Rashied Goodwin v. Edward Conway

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 15-2720

_______________

RASHIED K. GOODWIN

v.

DETECTIVE EDWARD CONWAY;

DETECTIVE C. LISSNER;

DETECTIVE RANDY SIDORSKI;

JOHN DOES 1-10, unknown supervising

officers in the Somerset Prosecutor's Office

Detective Edward Conway; Detective C. Lissner;

Detective Randy Sidorski,

Appellants

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. No. 3-12-cv-01040)

District Judge: Hon. Freda L. Wolfson

_______________

Argued March 14, 2016

Before: FUENTES, CHAGARES, and RESTREPO, Circuit

Judges

(Opinion Filed: September 12, 2016)

Eric S. Pasternack [ARGUED]

Lisa A. Puglisi

Office of Attorney General of New Jersey

P.O. Box 112

25 Market Street

Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex

Trenton, NJ 08625

Counsel for Appellants

Catherine M. Aiello [ARGUED]

Natalie J. Kraner

Megan B. Treseder

Lowenstein Sandler LLP

65 Livingston Avenue

Roseland, NJ 07068

Counsel for Appellee

_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_______________



Honorable Julio M. Fuentes assumed senior status on July

18, 2016.

2

FUENTES, Circuit Judge.

Rashied Goodwin was arrested pursuant to a warrant

for allegedly selling heroin to an undercover police officer. A

grand jury indicted him but the charges were eventually

dropped. Goodwin then brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983

lawsuit for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution

against the three detectives involved in securing his arrest

warrant. He claims that the detectives submitted a false

warrant application because they knew or should have known

that he was in jail at the time of one of the undercover drug

deals. He argues that his incarceration was evident from a

booking sheet the detectives had when they applied for his

arrest warrant. The detectives moved for summary judgment

and asserted a qualified immunity defense.

The District Court denied the detectives’ motion,

holding that there was a genuine dispute as to whether the

detectives possessed the booking sheet when they submitted

the warrant application, which precluded granting summary

judgment on the issue of whether the detectives had probable

cause to arrest Goodwin. According to the District Court, the

detectives’ qualified immunity defense also hinged on this

factual dispute.

At oral argument before this Court, defense counsel

conceded that the detectives were indeed aware of the

booking sheet before submitting the warrant application. The

only issue we must decide is whether that booking sheet and

any inferences derived therefrom preclude a finding of

probable cause. We conclude that they do not. Despite the

booking sheet, the detectives had probable cause when they

applied for Goodwin’s arrest warrant, and they are therefore

3

entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, we will reverse

the order of the District Court.

I.

A.

In late September 2009, the Somerset County

Organized Crime and Narcotics Task Force learned from a

confidential informant that an individual known as “Snipe”

was selling heroin in the Watchung/North Plainfield area of

New Jersey. At some point during the week of September 27,

2009, Detective Lissner, acting undercover, accompanied the

confidential informant to buy heroin from Snipe in a Sears

parking lot in Watchung at approximately 3:30 p.m. Snipe

approached Lissner’s car and handed the drugs to the

confidential informant through the front passenger side

window. Lissner asked Snipe if he could make future buys

from him without the confidential informant present. Snipe

said that was fine and gave Lissner his cell phone number. In

his follow-up report, Detective Lissner described Snipe as a

“black male.”1

Through a series of phone calls and text messages,

Detective Lissner set up a second buy from Snipe on October

16, 2009, again in the Sears parking lot. This time, Snipe sat

down in the front passenger seat of Lissner’s car and handed

Lissner the drugs. Following the exchange, Snipe drove out

of the parking lot and headed towards Plainfield. Detective

Lissner provided no physical description of Snipe in his

follow-up report.

1

App. 334.

4

Two other members of the Task Force, Detective

Conway and Detective Sidorski, observed the drug deals from

afar.2 No pictures or videos of Snipe were taken. The most

detailed physical description of Snipe is found in Detective

Conway’s investigation report of the first buy: “black male,

dark complexion, approximately 5’8, thin build, and

approximately 30 years old.”3

The Task Force worked to identify “Snipe.” They

contacted Lieutenant O’Brien in the Plainfield Police

Department, who advised the detectives that he knew “Snipe”

as Rashied Goodwin. In his deposition, O’Brien testified that

he had previously interacted with Goodwin “on the street,”

and that the only person he knew who uses the alias “Snipe”

is Goodwin.4

On November 13, 2009, Detective Conway obtained a

photograph of Goodwin from the Union County jail. His

investigation report indicates that he reached out to staff at

the jail because he learned that Goodwin had recently been

arrested and was being held there. Detective Conway showed

a copy of Goodwin’s photograph to Detective Lissner, who

positively identified Goodwin as the “Snipe” who sold him

drugs. Lissner then initialed and dated the photograph to

confirm that he identified Goodwin as Snipe. In his

deposition, Lissner testified that he “immediately recognized”

the individual in the photograph as the person from whom he

2

Detective Conway observed both drugs deals, and Detective

Sidorski observed the second drug deal. App. 332-38; App.

326 ¶ 61.

3

App. 333.

4

App. 256-57 (O’Brien Dep. 23:20-21, 25:2-5).

5

bought drugs, and that he would not have initialed the

photograph unless he was “a hundred percent sure” about the

identification.5

The detectives prepared an affidavit of probable cause

for Goodwin’s arrest. The affidavit itself refers only to the

second drug buy on October 16, 2009. But the affidavit was

submitted with a packet of supporting documents that

included, among other things: (1) the detectives’ investigation

reports describing the first and second drug buys, (2) a

supplementary investigation report explaining that the

Plainfield Police Department indicated “Snipe” may be

Rashied Goodwin’s alias and that Detective Lissner positively

identified a photograph of Goodwin as Snipe, and (3) a copy

of the photograph of Goodwin with Detective Lissner’s

initials.

On November 25, 2009, a warrant was issued for

Goodwin’s arrest. Because Goodwin was incarcerated on

other charges at the time, Detective Conway faxed the arrest

warrant to Union County jail as a detainer. Goodwin was

unaware of these charges until the end of December 2009,

when he was released from custody and then immediately re-

arrested. In January 2010, a grand jury returned an

indictment for Goodwin, charging him with knowingly and

purposefully distributing heroin, and with distributing heroin

within 1,000 feet of a school.

Some time after the indictment was issued, Goodwin

told his public defender that he had been incarcerated from

5

App. 153 (Lissner Dep. 119:3-5, 20-22).

6

September 26, 2009 through [].6 At the time Goodwin made

this claim, his attorney did not know the date of the first drug

buy because the investigation reports included with the

affidavit state only that the first buy occurred “during the

week of September 27, 2009.”7 Goodwin’s attorney asked

the prosecutor for the exact date of the first drug buy,

explaining that it was “essential to [his] client’s defense.”8

The prosecutor refused to disclose this information, however,

in an attempt to protect the identity of the confidential

informant. Rather than reveal the informant’s identity, the

prosecutor dropped the charges, and Goodwin was released

from jail. The parties now agree that the date of the first drug

buy was [].

The dispute in this case concerns a booking sheet from

the Plainfield Police Department in Goodwin’s Somerset

County case file.9 The booking sheet, which is undated,

indicates that Goodwin was arrested and detained on

September 26, 2009.10 Next to “Offender Disposition” is the

word “JAILED,” and next to “Time bailed or released” is a

6

Per agreement of the parties, the Court has redacted certain

dates which appear as "[ ]" in this opinion.

7

App. 332. The week of September 27, 2009 ran from

Sunday, September 27 through Saturday, October 3.

8

App. 302.

9

Although defense counsel conceded that the detectives

possessed the booking sheet at the time they submitted

Goodwin’s warrant application, it is unclear from the record

whether the booking sheet was actually included in the

application itself. As we will later explain, this ambiguity is

irrelevant.

10

App. 340.

7

blank line.11 The booking sheet describes Goodwin as a black

male, 31 years old, five feet six inches tall, and 150 pounds.12

Notably, the sheet lists Goodwin’s nickname as “Snipe.”13

B.

Goodwin brought this § 1983 action against Detective

Conway, Detective Lissner, and Detective Sidorski

(“Defendants”) for false imprisonment and malicious

prosecution. The crux of Goodwin’s claim is that Defendants

omitted from the warrant application “potential alibi”

information derived from the Plainfield booking sheet

regarding his incarceration on the date of the first drug buy.

Neither party disputes that the “Snipe” who sold drugs to the

undercover officer in the first drug buy was the same “Snipe”

who sold drugs in the second drug buy. Thus if Goodwin was

incarcerated during the first drug buy, he could not have been

the “Snipe” involved in the second drug buy.

Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing

that they had probable cause to arrest Goodwin and that, even

if the court found no probable cause, they would still be

entitled to qualified immunity. The District Court denied

Defendants’ motion, and Defendants appealed.14

11

Id.

12

Id.

13

Id.

14

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

A “district court’s denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to

the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable

‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291

8

II.

In this case, Defendants challenge the District Court’s

conclusion that the existence of a particular factual dispute

precluded summary judgment on the issue of whether

Defendants had probable cause to arrest Goodwin. In our

view, this is a legal issue, not a factual one.15 As we have

explained, the factual dispute on which the District Court

rested its opinion—whether Defendants possessed the

Plainfield booking sheet before submitting Goodwin’s

warrant application—is no longer in dispute and indeed, has

been resolved in Goodwin’s favor. Nonetheless, because we

conclude that the booking sheet was immaterial to the

notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.” Mitchell v.

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). We may therefore decide

an appeal challenging the district court’s decision on whether

the defendant’s alleged actions violated a constitutional right

or whether the right was clearly established. Id. at 528. We

may not, however, decide an appeal challenging the district

court’s determination of “evidence sufficiency, i.e., which

facts a party may, or may not, be able to prove at trial.”

Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995).

15

See, e.g., Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2019

(2014) (“[The defendants] contend that their conduct did not

violate the Fourth Amendment and, in any event, did not

violate clearly established law. Thus, they raise legal issues;

these issues are quite different from any purely factual issues

that the trial court might confront if the case were tried.”).

9

probable cause determination, we will reverse the District

Court’s decision on the issue of qualified immunity.16

III.

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity

unless their conduct violated a clearly established

constitutional right.17 Thus, to resolve a claim of qualified

immunity, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry:

(1) whether the plaintiff has shown the violation of a

constitutional right, and (2) whether the right was “clearly

established” at the time of the official’s conduct.18 Here,

Goodwin claims that Defendants arrested, detained, and

initiated criminal proceedings against him without probable

cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.19 A finding of

probable cause is therefore a complete defense to Goodwin’s

constitutional claims, and, accordingly, would entitle

Defendants to qualified immunity.

“[P]robable cause to arrest exists when the facts and

circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge are

sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to

believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the

16

We exercise plenary review of orders rejecting qualified

immunity at the summary judgment stage. Wright v. City of

Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 599 (3d Cir. 2005).

17

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).

18

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011).

19

The Fourth Amendment provides that people are “to be

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, . . . and no Warrants shall

issue, but upon probable cause . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV.

10

person to be arrested.”20 While the question of probable cause

is generally left to the jury, a court may conclude that

probable cause exists as a matter of law “if the evidence,

viewed most favorably to [the nonmoving party], reasonably

would not support a contrary factual finding.”21 “A ‘common

sense’ approach [must be taken] to the issue of probable

cause’ and a determination as to its existence must be based

on the ‘totality of the circumstances.’”22

20

Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir.

1995).

21

Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 1997).

22

Paff v. Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d 425, 436 (3d Cir. 2000)

(alterations in original) (quoting Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d

810, 818 (3d Cir. 1997)).

11

A. False Arrest/Imprisonment

Goodwin’s main contention is that Defendants

submitted a false warrant application and had no probable

cause to arrest him. Specifically, Goodwin claims that the

booking sheet that Defendants had in their possession made

clear that he was in jail when the first drug sale to Detective

Lissner took place. We note, however, that the supporting

documents attached to the affidavit of probable clause

included a detailed description of the investigation of

“Snipe,” explained that another law enforcement officer

indicated that “Snipe” may be Goodwin, and explained that

Detective Lissner positively identified a photograph of

Goodwin as “Snipe,” the person from whom he bought drugs.

This information was sufficient to lead a reasonable person to

believe Goodwin had committed the offense.

The mere existence of an arrest warrant, however, does

not shield an officer from liability for false arrest. In Wilson

v. Russo,23 we explained that “a plaintiff may succeed in a

§1983 action for false arrest made pursuant to a warrant if the

plaintiff shows, by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that

the police officer ‘knowingly and deliberately, or with a

reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or

omissions that create a falsehood in applying for the warrant;’

and (2) that ‘such statements or omissions are material, or

necessary, to the finding of probable cause.’”24 Omissions

and misrepresentations are “material” if a reconstructed

warrant application containing the alleged omissions and

23

212 F.3d 781 (3d Cir. 2000).

24

Id. at 786-87 (quoting Sherwood, 113 F.3d at 399).

12

excising the alleged inaccuracies would no longer establish

probable cause.25

Goodwin does not argue that Defendants deliberately

or recklessly omitted the booking sheet itself from the warrant

application. Rather, he argues that the existence of the

booking sheet—which Defendants concede they possessed

before submitting the application—provides evidence from

which a reasonable jury could infer that Defendants knew or

should have known that Goodwin was incarcerated on the

date of the first drug buy. Goodwin argues that had this

“potential alibi” information been included in the warrant

application, it would have seriously undermined a finding of

probable cause.

Goodwin’s argument rests on two alternative

assertions: (1) the booking sheet is plainly exculpatory,

or (2) Defendants had a duty to further investigate Goodwin’s

whereabouts on the date of the first drug buy. Both are

unconvincing.

First, the booking sheet was not plainly exculpatory.

We have explained that “[a]n officer contemplating an arrest

is not free to disregard plainly exculpatory evidence, even if

substantial inculpatory evidence (standing by itself) suggests

that probable cause exists.”26 In Reedy v. Evanson,27 for

example, we concluded that an officer disregarded plainly

exculpatory evidence when he submitted an arrest warrant

25

Id. at 789.

26

Id. at 790 (quoting Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646, 650 (8th

Cir. 1999)).

27

615 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2010).

13

application that charged the defendant with falsely reporting a

crime, yet knowingly omitted from the application the fact

that a very similar crime occurred shortly after the crime he

claimed the defendant had fabricated.28 We have also

explained that, while a victim witness’s positive identification

is usually sufficient to establish probable cause, plainly

exculpatory evidence, such as conclusive DNA evidence of

the suspect’s innocence, could outweigh that identification

and preclude a finding of probable cause.29

Here, by contrast, all the booking sheet shows is that

Goodwin was incarcerated beginning on September 26, 2009.

It does not say when he was released. The fact that the “time

released” line is left blank is of no moment, since the

document itself is undated. The detectives in this case simply

could not infer from the booking sheet itself that Goodwin

remained incarcerated through [], the date of the first drug

buy.

Thus the fact that Defendants were aware of this

booking sheet is insufficient to show that Defendants

submitted the warrant application with a reckless disregard

for the “truth” that Goodwin could not have been Snipe. To

the contrary, the booking sheet supports the connection

between Goodwin and Snipe because it lists Goodwin’s

nickname as “Snipe.” The physical description of Goodwin

in the booking sheet also closely matches the physical

description of Snipe in Detective Conway’s investigation

report. If anything, then, the booking sheet is inculpatory,

28

Id. at 223.

29

Wilson, 212 F.3d at 790.

14

and supports rather than undermines a probable cause

determination.

Second, the booking sheet did not trigger a duty to

further investigate Goodwin’s release date. We have

explained that the reliability of information provided to

officials may sometimes be questionable enough to “put a

reasonable official on notice that further investigation [is]

necessary.”30 Even so, the official may still rely on the

information unless the further investigation “would give rise

to an obvious reason to doubt the accuracy of the

information,”31 so as to “render[] the [official’s] reliance upon

that information unreasonably reckless.”32

In light of the information Defendants had at the time,

there was no reason for them to further investigate Goodwin’s

release date. Another law enforcement officer unconnected to

the investigation suggested that Snipe may be Rashied

Goodwin, and Detective Lissner “immediately” made a

positive photo identification of Goodwin. Goodwin makes

much of the fact that Detective Lissner made this photo

identification under “highly suggestive” circumstances.

While this argument may be relevant to evidence suppression

at a criminal trial, it is not relevant to the probable cause

determination here.33 Thus, Defendants had sufficient

30

United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 385 (3d Cir. 2006).

31

Id. at 386.

32

Id. at 385.

33

See, e.g., Robinson v. Cook, 706 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2013)

(“[W]e think it unwise to expand the Brathwaite framework

[for unduly suggestive identifications] from ‘a rule of

evidence to a rule of damages’ by applying it in an arrestee’s

15

information in front of them to conclude that the drug dealer

was Goodwin.

We note that it may be advisable for officers to

investigate further in other circumstances. For example, if the

officers possessed more concrete evidence that the suspect

was released on the exact date of the crime he allegedly

committed but were unsure of the exact time of release, or if

there was no photo identification involved, further inquiry

might be necessary. But here, all the booking sheet told

Defendants was that Goodwin was in custody [] before the

date of the first drug buy. While this may have raised

suspicion as to Goodwin’s whereabouts around the time of

the first drug buy, it did not undermine probable cause given

the other information Defendants had in their possession at

the time.

Because Goodwin has not set forth sufficient proof

that Defendants deliberately or recklessly disregarded the

truth when they submitted the warrant application to secure

his arrest warrant, Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity on his false imprisonment claim.

B. Malicious Prosecution

Goodwin must also show lack of probable cause to

prevail on his malicious prosecution claim.34 We have

already held that probable cause existed here. Moreover, a

civil suit alleging that probable cause was undermined by an

unreliable identification.” (quoting Phillips v. Allen, 668 F.3d

912, 915 (7th Cir. 2012))).

34

Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521-22 (3d Cir.

2003).

16

grand jury issued an indictment against Goodwin for the same

charges for which he was arrested, which “constitutes prima

facie evidence of probable cause to prosecute.”35 Thus,

Goodwin’s malicious prosecution claim likewise fails and

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

IV.

No one disputes that, had Defendants possessed and

ignored plainly exculpatory evidence when submitting

Goodwin’s warrant application, this would undermine if not

eviscerate a finding of probable cause. But that is not the

case here. The Plainfield booking sheet indicates that

Goodwin was in custody [] before the date of the first drug

deal in which he was allegedly involved. At most, then, the

booking sheet raised suspicion as to Goodwin’s whereabouts

around that time, but it did not trigger an obligation that

Defendants confirm his release date given the other

information they possessed at the time. Because we conclude

that Defendants had probable cause to arrest and prosecute

Goodwin, they are entitled to qualified immunity.

35

Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 353 (3d Cir. 1989).

Defendants argue that Goodwin’s grand jury indictment

creates a rebuttable presumption of probable cause for all of

his claims. But Goodwin’s arrest occurred before the

indictment, pursuant to an arrest warrant. The presumption

attaches only to the indictment and beyond, and thus has no

bearing on an arrest that precedes the indictment. See, e.g.,

Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1285 n.8 (11th Cir. 1999)

(explaining that “a subsequent grand jury indictment does not

retroactively provide probable cause for a false arrest that had

already taken place”).

17

Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court’s denial of

Defendants’ claim for qualified immunity with direction to

enter judgment in favor of Defendants.

18