR
4748960
THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
4/2/2015 2:53:14 PM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
CLERK
No. 03-14-00094-CR
In the FILED IN
3rd COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas AUSTIN, TEXAS
at Austin 4/2/2015 2:53:14 PM
___________________________ JEFFREY D. KYLE
Clerk
No. 13-1008-K26
In the 26th Judicial District Court
Williamson County, Texas
____________________________
WILLIAM ALBERT MOWER
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
Appellee
_____________________________
STATE’S BRIEF IN RESPONSE
_____________________________
Jana Duty
District Attorney
Williamson County, Texas
John C. Prezas
State Bar No: 24041722
Assistant District Attorney
405 Martin Luther King, Box 1
Georgetown, Texas 78626
(512) 943-1234
(512) 943-1255 (fax)
jprezas@wilco.org
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
i
I. STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 39.1 and 39.7, Appellant
has requested oral argument in this case. Therefore, to preserve its right to argue,
the State requests oral argument although the State believes that the facts and legal
arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record, and that the decision
process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.
ii
II. TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ........................................ ii
II. TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................. iii
III. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................... iv
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS ...............................................................................1
A. FACTS RELATED TO OFFENSE ITSELF ...................................................1
B. FACTS RELATED TO ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE..................................4
V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ..................................................................7
VI. ARGUMENT....................................................................................................7
A. ISSUE 1: THE STATUTE PURSUANT TO WHICH APPELLANT WAS
CONVICTED IS CONSTITUTIONAL .................................................................7
i. Standard of Review .......................................................................................7
ii. Constitutional as Applied to Appellant .........................................................9
iii. Constitutional on its Face ............................................................................12
B. ISSUES 2-3: STATE’S EXHIBIT 5 AND STATE’S EXHIBIT 6 WERE
PROPERLY ADMITTED ....................................................................................15
i. Standard of Review .....................................................................................15
ii. Existing Precedent Gives Wide Latitude in Linking Appellant to Priors ...15
iii. State’s Exhibit 7 Clearly Identifies Appellant ............................................17
iv. The Evidence Sufficiently Links Appellant to State’s Exhibit 6 ................18
v. The Evidence Sufficiently Links Appellant to State’s Exhibit 5 ................20
VII. PRAYER ........................................................................................................22
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................22
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................22
iii
III. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S 601 (1973) ................................................... 12, 13
Bynum v. State, 767 S.W. 2d 769, 774 (Tex. Crim. app. 1989) ................................9
Duncantell v. State, 230 S.W.3d 835, 843 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007,
pet. Ref’d) ...............................................................................................................9
Ely v. State, 582 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Tex. Crim.App. [Panel Op.]1979) .....................9
Engelking v. State, 750 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) .........................14
Ex Parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ...............................................8
Ex Parte Warren, 353 S.W.3d 490, 493-495 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)....................16
Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ............................. 15, 16
in re Shaw, 204 S.W.3d 9, 15 (Tex.App—Texarkana 2006, pet. ref’d) ..................12
Maloney v. State, 294 S.W.3d 613, 625-629 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009,
pet. Ref’d) ............................................................................................ 9, 12, 13, 14
Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) .............15
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) ...............................................................12
Parker v. State, 985 S.W.2d 460,464 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) .................................14
Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) .................................7
State v. Holcombe, 187 S.W.3d 496 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) .................................13
State v. Salinas 892 SW2d 9, 10-11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st. Dist.] 1997, pet.
Ref’d) ......................................................................................................................7
U.S. v. Hornaday, 392 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2004) ..........................................8
U.S. v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008) ...............................................................8
iv
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The state wishes to clarify the following facts to supplement those addressed in
Appellant’s brief.
A. FACTS RELATED TO OFFENSE ITSELF
The site Appellant used to chat with a person he thought was fourteen year
old girl was MocoSpace, a legitimate site that allows users to start a chat based on
zip code. R.R. vol. 5 p. 23. Adults do use MocoSpace when seeking romantic
relationships. R.R. vol. 5 p. 23. However, the only age restriction is that a
MocoSpace user must input a date of birth that indicates they are 18. R.R. vol. 5 p.
19-20. There are no background investigations or other efforts to verify whether or
not the birthdate input is accurate. R.R. vol. 5 p. 19-20.
The profile, “sammylopez”, Sergeant Rodgers created and used to chat with
Appellant did list an age of 22. R.R. vol. 5 p. 25, 27. However, Rodgers took
several steps to let Appellant know that the person with whom Appellant was
chatting was indeed a underage child. Rodgers chatted with Appellant a week
prior to the chats recorded and entered into evidence in this case. R.R. vol. 5 p. 25.
In this prior chat, Rodgers identified himself as a 14-year-old girl and updated his
profile, the same one that showed an age of 22, to indicate the girl was grounded
and was in trouble with her mom. R.R. vol. 5 p. 25. Rodgers did this specifically
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to make clear to Appellant that Appellant was not chatting with a 22-year-old but
rather with a 14-year-old girl, as 22-year-old women are not typically grounded by
their mothers. R.R. vol 5. p. 25.
After this previous chat, in which Appellant learned that the profile with
whom he was chatting belonged to a 14-year-old girl, Appellant again contacted
Rodgers. R.R. vol. 5 p. 25. Rodgers recognized Appellant’s screen name as
badbilly1966. R.R. vol. 5 p. 25. This time, Rodgers updated the profile to make
reference to summer time and not being able to believe that she was going to be a
freshman. R.R. vol 5. p. 26. Based on statements made in the prior chat, the
statements in the prior profile and the statements made in the then-current profile,
Appellant had every indication he was initiating a second chat session with an
eighth grade girl going into freshman year of high school after the summer ended.
R.R. vol. 5 p. 25-26.
Appellant’s first post in this chat was, “what’s up sexy young lady?” R.R.
vol. 5 p. 29. During that chat session Appellant references and confirms his
knowledge from the previous chat that he is speaking with a 14-year-old girl when
he says, “I’d ask you to go but your grounded.” R.R. vol. 5 p. 31. Appellant then
asked Rodgers to go skinny dipping with him, at which point Rogers reminded him
that the online persona with whom Appellant was chatting was 14 and, thereby,
giving Applicant the chance to back out. R.R. vol. 5 p. 32. Rather than backing
2
out, Appellant asked Rodgers if that was a problem and Rodgers stated “no just
making sure that u remembered that I was only 14 and not like 22 like my profile
says.” R.R. vol. 5 p. 33.
After this exchange, when there can be no doubt left that Appellant is
chatting with a 14-year-old child, Appellant asked, “you like big cock”, sent
Rodgers a picture of his penis and asked, “you wanna ride it”. R.R. vol 5. p.36.
Rodgers again made clear that the persona was a virgin and Appellant responded,
“want me to pop you’re cherry”. R.R. vol. 5 p. 37
As the chat session becomes more sexual in nature, Rodgers, in the persona
of the minor girl, says she doesn’t want to be 15 and pregnant and that Appellant
should bring a condom. R.R. vol. 5 p. 38. After they agreed on an address of a
nearby park as a place to meet, Appellant stated he would bring beer, and directed
the persona to wear a loose dress and no panties. R.R. vol. 5 p. 38-39.
Prior to arriving at the park, gave Rodgers his phone number so that
Appellant could continue to communicate via text message. R.R. vol. 5 p. 42.
Appellant notified Rodgers via text message when Appellant was near and when
he arrived at the agreed upon park. R.R. vol. 5 p. 42. Rodgers observed Appellant
walking around the park with his cell phone out, looking around as if expecting to
meet someone, and carrying brown bags that appeared to contain beer. R.R. vol. 5
p.42-43.
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At no point in the records from the chat or from the testimony at trial, is
there any indication that Appellant ever made reference to age-play or any sort of
roleplay or attempted to clarify the true age of the profile with whom he thought he
was chatting. Rather, Appellant accepted without hesitation the assertion that he
was chatting with an underage girl and continued to pursue a sexual interlude with
her. Appellant’s admissions in his subsequent interview with investigators further
confirms that he did, in fact, go to the agreed upon meeting location with the plan
to engage in sexual intercourse with a person he believed to be a 14-year-old girl.
R.R. vol. 7, Exhibit 3.
B. FACTS RELATED TO ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE
AT PUNISHMENT PHASE OF TRIAL
During the punishment phase of the trial, the State offered State’s Exhibit 5
and State’s Exhibit 6, to which Appellant objected. R.R. vol. 5 p. 93. After
allowing both sides to argue outside the presence of the jury, the Court admitted
State’s Exhibit 6 but initially sustained Appellant’s objection as to State’s Exhibit
5, R.R. vol. 5 p. 93-99, 100. After further argument, the trial court admitted State’s
Exhibit 5, R.R. vol. 6 p. 11.
State’s Exhibit 5 consists of two documents from the state of Nebraska, one
entitled “Amended Complaint” and one entitled “Journal Entry and Order”, R.R.
vol. 7, State’s Exhibit 5. The latter appears to be a computer print-out summary of
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the disposition of the complaint and states, “Defendant was granted allocution and
sentence was pronounced by the Court.” R.R. vol. 7, State’s Exhibit 5. The
“Amended Complaint” charges William Mower with violating the Nebraska
Sexual Offender Registration Act on January 16, 2008, by failing to register with
the Sheriff of the County of Hall within the appropriate time period after becoming
subject to such registration, R.R. vol. 7, State’s Exhibit 5. Both pages of State’s
Exhibit 5 document a Date of Birth of 6/12/1966 and the name of the person
charged and sentenced as William Mower, R.R. vol. 7, State’s Exhibit 5. Both
pages are consistent with each other in their reflection of the Nebraska statute
charged, the County of Hall, the Case ID number of CR08-188, R.R. vol. 7,
State’s Exhibit 5.
State’s Exhibit 6 is a Certificate of Conviction from the state of New York
that reflects that William A. Mower pled and was sentenced for the crime of
Attempted Rape in the First Degree. R.R. vol. 7. State’s Exhibit 6 does list an
erroneous date of birth of 6/1/1966 rather than 6/12/1966. R.R. vol. 7. State’s
Exhibit 6 lists a disposition date of December 17, 1998. R.R. vol. 7.
During the punishment phase of the trial, the State also offered, and the trial
court admitted, State’s Exhibit 7, a business record affidavit and accompanying
records from the Texas Department of Public Safety’s Sex offender Registration
Bureau. R.R. vol. 6 p. 101. State’s Exhibit 7 contains a variety of information
5
identifying Appellant, such as name, date of birth, photographs of Appellant’s face,
an FBI number, a TIC number, an NIC number, a driver’s license number, social
security number, height, weight, shoe size, eye and hair color, a listing of scars and
tattoos, signature, and a full set of Appellant’s fingerprints. R.R. vol. 7 State’s
Exhibit 7. The name and date of birth of Appellant contained in State’s Exhibit 5
match that reflected for Appellant in State’s Exhibit 7. R.R. vol. 7 State’s Exhibit
5, 7. State’s Exhibit 7 also lists the conviction for attempted rape in New York as
the basis for the imposition of sex offender registration on Appellant and contains
corroborating details, as discussed further below. R.R. vol. 7., State’s Exhibit 6, 7.
During the punishment phase of the trial the State also offered, and the trial
court admitted, State’s Exhibit 8, a fingerprint card collected by Janet Boring, a
crime scene specialist with the Williamson County Sheriff’s Office. R.R. vol. 6 p.
107, 112, R.R. vol. 7. Ms. Boring testified as to her training and experience and
then testified that she compared the fingerprints she collected in State’s Exhibit 8
and the fingerprints contained in State’s Exhibit 7 and concluded both sets of
fingerprints came from the same person. R.R. vol. 6 p. 113, 109-112.
Also during the punishment phase, the State offered State’s Exhibit 3 (a
previous redacted version State’s 3A had been offered at trial with many of the
portions relevant to this appeal redacted), a video recording of an interview with
Appellant. R.R. vol. 7. During that interview, Appellant admitted to both the
6
offense reflected in State’s Exhibit 5 and in State’s Exhibit 6. R.R. vol. 7, Exhibits
3, 5, 6.
V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Statute pursuant to which Appellant was convicted is neither overbroad
nor impermissibly vague. It does not forbid the “Age Play” Appellant describes
and it is clear that Appellant was not engaged in “Age Play” in this case.
Therefore, the statute is constitutional both as applied to Appellant and on its face.
Both State’s Exhibits 5 and 6 were properly admitted because the State
produced sufficient evidence, consistent with existing precedent, to properly link
Appellant to both exhibits.
VI. ARGUMENT
A. ISSUE 1: THE STATUTE PURSUANT TO WHICH
APPELLANT WAS CONVICTED IS CONSTITUTIONAL
i. Standard of Review
When considering Appellant’s assertion that the Tex. Penal Code §33.021 is
unconstitutional, this Court must review the statute de novo. See, State v. Salinas
892 SW2d 9, 10-11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st. Dist.] 1997, pet. ref’d). The court
must presume the statute is valid and the legislature has not acted unreasonably or
arbitrarily. Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
7
Generally, the burden rests up on the person challenging the statute to establish its
unconstitutionality. Id.
Appellant is correct that in Ex Parte Lo, the Court of Criminal Appeals held
that where the government seeks to restrict and penalize speech, precedent from
the Supreme Court of the United States makes clear that a “strict scrutiny” analysis
applies, and the usual presumption of constitutionality is reversed. Ex Parte Lo,
424 S.W.3d 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). However, it is not speech that the
government seeks to restrict in Appellant’s case. The Court of Criminal Appeals
in Ex Parte Lo, struck down section 33.021(b) of the Texas Penal Code that did
punish speech by prohibiting certain types of sexually explicit communications.
Id.
However, the Court of Criminal Appeals made a strong and direct
distinction between that provision and §33.021(c), which prohibits the conduct of
using electronic communications to solicit a minor to meet another person with the
intent that the minor will engage in certain sexual behavior. Id. In fact, the court
noted, “Such solicitation statutes exist in virtually all states and have been
routinely upheld as constitutional because ‘offers to engage in illegal transactions
[such as sexual assault of a minor] are categorically excluded from First
Amendment protection.’” Id. at 15, citing U.S. v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297
(2008) and U.S. v. Hornaday, 392 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2004).
8
The Court of Criminal Appeals went on to note that it is the conduct of
requesting that a minor engage in illegal sexual acts that is the gravamen of the
statute by which Appellant in this case was convicted and noted that the First Court
of Appeals previously upheld the constitutionality of this statute in Maloney v.
State, 294 S.W.3d 613, 625-629 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. Ref’d).
The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the conduct oriented §33.021(c), while
not an issue in that case, provided, “an excellent contrast” to the §33.021(b) that
they ultimately deemed unconstitutional. Id.
Thus, Appellant’s reliance on Ex Parte Lo in this case is misplaced.
Therefore, this Court must uphold the statute if it can determine a reasonable
construction that will render it constitutional. Ely v. State, 582 S.W.2d 416, 419
(Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979). Further, if the statute at issue here can be
construed in more than one way, at least one of which sustains its validity, this
Court should apply the interpretation that sustains is validity. Duncantell v. State,
230 S.W.3d 835, 843 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d).
ii. Constitutional as Applied to Appellant
When asserting that a statute is facially unconstitutional, Appellant must first
carry the burden of showing that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to
him. Bynum v. State, 767 S.W. 2d 769, 774 (Tex. Crim. app. 1989) Appellant’s
brief does not appear to contain any such argument beyond a single statement that
9
Appellant was chatting with a person whose profile indicated they were twenty two
years old in what Appellant terms an adult-only chat room. Other than this
statement, the entire brief is directed toward challenging the constitutionality of the
statute as a whole.
Regardless, §33.021 is clearly not unconstitutional as applied to Appellant,
and therefore, this Court need not consider the more general assertion of
unconstitutionality as the First Court of Appeals did in Maloney. Appellant never
made any reference to fantasy, inquired as to the true age of the persona with
whom he was chatting, or attempted to otherwise define the scope of any such
fantasy. Instead, Appellant was repeatedly confronted with the fact that the person
with whom he was chatting was an underage girl. Appellant responded to the
multiple repeated assertions and clues of the age of the person with whom he was
chatting by soliciting for sexual activity the person he thought was an underage
girl, arranging a meeting, and then arriving at the meeting place with the very
supplies that he indicated he would bring.
Further, in State’s Exhibit 3, the video recording of law enforcement
interviewing the Appellant, the Appellant makes admissions that make clear that
the statute at issue is constitutional as applied to him. Once at approximately
10
12:38:001 and twice in a discussion beginning at approximately 13:17:06,
Appellant makes the statement, “You got me dead to rights.” C.R. vol. 7. The
Appellant admits that he knew the girl with whom he was chatting was 14 in a
conversation beginning at approximately 12:38:45. C.R. vol. 7. He admits he
chatted with “her” (the 14-year-old persona) once before and discussed how “her”
mother was angry at “her” in a conversation beginning at approximately 12:42:10.
R.R. vol. 7. Appellant admits sending “her” the picture of his erect penis at
approximately 12:43:48. Appellant also admits that when “she” told him “she”
was a virgin, he said he wanted to “pop her cherry,” at approximately 12:48:10.
R.R. vol. 7. At approximately 13:01:00 the Appellant admits he was sexually
stimulated by the conversation with “her.” R.R. vol. 7. At approximately 13:03:20
the Appellant admits that he has an interest in young girls because they are young
and inexperienced and he is older and can “show them the ropes.” R.R. vol. 7. At
approximately 13:11:20, the Appellant agrees that if a girl had shown up in a
sundress and no panties he would have sexually assaulted her. R.R. vol. 7. Finally,
at approximately 13:29:30, the investigator interviewing the Appellant asked him if
he understood how bad it could have been if a 14-year-old girl had shown up, and
the Appellant answered, “Yes I do. Yes I do. And that’s what’s eating me up.
1
The times indicated in this brief come from the timer on the banner that is visible at the top of
the video when the video file contained on State’s Exhibit 3 is played on a PC computer with
Windows Media Player.
11
Knowing I was going to do something so,” and then Appellant trailed off without
finishing his sentence. R.R. vol. 7.
Thus, the interview with the Appellant makes clear that he was not engaging
in “age play” or some other fantasy, but in fact was planning to meet and have sex
with a person he believed to be a 14-year-old girl, and that if he had found a 14-
year-old girl at the park where law enforcement found him, he would have sexually
assaulted her.
iii. Constitutional on its Face
However, if this Court does consider Appellant’s assertion that §33.021 is
facially unconstitutional, it should consider the First Court of Appeals decision in
Maloney, which is directly on point. There, as here, §33.021 (c) was challenged,
unsuccessfully, as void for vagueness and as being overbroad on the basis of the
lack of definition for the term fantasy and that it prevents adults from engaging in
fantasy with another consenting adult. Maloney v. State, 294 S.W.3d at 625-629.
1. Statute is Not Overbroad
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the doctrine of
overbreadth should be employed with hesitation and only as a last resort. See, New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). Thus, to invalidate a statute on its face, the
overbreadth must be substantial and a court must find more than the mere
possibility of imagining some unconstitutional application. See, In re Shaw, 204
12
S.W.3d 9, 15 (Tex.App—Texarkana 2006, pet. ref’d) (citing Members of City
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984)) and Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S 601 (1973). Indeed the Supreme Court has said that when
conduct, and not just speech, is involved, the overbreadth of the statute at issue
must, “not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s
plainly legitimate sweep.” Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615.
The First Court of Appeals in Houston, considered these cases, among others, in
holding that prevention of sexual assault and abuse of children addressed by
§33.021(c) was “of surpassing importance” and that, “the incidence of the State
seeking to prosecute two consenting adults engaging in online role playing or
‘fantasy’ would likely be exceedingly low.” Maloney, 294 S.W.3d at 628. That
court then held that the over breadth of §33.021 was not substantial relative to its
plainly legitimate sweep and therefore the section was not unconstitutionally
overbroad. The First Court’s analysis is sound and this Court should adopt its
holding. Id.
2. The Statute is Not Impermissibly Vague
Appellant also claims that §33.021 is void for vagueness because it fails to
provide a definition for fantasy, for which proposition Appellant cites State v.
Holcombe, 187 S.W.3d 496 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In Holcombe, the Court of
Criminal Appeals did indeed hold that a statute is void for vagueness when it fails
13
to define a criminal offense with enough clarity that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is forbidden in a manner that does not allow arbitrary or
discriminatory enforcement. Id. at 499. However, The Court of Criminal Appeals
has also held that a statute is not unconstitutionally vague simply because it fails to
define certain words or terms contained therein, but has instead directed courts to
give such undefined words their plain meaning. Engelking v. State, 750 S.W.2d
213, 215 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), Parker v. State, 985 S.W.2d 460,464 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1999).
Further, the First Court of Appeals reasoned in Maloney that §33.021 does not
criminalize engaging in fantasy, but instead very clearly prohibits a person from
"soliciting a minor over the internet or through other electronic media to meet him
or another person with the intent that the minor will engage in sexual contact,
sexual intercourse, or deviate sexual intercourse with him or another person.”
Maloney, 294 S.W.3d at 629. The First Court then correctly reasoned that since it
is not until this conduct is established that §33.021 prohibits an accused from
defending against the charge by claiming that he was merely engaged in fantasy,
§33.021 does not criminalize the act of fantasy. Id. Based on that rationale, the
First Court held that §33.021 was not unconstitutionally vague. This reasoning is
sound and this Court should hold similarly here.
14
B. ISSUES 2-3: STATE’S EXHIBIT 5 AND STATE’S EXHIBIT 6
WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED
i. Standard of Review
Appellant is correct that this court must review the trial court’s decision to
admit State’s Exhibit 5 and State’s Exhibit 6 under the abuse of discretion standard
and only reverse the trial court’s decision if the trial court acted without referring
to any guiding rules or principles or, in other words, if the trial court acted in an
arbitrary and unreasonable manner. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380,
391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (citing Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701
S.W.2d 238, 241-242 (Tex. 1985), cert. denied 476 U.S. 1159, (1986)). “The mere
fact that a trial judge may decide a matter within his discretionary authority in a
different manner than an appellate judge in a similar circumstance does not
demonstrate that an abuse of discretion has occurred.” Id.
ii. Existing Precedent Gives Wide Latitude in Linking
Appellant to Priors
The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that to establish a Defendant’s
previous conviction the State must show that a prior conviction exists and must
link the Defendant to that conviction, but has not required any particular manner
for providing such proof. Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). Not only is a written judgment and sentence not required, but the Court of
15
Criminal Appeals noted that in a “paperless” era, such judgments may become
obsolete, when it went on to hold that a computer print-out from the Dallas County
Clerk coupled with a certified driving record was enough to prove the prior
convictions contained therein beyond a reasonable doubt. Id at 923-925. The
Court of Criminal Appeals cited the Flowers holding to find that the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice properly imposed sex-offender registration
conditions of parole based on an out of state prior sex offense conviction as
evidenced by the DPS CCH report (or rap sheet) and a “Final Disposition Report”
submitted to the FBI by the Chicago Police Department. Ex Parte Warren, 353
S.W.3d 490, 493-495 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
In his brief, the Appellant himself acknowledges that the Flowers case
expanded the ways the State can prove a prior conviction in light of the ways in
which electronic records are handled in the digital age. This is especially true
given that Flowers, like this case, involves prior convictions from a State other
than Texas, and thus which operates on rules and common procedures other than
those imposed for judgments here in Texas. Appellant’s objection then, in light of
the wide latitude given the State in Flowers, is to challenge the links between the
Appellant and State’s Exhibits 5 and 6.
16
iii. State’s Exhibit 7 Clearly Identifies Appellant
The State used State’s Exhibit 7 to link the Appellant to the prior convictions
about which Appellant now complains. The State did so because the link between
Appellant and State’s Exhibit 7 is clear. State’s Exhibit 7 contains a multitude of
information about the Appellant including multiple photographs of his face, date of
birth, sex, race, height, weight, eye color, hair color, FBI number, DPS number,
TIC number, NIC number, driver’s license number, shoe size, blood type, social
security number, address history, cellular phone numbers, information regarding
his vehicle (year, make, model, license plate number, color, style), a description of
scars and tattoos, and multiple fingerprints of the Appellant include a full set and
multiple thumbprints. R. R. vol. 7.
Further, Janet Boring, the fingerprint expert with the Williamson County
Sheriff’s Office testified that the fingerprints on State’s Exhibit 7 matched the
fingerprints she obtained from the Appellant. R.R. vol. 6 p. 113, 109-112. This
kind of information, especially the FBI number and other such government issued
numbers, is the type of information used and approved in the Flowers and Warren
cases.
Thus, there can be little doubt that the same William Mower appealing his
conviction in this case is the same William Mower described in State’s Exhibit 7.
17
iv. The Evidence Sufficiently Links Appellant to State’s
Exhibit 6
State’s Exhibit 6, entitled “Certificate of Conviction” is clearly on its face
documentation of a conviction from the state of New York for the crime of
Attempted Rape in the First Degree in violation of section 110-130.35 of New
York penal laws. R.R. vol. 7. State’s Exhibit 7 indicates the Appellant is required
to register as a sex offender in Texas because of a New York conviction for
“Attempt to Commit Rape/1st Degree/Forcible Compulsion New York Penal Law
130.35.” R.R. vol. 7. Both State’s Exhibit 7 and State’s Exhibit 6 list the same
sentencing date. R.R. vol. 7. This sentencing date, offense title, and section of the
New York penal law are listed in multiple places in State’s Exhibit 7. R.R. vol. 7.
In addition, the third page of the document entitled “Pre-Release
Notification Form Texas Sex Offender Registration Program” contained within
State’s Exhibit 7, lists the same county where the offense occurred, Chenango, as
that reflected on the face of State’s Exhibit 6. R.R. vol. 7. The document in State’s
Exhibit 7 entitled “Offender Relocate Notice From Colorado to Texas” lists “NY”
under “Where Sex Conviction Occurred.” R.R. vol. 7.
It is true that the State’s Exhibit 7 shows Appellant’s date of birth as
06/12/1966 and State’s Exhibit 6 lists a date of birth of 06/1/1966, but in light of
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the other linking evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deeming
this a clerical error and admitting State’s Exhibit 6. R.R. vol. 7.
Further, State’s Exhibit 5, discussed below, reflects that Appellant was
charged with violating sex offender registration conditions. R.R. vol. 7. Given that
State’s exhibit 7 reflects only the New York attempted rape conviction as a basis
for the Appellant’s duty to register, the existence of State’s Exhibit 5 serves as
another factor showing the connection between State’s Exhibits 6 and 7.
In addition, State’s Exhibit 3, the recorded interview of the Appellant
contains an admission by the Appellant, at approximately 12:38:54, that he is a
registered sex offender because of an Attempted Rape charge out of the state of
New York. R.R. vol. 7. During this conversation, the Appellant gives further
detail about the crime, telling the interviewer that he got drunk, blacked out, beat
up a 38 year old woman, and tore her clothes off. R.R. vol. 7. He says the offense
happened in 1998. R.R. vol. 7. Again at approximately 12:56:20, the Appellant
admits that he was incarcerated in New York and took the first plea deal they
offered him. At 13:07:34, the Appellant confirms yet again that he was involved in
an attempted rape in New York. R.R. vol. 7.
The details in the Appellant’s confession, beyond the fact of the admission
itself, match details in the State’s other exhibits. Specifically, the Appellant’s
admission to investigators that the victim in the attempted rape charge in New
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York was a 38-year-old female corresponds to the victim information listed under
the subheading “Offense Information” in State’s Exhibit 7. R.R. vol. 7. The
Appellant’s admission that the New York offense happened in 1998 matches with
State’s Exhibit 6, which lists an indictment number of 98-39 and the Date of plea
and sentence of December 17, 1998. R.R. vol. 7.
Given the manner in which these various links lend credibility to the
Appellant’s admission that he was convicted of the crime shown in State’s Exhibit
6, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting State’s Exhibit 6.
v. The Evidence Sufficiently Links Appellant to State’s
Exhibit 5
State’s Exhibit 5 consists of two documents from the state of Nebraska, an
Amended Complaint accusing Appellant of the crime of “Criminal Attempt—
Violation of Sexual Offender Registration Act” and a “Journal Entry and Order”
reflecting Appellant’s sentencing for said crime. R.R. vol. 7. In addition to having
the same name, State’s Exhibit 5 and State’s Exhibit 7 both reflect the Appellant’s
proper date of birth as 06/12/1966. R.R. vol. 7. As discussed above State’s Exhibit
5 and 6 are linked to each other as well as Appellant since there is no other basis
listed than the New York conviction that would require Appellant to register as a
sex offender and thus no other reason that Appellant would be charged with
violating the conditions of sex offender registration. Further in State’s Exhibit 3,
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discussed above, when the Appellant is asked if anything ever happened in
Nebraska at approximately 13:07:34, the Appellant replies, “They got me for
failure to register because I didn’t know what the laws were…didn’t get there in
time or something so I got that.” R.R. vol. 7.
This admission, along with the connection between State’s Exhibit 6, which
is clearly linked to the Appellant, and State’s Exhibit 5 as well as the Appellant’s
correct date of birth, provide sufficient links such that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting State’s Exhibit 5.
Certainly when evaluating both State’s Exhibits 5 and 6, the fact that the
Appellant admitted to the offenses in his recorded interview is significant as that is
something that the court in Flowers did not have. Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 919-921.
Further, in Flowers the Court of Criminal Appeals found a certified driver’s record
from the Texas Department of Public Safety sufficient to corroborate a computer
print out of a conviction from the Dallas County Clerk’s office. Here, we have far
more information in the Certification of Sex Offender Record Information from the
Texas Department of Public Safety admitted as State’s Exhibit 7, than is typically
obtained from driver’s license records.
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VII. PRAYER
Wherefore, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
conviction.
Respectfully submitted,
Jana Duty
District Attorney
Williamson County, Texas
/s/ John C. Prezas
John C. Prezas
State Bar No: 24041722
Assistant District Attorney
405 Martin Luther King, Box 1
Georgetown, Texas 78626
(512) 943-1234
(512) 943-1255 (fax)
jprezas@wilco.org
VIII. CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that the State’s brief contains 4,999 words in compliance with Rule
9.4 of the Texas rules of Appellate Procedure.
__/s/ John C. Prezas______________
John C. Prezas
IX. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the State’s brief has been e-filed on April 2, 2015,
and sent to the attorney for Appellant, Kristen Jernigan, 207 S. Austin Ave.,
Georgetown, Texas, 78626, via e-service.
_/s/ John C. Prezas_______________
John C. Prezas
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