Presumption of vindictiveness exists because the superseding indictment was filed for the purpose of punishing the defendant who had invoked right to trial by jury
How later courts described this case
- Presumption of vindictiveness exists because the superseding indictment was filed for the purpose of punishing the defendant who had invoked right to trial by jury
- the email from Smith to Appellee’s counsel indicates that Smith was not personally authorized to dismiss the cases, but that she would submit her recommendation as to two of the four pending cases, CR1, 487
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
PD-0019-15, PD-0020-15
PD-0021-15, PD-0022-15 November 2, 2015
State of Texas, Appellant,
v.
Albert G. Hill, III, Appellee.
On Discretionary Review from
Nos. 05-13-00421-CR, 05-13-00423-CR
05-13-00424-CR, and 05-13-00425-CR
Fifth Court of Appeals, Dallas
On Appeal from Nos. F11-00180, F11-00182,
F11-00183, and F11-00191
204th District Court, Dallas County
Appellee’s Reply Brief
Michael Mowla L.T. (Butch) Bradt George R. Milner III
445 E. FM 1382 No. 3-718 14090 S.W. Freeway # 300 2828 N. Harwood St. Suite 1950
Cedar Hill, Texas 75104 Sugar Land, Texas 77478 Dallas, Texas 75201
Phone: 972-795-2401 Phone: 281-201-0700 Phone: 214-651-1121
Fax: 972-692-6636 Fax: 281-201-1202 Fax: 214-953-1366
michael@mowlalaw.com ltbradt@flash.net ItsRainingII@aol.com
Texas Bar No. 24048680 Texas Bar No. 0284160 Texas Bar No. 00784611
Attorney for Appellee Attorney for Appellee Attorney for Appellee
and Lead Counsel
ORAL ARGUMENT GRANTED
I. Table of Contents
I. Table of Contents .............................................................................................2
II. Table of Authorities .........................................................................................4
III. Argument .........................................................................................................6
1. The State makes various incorrect factual assertions ......................................6
i. The State’ factual contention that Appellee alleged
prosecutorial misconduct “in an effort to avoid paying the
$20 million dollar judgment” or “face a criminal trial” is
incorrect. ................................................................................................6
ii. The State incorrectly asserts that the “State never
stipulated to admissibility of Appellee’s Exhibits” because
the State: (1) stipulated to the authenticity of the exhibits;
and (2) the stipulation as to the authenticity of the exhibits
is a judicial admission by the State. Thus, the documents
attached to the Motion to Dismiss: (1) are conclusive upon
the State; and (2) relieves Appellee’s burden of proving
the admitted facts. Thus, the State is barred from disputing
the admitted facts...................................................................................8
2. The State’s claim that Appellee “apparently no longer seeks to
assert his due process claim concerning lack of an impartial
prosecutor” is without merit because Appellee specifically
argues throughout his Brief that: (1) the government singled
Appellee out for prosecution and has not proceeded against
others similarly situated based on the type of conduct for
which Appellee is charged; and (2) the government’s
discriminatory selection is invidious. A prosecutor who acts in a
discriminatory or invidious manner and prosecutes for an
improper purpose cannot also be an “impartial prosecutor.” ........................12
3. The State presents no valid counter to Appellee’s arguments that:
(1) Appellee proffered evidence to the Motion to Dismiss
alleging prosecutorial misconduct; (2) the trial court in its
discretion determined that the proffered evidence was sufficient
to entitle Appellee to a hearing; and (3) “some evidence” means
evidence that constitutes a colorable claim of a constitutional
violation that may prove the elements of a presumed selective
prosecution claim, and not evidence that proves the
2
constitutional violation itself: (1) beyond a reasonable doubt, (2)
by clear and convincing evidence, or (3) by a preponderance of
the evidence. ..................................................................................................21
4. Clarification of the Fifth Circuit standard, which is indeed the
same standard (“colorable claim”) that Appellee argues this
Court should adopt.........................................................................................25
5. Not only have nearly all of the federal circuit court of appeals
adopted standards substantially similar to the standard that
Appellee argues this Court should adopt, states have done so as
well: that so long as a defendant attaches a proffer of evidence to
a motion to dismiss due to prosecutorial misconduct that the trial
court in its discretion determines to present a colorable claim of
a constitutional violation, the defendant has attached “some
evidence,” and the trial court has discretion to conduct a hearing
on the motion to dismiss. ...............................................................................26
IV. Conclusion and Prayer ...................................................................................30
V. Certificate of Service .....................................................................................31
VI. Certificate of Compliance with Tex. Rule App. Proc. 9.4 ............................32
3
II. Table of Authorities
Cases
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) .................................................................14
Bryant v. State, 187 S.W.3d 397 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).......................................10
Commonwealth v. Washington W., 928 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 2010) .........................27
Commonwealth v. Washington W., 967 N.E.2d 615 (Mass. 2012) .........................28
Gawlik v. State, 608 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) ......................................22
Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)..........................................22
Henderson v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 600 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. App.
Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.)......................................................9
Hollen v. State, 87 S.W.3d 151 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2002), reversed
on other grounds, 117 S.W.3d 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) ........................10
M.J.R.’s Fare of Dallas, Inc. v. Permit and License Appeal Bd. of
Dallas, 823 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ den.) ........................10
Mahoney v. Mahoney, 103 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. Civ. App. Amarillo 1937,
writ ref.) .........................................................................................................11
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980)........................................................13
Martin v. State, 200 S.W.3d 635 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ......................................10
Matney v. State, 99 S.W.3d 626 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 2002) ..................22
Mendoza v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 606 S.W.2d 692 (Tex.
1980) ..............................................................................................................11
Perry v. Brooks, 808 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. App. Houston [14th
Dist.]1991, no writ)........................................................................................10
Porter v. Texas Dept. of Public Safety, 712 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. App. San
Antonio 1986, no writ) ....................................................................................9
Richardson v. State, 831 So. 2d 799 (Fla. App. 2002) ............................................26
State v. Ballard, 752 A.2d 735 (N.J. Super. 2000) ..................................................29
State v. LaMar, 767 N.E.2d 166 (Ohio 2002)..........................................................28
State v. Smith, 703 A.2d 954 (N.J. Super. 1997) .....................................................29
State v. Staten, 1998 Wash. App. LEXIS 869 (Wa. Ct. App. 1998)
(unpublished opinion) ....................................................................................28
4
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) ...................................................22
United States v. Brown, 298 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2002) ............................................15
United States v. Cooks, 52 F.3d 101 (5th Cir. 1995) ...............................................25
United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982) ......................................................15
United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1978)........................................25
United States v. Meyer, 810 F.2d 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ........................................15
United States v. Taylor, 749 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) ...................15
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) ..........................................................22
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987)
.......................................................................................................................14
Other Authorities
Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999) ............................................................ 14, 24
Concise Oxford American Thesaurus (2006) ..........................................................24
West’s Legal Thesaurus/Dictionary, Spec. Deluxe Ed. (1986) ...............................14
Rules
Tex. Rule App. Proc. 68.11 (2015) ..........................................................................32
Tex. Rule App. Proc. 9.4 (2015) ..............................................................................33
Tex. Rule App. Proc. 9.5 (2015) ..............................................................................32
Tex. Rule Evid. 803 (2013)......................................................................................10
Tex. Rule Evid. 902 (2013)......................................................................................10
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. Amend. V..............................................................................................23
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV .........................................................................................23
5
To The Honorable Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals:
Appellee Albert G. Hill, III respectfully submits this reply brief:
III. Argument
1. The State makes various incorrect factual assertions
Throughout its brief, the State makes various incorrect assertions about the
facts. This Reply Brief addresses the most pertinent incorrect assertions they go to:
(1) the reason why Appellee filed the motion to dismiss; and (2) the admissibility of
the documents attached to the Motion to Dismiss. A correct recitation of the facts,
fully supported by record citations, is found in Appellee’s Brief.
i. The State’ factual contention that Appellee alleged prosecutorial
misconduct “in an effort to avoid paying the $20 million dollar
judgment” or “face a criminal trial” is incorrect.
The State alleges in its brief that “Hill alleges prosecutorial misconduct in an
effort to avoid paying the $20 million judgment or facing a criminal trial.” State’s
Br., 6. The State also claims that “In November 2012—while still challenging the
$20 million federal judgment—Hill filed unsworn motions in his criminal cases
seeking dismissal of the indictments or, alternatively, an “evidentiary hearing and
discovery into the issues surrounding the District Attorney’s decision to indict this
case.” State’s Br., 6. And, the State contents, “[B]y this time, the DA’s Office had
dismissed the charges against Hill’s wife.” State’s Br., 6.
6
First, Appellee was indicted on March 31, 2011. (F11-00180/05-13-00421-
CR) (CR-180, 6, 427). After conducting an investigation, Appellee uncovered
compelling circumstantial evidence that Lisa Blue, who at the time was involved in
civil litigation against Appellee over a fee dispute, corruptly influenced Watkins,
who in turn authorized obtaining the four indictments against Appellee. The factual
basis for Appellee’s claims are detailed in the Appellee’s Brief. On December 7,
2010, Blue and her associated attorneys filed a complaint in federal court against
Appellee and his wife, seeking to recover over $50 million in the litigation in federal
court. (RR5, DX-1, 117-123, 139, 408). Then on March 31, 2011, about two weeks
before the scheduled start of the fee dispute trial between Appellee and Blue, the
indictments against Appellee and his wife were returned, and were made public on
April 4, 2011. (RR5, DX-1, 141, 146-147; CR-180, 162; CR-182, 158; CR-183,
158; CR-191, 157).
Second, Appellee did not file the Motion to Dismiss until November 16, 2012,
asserting that his constitutional rights to Due Process and Equal Protection were
violated because, due to Blue’s bribing and influence of Watkins, Appellee was: (1)
selectively prosecuted; (2) vindictively prosecuted; and (3) deprived of his right to a
disinterested prosecutor. (CR-180, 31-488).
Thus, the State’s factual assertion that “Hill alleges prosecutorial misconduct
in an effort to avoid paying the $20 million judgment...” has no basis in fact because
7
Appellee filed the Motion to Dismiss on November 16, 2012 and did so only after a
detailed investigation. Further, the Motion to Dismiss was filed long after Appellant
was indicted on March 31, 2011, which was two weeks before the start of the fee
dispute, and even longer after Blue and her associated attorneys filed a complaint in
federal court against Appellee and his wife, seeking to recover over $50 million on
the settlement. (RR5, DX-1, 117-123, 139, 408). If Appellee filed the Motion to
Dismiss merely to try avoid paying a judgment, he would have done so long before
November 2012. And, it was Blue’s greed and Watkins’s corruptibility that brought
on the Motion to Dismiss, not any action by Appellee.
Finally, the State provides no factual basis for its assertion that Appellee
alleged prosecutorial misconduct “in an effort to avoid...facing a criminal trial.”
This is a mere conclusory statement due to the fact that Appellee dared to assert his
constitutional rights to: (1) not be selectively prosecuted; and (2) a disinterested
prosecutor.
ii. The State incorrectly asserts that the “State never stipulated to
admissibility of Appellee’s Exhibits” because the State: (1)
stipulated to the authenticity of the exhibits; and (2) the stipulation
as to the authenticity of the exhibits is a judicial admission by the
State. Thus, the documents attached to the Motion to Dismiss: (1)
are conclusive upon the State; and (2) relieves Appellee’s burden of
proving the admitted facts. Thus, the State is barred from disputing
the admitted facts.
The State asserts that, although Appellee claims that the State stipulated to the
“authenticity and admissibility” of his attachments, the State “never stipulated to
8
admissibility,” and that “the trial court admitted Hill’s Exhibits 1-4 only “for record
purposes.” This is an irrelevant, “hair-splitting” argument, and is inconsequential
and trivial. When the trial court asked the State, “any objection” to the admission of
the exhibits, the State responded, “Not -- not for authenticity purposes, Your Honor,”
and “No authenticity objection, Your Honor.” (RR4, 30-31).
It is axiomatic that all documents are hearsay. Further, before any document
can be admitted as an exception under the hearsay rule, the party offering the
document must show it is authentic. For instance, Texas Rule of Evidence
803(8) provides that public records are not excluded under the hearsay rule. To
Qualify under Rule 803(8), the proponent must show that the document is
authentic. See Porter v. Texas Dept. of Public Safety, 712 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex.
App. San Antonio 1986, no writ); Tex. Rule Evid. 803(8) (2013); see also
Henderson v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 600 S.W.2d 844, 850 (Tex. App. Houston [1st
Dist.] 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (Trial court properly excluded a document that a
witness could not identify or authenticate). Thus, a document is authentic if a
sponsoring witness vouches for its authenticity or if the document meets the
requirements of self-authentication in Texas Rule of Evidence 902. See Tex. Rule
Evid. 902 (2013).
The State stipulated to the authenticity of these documents. A stipulation
“obviates the need for proof on [the] litigable issue.” Hollen v. State, 87 S.W.3d
9
151, 155 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2002), reversed on other grounds, 117 S.W.3d 798
(Tex. Crim. App. 2003); see also M.J.R.’s Fare of Dallas, Inc. v. Permit and License
Appeal Bd. of Dallas, 823 S.W.2d 327, 330-331 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ
den.) (When parties stipulate to certain facts and documentary evidence, “these
stipulations are binding upon the parties, the trial court, and the reviewing
court”) (emphasis supplied) and Perry v. Brooks, 808 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. App.
Houston [14th Dist.]1991, no writ) (“Stipulations are conclusive as to the facts
stipulated and to all matters necessarily included therein...As such, stipulations
enjoy equal dignity with judicial admissions, which eliminate an adversary’s
necessity of proof and establish the admitted elements as a matter of law.) (emphasis
supplied).
Not only did the State stipulate to the facts; the State judicially admitted the
facts because when a party stipulates to evidence, it is a judicial admission, and
there is no longer a need for the moving party to provide proof of the
facts stipulated to. See Bryant v. State, 187 S.W.3d 397 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) and
Martin v. State, 200 S.W.3d 635 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A judicial admission is
“conclusive upon the party making it, and it relieves the opposing party’s
burden of proving the admitted fact, and bars the admitting party from
disputing it.” Mendoza v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 606 S.W.2d 692,
10
694 (Tex. 1980) (emphasis supplied); see also Mahoney v. Mahoney, 103 S.W.2d
459, 462 (Tex. Civ. App. Amarillo 1937, writ ref.).
As a result, there is no basis in fact or law for the State’s assertion that the
“State never stipulated to admissibility of Appellee’s Exhibits” because the State:
(1) stipulated to the authenticity of the exhibits; and (2) the stipulation as to the
authenticity of the exhibits is a judicial admission by the State. Thus, the documents
attached to the Motion to Dismiss: (1) are conclusive upon the State; (2) relieve
Appellee’s burden of proving the admitted facts; and (3) because of the
conclusiveness and removal of Appellee’s burden, bars the State now from disputing
the admitted facts.
11
2. The State’s claim that Appellee “apparently no longer seeks to assert his
due process claim concerning lack of an impartial prosecutor” is without
merit because Appellee specifically argues throughout his Brief that: (1)
the government singled Appellee out for prosecution and has not
proceeded against others similarly situated based on the type of conduct
for which Appellee is charged; and (2) the government’s discriminatory
selection is invidious. A prosecutor who acts in a discriminatory or
invidious manner and prosecutes for an improper purpose cannot also be
an “impartial prosecutor.”
In its brief, the State claims “[O]n appeal to this Court, Hill apparently no
longer seeks to assert his due process claim concerning lack of an impartial
prosecutor. His petition for discretionary review and merits brief mention this claim
only in detailing the procedural history of the case. As a result, the State will address
only the claims for selective and vindictive prosecution.” State’s Br., 24-25. As the
following will show, the State’s arguments are without merit because Appellee in
fact has not abandoned any arguments because a prosecutor who acts in a
discriminatory or invidious manner and prosecutes for an improper purpose cannot
also be an “impartial prosecutor.
First, Appellee argues and has shown that he met the standard of establishing
a prima facie case of selective prosecution in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Appellee was entitled to a hearing under the “presumption of
prosecutorial vindictiveness” method because he provided “some evidence” that
shows: (1) the government Appellee out for prosecution and has not proceeded
against others similarly situated based on the type of conduct for which Appellee
12
was charged; and (2) the government’s discriminatory selection is invidious. This
is all Appellee is required to show for the burden to shift to the State to justify the
discriminatory treatment. The State not only failed to do so, but the evidence in fact
showed the invidious and criminal nature of the State’s behavior.
Second, the State apparently concludes that Appellee’s right to an impartial
prosecutor is divorced from his proven claims of selective and vindictive prosecution
(“As a result, the State will address only the claims for selective and vindictive
prosecution,” State’s Br., 24-25). This is an incorrect conclusion. The State clearly
misunderstands the meaning of the phrase “impartial prosecutor.”
The issue of what constitutes an “impartial” prosecutor requires explanation.
The opposite of an “impartial prosecutor” is a “partial prosecutor.” “Impartial”
means “unbiased; disinterested.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th ed., 755 (1999).
“Partial” means “prejudiced, unfair, or involved.” West’s Legal
Thesaurus/Dictionary, Spec. Deluxe Ed., 559 (1986). A prosecutor is not “partial”
merely because the prosecutor zealously seeks a conviction. In fact,
“[I]n an adversary system, [prosecutors] are necessarily permitted to be zealous in
their enforcement of the law...” Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980).
As a result, “partiality” deals not with a zeal to prosecute, but with a situation where
the personal interests of the prosecutor cause a structural conflict of interest. Young
13
v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 807-808 and n.18 (1987).
As the Supreme Court of the United States observed in Young, see id. at n.18,
“Prosecutors may on occasion be overzealous and become overly
committed to obtaining a conviction. That problem, however, is
personal, not structural. As the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
said in disapproving the appointment of an interested
contempt prosecutor in Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Stock Buyers Int’l, Inc.,
760 F.2d 698, 705 (1985)...such overzealousness “does not have its
roots in a conflict of interest. When it manifests itself the courts deal
with it on a case-by-case basis as an aberration. This is quite different
from approving a practice which would permit the appointment
of prosecutors whose undivided loyalty is pledged to a party interested
only in a conviction.”
Thus, a prosecutor’s personal interest or partiality may present “an actual conflict
of interest if its potential for misconduct is deemed intolerable.” Young, 481 U.S. at
807 n.18.
Contrary to the State’s apparent assertion that Appellee’s right to an impartial
prosecutor is divorced from his proven claims of selective and vindictive
prosecution, a prosecutor who acts in an invidious, selective, or vindictive manner
is clearly not an “impartial” prosecutor. A prosecutor acts in a “vindictive” manner
and in violation of the Due Process Clause where the prosecutor uses criminal
charges in an attempt to penalize a defendant’s valid exercise of constitutional or
statutory rights. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27-28 (1974). To prevail on a
claim of vindictive prosecution, a defendant must show either actual
vindictiveness or facts sufficient to give rise to a rebuttable presumption of
14
vindictiveness. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 373, 380-381 (1982) (A
presumption of vindictiveness is appropriate where “reasonable likelihood” that
vindictiveness exists on other grounds); see also United States v. Brown, 298 F.3d
392, 405-406 (5th Cir. 2002). A presumption of vindictiveness typically arises when
a defendant is reindicted following a trial and the charging decision is changed.
Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 381; see also United States v. Taylor, 749 F.2d 1511, 1513
(11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (A presumption of vindictiveness exists because the
prosecutor brought a charge carrying potentially greater sentence than the original
charge because circumstances demonstrated either actual vindictiveness or realistic
fear of vindictiveness); see also United States v. Meyer, 810 F.2d 1242, 1246-1247
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (Presumption of vindictiveness exists because the superseding
indictment was filed for the purpose of punishing the defendant who had invoked
right to trial by jury).
Appellee has not asserted claims of vindictive prosecution in a manner as such
claims are normally made. Thus, the State’s arguments that Appellee “failed to
establish vindictive prosecution” are irrelevant to this case. See State’s Br., 30-34.
Rather, Appellee clearly showed a claim of selective and invidious
prosecution in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Appellee was
entitled to a hearing under the “presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness”
standard because he proffered “some evidence” that shows: (1) Watkins singled out
15
Appellee for prosecution and has not proceeded against others similarly situated
based on the type of conduct for which Appellee was charged; and (2) the
government’s discriminatory selection is invidious.
The State argues that the only evidence presented regarding the selective
nature of the prosecution is that Stephanie Martin did not admit during her
testimony that Appellee’s prosecution was “unprecedented,” but instead was
unprecedented as it “related only to her caseload” State’s Br., 17). The State’s
argument is incorrect and does not accurately reflect the record. Although Martin
testified as to her caseload, the first assistant district attorney (Moore) and Martin’s
direct supervisor (Strittmatter) also testified also that they are not aware of any other
instance when a case similar to Appellee’s was prosecuted.
As support for its contention, the State cites page 155 of volume 4 of the
Reporter’s Record. State’s Br., 17. The entire exchange on this issue on page 155
of volume 4 is as follows:
Appellee’s counsel: Now, Ms. Martin, you testified, if I just heard
correctly, that you had precedent. You, in fact, have never presented a
case to the Grand Jury, mortgage fraud case, where the loan was funded,
it was paid as expected, repaid in full and there was no complaint from
the bank. You’ve never presented a case like that to the Grand Jury
before the Hills.
THE COURT: Is that a question?
Appellee’s counsel: Is that right?
Stephanie Martin: I’m trying to think. I don’t think so.
16
Appellee’s counsel: Yes. This case, in that respect, was
unprecedented?
Stephanie Martin: Where the loan was funded?
Appellee’s counsel: Funded, repaid, no complaint from the bank.
Stephanie Martin: Right. Just like a shoplifting case where you take
all the groceries out to the car, put them in the car and you get caught
and you give it back.
Appellee’s counsel: Has --
Stephanie Martin: You’re right.
Stephanie Martin, who was responsible for prosecuting these cases, states that
she never even presented such a case to the grand jury.
Then on pages 49-50 of volume 4, the following exchange took place
between Appellee’s counsel and Terri Moore:
Appellee’s counsel: Do -- are you aware of any cases in the office’s
history, during your tenure or otherwise, where the allegation was
someone had made a false statement in a loan that was funded, paid as
expected, repaid in full, and there was no complaint from the lender?
Any cases like that?
Terri Moore: Specifically, those limited facts? No.
Thus, the then-first assistant to Watkins since January 1, 2007 stated that she
is not aware of any similar cases being prosecuted.
17
Finally, on pages 126-127 and 129 of volume 4, the following exchange
took place between Appellee’s counsel and Donna Strittmatter, the supervisor
of the unit that prosecutes mortgage fraud cases:
Appellee’s counsel: Okay. Are you aware of a single instance ever that
the Dallas County DA’s office has indicted a mortgage fraud case
where the loan was fully collateralized, paid as expected, and repaid in
full and there was no complaint from the bank, but it was indicted any
way?
Donna Strittmatter: I am not aware because I have not been the
mortgage fraud prosecutor.
Appellee’s counsel: Well, you’ve been the supervisor of the unit that
prosecutes mortgage frauds.
Donna Strittmatter: I’m certainly aware of us prosecuting instances
where the person did nothing but submit the false loan application,
didn’t even get the money, and we indicted and prosecuted those
individuals.
Appellee’s counsel: I understand, ma’am. That -- and you’re talking
about an effort somebody was making to obtain money and, of course,
we don’t know whether they would have defaulted or stolen the money.
I’m asking about situations, specifically, in which -- of -- that you’re
aware, ever in the history of this office, in which someone’s been
prosecuted for mortgage fraud where the loan was collateralized, was
repaid as expected, repaid in full, and the bank filed no complaint.
Donna Strittmatter: I don’t know, but that doesn’t mean it hasn’t
happened.
....
Appellee’s counsel: All right. And you’re not aware, as you sit here,
of any case HUD’s ever referred to your office in which the loan was
collateralized, paid as expected, HUD didn’t lose any money?
18
Donna Strittmatter: They may have. I can’t say that that is not true.
Appellee’s counsel: Just asking if you’re aware of any.
Donna Strittmatter: I can’t give you a defendant’s name off the top of
my head.
The most damning aspect about Strittmatter’s testimony was that like Martin and
Moore, Strittmatter was fully aware of what the nature of this hearing was and yet
Strittmatter could not manage to name a single other person who was prosecuted
under remotely similar facts. The reasons for this are clear: (1) there never was
another prosecution under remotely similar facts (selective prosecution); and
(2) Watkins pushed through the indictments against Appellee solely as a favor
for his friend and fellow Democratic Party operative, Blue, who “just
happened” to be involved in a fee dispute against Appellee which Blue sought
over $50 million for about six months of work (invidious reason). Thus, no
evidence was presented by the State showing that: (1) a single other person with
facts similar to Appellee’s case was prosecuted; or (2) the reasons for the prosecution
were proper. In fact, Appellee established just the opposite: that no other person had
ever been prosecuted under similar facts, and the reasons for the prosecution were
indeed invidious.
The State also claims that Appellee provided “no evidence” to support the fact
that prosecutor Deborah Smith communicated her “concerns” about the charges.
This allegation goes to the State’s desire for this Court to hold that a movant in a
19
selective or invidious prosecution claim must prove up the allegation by way of
evidence attached to the motion to dismiss before the movant is entitled to a hearing.
However, as detailed in the Appellee’s Brief, this is not the correct standard. For
instance, Appellee proffered evidence that on October 12, 2012, Appellee’s counsel
met with Smith, to whom the case had then been reassigned. (RR4, 216-218; CR-
180-Supp-Aug02, 92). During this meeting, Appellee proffered to the trial court that
Smith apologized for how the State handled the cases against Appellee and his wife,
indicated that she was conducting “due diligence” interviews of witnesses, and stated
that she would recommend dismissing certain or all of the charges against both
Appellee and his wife. Id. (the email from Smith to Appellee’s counsel indicates that
Smith was not personally authorized to dismiss the cases, but that she would submit
her recommendation as to two of the four pending cases, CR1, 487). Later that same
day, the District Attorney’s Office moved to dismiss all charges against Erin Hill
(Appellee’s wife) “in the interest of justice.” Id.
20
3. The State presents no valid counter to Appellee’s arguments that: (1)
Appellee proffered evidence to the Motion to Dismiss alleging
prosecutorial misconduct; (2) the trial court in its discretion determined
that the proffered evidence was sufficient to entitle Appellee to a hearing;
and (3) “some evidence” means evidence that constitutes a colorable claim
of a constitutional violation that may prove the elements of a presumed
selective prosecution claim, and not evidence that proves the
constitutional violation itself: (1) beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) by clear
and convincing evidence, or (3) by a preponderance of the evidence.
The issues in this case are whether: (1) Appellee proffered evidence to the
Motion to Dismiss alleging prosecutorial misconduct; (2) the trial court in its
discretion determined that the proffered evidence was sufficient to entitle Appellee
to a hearing; and (3) “some evidence” means evidence that constitutes a colorable
claim of a constitutional violation that may prove the elements of a presumed
selective prosecution claim. The State snipes at certain parts of Appellee’s
arguments as though it is possible for them to be argued in a vacuum, such as the
State’s contention that the “only evidence” presented regarding the selective nature
of the prosecution is that Martin did not admit during her testimony that Appellee’s
prosecution was “unprecedented,” but instead was unprecedented as it “related only
to her caseload, when in fact the first assistant district attorney (Moore) and Martin’s
direct supervisor (Strittmatter) also testified also that they are not aware of any other
instance when a case similar to Appellee’s was prosecuted. However, none of the
State’s arguments sufficiently counter the conclusion that Appellee met the burden
set forth by the Supreme Court in United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463
21
(1996). Appellee proffered with the Motion to Dismiss not just “some evidence,”
but rather “exceptionally clear evidence” proving that Watkins: (1) singled Appellee
out for prosecution and did not proceed against others similarly situated based on
the type of conduct for which Appellee was charged; and (2) acted in an invidious
manner. See also Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996);
Matney v. State, 99 S.W.3d 626, 628 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 2002); Gawlik
v. State, 608 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); U.S. Const. Amend. V; U.S.
Const. Amend. XIV.
The State would like this Court to believe that a prosecutor’s decision to
prosecute amounts to a totally unfettered discretion to prosecute alleged violations
of criminal statutes, but this is simply not the case. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S.
598, 608 (1985). If a person presents “some evidence” to a trial court that tends to
show a colorable claim of a discriminatory or other improper purpose for a
prosecution, the trial court is well within its rights to conduct a hearing on the
matter. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465.
In Armstrong, the Supreme Court does not clearly define what constitutes
“some evidence.” However, it appears that the Supreme Court holds that “some
evidence” means evidence that provides a colorable basis to show that the defendant
can prove the two elements of a selective prosecution claim. Those elements are: (1)
the government singled out the defendant for prosecution and has not proceeded
22
against others similarly situated based on the type of conduct for which the
defendant is charged; and (2) the government’s discriminatory selection is invidious
and not for a proper purpose.
As Appellee details in the Appellee’s Brief, a “colorable claim” is one that is
“plausible, credible, or conceivable,” or one that is “legitimate and that may
reasonably be asserted, given the facts presented and the current law.” Concise
Oxford American Thesaurus, 149 (2006); Black’s Law Dictionary, 240 (7th ed.
1999). “Exceptionally clear evidence” is evidence that is “unusually obvious, plain,
evident, and intelligible.” Concise Oxford American Thesaurus, 138, 292 (2006).
Another legitimate definition of a “colorable claim” is where the defendant presents
“some evidence” tending to show a disparate treatment and discriminatory intent
that entails a “nonfrivolous showing based on more than conclusory allegations.”
United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508, 1512 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasis supplied).
Contrary to the State’s contention that Appellee did not identify specific
portions of the proffered evidence to show that Appellee proffered “some evidence”
that provides a colorable basis to show that the defendant can prove the two elements
of a selective prosecution claim, Appellee attached and identified the following to
the Motion to Dismiss: (1) Hill Jr.’s February 2010 complaint to the Dallas District
Attorney’s office, (2) pleadings from other proceedings and excerpts from Watkins’s
campaign finance reports, (3) email exchanges among attorneys in the fee litigation
23
between Blue and Appellee, (4) Blue’s telephone records, (5) a log of text messages
between Blue, Watkins, and his assistant, (6) announcements about the SMU
scholarship funded by Blue and about Watkins’s hiring of Blue to help in unrelated
litigation, (7) a printout of a 2007 Texas Lawyer article about the district attorney’s
office’s grand jury policy, (8) Smith’s email about her reassignment, (9) excerpts
from transcripts in the litigation between Blue and Appellee, (10) deposition
testimony from Blue in the litigation between Blue and Appellee in which Blue
testified to receiving two phone calls from Watkins about the indictments of the
Appellee and his wife, and (11) deposition testimony from Malouf (Blue’s co-
counsel in the litigation between Blue and Appellee), who testified to overhearing
one of those conversations. See CR-180, 68-488.
Therefore, it is clear that: (1) Appellee proffered evidence to the Motion to
Dismiss alleging prosecutorial misconduct; (2) the trial court in its discretion
determined that the proffered evidence was sufficient to entitle Appellee to a
hearing; and (3) “some evidence” means evidence that constitutes a colorable claim
of a constitutional violation that may prove the elements of a presumed selective
prosecution claim, and not evidence that proves the constitutional violation itself:
(1) beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) by clear and convincing evidence, or (3) by a
preponderance of the evidence. The State presents no valid counterarguments
against these conclusions or facts rebutting the facts cited by Appellee.
24
4. Clarification of the Fifth Circuit standard, which is indeed the same
standard (“colorable claim”) that Appellee argues this Court should
adopt.
In the Appellee’s Brief, Appellee noted that the Fifth Circuit in United States
v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1309 (5th Cir. 1978) held that to obtain a discovery
hearing on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must first make a prima
facie showing that the government acted inappropriately. Appellee disagreed with
the standard in Johnson, but still argued that the analysis for his case does not change
because he attached “some evidence” showing a constitutional violation.
However, in United States v. Cooks, 52 F.3d 101, 105 (5th Cir. 1995), the
Fifth Circuit in fact held that in order to obtain discovery and a hearing, a movant
must make a colorable claim for both elements of selective prosecution. In Cooks,
the court held that the defendant, a black man, failed to establish that the government
prosecuted him in order to subject him to high penalties for cocaine-base
offenses. Id. at 105. The defendant argued that he was entitled to a hearing by
attaching a report stating that minority arrests for drug offenses were now ten times
greater than in past years and statistics detailing that the majority of those arrested
for cocaine base offenses are black. Id. The Fifth Circuit held that this evidence
failed to give rise to a “colorable claim” that he was selectively prosecuted.
25
5. Not only have nearly all of the federal circuit court of appeals adopted
standards substantially similar to the standard that Appellee argues this
Court should adopt, states have done so as well: that so long as a
defendant attaches a proffer of evidence to a motion to dismiss due to
prosecutorial misconduct that the trial court in its discretion determines
to present a colorable claim of a constitutional violation, the defendant
has attached “some evidence,” and the trial court has discretion to
conduct a hearing on the motion to dismiss.
The State objects to Appellee’s arguments that nearly all the federal circuit
court of appeals adopted standards substantially similar to the standard that Appellee
asks this Court to adopt. However, many states have also adopted similar standards:
that so long as a defendant attaches a proffer of evidence to a motion to dismiss due
to prosecutorial misconduct that the trial court in its discretion determines to present
a colorable claim of a constitutional violation, the defendant has attached “some
evidence,” and the trial court has discretion to conduct a hearing on the motion to
dismiss:
Florida: in Richardson v. State, 831 So. 2d 799 (Fla. App. 2002), the
defendant alleged that he was selectively prosecuted for drug-trafficking under the
Florida RICO statute because he was selectively targeted for a wiretap as a result of
his race. As evidence in support of a hearing, the defendant attached documents
supporting the following contentions: (1) all five cases involving drug wiretaps that
were being defended by the public defender involved minority defendants; (2) over
the past three years, the public defender had not represented a white person in a drug
wiretap case; (3) reports issued by the state attorney's office did not reflect any white
26
drug wiretap target since 1992; (4) a printout from the public defender for the last
ten years reflected that of the 1,848 drug trafficking cases handled by the public
defender, only 404 were white and did not involve wiretaps; and (5) the police were
not able to identify any cases that involved an initial wiretap of a nonminority target.
The court denied the motion for a hearing and requested discovery because it
is not enough for a defendant to submit statistical evidence that a prosecution tends
to affect a particular group; rather, the statistics must address “the critical issue of
whether that particular group was treated differently than a similarly-situated
group.” Further, “a trial court has broad discretion in ruling on discovery matters.”
As a result, the defendant failed to establish a “colorable basis” for a claim of
selective prosecution sufficient to entitle him to the requested discovery. Id. at 802
(emphasis supplied).
Massachusetts: in Commonwealth v. Washington W., 928 N.E.2d 908 (Mass.
2010), a fifteen-year-old boy with Asperger's Syndrome was accused of having
sexual encounters with a thirteen-year-old boy also with Asperger's Syndrome. Id.
at 910. Although the court affirmed the prosecutor’s “wide discretion” in deciding
whether to press charges, presuming the prosecutor’s decision was made in good
faith, the court also affirmed a limited version of a discovery order granted to the
child to pursue a selective prosecution claim based on a minimal (colorable) showing
that the child may have been prosecuted only because of the same-sex nature of the
27
case. When the government ultimately failed to produce the discovery even under a
protective order and even though the government conceded that the discovery
contained no any personal or sensitive information, the trial court found that the
government’s “egregious” conduct “gives rise to a determination of presumptive
prejudice and warrants dismissal.” The Supreme Court of Massachusetts affirmed
this ruling in Commonwealth v. Washington W., 967 N.E.2d 615 (Mass. 2012).
Ohio: In State v. LaMar, 767 N.E.2d 166 (Ohio 2002), the court ruled that the
defendant failed to present credible evidence showing the possibility of selective
prosecution that would entitle him to a hearing. Although the court did not use the
phrase “colorable,” the implication from LaMar clearly is that alleging only that he
was the only person accused of murder during a prison riot who was prosecuted
under the death penalty statute because he is black does not amount to credible
evidence, especially where at least three of the other four defendants are also black
and were not prosecuted under the death penalty statute. Id. at 187-188. The court
also points out that two years earlier, it affirmed the convictions of a white inmate
who received the death penalty for murders committed during the riot. Id. at 188-
189.
Washington: in State v. Staten, 1998 Wash. App. LEXIS 869 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1998) (unpublished opinion), although the court did not use the phrase
“colorable claim,” it did hold that a defendant seeking discovery on a selective-
28
prosecution claim must make an “initial credible showing” of a constitutional
violation by attaching “some evidence tending to show the elements of a selective
prosecution claim.” Here, the defendant attached only “anecdotal evidence” showing
that while blacks make up only five percent of the population of the county, they
account for 77 percent of the defendants facing “persistent offender allegations”
(three-strikes law). Id. at *8-9. Such statistical evidence of the disproportionate
effect of a law on a particular group of individuals, without more, is not sufficient,
and there must be some evidence that similarly situated defendants of other races
could have been prosecuted for a third strike but were not. Id. at *9-10.
New Jersey: in State v. Ballard, 752 A.2d 735 (N.J. Super. 2000), in citing
State v. Smith, 703 A.2d 954 (N.J. Super. 1997) and Armstrong, the New Jersey
Appellate Division held that discovery relating to a defendant's claim
of selective enforcement “is permitted only when there is a colorable claim” of a
constitutional violation such as selective enforcement. Id. at 738. The court held that
the defendant made the “threshold showing” of a “colorable claim” of a
constitutional violation. The court first noted that “discovery is appropriate if it will
lead to relevant and material information. Id. at 739. The court found that the
defendant (nonwhite) attached sufficient evidence to make a threshold showing of a
colorable claim that police officers were racially profiling in enforcing motor vehicle
29
laws because the evidence showed that in the area where the stops occurred, blacks
and Hispanics were several times more likely to be stopped than Caucasians.
Appellee has shown through the holdings of five other states agree with his
argument that so long as a defendant attaches a proffer of evidence to a motion to
dismiss due to prosecutorial misconduct that the trial court in its discretion
determines to present a colorable claim of a constitutional violation, the defendant
has attached “some evidence,” and the trial court has discretion to conduct a hearing
on the motion to dismiss.
IV. Conclusion and Prayer
For the reasons stated in the Opening Brief and this Rely Brief, Appellee
respectfully prays that this Court reverse the judgment and opinion of the Court of
Appeals, find that Appellee provided “some evidence” constituting a colorable claim
that allowed the trial court to exercise its discretion to order a hearing, and affirm
the trial court’s Order Granting Motion to Dismiss.
Respectfully submitted,
George R. Milner III
Milner Finn Price
2828 N. Harwood St. Suite 1950
Dallas, Texas 75201
Phone: 214-651-1121
Fax: 214-953-1366
ItsRainingII@aol.com
Texas Bar No. 00784611
30
Leonard Thomas (Butch) Bradt
14090 Southwest Freeway Suite 300
Sugar Land, TX 77478
Phone: 281-201-0700
Fax: 281-201-1202
ltbradt@flash.net
Texas Bar No. 02841600
Attorney for Appellee
Michael Mowla
P.O. Box 868
Cedar Hill, Texas 75106
Phone: 972-795-2401
Fax: 972-692-6636
michael@mowlalaw.com
Texas Bar No. 24048680
Attorneys for Appellee
/s/ Michael Mowla
By: Michael Mowla
V. Certificate of Service
I certify that on November 1, 2015, a true and correct copy of this document
was served on Chad Baruch by email to chad@jtlaw.com, on Lisa McMinn, the State
Prosecuting Attorney, by email to Lisa.McMinn@spa.texas.gov, and on John
Messinger, Assistant State Prosecuting Attorney, by email to
john.messinger@spa.state.tx.us. See Tex. Rule App. Proc. 9.5 (2015) and Tex. Rule
App. Proc. 68.11 (2015).
/s/ Michael Mowla
By: Michael Mowla
31
VI. Certificate of Compliance with Tex. Rule App. Proc. 9.4
This certifies that this document complies with the type-volume limitations
because this document is computer-generated and does not exceed 7,500 words.
Using the word-count feature of Microsoft Word, the undersigned certifies that this
document contains 5,898 words in the document except in the following sections:
caption, identity of parties and counsel, table of contents, table of authorities,
statement of the case and jurisdiction, statement regarding oral argument, statement
of issues or questions presented, signature, proof of service, certification, certificate
of compliance, and appendix. This document also complies with the typeface
requirements because it has been prepared in a proportionally-spaced typeface using
14-point font. See Tex. Rule App. Proc. 9.4 (2015).
/s/ Michael Mowla
By: Michael Mowla
32