Opinion

in Re Reidie James Jackson, Relator

Court
Texas Supreme Court
Filed
Nov 25, 2015
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 3.1%

sore, bruised ear which required no medical care and healed in a few days would not support civil rights claim for excessive force

How later courts described this case

  • sore, bruised ear which required no medical care and healed in a few days would not support civil rights claim for excessive force
  • "An inmate who complains of a push or shove that causes no discernible injury almost certainly fails to ~ate a valid excessive force clai~'
  • stating that "all [common-law] tort theories alleged against a governmental unit ... are assumed to be 'under [the Tort Oaims Act]' for purposes of section 101.106." (citing Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 659 (Tex. 2008))
  • excessive force claim for spraying with a fire hose frivolous where prisoner suffered no injury

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

07-15-00429-CV

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CAUSE NO. 2012500,295

REIDIE JACKSON § IN THE DISTRICT COURT

TDCJ # 1164177, §

Plaintiff §

§

§ LUBBOCK COUNTY, TEXAS

v. §

§

VAUGHN, ET AL, § 72nd JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Defendants §

Defendants Honesto, Nail, and Guzman's Motion to Declare

Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant & Request for Security

Defendants Honesto, Nail, and Guzman file this Motion to declare PlaintiffReidie Jackson

a vexatious litigant and request that the Court stay the proceedings and order Plaintiff to provide

security pursuant to Section 11.051 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

Statement of the Case

·Plaintiff is Reidie Jackson. On January 6, 2012, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants

Robert Vaughn and Nicky Emsoff for assault, battery, conspiracy, excessive force, bystander

liability, and violations ofthe Texas Constitution and U.S. Constitution. On December 11, 2014,

the Amarillo Court of Appeals reversed the trial court judgment dismissing Plaintiff's suit pursuant

to Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code, and remanded the case. See Jackson

v. Vaughn, 07-13-00022-CV, 2014 WL 6999333, at *6 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Dec. 11, 2014, no.

pet. h.). The Court of Appeals held that Plaintiff's pleadings sufficiently alleged a Section 1983

excessive force claim and a bystander claim. !d. On April24, 2015, Defendants Peter Honesto and

James Nail filed their original answer, and on April27, 2015, Defendants Honesto and Nail, along

with David Guzman, who was answering for the first time, filed an amended answer. 1

1

The counsel for defendants was not made aware until February 4, 2015 that Defendants Honesto, Nail, and

Guzman had potentially been served back in November 2012.

1

Arguments and Authorities

A. Vexatious Litigant Statutes

Chapter 11 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code contains provisions addressing

vexatious litigants-persons who abuse the legal system by filing numerous, frivolous lawsuits.

See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§§ 11.001-11.104. This chapter provides that on or before the

ninetieth day after the defendant files an original answer or makes a special appearance, the

defendant may move for an order declaring that the plaintiff a vexatious litigant and requiring the

plaintiff to furnish security in order to proceed with 1'1is case. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §

11.051. Additionally, the court may declare this litigant vexatious on its own motion after notice

and hearing. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 11.202(a); In re Douglas, 333 S.W.3d 273,287 (Tex.

App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.).

On the filing of a motion under§ 11.051, the litigation is stayed until after the motion's

disposition. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 11.052. If, after hearing the evidence on the motion,

the Court grants the motion, it "shall order the plaintiff to furnish security for the benefit of the

moving defendant" to be paid by a date determined by the Court. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§

11.055 (emphasis added). If the plaintiff fails to pay the security within the court's deadline, the

court "shall dismiss [the] litigation." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 11.056 (emphasis added). If

the plaintiffs suit is subsequently dismissed on the mL ·its, Section 11.057 states that the "moving

defendant has recourse to the security ... in an amount determined by the Court."

B. Criteria for Finding a Litigant Vexatious

Under Section 11.054, a court may find a plaintiff vexatious if the defendant shows that

there is not a "reasonable probability" that the plaintiff will prevail in the present suit. Second, the

defendant must meet one of three additional requirements. This prong of the vexatious litigant

2

analysis is satisfied by Plaintiffs pro se litigation history. Over the past seven years, Plaintiff has

"commenced, prosecuted, or maintained at least five litigations as a pro se litigant ... that have

been: (A) finally determined adversely to the Plaintiff; (B) permitted to remain pending for at least

two years without [proceeding] to trial or hearing; or (C) determined ... to be frivolous or

groundless." See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 11.054(1).

C. Effect of Declaring Plaintiff to be Vexatious

Because Offender Reidie James Jackson fits the statutory definition of a vexatious litigant,

this court should require him "to furnish security for the benefit of the moving defendant" and

"dismiss [this suit if he] does not furnish the security within the time set by the order." Tex. Civ.

Prac. & Rem. Code § 11.055-56. If his suit is subsequently dismissed on the merits, Section 11.057

requires that Defendants "have recourse to the security ... in an amount determined by the Court."

D. Notice of Stay of Proceedings

Upon the filing of this motion, the present "litiJation is stayed and the moving defendant

is not required to plead" until10 days after the motion is denied or 10 days after the Plaintiff has

furnished security in accordance with the Court's order. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 11.052.

E. No Reasonable Probability of Success on the Merits.

Before finding a plaintiff a vexatious litigant, the defendant must show that "there is not a

reasonable probability that the plaintiff will prevail in the litigation against the defendant." See

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 11.054. "Undertaking [this] inquiry implicitly requires the trial

court to preliminarily accept the factual assertions as true and assess whether they comprise a

viable cause of action." Lagaite v. Uy, 347 S.W.3d 890, 893 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2011, no pet.). . v.S~;()fl

·. ----, >r ~(1 . ~~

By its terms, Section 11.054 "does not require conclusive evidence" that the plaintiff is /vexatious'\.~. 'i:l\A:.\(~~

\ )0\ ~

litigant but "proof rising only to the level of a reasonabu probability." Gant v. Grand Prairie Ford, 'p~\1..')(

~·,\,'{-(

,o'9

~·

3

L.P., 2-06-386-CV, 2007 WL 2067753, at *3 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth July 19,2007, pet. denied).

The Amarillo Court of Appeals held that "[t]aking Jackson's plead facts as true ... his pleadings

sufficiently allege a section 1983 excessive force claim and a bystander claim." Jackson, 2014 WL

6999333 at *5. However, Plaintiffs claims are not likely to succeed on the merits.

1. There is no reasonable probability that Plaintiff will prevail on his excessive use

of force claim.

There is not a reasonable probability that Plaim:iff will succeed on his use of force claim.

The constitutional standard for an excessive use of force is "whether force was applied in a good

faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of

causing harm." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (internal quotations omitted). The Court

in Hudson also noted that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition o~ cruel and unusual punishment

"necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided

that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind." !d. at 10 (internal

quotations omitted); see also Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997). Plaintiffs

claims of excessive use of force must fail if Defendants acted with even an arguable effort to

maintain or restore discipline. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1986) ("Prison

administrators ... should be accorded wide-ranging ueference in the adoption and execution of

policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline

and to maintain institutional security.") (internal quotations omitted).

The Supreme Court in Hudson provides the five factors that a Plaintiff must prove to

support his excessive use of force claim. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The Hudson factors include: (1)

the extent of the injury suffered; (2) the need for the application of force; (3) the relationship

between the need and the amount of force used; (4) the threat reasonably perceived by the

responsible officials; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. Id. at

4

7; Baldwin v. Stalder, 137 F.3d 836, 839 (5th Cir. 1998); Hudson v. McMillian, 962 F.2d 522, 523

(5th Cir. 1992). "The amount of force that is constitutionally permissible ... must be judged by

the context in which that force is deployed." Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 434 (5th Cir. 1996). It

should be noted that not every push or shove, even if it may seem unnecessary in the peace of a

judge's chambers, violates a prisoner's constitutional rights. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F .2d 1028, 1033

(2nd Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)). Plaintiff cannot satisfy

the five Hudson 8 that he must prove in order to support his use of force claim.

First, Plaintiff has not shown an injury. In Brown v. Lippard, the Fifth Circuit considered

the effect of the first Hudson factor, relating to the injuries suffered. 472 F.3d 384, 386-387 (5th

Cir. 2006). The Fifth Circuit held in that case that injuries are insufficient to support an

excessive force claim where there is no physical injury, or where the injury is extremely minor,

such as a bruise caused by having one's ear twisted. Id. at 387. Additionally, civil rights plaintiffs

must allege an actual injury caused by the defendants' actions. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 1178

(2010) ("An inmate who complains of a push or shove that causes no discernible injury almost

certainly fails to ~ate a valid excessive force clai~'); see also Memphis Community School

Districtv. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299,308 (1986) (for a§ 1983 claim to b~iabl~the plaintiffmust

allege an injury). This is true in cases alleging excessive use of force. See, e.g., Jackson v.

Culbertson, 984 F.2d 699, 700 (5th Cir. 1993) (excessive force claim for spraying with a fire hose

frivolous where prisoner suffered no injury); Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir.

1997) (sore, bruised ear which required no medical care and healed in a few days would not support

civil rights claim for excessive force). Ultimately, where the objective factors of an inmate's

medical record show no evidence of any injuries consistent with the inmate's allegations, the court

may conclude that the allegations are implausible. See Wilburn v. Shane, 193 F.3d 517, 1999 WL

5

706141 (5th Cir. 1999), citing Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d 278,281-82 (5th Cir. 1990).

In Williams, an offender accused an officer of using excessive force in violation of his

Eighth Amendment rights. Williams v. Thompson, No. 5:11-cv-68, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25302,

at *2-3 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2012). More specifically, the offender alleged that the officer hit him

over the head with a flashlight so hard that he was knocked unconscious. Id. at *6. The medical

records, however, did not show that the offender had a bruise, knot, or any injury associated with

his allegation of excessive force. Id. The Court held, that since the objective medical records did

not show that the offender suffered an injury, his claims were dismissed in line with the Supreme

Court's holding in Wilkins. Id. at *7.

Plaintiff has not suffered an injury or provided proof of an injury outside of his conclusory

self-serving statements. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint at 14 ("Every [sic] since

the incident Plaintiff has been having progressively blurred vision, his real tooth along with his

temporary dental plate suffered chips and breakage."), Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint at 6

("Plaintiff was permanently injured."). Moreover, a review of the relevant portions of the medical

report contained in the Use of Force Report indicate that at the time of the event Plaintiff

complained of back injury, yet upon examination no injuries were found. Exhibit A at 4-6.

Additionally, the medical records for the relevant time period do not show that the Plaintiff

submitted any sick call requests or saw a clinician for his alleged injuries. Exhibit B at 7. Given

that Plaintiff did not suffer any injuries or has not presented credible evidence of his injuries, there

is no reasonable probability that Plaintiffwill prevail in his excessive use of force claim.

The next Hudson factor discussed is the need for the application of force. In his second

amended complaint, Plaintiff states that he committed several defiant acts that caused force to be

used: he refused the initial preparation and transport; '1e refused to relinquish the handcuffs and

6

follow commands of the officers; and he placed his mattress in front of the entrance of his cell

,(-!

door in order to obstruct the officers' path. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint at pages 10-12; ·9·tK

,J '-' ,·

,~rs ,tfY

see also Exhibit A at 2-4. These acts of defiance are what initiated the use of force and were 1' /

~in order to regain compliance and the safe transport of the Plaintiff.

The third Hudson factor discussed relates to the relationship between the need and the

amount of force used. The officers involved used the minimum amount of force necessary to

/ ----

control Plaintiff in response to Plaintiffs acts of misconduct and defiance. Plaintiff refused to

~ ~ iJ- relinquish his hand restraints when instructed by the officers and he used his mattress as a physical

xy};(\~r

4

rf'' _, ~ deterrent to promote his non-compliance. In such a case, force was necessary to regain control of

·~0"-..j-+

.r' Plaintiff.

The final two Hudson factors deal with the threat perceived and the efforts made to temper

the severity of the response. As admitted by the Plaintiff, he refused to comply with several orders

from the officers for transport and even used his bed as a barrier between himself and the officers.

Given that the officers' line of sight was presumably obstructed and Plaintiff continuously refused

to comply with orders to be searched and have hand restraints applied, force was reasonable,

necessary, and administered in a manner to effectuate safe transport of the Plaintiff despite his

non-compliance.

When viewed in its totality, the evidence presented fails to support Plaintiffs alleged

violations to his Eighth Amendment rights; therefore, Plaintiff is not reasonably likely to succeed

on his excessive use of force claim.

2. There is no reasonable probability that Plaintiff will prevail on his bystander

liability claim.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Vaughn and Emsoff were deliberately indifferent to the

use of force and deliberately allowed excessive force to occur. Plaintiff's Fourth Amended

7

Complaint at 4. Plaintiff never contends that Defendants Vaughn and Emsoff actually participated

in the use of force. Bystander liability exists only when an officer "(1) knows that a fellow officer

is violating an individual's constitutional rights; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the

harm; and (3) chooses not to act." Kitchen v. Dallas County, Tex., 759 F.3d 468, 480 (5th Cir.

2014). The plaintiff must be able to allege and prove "another officer's use of excessive force" in

order to establish a (ause of actio~ under bystander liability. I d. Additionally, even if an officer is

present during the relevant events, the plaintiff must show that the officer "had a reasonable

opportunity to realize the excessive nature of the force and to intervene to stop it." Hale v. Townley,

45 F.3d 914,919 (5th Cir. 1995).

For reasons discussed the previous section, there is no reasonable probability that Plaintiff

will succeed on the merits of his excessive use of fcrce claim. Thus, because a constitutional

violation is an essential underlying element of bystander liability, there is also no reasonable

probability that Plaintiff will succeed on his bystander liability claim.

3. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Defendants were employed by TDCJ at all times relevant to the allegations in Plaintiffs

petitions. Defendants asserted their entitlement to qualified immunity in their answers and are

entitled to the protections afforded b~ that affirmative defense. The Amarillo Court of Appeals

held that it was error to dismiss the original proceedings based on "the sufficiency of Jackson's

pleadings vis-a-vis the official immunity claim of Vaughn and Emsoff." Jackson, 2014 WL

6999333 at *9. However, because Defendants Honesto, Nail, and Guzman did not answer prior to

the case being appealed to the Amarillo Court of Ap1,eals, they have never argued the issue of

qualified immunity as it applies to them. Additionally, because the bystander liability claim was

never explicitly plead or briefed on appeal nor was it addressed in the Court's original Findings of

8

Fact and Conclusions of Law, Defendants Emsoff and Vaughn have not yet addressed the issue of

qualified immunity as it pertains to Plaintiff's bystander liability claim.

In order to overcome a defendant's entitlement to qualified immunity, a plaintiff must

satisfy a three-part test. Kipps v. Callier, 197 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Morris v.

Dearborne, 181 F.3d 657, 665 (5th Cir. 1999)). First, the plaintiff must allege the deprivation of a

constitutional right. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603,603 (1999); see also Morris v. Dearborne, 181

F.3d 657,665 (5th Cir. 1999). Second, the plaintiffmust allege the violation of a right that was

1.. clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 603. Finally, the plaintiff

-d \§'ust producif competent summary judgment evidence which demonstrates that the violation

occurred or at least gives rise to a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant actually

engaged in the conduct that violated the clearly established right. Kipps, 197 F.3d at 768. If the

plaintiff meets this burden, then the court must decide whether the conduct was nonetheless

"objectively reasonable." Eugene v. AliefiSD, 65 F.3d 1299, 1305 (5th Cir. 1995). A plaintiff fails

to satisfy either of these requirements with conclusory allegations of wrongdoing. Geter v.

Fortenberry, 849 F.2d 1550, 1553 (5th Cir. 1988).

As detailed above, Plaintiff's claims are substantively deficient and he has: 1) Plaintiff has

not suffered, a physical injury as required by Hudson; 2) Plaintiff's excessive use of force claim

against Defendants fails to withstand constitutional scrutiny when analyzed under the factors

delineated in Hudson and Wilkins; and 3) Plaintiff's bystander liability claims fails because there

was no underlying constitutional violation of Plaintiff's rights of which Defendants Emsoff and

Vaughn were aware. For these reasons, the Defendants' entitlement to qualified immunity is

preserved and therefore, Plaintiff has no reasonable probability of success on his claims.

As shown above, Plaintiff's claims fail constitu·:ional scrutiny. Therefore, the Plaintiffhas

9

not cleared the first hurdle of the qualified immunity analysis. However, even if the Court could

find that there was a violation of the Plaintiffs constitutional rights, it must still determine whether

the Defendants' actions were objectively unreasonable in light of the law as it existed at the time

the conduct occurred and in light of the information that the defendant possessed. Assuming

arguendo that Defendants violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights, their actions were objectively

reasonable. For this independent reason, Defendants arlo! entitled to qualified immunity.

Foremost, as supported by the attached evidence, Plaintiff has not suffered an injury within

the framework of the constitution that would incite its protection. Furthermore, Plaintiff himself

admitted that he was committed several defiant acts, which lead to the need for an extraction team.

Therefore, any force, if used, was reasonably applied in an effort to regain compliance.

In total, the Plaintiff has offered only conclusory allegations which are not sufficient to

show a reasonable probability of success on the merits of his claims. Defendants have also

provided evidence that shows that there is not a reasonable probability that Plaintiff will prevail in

the litigation. Thus, Defendants have met the first prong of the test to determine whether Plaintiff

is a vexatious litigant.

F. Plaintiff's Previous Litigation

In the past seven years, Plaintiff has filed more than five litigations and appeals, proceeding

pro se, which have been finally determined adversely against him or dismissed as groundless or

frivolous. 2 The following six suits have been dismissed as groundless or frivolous: (1) Jackson v.

Darryl Glenn, 2:14-cv-0036 (N.D. Amarillo Division) was dismissed on July 2, 2014 as frivolous

and for failure to state a claim (See Exhibit C); (2) Jackson v. John Adams, et al., 2:10-cv-0261

2 While Plaintiff has already been declared

vexatious by the 25lst District Court in Potter County on June 26, 2013

and is now subject to a prefiling order (See Exhibit I), this prefiling order does not apply to the current litigation since

it was filed prior to the prefiling order being signed.

10

(N.D. Amarillo Division) was dismissed on June 15, 2011 as frivolous and for failure to state a

claim (See Exhibit D at 6); (3) Jackson v. Rick Thaler, et al., No. 25,403 (278th District Court of

Walker County) was dismissed on August 2, 2011 as frivolous (See Exhibit E, Memorandum

Opinion from the Appeal in the Tenth Court of Appeals at 1-2); (4) Jackson v. Boland, et al., No.

2:12-cv-0212 (N.D. Amarillo Division) was partially dismissed against Defendant G. David as

frivolous and for failure to state a claim on January 14, 2013 (See Exhibit F); (5) Jackson v. Mark

W Stiles Unit, et al., No. E-0189936 (172nd District Court of Jefferson County) was dismissed on

January 6, 2012 as frivolous (See Exhibit G); (6) Jackson v. State of Texas, No. 11-E-0255-C

(130th District Court of Matagorda County, Texas) was dismissed on April21, 2011 as having no

arguable basis in law (See Exhibit H).

Thus, Plaintiff clearly fits the statutory definition of a vexatious litigant for this suit as well.

Therefore, the Court should order him to furnish security and his case should be dismissed if this

security is not timely paid.

Conclusion

Because Plaintiff does not have a reasonable probability of prevailing on his claims and

because Plaintiff has commenced at least five lawsuits prose in the seven-year period immediately

preceding the date of this motion, the Court, after notice and a hearing, should order plaintiff to

provide security to defendant to cover reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the

litigation, including costs and attorney fees. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 11.055(c)

Respectfully submitted,

KEN PAXTON

Attorney General of Texas

CHARLES E. ROY

First Assistant Attorney General

11

JAMES E. DAVIS

Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation

KAREN D. MATLOCK

Assistant Attorney General

Chief, Law Enforcement Defense Division

Is/ PATRICK T. POPE

PATRICK T. POPE

Assistant Attorney General

Attorney-in-Charge

State Bar No. 24079151

Law Enforcement Defense Division

Office of the Attorney General

P. 0. Box 12548, Capitol Station

Austin, Texas 78711-2548

(512) 463-2080 I Fax (512) 936-2109

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

VAUGHN, EMSOFF, NALL, HONESTO,

AND GUZMAN

NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING

I, PATRICK POPE, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, do hereby certify that I have

electronically submitted for filing a correct copy of the foregoing Defendants Honesto, Nail, and

Guzman's Motion to Declare Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant & Request for Security in

accordance with File & Serve Xpress for Lubbock County, Texas, on May 8, 2015.

Is/ PATRICK T. POPE

PATRICKT. POPE

Assistant Attorney General

12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, PATRICK POPE, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, do hereby certify that a true

and correct copy of the above and foregoing Defendants Honesto, Nail, and Guzman's Motion

to Declare Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant & Request for Security has been served by placing

same in the United States Mail on May 8, 2015, addre<sed to Plaintiff:

Reidie Jackson No.1164177

TDCJ- Clements Unit

9601 Spur 591

Amarillo, TX 79107

Plaintiff ProSe

/s/ PATRICKT. POPE

PATRICKT. POPE

Assistant Attorney General

13

CAUSE NO. 2012- 500,295

REIDIE JACKSON § IN THE DISTRICT COURT

TDCJ # 1164177, §

Plaintiff §

§

§ LUBBOCK COUNTY, TEXAS

v. §

§

VAUGHN, ET AL, § 72nd JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Defendants §

Defendants Honesto, Nail, and Guzman's Motion to Declare

Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant & Request for Security

EXHIBIT A

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Use of Force Report

Employee Use of Force Fact Findin g Inquir y

Facility (Unit snd Alpha Coda): Montfo rd JM

0 Use of Minor Force 1:81 Use of Major Force 0 Use of Deadly Force

Report Numbe r: MA-0139~03-11

Incident Numbe r(if applicable) :

Instruction• to Aftlsts nt Warden (01' designe e):

•

comple te Sections I and II;

•

If employe es/offen ders interviewed, list them in Section Ill

(no requirem

> (NOTE: New or additfone/lnfonnatlon must be :supporled by writtenent:stateme to call all those, or limit yourself to just those, named In the Reporl)

nts [on an lnter-Offfce Communication].)

•

If facts are evident you may determine there Is no necessity to

conduct interviews; if so, proceed to Section N: and

•

Provide a summary of nndlngs and recommendations in

Section IV forth" Reprimanding Authority to review.

Instruct/~ to Reprfm andlng Authorf ty:

•

Not• your evaluatfon of the employee's conduct and ection

taken, if any, in Section V.

I. USE OF FORCE OCCURRED

a. Use of Force occurred on (date/lime):

3-17-11 1515

b. Location where use of force occurred:

WRMF Ward AS-1

II. EMPLOYEE PARTICIPANT I WITNESS

Ma:tne Cind:t

(Print Last}

0 CO IV

(First} (MI} (Rank/Title)

Ill. FACT-FINDING INQUIRY

a. Fact-tlndlng Inquiry began on (date): 412/2011 and ended on (date): 4/512011

b. EMPLO VEE(S) interviewed (p/tHse print):

Last Guzma n First David Ml _J_ Rank COlli

Last Honest o First Peter Ml _jj_ Rank CO IV

Last ~illl First Jsi!D§I Ml _a_ Rank CQI!I

c. OFFENDER(S) Interviewed (please print):

Last none First Ml

Last First Ml

- TDCJJ Custody

- TDCJJ Custody

IV. SUMMARY AND FINDINGS

a. Summary of Inquiry: See attache d

b. Findings: Based on See attache d

, it appears the employee's actions were:

12] Appropriate; 0 Inappropriate (.> Determ ined to be 'aggtav ated'? 0 YES 0 NO),

. .. as evidenced by: 0 Alleged violation of departmental rules/regulations (Specify):

0 Other (Specify):

c. Recommendatlons: ~ No action taken 0 Refer to OIG for investigation 0 Employee Hearing pursuant to PD-22

0 Other (Specify):

A

d. Assistant Warden (ordealgnee) conducting inquiry:

Ra~ Perez

(Printed Name and Rank/Title)

Major ~~ -v//3///

(SljjilatureiO!JW.

V. FINAL OUTCOME

a. Evaluation: I have found the employee's actions were: ~ Appropriate 0

0 I am unable to determine based on evidence presented

Inappropriate (Determined to be 'aggrevated'? 0 YES 0 NO) -or-

b. Action: ~ No action taken 0 Refer to OIG for investigation (UOF-0/G RefemJI Attsched)

,...... - 0

Other (Specify):

jackson0001

SUMMARY: Offender Jackson was scheduled to chain out and stated he was not leaving the

unit without his property. He was housed in the Western Regional Medical Facility, AS-1. The

offender had no property at this unit. Warden Tucker was contacted and authorized the use of a

move team to place the offender on the chain bus by force if necessary. Chemical agents were

not authorized since the chain bus operator will not allow offenders on the bus who have been

exposed to chemical agents. A move team was assembled consisting of Officers: 1) Nail vest 9,

Ortega vest 12, Guzman vest 8. A. Martinez vest 13, Honesto vest 5 and Officer Mayne

operating the video camera. Sgt. Villegas briefed the camera and mistakenly stated chemical

agents were authorized. Staff went to the cell. Sgt. Villegas ordered Offender Jackson to submit

to a strip search and the application of hand restraints or chemical agents and/or the move team

would be used (although chemical agents would not be used). Offender Jackson refused and

stated he was not leaving until he had his property. Nurse Reese attempted verbal intervention

without success. Sgt. Villegas again repeated his orders and warnings. The offender did not

comply and placed a mattress in front of himself. Sgt. Villegas opened the cell door, the team

entered the eel} and Offender Jackson pushed team members past him. Team members were able

to grab Offender Jackson and force him to the floor."~er a brief struggle team members were

,- able ~y hand and leg restraints. Once restraints h1d been applied Offender Jackson stopped

··. resisting. Team members placea Offender Jackson in a sitting position, released the hand

restraints and reapplied them in front of his body. Team members released the leg restraints and

applied a chain. The lockbox and box was applied. Offender Jackson then refused to stand and

walk stating his leg was broken. Team members lifted Offender Jackson and placed him on a

gurney. Offender Jackson was then transported to the sally port. Arriving at the chain bus he

refused to stand and walk. Team members lifted Offender Jackson. carried him onto the bus and

placed him in a seat. The interior door was secured. The team exited the bus. The offender stated

his back and neck were injured. Nurse Reese visually assessed the offender and noted no visual

injury. Sgt. Villegas then took photos through the caged door. Sgt. Villegas then read the

offender participant statement and Offender Jackson stated he wanted to make a written

statement. Sgt. Villegas then concluded the use of force and the video camera was turned off.

FINDINGS: This use of force underwent a Fact-Finding Inquiry because the offender alleged he

was kicked and kneed in the head. Secondly, this action could not be confirmed or dismissed*

since the video camera wasnot on wide angle and could not be fully seen when viewing the

video tape.

Move team members were interviewed regarding their specific roles in this incident. All denied

the offender was struck or kneed during this use of force and did not see any other move team

member accomplish this action. Based on the offender's behavior during this incident and a lack

of evidence to support his account of the action's takert by staff, I do not feel any further action is

necessary with respect to this particular finding.

After the video camera was first turned on, Sgt. Villegas had Officer Mayne check the camera to

ensure it was on wide angle. During her manipulation of the camera's settings, which were

correct before she began to make readjustments, she zoomed the lens without returning it to the

wide angle setting, which significantly detracted from completely viewing the action taken

jackson0002

I

I find no action to intentionally conceal what took place

with this offender regarding the use of

the video camera. I do however feel Officer Mayne shoul

d undergo remedial training in the use

of the video camera however, to lessen the likelihoa ·1 of

this finding recurring. No further action

is necessary.

jackson0003

CRIMINAL JUSTICE

TE XA S DEPARTMENT OF

Use of Force Report

Witness Statement

acility (Unit and Alpha Cod

e): M

0 Use of Deadly Force

] Use of Minor For ce

·~eport Number: f'1A-o1.)9<f- a.l- 11

le):

Incident Number (if applicab

I. INSTRUCTIONS

of

re. dur ing, and afte r the use

il as pos sibl e, des crib e wha t you witnessed befo

deta

at Section ll.b, In as muc h

• Complete Sec tion 1/.a, then h employee involved; and

force occ urre d, incl udf ng:

of force; • Name and ranl</tit/e of eac

• Time (or app rox ima te time ) of use e/of fender inju ries , If any.

• Des crip tion of employe

Invo lved ;

• Name of each offe nde r

II. STATEMENT

che d

0 Continuatton page(s) atta

Ill. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

·-·-·~~,;"" ~"hmitte

d is complete and accurate.

"·-

jackson0004

------

-·---~---------

TEXAS DEPARTMENT Ot-

CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Use of Fo rce Report .

Em plo ye e/O ffe nd er Use

of Force InJury Re po rt

0 Use of Minor Fm :e

Report Number: MI=:Q'.1'i1 ~ lJJ - £I 0 Use of Deadly Force

lnd den t Num bef (If appkab

le):

L EMPLOYEE OR OFFENDER

.R8n111111te:

TDCJNo.: --1\--lot./-- --:z--------------

=1 '1

I. EXAMINATION .

•· DldEmpJoyeeiOif8ndet~ollfM?

If 'YES,' dnc:ribe: --~~~"'""

",_

w.. ltMt ErnployeeK)frender eum__ --ftJ:::YES

z: -- 0 NO

--

e5 YES 0 -:NO:=--'YE

----------:--:---......,._,.--

b. ______

lnlld .. the unll1

lf'N O,' explllln: --- S,' d..elllrne~ 3/Yzb

If provide

I':2

---------

E~--

I ,.,

o. W• alh e ----~r---

lnfl - - - - - - ---------

• If 'YES,' p111ce e "by ttiiC nd dur lnt the use d bee

h II'U dfw bod y lhatw. ?

~

0

YES

f!'H!Tif:. NO r:1 1

~ § Elld f,_ ~ ••. •,., ..,

Abd om MIS tam adl ·01 ~

Ank'-(1) • O:Z

1vr ntJ. 03

Bllclc • 04

ButtocU·O&

OM III· OfJ

e.t a) •

E~a) • 01

ar

FIIC e·O I·

Foa41F... -10

Glnlt8l AIM · 22

• ~· Hlnd(a)-12

HHd -13

Hlp(1) ·14

leg §

.. f:fHM• IIH it•h all beu..d

(1)·

Ned& -11

PeNta • 21

17 8

Sho

1ft ll.d below):

ulder-18

Wrltt(a). 20

d. Indica~~~ the extent of Inju l Grain· 11 l<ilM(a) ·11

ry to HC tl . . . dth e ~ nole

, . , OINt· "'lo dy. ,.. cod d ebcMt (M W tiNI "'loGJY ...

_ Allnlalon e" noa.ct: _., .,. ,,_ ,_ . fllln )urr , one t)'p

_ Contualan l of lnju ty may hiM mw

w

_ Am pul don _ C~

- Fre din _ lntw nllllf1ur!M

·

_ 81111- - HM I1ng I.OM _ Sho ck

_ _ DafnMIIIIIa. _ N. ....

Bni iN _ _ HM tt Al l* _ _ SprMI

_ Bum Dlllocllllon - Ope n Hee d Injury

_ Dlz He • Ellh aultlcn .....;. - · Strain

_ Clo lld Heed I~

zfne luiF alnl netl - Hemle ._ Pun c:lur e _

_ Foreign ObjeGt In Eye - _ Ru pbn EllpoiUfe to

e. Injury SeventY Codes tnflwnmatlan _ Commun1cab1a

(,tti NI 11M lhltl mo at aptl Scra tch

y dH c:rl ftl t1N1 hlf h•l len DIH BH

0 Minot (0118 1m . flftfltrHnllob / ollti/Uf1 noted ht l.d •bo n):

MIVallon) • 01 0 Serloua • 02 0

De.... . 03

f. Ia the offender c:laulfle

d M 'clllblad1' 0 YES (3" a

Sf\ n€-?'74 \j\J r·~ 1

NO

g. Medlctll. ala« who per1tltmlld ~ (Pr*ll N_ ,,.,_ .}: \ ..'I

1

IILT~TMENT

Com ple te thl• MCtlon DN

LY If ...,...,..,otr.nder aual-'ned lnjurtaa .dlld!ll

lhe 11M of force:

a. Was ltle EmployetriOtflin

dar lreMIId lor lnjw lft?

If 'NO ,' elCplllin why: 0 0 YES 0 NO

Ref uled 0 Other (e1tpi/1Jn):

If 'YES,' provide dea aipt lon

of treatment: - - - -

---

-------------------- -------

-------

0 Offender's aaalgned lilling area ----------~--------- ------

0 Hospital (Heme): - - - - - - - - -- -- -- -- -·~kh~~~=

0 Unit Infirmary

0 Othef(S,_clfyl: - - - - --- -

---------

--------

-------------1

b. Medical staf f wt10 administ

ered, or allelnpted to administ

er, treatment (Prt111 Ntme111tltl.':

-------

-------

--

N. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

1.

b

1administered trle ctxamlnalion

J administered. or attempted to adninisler,

J... _.,,

(Sig n.,I NtiO aii) G /LJt/-,

/'/ZI

tho treatment (SUJilalure/Dalt

. /J

...) --/" "'. /? ·

l:

'f) /J.

'"" ./

'A-If1 ..., I

v 1 1 r II

jacksonooosl

I

&ntford JM

0 Use of Minor Force fi?J UN of Major Force 0 Use of Deadly Force

Repc111 Number. /l1,4 0 I J1 9 -OS -l(

Incident Number (If eppllcable):

V. PHOTOGIW'HI

~ fD Shift SllpfiiVIMr.

• Affllch all~ ltetw:

VI. DIAGRAM(&) I DESCRIPTION OP INJURY

In~ fD MNICIII Sfllltt ----------------------------

• tndlclltw lnjurlM •u,.,/ned during the u.. of ron:. by m-'rlllf body d,.,.,• •nd provide brl.t ducrlptlon below:

Brief Oeec:r!ptlon:

Oeecr1pllon provl~ed by. /}

jackson0006

CAUSE NO. 2012-500,295

REIDIE JACKSON § IN THE DISTRICT COURT

TDCJ # 1164177, §

Plaintiff §

§

§ LUBBOCK COUNTY, TEXAS

v. §

§

VAUGHN,ET AL, § 72nd JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Defendants §

Defendants Honesto, Nail, and Guzman's Motion to Declare

Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant & Request for Security

EX HIB ITB

AFFIDAVIT

§

THE STATE OF TEXAS §

§

COUNTY OF WALKER

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, personally appeared Lisa D.Cunha,

who, being by me duly sworn, deposed as follows:

"My name is Lisa D'Cunha, and I am over the age of eighteen (18), of sound

mind, competent and capable of making this affidavit, and personally acquainted with the

facts herein stated:

I am the Custodian of Records at The University of Texas Medical Branch -

Correctional Managed Care, Health Services Archives and my office is located in

Huntsville, Texas. In this capacity, I am the individual who can authenticate and certify

as official, copies of medical records at the TDC.! Health Services Archives. Attached

hereto are 37 pages of records from the medical records of Reidie Jackson TDCJ

#1164177. These said records are kept in the regular course of business by an employee

or representative of UTMB-Correctional Managed with knowledge of the act, event,

condition, opinion or diagnosis, recorded or to transmit information thereof to be

included in such record; and the record was made at or near the time or reasonably soon

thereafter. The records attached hereto are the original or exact duplicates of the original

and no other documents exist in the files on the above named person at TDCJ Health

Services Archives".

£~

Lisa D'Cunha

State ofT exas,

County ofW~er . .J

Before Me [~ /{ ·- V-L'dwo on this day personally

appeared ~C---- /0 t!ua"-6o , known to me through her

Texas Driver's License to be the person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing

instrument and acknowledge to me that she executed the same for the purpose and

consideration therein expressed. jAJ..r

Given under my hand and seal of office this _ _ _ _ _ _ _day of ~5< ,

A.D., Jj) t-d--' a

Correctional Managed Care

MD/MLP - SICK CALL EXAM

Patient Name: JACKSON, REI DIE TDCJ#: 1164177 Oat~: 03/21/2011 11:40 Facility: CLEMENTS ECB

(BC)

Age: 33 year Race: B Sex: male

Most recent vitals from 3/21/2011: BP: 162/94 (Sitting); Wt:; Height: 781n.; Pulse: 88 (Sitting); Resp:; Temp:

Allergies: NO KNOWN ALLERGIES

I Patient Language: ENGLISH Name of interpreter, if required:

Current Medications:

NORVASC 1OMG, 1 TABS ORAL QD

VASOTEC 20MG, 1 TABS ORAL QD

TENEX 2MG, 1 TABS ORAL QPM

LOPRESSOR 100MG, 1 TABS ORAL BID

ZOLOFT 100MG, 1 TABS ORAL QAM

HYDRODIURIL 25MG, 1 TABS ORAL QD

SCR Received On: _ _ _ (date)

Today's Problem:

S: POST MONTFORD FOLLOW UP

NO COMPLAINTS

0: L T FOOT • INFECTION HEALED UP

A: POST MONTFORD FOLLOW UP

Plan is as follows: RTC AS NEEDED.

Electronically Signed by PATEL, DHIRAJLAL S. M.D. on 03/21/2011.

##And No Others##

jackson0007

CAUSE NO. 2012-500,295

REIDIE JACKSON § IN THE DISTRICT COURT

TDCJ # 1164177, §

Plaintiff §

§

§ LUBBOCK COUNTY, TEXAS

v. §

§

VAUGHN, ET AL, § 72nd JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Defendants §

Defendants Honesto, Nail, and Guzman's Motion to Declare

Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant & Request for Security

EXHIBIT C

-·· -·--·------····-··----------------------

Case 2:14-cv-00036-J-BB Document 21 Filed 07/02/14 Page 1 of 1 PageiD 134

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AMARILLO DIVISION

REID IE JACKSON, PRO SE, §

also known as REIDIE JAMES JACKSON, §

TDCJ-CID No. 1164177, §

Previous TDCJ-CID No. 795456, §

Previous TDCJ-CID No. 874760, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § 2:14-CV-0036

§

DARRYL GLENN, Law Library Supervisor; §

§

Defendant. §

JUDGMENT

Of equal date herewith, the Court has entered an Order of Dismissal in the above-referenced

and numbered cause.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED and DECREED that the Civil Rights Complaint by plaintiff

REID IE JACKSON is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AS FRIVOLOUS AND WITHOUT

PREJUDICE FOR FAlLURE TO STATE A CLAIM ON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.

The Clerk will mail a copy of this Judgment to the plaintiff and to each attorney of record by

first class mail.

It is SO ORDERED.

Signed this the ------~~:.-·_,_1J,~lf~day of July, 2014.

/

CAUSE NO. 2012-:';00,295

REIDIE JACKSON § IN THE DISTRICT COURT

TDCJ # 1164177, §

Plaintiff §

§

§ LUBBOCK COUNTY, TEXAS

v. §

§

VAUGHN, ET AL, § 72nd JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Defendants §

Defendants Honesto, Nail, and Guzman's Motion to Declare

Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant & Request for Security

EXH IBIT D

Case 2:10-cv-00261-J-BB Document 9 Filed 06115/11 Page 1 of 6 PageiD 73

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AMARILLO DIVISION

REIDIE JACKSON, PRO SE, §

TDCJ-CID No. 1164177, §

Previous TDCJ-CID No. 795456, §

Previous TDCJ-CID No. 874760, §

JERMAINE LANDRUM, §

TDCJ-CID No. 1403311 §

§

Plaintiffs, §

§

v. § 2: 10-CV-0261

§

JOHN ADAMS ET AL., §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff REIDIE JACKSON, acting prose and while a prisoner incarcerated in the Texas

Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, has filed suit pursuant to

Title 42, United States Code, section 1983 complaining against ten defendants employed by or

associated with the Texas Department of Criminal Justlce and has been granted permission to

proceed in forma pauperis.

The original complaint was also signed by inmate JERMAINE LANDRUM. Inmate

LANDRUM did not pay the filing fee nor did he submit an application to proceed in forma

pauperis. On May 23, 2011, a show cause order issued giving LANDRUM until June 6, 2011 to

respond and show cause why he should not be dismissed from this cause. The response period

has expired, and no response has been received. It appears inmate LANDRUM has abandoned

this cause and his claims should be dismissed for failure to prosecute.

Case 2:10-cv-00261-J-BB Document 9 Filed 06/15/11 Page 2 of 6 PageiD 74

On May 9, 20 11, an Order to Cure Deficiencies by Amended Complaint and

Findings,

Conclusions and Recommendation issued in the instant cause, informing plainti

ff JACKSON of

the deficiencies in his original complaint and ordering him to cure by filing

an amended

complaint or to file objections to the Findings, ConClusions and Recommenda

tion.

Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint on May 20, 2011.

By his Amended Complaint, plaintiff JACKSON alleges he has been prosec

uted for acts

which constitute crimes under Texas state law, but that these prosecutions

have been handled by

defendants through the disciplinary process of the Text1S prison system. Plainti

ff alleges

defendants ADAMS, BERGER, BAKER, CLARK, and NASH have a fiducia

ry responsibility to

plaintiff to abide by state and federal laws and to ensure his civil rights are

not violated.

Plaintiff states any warden, major or captain in TDCJ-CID can participate

in the disciplinary

process. As a result of disciplinary cases, plaintiff states he has suffered punish

ments including

the use of force, confiscation of money from his inmate account, confiscation

of personal

property, cell restriction, confiscation of accumulated goodtime credits, visitati

on restriction,

denial of line class, and confinement to administrative segregation. Plainti

ff says the disciplinary

rules are used for population management and retaliation. Plaintiff does not

challenge any

specific disciplinary rule or application of the disciplinary process, but challen

ges the entire

disciplinary process.

Plaintiff JACKSON further alleges defendants GLENN, EDWARDS, MASS

EY,

BRINKLEY, and SEGMAN are all mailroom personnel who are responsible

for handling inmate

mail and that they utilize illegal rules to deny inmates general correspondenc

e, justifying the

rules with security concerns. He complains they restrict books and publica

tions concerning

4\l(H)26J.allruh:s 2

Case 2:10-cv-00261-J-BB Document 9 Filed 06/15/11 Page 3 of 6 PageiD 75

death, rape, sex, drugs, and assault and use the rules to relieve thems

elves of the duty to deliver

the mail. As with the disciplinary rules, plaintiff does not challenge

any one rule or application

of the rules, but the fact that there are correspondence rules at all.

Plaintiff JACKSON has attached some grievances to his complaint

as "examples of the

ongoing violations that are enacted and enforced by defendants" but,

as his statement of claims

shows, he does not base his complaint on the incidents forming the

basis for those grievances.

Instead, he asserts the broader claims set forth above.

Plaintiff JACKSON requests an award of damages and that TDCJ-CID

be ordered "to get

in compliance with the law."

JUDICIAL REVIEW

When a prisoner seeks redress from a governmt>:ntal entity or officer

or employee of a

governmental entity, the Court must evaluate the complaint and dismis

s it without service of

process, Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 1990), if it is frivolo 1

us , malicious, fails to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from

a defendant who is

immune from such relie£ 28 U.S.C. 1915A; 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2).

The same standards will

support dismissal of a suit brought under any federal law by a prison

er confmed in any jail,

prison, or other correctional facility, where such suit concerns prison

conditions. 42 U.S.C.

1997e(c)(l). A Spears hearing need not be conducted for every prose

complaint. Wilson v.

Barrientos, 926 F.2d 480, 483 n.4 (5th Cir. 1991 l

1A claim is frivolous if it lacks

an arguable basis in law or in fact, Boo~r v. Koonce, 2 F.3d 114, 115

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 1733, 118 L.Ed.2d (5th Cir. 1993); see,

340 (1992).

2Cf, Green

v. McKaskJe, 788 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Of course,

our discussion of Spears should not be interpreted

to mean that all or even most prisoner claims require or deserve a SpearJ

'1earing, A district court should be able to dismiss as

frivolous a significant number of prisoner suits on the complaint alone

or d1e complaint together with the Watson

questionnaire.").

4\HHl261.allrui<S 3

Case 2:10-cv-00261-J-BB Document 9 Filed 06/15/11 Page 4 of 6 PageiD 76

The District Judge has reviewed plaintiffs pleadings and has viewed the facts alleged

by

plaintiff in his complaint to determine ifhis claims present grounds for dismissal or should

proceed to answer by defendants.

THE LAW AND ANALYSIS

Plaintiff's statement of claim fails to state a cl:>'.m that any federally protected right has

been violated by any one or more of the defendants. To state a claim upon which relief

may be

granted, ''the plaintiff must plead 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausibl

e on its

face."' In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191,205 (5th Cir. 2007)(q

uoting Bell

At/. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

A

plausible entitlement to relief exists when the allegations in the complaint cross the thresho

lds

separating the "conclusory" from the "factual" and the "factually neutral" from the "factual

ly

suggestive." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 n.5, 127 S.Ct. 1955,

1966 n.5,

167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Plaintiff has utterly failed to state a claim on which relief can

be

granteq against any of the named defendants.

Plaintiffs attempt to challenge the entire disciplinary procedure is frivolous. Plaintif

f

was not prosecuted for the criminal acts he alleged fom·.ed the basis for disciplinary actions;

he

was, quite simply, disciplined. Thus, plaintiff was not entitled to the full panoply of

rights which

accompany criminal conviction. If the determination had been made that plaintiff's actions

were

egregious enough to justify referral for criminal prosecution, which sometimes happens

if the

crime is committed while the defendant is already serving time, plaintiff could have been

disciplined as well as subjected to criminal prosecution. Plaintiffs belief that his behavio

r

merited criminal conviction instead of a disciplinary procedure does not state a claim

of

4110.0261.allrules 4

Case 2:10-cv-00261-J-BB Document 9 Filed 06/15/11

Page 5 of 6 PageiD 77

constitutional dimension. Plaintiff is attempting to assert a constitutiona

l right which does not

exist and his claim, therefore, is frivolous. Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827,

104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).

Plaintiff's attempt to challenge the existence of correspondence rules

which limit his First

Amendment freedom of speech while in prison is likewise frivolous.

Plaintiff offers the global

argument that the defendants enforce prison correspondence rules

all of which are, per se,

unconstitutional.

The Constitution is superior to any ordinary lee islative act and, where

they both apply to

the same subject matter, it is the Constitution which must govern.

Marbury v. Madison, 1

Cranch 137, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). "It is emphatically the

province and duty of the

judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule

to particular cases, must of

necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with

each other, the courts must

decide on the operation of each." !d. Therefore, it is the province

of the courts to interpret the

Constitution.

The Supreme Court has ruled that an inmate's First Amendment corres

pondence rights

may be limited by regulations reasonably related to the institution's

legitimate governmental

interest, such as, for example, security. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.

78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96

L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). Plaintiff's challenge to the entirety of the corres

pondence rules is frivolous.

Neitzkev. Willia ms,49 0U.S. 3I9, I09S.Ct.1827, 104.L.Ed.2d338(1

989).

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff JACKSON has been given ample opportunity to provide his

best factual

statement. Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789,792 (5th Cir. 1986).

Plaintiff has had the

4\I0-0261.allrules 5

Case 2:10-cv-00261-J-BB Document 9 Filed 06/15/11

Page 6 of 6 PageiD 78

opportunity to amend to allege his best case and appears to have

done so. Bazrowx v. Scott, 136

F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998).

For the reasons set forth above and pursuant to Title 28, United

States Code, sections

1915A and 1915(e)(2), as well as Title 42, United States Code,

section 1997e(c)(l), the Civil

Rights Complaint filed pursuantto Title 42, United States Code,

Section 1983, by plaintiff

REID IE JACKSON is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AS FRIV

OLOUS AND FOR

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ON WHICH RELIEF CAN

BE GRANTED.

Further, in light of the failure of plaintiff LANDRUM to pay the

filing fee, request pauper

status, or respond to the show cause order, LANDRUM's claim

s are DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE FOR FAlLURE TO PROSECUTE.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDP.-GL Y.

The Clerk shall send a copy of this order to plaintiff and to any

attorney of record. The

Clerk shall also mail copies of this order to TDCJ-Office of the

General Counsel, P.O. Box

13084, Austin, TX 78711; and to the ProSe Clerk at the U.S.

District Court for the Eastern

District of Texas, Tyler Division.

IT IS SO ORDERE~ .

Signed this the~~ of June, 2011.

4\10.026Uilrulcs 6

CAUSE NO. 2012-500,295

REIDIE JACKSON § IN THE DISTRICT COURT

TDCJ # 1164177, §

Plaintiff §

§

§ LUBBOCK COUNTY, TEXAS

v. §

§

VAUGHN,E T AL, § 72nd JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Defendants §

Defendants Honesto, Nail, and Guzman's Motion to Declare

Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant & Request for Security

EX HI BI TE

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-11-00323-CV

REID IE JAMES JACKSON,

Appellant

v.

RICK THALER, TEX. DEP'T OF

CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

Appellee

From the 278th District Court

Walker

MEMORA NDUM OPINION

This is an inmate-litigation case under chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practices and

Remedies Code. See TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003(a)(2) (West 2002). In

seven issues, appellant, Reidie James Jackson, complains about

See id. We affirm.l

1 All pending motions are dismissed as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

Jackson is currently incarcerated at the Clements Unit in the Institutional

Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice in Amarillo, Texas. On December

13,2010, Jackson filed his original petition alleging a claim for false imprisonment based

upon his assertion that he was incarcerated seventy-one days in excess of his 333-day

criminal sentence. 2 He sought $110,000 in monetary damages and any other relief

necessary to "resolve the controversy." Thereafter, appellees, Rick Thaler and the Texas

Department of Criminal Justice, filed an original answer, asserting immunity and

numerous affirmative defenses, and a jury demand.3 The Texas Attorney General filed

an amicus curiae brief recommending that Jackson's claim be dismissed for failure to

comply with chapter 14. See id.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Inmate litigation is governed by the procedural rules set forth in chapter 14 of the

civil practice and remedies code. See id. §§ 14.001-.014 (West 2002 & Supp. 2011); see also

McBride v. Tex. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, No. 13-05-559-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 1290, at

*6 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Feb. 21, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The Texas

Legislature enacted chapter 14 to control the flood of lawsuits filed in state courts by

2 Apparently, at some point, Jackson was released from prison, though the precise date is unclear

based on this record. His complaint pertains to a June 9, 1999 conviction for possession of a controlled

substance, which resulted in a three-year prison sentence with 333 days of time credited. In any event, he

is currently incarcerated based upon a separate criminal off-o nse.

3 In one of his numerous motions filed in the trial court. Jackson identified Thaler as the Director

of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.

Jackson v. Thaler Page2

~--=

prison inmates, which consume valuable judicial resources with seemingly little

offsetting benefit. Hickson v. Moya, 926 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex. App.-Waco 1996, no

writ). This Court has noted:

Prisoners have everything to gain and little to lose by filing frivolous suits.

It costs them almost nothing; time is of JlO consequence to a prisoner;

threats of sanctions are virtually meaningless; and the prisoner can look

forward to a day trip to the courthouse. Thus, the temptation to file a

frivolous suit is strong. Such suits, however, waste valuable resources

and subject the state and its prison officials to the burden of unwarranted

litigation, preventing claims with merit from being heard expeditiously.

Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing Spellman v. Sweeney, 819 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex.

App.-Waco 1991, no writ)).

Generally, the dismissal of inmate litigation under chapter 14 is reviewed for

abuse of discretion. Brewer v. Simental, 268 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. App.-Waco 2008, no

pet.). "To establish an abuse of discretion, an appellant must show the trial court's

actions were arbitrary or unreasonable in light of all the circumstances. The standard is

clarified by asking whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules

or principles." Spurlock v. Schroedter, 88 S.W.3d 733,735-36 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi

2002, pet. denied) (internal citations omitted). We may not substitute our judgment for

that of the trial court with respect to the resolution of factual issues or matters

committed to the trial court's discretion. See In re Spooner, 333 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex.

App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, orig. proceeding); see also Downer v. Aquamarine

Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 242 (Tex. 1985). The judgment of the trial court will be

affirmed if that judgment can be upheld on any reasonable theory supported by the

evidence. Ex parte E.E.H., 869 S.W.2d 496, 497-98 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]l993,

Jackson v. Thaler Page3

writ denied); Harris County Dist. Attorney's Office v. Burns, 825 S.W.2d 198, 200 (Tex.

App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied). And, we consider only the evidence

most favorable to the judgment, and if there is some evidence to support the judgment,

we will affirm. State v. Knight, 813 S.W.2d 210, 211 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]

1991, no writ).

The trial court has broad discretion to dismiss an inmate's claim as frivolous.

Schroedter, 88 S.W.3d at 736. In fact, section 14.003 authorizes the trial court to dismiss

an inmate's claim, either before or after service , .f process, if the claim is found to be

frivolous or malicious. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.§ 14.003(a)(2). To determine

whether a claim is frivolous, the trial court may consider if: (1) the claim's realistic

chance of ultimate success is slight; (2) the claim has no arguable basis in law or fact; (3)

it is clear that the party cannot prove facts in support of the claim; or (4) the claim is

substantially similar to a previous claim filed by the inmate because the claim arises

from the same operative facts. Id. § 14.003(b); see Schroedter, 88 S.W.3d at 736.

Furthermore, the trial court is not required to conduct a hearing before

dismissing a case pursuant to chapter 14. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.§

14.003(c). Instead, the question of whether to hold a hearing is committed to the trial

court's discretion. See id.; see also McCray v. Mulde·, No. 12-10-00349-CV, 2011 Tex. App.

LEXIS 5884, at *10 (Tex. App.-Tyler July 29, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Hamilton

v. Pechacek, 319 S.W.3d 801, 810 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2010, no pet.)). Thus, in this

case, the trial court was not required to provide Jackson with an opportunity to respond

before dismissing his claim under section 14.003. See, e.g., Geiger v. Garcia, No. 10-07-

Jackson v. Thaler Page4

00404-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 7885, at *3 (Te.c App.-Waco Oct. 7, 2009, no pet.)

(citing Gowan v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 99 S.W.3d 319,323 (Tex. App.-Texarkana

2003, no pet.)).

III. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL

In his seven issues, Jackson contends that: (1) the trial court erred in dismissing

his lawsuit because he has a First Amendment right to file suit and because the

dismissal denied him due process; (2) the trial court violated Texas Rule of Civil

Procedure 308 by failing to enforce an order signed on February 9, 20114; (3) the trial

court erred by not allowing him to prosecute his claim against the defendants

4 Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 308 provides that:

The court shall cause its judgments and decrees to be carried into execution; and where

the judgment is for personal property, and it is shown by the pleadings and evidence and

the verdict, if any, that such property has an especial value to the plaintiff, the court may

award a special writ for the seizure and delivery of such property to the plaintiff; and in

such case may enforce its judgment by attachment, fine[,} and imprisonment.

TEX. R. Civ. P. 308.

In the February 9, 2011 order of which Jackson complains, the trial court ordered that the Texas

Attorney General's Office file an amicus curiae brief within sixty days of receipt of the order. Jackson

appears to argue that the filing of the amicus curiae brief was not timely ffied. We do not find this

argument to be meritorious, especially considering the Attorney General's Office ffied its amicus curiae

brief on February 28,2011, less than thirty days after the trial court signed its order.

And, to the extent that Jackson argues that the Attorney General's Office is not authorized to

represent Thaler, we point out that article IV, section 22 of the Texas Constitution provides that the

Attorney General "shall represent the State in all suits and pleas in the Supreme Court of the State in

which the State may be a party ... and perform such other duties as may be required by law." TEX.

CONST. art. IV,§ 21; see Brady v. Brooks, 99 Tex. 366,89 S.W. 1052, 1055 (1905). In addition, sections 101.103

and 104.004 of the civil practice and rem~dies code authorize the Attorney General's Office to defend

public servants. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CoDE ANN. § 101.103 (West 2011) (stating that the Attorney

General's Office shall defend each action brought under the Texas Tort Claims Act 1/against a

governmental unit that has authority and jurisdiction coc :tensive with the geographical limits of this

state"); see id. § 104.004 (West 2011) (requiring the Attorney General's Office to defend a public servant

against a suit for damages based upon actions within the scope of the public servant's employment). We

therefore find this argument lacking an arguable basis in law as well.

Jackson v. Thaler PageS

separately; (4) the trial court was biased and refused him a fair trial; (5) Thaler did not

obey the trial court's orders-in particular, the February 9, 2011 order-and thereby

prejudiced Jackson's case; (6) the trial court erred in dismissing his lawsuit without

notice and a hearing; and (7) the trial court erred in relying on chapter 14 to analyze his

lawsuit.

When the trial court dismisses a claim without conducting a fact hearing, which

is the case here, the issue on appeal is whether the claim had an arguable basis in law.

See Spurlock v. Johnson, 94 S.W.3d 655,658 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (citing

Martin v. Tex. Bd. of Criminal Justice, 60 S.W.3d 226,229 {Tex. App.-Corpu s Christi 2001,

no pet.); Sawyer v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 983 S.W.2d 310, 311 (Tex. App.-

Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied)). Based on our review of the record, including all

of the briefs and responses he has filed in this Court, we conclude that Jackson's false-

imprisonmen t claim has no arguable basis in law. See TEx. Ov. PRAC. & REM. CODE

ANN. § 14.003(b)(2); see also Brewer, 268 S.W.3d at 767; Spurlock, 94 S.W.3d at 658;

Schroedter, 88 S.W.3d at 736. This is true for many reasons, which we will now explain.

First, the crux of Jackson's underlying lawsuit is that he was wrongfully

incarcerated for a period beyond his judicially-imposed sentence. 5 The United States

Supreme Court has stated that "Congress has determined that habeas corpus is the

sIn his original petition, Jackson did not reference title 42, section 1983 of the United States Code.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Spurlock v. Johnson, 94 S.W.3d 655, 658 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.)

("To determine whether a trial court has properly determined that there is no arguable basis in law for a

claim, 'we examine the types of relief and causes of action appellant pleaded in his petition to determine

whether, as a matter of law, the petition stated a cause of action that would authorize relief.~~~ (quoting

Jackson v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice-Inst. Div., 28 S.W.3d 811, 813 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet.

denied))).

Jackson v. Thaler Page6

appropr iate remedy for state prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or length of

their confinement, and that specific determination must override the general terms of

[section] 1983." Prieser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 1836, 36 L. Ed. 2d

439 (1973). Later, in Heck v. Humphrey, the United States Supreme Court clarified that

"the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging

the validity of outstan ding criminal judgments applies to [section] 1983 damage s

actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction

or confinement ...." 512 U.S. 477, 486, 114 S. O·. 2364, 2372, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994).

Therefore, because Jackson challenges the validity of the fact and duratio n of his

confinement, the proper remedy is a habeas corpus petition in the federal court. See

·

Heck, 512 U.S. at 486, 114 S. Ct. at 2372; see also Prieser, 411 U.S. at 490,93 S. Ct. at 1836.

Next, Jackson fails to identify a basis in law for his claim of money damages;

instead, he simply asserts, without explaining, that he should be paid $110,000 in

money damage s for the alleged false imprisonment. Though he cites to the Texas Penal

Code, Texas Constitution, and other avenues for redress, Jackson cannot bring a private

cause of action under these provisions. See TEX. Ov. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.001

(West Supp. 2011) (providing that a person is entitled to compensation if, among other

things, he served time in prison and has received a full pardon on the basis of innocence

or has been granted relief in accordance with a writ of habeas corpus -none of which

apply here); Smith v. City of League City, 338 S.W.3d 114, 127 (Tex. App.-H ouston [14th

Dist.] 2011, no pet.) ("The due process provisions of the Texas Constitution do not

imply a cause of action for damages."); Spurlock, 94 S.W.3d at 658 ("However, the Texas

Jackson v. Thaler

Page7

Penal Code does not create private causes of action ... .");City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284

)

S.W.3d 366, 380 (Tex. 2009) ("With the limited ultra vires exception ... governm ental

immunit y protects governm ent officers sued in their official capacities to the extent that

it protects their employers.").6

Therefore, because we have concluded that Jackson's lawsuit does not have an

arguable basis in law, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in

dismissin g Jackson's lawsuit as frivolous without a hearing. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE ANN.§ 14.003(b)(2); see also Brewer, 268 S.W.3d at 767; Schroedter, 88 S.W.3d at 736.

Accordingly, we overrule all of Jackson's issues pertainin g to the trial court's order of

dismissal.

IV. JACKSON 'S REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUS IONS OF LAW

While we recognize that we are required to review and evaluate pro se pleading s

with liberality and patience, we are also required to apply the same standard s

applicable to pleading s drafted by lawyers. See f.oster v. Williams, 74 S.W.3d 200, 202

(Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. denied). In light of that, Jackson also appears to argue

6 On appeal, Jackson asserts that Thaler's actions were ultra vires;

however, in his original

petition, Jackson did not allege that Thaler acted outside the scope of his employment such that his

actions were ultra vires. See Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367, 369 (Tex. 2011) (stating that "all

[common-law] tort theories alleged against a governmental unit ... are assumed to be 'under [the Tort

Oaims Act]' for purposes of section 101.106." (citing Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d

653, 659 (Tex. 2008))). In addition,

[i]t is fundamental that a suit against a state official is merely another way of pleading an

action against the entity of which [the official] is an agent. A suit against a state official in

his official capacity is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest

is the entity. Such a suit actually seeks to impose liability against the governmental unit

rather than on the individual specifically named and is, in all respects other than

name ... a suit against the entity.

Id. at 382 n.68 (internal citations & quotations omitted).

Jackson v. Thaler PageS

that he was entitled to findings of fact and conclusions of law from the trial court. Here,

Jackson requeste d such findings. And when the trial court failed to enter such findings

,

Jackson sent the trial court a letter notifying it that the findings were past due. See TEX.

R. Crv. P. 297.

Texas courts have held that, when a trial court renders judgme nt or dismisses a

cause without hearing any evidence, findings of fact are not appropriate. See IKB Indus.,

Ltd. v. Pro-Line Corp., 938 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1997); Retzlaff v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal

Justice, 94 S.W.3d 650, 655 (Tex. App.-H ouston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (holding

that there is no duty to file findings after dismissal of an inmate suit under Texas Civil

Practice and Remedies Code chapter 14); Timmons v. Luce, 840 S.W.2d 582, 586 (Tex.

App.-T yler 1992, no writ); see also Walker v. Callahan, No. 04-05-00095-CV, 2005 Tex.

App. LEXIS 7887, at **3-4 (Tex. App.-S an Antonio Sept. 28, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.);

Khufu v. Stringfellow, No. 12-03-00362-CV,2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 3291, at *7 (Tex. App.-

Tyler Apr. 29, 2005, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Thus, the trial court had no duty to file

findings of fact and conclusions of law in this Cc'.e. See IKB Indus., Ltd., 938 S.W.2d at

443; Retzlaff, 94 S.W.3d at 655; Timmons, 840 S.W.2d at 586; see also Walker, 2005 Tex.

App. LEXIS 7887, at **3-4; Khufu, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 3291, at *7. As such, this issue is

overrule d.

V. CONCLU SION

Having overrule d all of Jackson's issues on appeal, we affirm the judgme nt of the

trial court.

Jackson v. Thaler Page9

ALSCOGGINS

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed February 29, 2012

[CV06]

Jackson v. Thaler Page 10

CAUSE NO. 2012-500,295

REIDIE JACKSON § IN THE DISTRICT COURT

TDCJ # 1164177, §

Plaintiff §

§

§ LUBBOCK COUNTY, TEXAS

v. §

§

VAUGHN,E T AL, § 72nd JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Defendants §

Defendants Honesto, Nail, and Guzman's Motion to Declare

Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant & Request for Security

EX HI BI TF

r-~----~----------------~----------- ---------------------------------------~·\

Case 2:12-cv-00212-~;~ Document 23 Filed 01/14/13 ~~e 1 of 4 PageiD 269

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AMARILLO DIVISION

REIDIE JACKSON, PRO SE, §

TDCJ-CID No. 1164177, §

Previous TDCJ-CID No. 795456, §

Previous TDCJ-CID No. 874760, §

JERMAINE LANDRUM, §

TDCJ-CID No. 1403311 §

§

Plaintiffs, §

§

v. § 2:12-CV-0212

§

GREGORY BOLAND, §

MANUEL FRESCAS, and §

GREGORY S. DAVID, §

§

Defendants. §

ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL

The instant cause was originally filed as Case No. 100851-A in the 47th Judicial District ·

Court of Potter County, Texas on August 30,2012 and was removed to the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Texas, Amarillo Division, on October 8, 2012, by defendants

BOLAND and FRESCAS, where it was filed under the above-stated style and cause number.

PlaintiffREIDIE JACKSON, acting pro se and while a prisoner confined in the Texas

Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, filed suit pursuant to Title 42,

United States Code, sections 1983, 1985(3), and 1986 complaining against the above-named

defendants. The filing fee was paid by the defendants upon removal.

On December 14, 2012, a Report and Recommendation was issued by the United States

Magistrate Judge recommend·

case 2:12-cv-00212-.:.]~ Document 23 Filed 01/14/13 ~:te 2 of 4 PageiD 270

On December 26, 2012, plaintiff filed a document entitled "Second Amended Compla

int"

which, by his January I0, 2013 Response, he has elected to have treated as his Objectio

ns to the

Report and Recommendation. By his Objections, plaintiff alleges defendant DAVID was

presumably the warden who gave directions and enforced policies on the High Security

Area where

plaintiff was housed. He states defendant DAVID enforced the policy or custom that prevente

d

inmates from giving sick call requests directly to medical personnel.

Plaintiff goes on to allege that all the defendants had a "mutual understanding" and a

common goal of deliberately, intentionally, or recklessly endangering plaintiffs present

and future

health. Plaintiff says defendant DAVID, after receiving notice of the altercation between

plaintiff

and defendant FRESCAS, "refus[ ed] to instruct a subordinate [to] have medical engage

treatment

policy."

While plaintiff ascribes a "mutual understanding" and "common goal" to the defendants,

he

does not present any allegation of material fact to support the implicit claim of conspira

cy.

Conclusory allegations lacking reference to material facts are not sufficient to state a claim

of

conspiracy under section 1983, McAfee v. 5th Circuit Judges, 884 F.2d 221 (5th Cir.1989

), cert.

denied, 493 U.S. 1083, 110 S.Ct. 1141, 107 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1990).

As to his allegation that DAVID, after receiving notice of the February 25, 2012 altercati

on

between plaintiff and defendant FRESCAS, "refus[ed] to instruct a subordinate [to] have

medical

engage treatment policy," the only notice plaintiffs complaint indicates went to DAVID

was that

contained in plaintiffs April27, 2012 Step I Grievance No. 2012160993, by which plaintiff

requested a unit transfer. Although plaintiff alluded to an attempt by the other defenda

nts to cover-

up the incident by denying him medical treatment, plaintiff does not actually request medical

treatment or indicate he needs any at that time. Moreover, defendant DAVID merely investig

ated

2

Case 2:12-cv-00212-~;)s Document 23 Filed 01/14/13 t.:]te 3 of 4 PageiD 271

and resolved the grievance. As set forth in the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recomm

endation, the

narrowing of prisoner due process protection announced in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.

472, 115

S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 ( 1995), leaves plaintiff without a federally-protected right

to have his

grievances investigated and resolved. Any right of that nature is grounded in state law

or regulation

and the mere failure of an official to follow state law or regulation, without more, does

not violate

constitutional minima. See, e.g., Murray v. Mississippi Dept. ofCorrections, 911 F.2d

1167, 1168

(5th Cir. 1990); Ramirez v. Ahn, 843 F.2d 864, 867 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1085,

109 S.Ct.

1545, 103 L.Ed.2d 849 (1989); Baker v. McCollan, 433 U.S. 137, 146-47, 99 S.Ct. 2689,26

95-

2696,61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). Moreover, plaintiff's claim in this respect is, at most, that

defendant

DAVID was negligent in the investigation and resolution of plaintiff's grievance. Plaintif

f's section

1983 claim against defendant DAVID on this basis lacks an arguable basis in law and

is frivolous.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 u.s. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 r .Ed.2d 338 (1989).

The Court has made an independent examination of the records in this case and has

examined the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, as well as the Objectio

ns filed by the

plaintiff.

The Court is ofthe opinion that the objections ofthe plaintiff should be OVERRULED

and

the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge should be ADOPT

ED by the

United States District Court, as supplemented herein.

This Court, therefore, does OVERRULE plaintiff's objections, and does hereby ADOPT

the

Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge, as supplemented

herein.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's Civil Rights Claims filed pursuant to Title

42, United States Code, sections 1983, 1985(3) and 1986 by plaintiffREIDIE JACKS

ON against

defendant GREGORY S. DAVID be DISMISSED WITPOUT PREJUDICE FOR FAILUR

E TO

3

Case 2:12-cv-00212-.C~ Document 23 Filed 01/14/13 ~~e 4 of 4 PageiD 272

STATE A CLAIM ON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED AND WITH PREJUDICE

AS

FRIVOLOUS.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

The Clerk shall send a copy ofthis order to plaintiff and to any attorney of record.

The Clerk shall also provide a copy of this order by regular mail, facsimile transmission,

or

e-mail to: (l) the TDCJ-Office ofthe General Counse~,. P.O. Box 13084, Austin, Texas,

78711, Fax

Number (512) 9362159; (2) the Inmate Trust Fund, P.O. Box 629, Huntsville, Texas 77342-0

629,

fax: 936-437-4793; and (3)

It is SO ORDERED.

{

Signed this the _ _ __.;.;_/_,.f_/ day of January, 2013.

4

CAUSE NO. 2012-500,295

REIDIE JACKSON § IN THE DISTRICT COURT

TDCJ # 1164177, §

Plaintiff §

§

§ LUBBOCK COUNTY, TEXAS

v. §

§

VAUGHN, ET AL, § 72nd JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Defendants §

Defendants Honesto, Nail, and Guzman's Motion to Declare

Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant & Request for Security

EX HIB ITG

'.

Cause No. 11-E-0255-C

REIDIE JACKSON § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

§

vs. § MATAGORDA COUNTY, TEXAS

§

STATE OF TEXAS, et al. § 130th JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

ORDER DISMISSING INMATE LITIGATION

(§ 14.003(a)(2), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code)

On this day the court received and reviewed the original petition filed by Reidie

Jackson, an inmate incarcerated in the Institutional Division, Texas Department of Criminal

Justice. Jackson filed an unsworn declaration of inability to pay costs with the petition,

therefore, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE, Chapter 14, relating to Inmate Litigation, applies.

Chapter 14 authorizes a trial court to dismiss an inmate's claim as frivolous, before

or after service of process, if it finds "(1) the claim's realistic chance of ultimate success is

slight; (2) the claim has no arguable basis in law or in fact; (3) it is clear that the party cannot

prove facts in support of the claim; or (4) the clair. l is substantially similar to a previous

claim filed by the inmate because the claim arises from the same operative facts." TEX. CIV.

PRA(::. &REM. CODE §14.003(b).

The court has determined that the is case may be decided without hearing and

therefore accepts Plajntifr s allegations as true. 1 Jackson's claim under Section 1, Article 17,

Texas Constitution2 alleges that his property was taken under a search warrant issued on

Deputy Keith Sullivan's affidavit. He alleges the affidavit supporting the warrant stated, "the

[confidential informant] advised [Sullivan] that.. .. " Jackson infers from this that Sullivan's

affidavit was not made based on information within Sullivan's personal knowledge, but

instead within the confidential informant's personal knowledge. Jackson concludes the

search warrant and subsequent search were legally defective.

Perales v. Kinney, 891 S.W.2d 731, 732 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).

2

"No person's property shall be taken, damaged, or destroyed for or applied to public use

without adequate compensation being made ... " Tex. Const. art. I, § 17.

..,

l

H

V o 3~ f 'lLS-11 (p w.__

i i'

--.J-)_.}0

Plaintiffs allegations, taken as true, have no arguable basis in law because the

officer's reliance upon information provided by a confidential informant does not render the

officer's affidavit defective or the subsequent search illegal. 3 The court therefore determines

that Plaintiffs claims, taken as true on the facts, is without an arguable basis in law.

ITIS ORDERED that this case and cause of action is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE pursuant to TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE§ 14.003(a)(2) and § 14.003(b )(2).

Signed: April21, 2011.

c

Judge Presiding

Illinoisv. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,231, (l983)(approvingsearch warrants supported by hearsay

when the informant's information is sufficiently reliable to provide the magistrate with a substantial basis

for determining the existence of probable cause).

CAUSE NO. 2012-500,295

REIDIE JACKSON § IN THE DISTRICT COURT

TDCJ # 1164177, §

Plaintiff §

§

§ LUBBOCK COUNTY, TEXAS

v. §

§

VAUGHN, ET AL, § 72nd JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Defendants §

Defendants Honesto, Nail, and Guzman's Motion to Declare

Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant & Request for Security

EX HIB ITH

REIDIE JAMES .JACKSON,

Plaintiff

v.

DAVID ELLIS, ET AL.,

Defendants

251ST .JUDICIAL DISTRICT

ORDER·

On this date, the Court considered Defendants Ellis and Gratz's Motion to Dismiss

Pursuant to Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies _Code and Defendallts' Motion

to Declare Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant and Motion for a Pre-Filing Order simultaneously.

After sufficient notice to all parties and a hearing on the motions, the Court reviewed the

pleadings on file, the law, and the arguments of the p1.1rties and has detennined that Defendants'

Motions should be GRANTED as set forth below:

IT IS THEREFORE

of ac

the

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED; that Plaintiff Reidie James Jack~on should be, and

therefore is, designated a vexatious litigant pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code

§ 11.054;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That Plaintiff Reiclie James Jackson provide security for

the benefit of Defendants in the amount of$ {51) .DC) , within 30 days of the signing of

this Court's order pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 11.055, or this suit will

be dismissed pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 11.056; A CERT\FIED CP,PY

Page 1 of i/

CAROLINE WOODBURN

District Clerk

Pottir cou~ty. Texas .

1.444483 ' )! . C"...

By,_ _..,.:"\•1-....

·~)...

')

\ """",...._.,__,. IJCLIUL"

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that Plaintiff Reidie James Jackson is hereby subject to

this Pre-Filing Order and is enjoined from filing any new litigation in propria persona in the

State of Texas without the prior pem1ission of the local administrative judge, pursuant to Texas

Civil Practice and Remedies Code §11..051-11.057.

SIGNED this ,;1(o~day of~Jt~UJ'i=-w..t~---' 2013.

A CERTIFIED COPY

Page ·/ of ')·-

CAROLINE WOODBURN

District Clerk

Potter..C.Ounty, Texas

1' >t

~t f) '

By "fiX}'

. v·

) _. Deputy

CD -o

'""-l

-< 0 =

.__.

~ §;

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--1

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