The opinion
FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
AUG 22 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS No. 71-01092
BOARD,
NLRB No. 20-CC-1008
Petitioner,
ORDER*
v.
TEAMSTERS UNION LOCAL NO.70,
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD
OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS,
WAREHOUSEMEN & HELPERS OF
AMERICA,
Respondent.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS No. 82-07451
BOARD,
NLRB No. 32-CC-509
Petitioner,
v.
TEAMSTERS UNION LOCAL NO. 70,
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD
OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS,
WAREHOUSEMEN & HELPERS OF
AMERICA,
Respondent.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
On Motion to Modify Judgments of This Court
Enforcing Orders of the National Labor Relations Board
Argued and Submitted August 12, 2016
San Francisco, California
Before: HAWKINS and GRABER, Circuit Judges, and SELNA,** District Judge.
Teamsters Union Local No. 70 ("Union") has moved for relief from several
of our judgments pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Under Rule
60(b), a party seeking modification "bears the burden of establishing that a
significant change in circumstances warrants revision of the decree." Rufo v.
Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 383 (1992). The Union argues that the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015), is a
significant change in circumstances that warrants revision of our judgments. We
disagree and deny the motion.
We assume, without deciding, that Reed changed the Supreme Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence in some respects. But it did not do so in a way that
matters here. When faced with a constitutional challenge, the Supreme Court has
not disturbed the National Labor Relations Act’s prohibition against peaceful
secondary picketing. NLRB v. Retail Store Emps. Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S.
**
The Honorable James V. Selna, United States District Judge for the
Central District of California, sitting by designation.
2
607 (1980). The Court has recognized that picketing might have a coercive effect,
not entitling it to full First Amendment protection. See Bakery & Pastry Drivers
Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Picketing
by an organized group is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a
particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of
one kind or another, quite irrespective of the ideas which are being disseminated.").
Reed, in result and rationale, does not necessarily undermine these cases.
Therefore, we are not free to disregard the Supreme Court’s picketing-specific
jurisprudence. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) ("[I]f a precedent
of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected
in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which
directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own
decisions." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because the Union has established
no relevant change in law, we may not revise our previous judgments.
Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.
3