holding that an individual detained for alleged shoplifting by a state-licensed security guard could not bring suit pursuant to Section 1983 against the private employer of the guard solely on the principle of respondeat superior
How later courts described this case
- holding that an individual detained for alleged shoplifting by a state-licensed security guard could not bring suit pursuant to Section 1983 against the private employer of the guard solely on the principle of respondeat superior
- holding that reasoning of Supreme Court in Monell was equally applicable to private corporations and that § 1983 “evinc[ed]” a Congressional intent not to impose vicarious liability
- finding that the plaintiff could not recover against a private state-employed company under § 1983 based on respondeat superior
- finding that the lack of vicarious liability under § 1983 extends to private corporations acting under color of state law
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ALBERT V. BRYAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Appellant Clifton Powell seeks this Court’s permission to pursue, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ,
1
a claim against the private employer of a State-licensed security guard for the latter’s tortious treatment of him; the employer’s liability is predicated solely on the doctrine of
respondeat superior.
Because Powell’s claim falls outside the scope of the statute, we affirm the District Court’s judgment on the pleadings.
Powell alleges the following facts.
2
On August 5, 1980, he and a companion were walking in the Laurel (Maryland) Shopping Center when they were confronted by Robert K. Skeen, a security guard who questioned them about a shoplifting incident. Skeen was employed by the shopping center’s owner, appellee Shopco Laurel Company (Shopco), and was commissioned a “Special Police Officer” under the laws of Maryland. At Skeen’s request, Powell agreed to accompany him to the security office of the center’s J. C. Penney’s store, the scene of the alleged shoplifting. En route, Skeen repeatedly refused to allow Powell to stop at a restroom. When he attempted to do so without permission, Skeen hit him in the head with a slapjack and handcuffed him. After this attack Skeen arrested Powell for assault and battery, disturbing the peace, and resisting arrest, of which he was subsequently acquitted.
Powell filed this action against Shopco and Skeen in October 1980, charging
inter alia
that Skeen, while acting under the col- or of State law, had deprived him of his civil rights.
3
To repeat, Shopco’s liability was laid solely on principles of
respondeat superior.
The District Court, July 21, 1981, granted Shopeo’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that
respondeat superior
could not be invoked under section 1983
4
*506
In
Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services,
436 U.S. 658 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a municipal corporation cannot be saddled with section 1983 liability via
respondeat superior
alone. We see this holding as equally applicable to the liability of private corporations. Two aspects of
Monell
exact this conclusion. The Court found section 1983 evincing a Congressional intention to exclude the imposition of vicarious answerability. For a third party to be liable the statute demands of the plaintiff proof that the former “caused”
5
the deprivation of his Federal rights. 436 U.S. at 691-92 , 98 S.Ct. at 2036 . Continuing, the Court observed that the policy considerations underpinning the doctrine of
respon-deat superior
insufficient to warrant integration of that doctrine into the statute.
Id.
at 694 , 98 S.Ct. at 2037 . No element of the Court’s
ratio decidendi
lends support for distinguishing the case of a private corporation.
With appellant Powell’s Federal claim against Shopco fatally flawed, the judgment of the District Court is
AFFIRMED.
1
. The statute provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
2
. Given the posture of this appeal, we assume the truth of these factual allegations. See,
e.g., Strescon Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 664
F.2d 929, 930 n.2 (4th Cir. 1981); 2A Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 12.15, at 2342 (2d ed. 1981).
3
. Various pendent State claims were alleged against both defendants. All non-Federal claims against Shopco were dismissed with the section 1983 claim.
4
. Finding no just reason for delay, the District Court entered final judgment as to Shopco pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, thus placing this matter within this Court’s 28 U.S.C. § 1291 jurisdiction.
See C.
Wright, The Law of Federal Courts § 101, at 453-54 (1970). Hence the liability of defendant Skeen is not before this Court, and we express no views as to that question.
5
. See note 1
supra.