holding that defendant Brown’s probationary sentence did not commence until his release from federal custody and noting that because “probation rehabilitates a defendant in a less restrictive manner than total confinement” then “logic would lead to the conclusion that a term of probation cannot be served while the defendant is imprisoned on an unrelated sentence, whether it be in a state facility as in Allshouse or in federal custody as with Brown”
How later courts described this case
- holding that defendant Brown’s probationary sentence did not commence until his release from federal custody and noting that because “probation rehabilitates a defendant in a less restrictive manner than total confinement” then “logic would lead to the conclusion that a term of probation cannot be served while the defendant is imprisoned on an unrelated sentence, whether it be in a state facility as in Allshouse or in federal custody as with Brown”
- holding that Appellant Brown’s probationary sentence did not commence until his release from federal custody and noting that because “probation rehabilitates a defendant in a less restrictive manner than total confinement” then “logic would lead to the conclusion that a term of probation cannot be served while the defendant is imprisoned on an unrelated sentence, whether it be in a state facility as in Allshouse or in federal custody as with Brown”
- stating that “where the trial court addresses the issues raised in an untimely Rule 1925(b) statement, we need not remand but may address the issues on their merits” (citation omitted)
- explaining that “where the trial court addresses the issues raised in an untimely Rule 1925(b) statement, we need not remand but may address the issues on their merits”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
J-A17024-16
2016 PA Super 173
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
STEPHEN J. BROWN
Appellant No. 1033 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 7, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0203611-2006,
CP-51-cr-0308891-2006
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*
OPINION BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED AUGUST 09, 2016
Stephen Brown (a/k/a Rodney Greene) appeals from the judgment of
sentence, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
after he violated his probation by committing retail theft. Upon review, we
affirm Brown’s judgment of sentence.
The trial court summarized the facts as follows:
On April 10, 2005, [Brown] used the victim “P.R.’s” identity to
open Chase Visa (charging $1200.00) and Sears credit cards
(charging $1632.02), [] on several occasions identified himself
as the complainant[,] and used Western Union to transfer money
($245.00) in the complainant’s name. [Brown] also used
complainant’s identity to obtain phone service and provided
complainant’s identifying information for two traffic court
citations. On November 3, 2005, police executed a search
warrant on [Brown’s] apartment and recovered credit cards, a
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A17024-16
driver’s license, and check stubs in the names of the victims
along with identification for multiple victims; the police also
recovered blank police and district attorney office letterhead.
On April 9, 2007, [Brown] entered into a guilty plea to felony-
three identity theft, 18 Pa.C.S. §4120. . . . [Brown] was
sentenced pursuant to his plea agreement to 11 ½ to 23
months[’] incarceration with immediate parole, followed by four
years[’] reporting probation.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/11/15 at 1-2.
After sentencing, Brown was released on parole. The following day,
April 10, 2007, Brown was taken into federal custody. On June 23, 2008,
Brown pled guilty in federal court to three counts of mail fraud,1 three
counts of identity theft,2 two counts of access device fraud,3 three counts of
aggravated identity theft,4 and two counts of forgery of signatures of judge
or court officer.5 Brown was sentenced to 27 months’ incarceration followed
by 3 years of supervised release. Brown was released on September 26,
2013, from federal custody.
On April 24, 2014, Brown was arrested for retail theft. On March 9,
2015, he pled guilty to the charge and was sentenced to 30 days’ probation.
____________________________________________
1
18 U.S.C. § 1341.
2
18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7).
3
18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2).
4
18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1).
5
18 U.S.C. § 505.
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On April 7, 2015, Judge Chris R. Wogan held a violation of probation hearing
with respect to Brown’s 2007 conviction. Judge Wogan found that Brown’s
state probation did not begin until his release from federal custody on
September 26, 2013, and, thus, his conviction for retail theft was a direct
violation of that probation. Accordingly, Brown’s probation was revoked and
he was resentenced to 48 months of reporting probation and a $250.00 fine.
On April 10, 2015, Brown filed a notice of appeal from his probation
revocation sentence and, on April 13, 2015, the court ordered him to file a
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
within 21 days. On April 30, 2015, Brown filed a request for an extension to
file his Rule 1925(b) statement, claiming that the notes of testimony from
his violation of probation (VOP) hearing were not yet available. The court
granted the extension until May 13, 2015. On May 13, 2015, counsel filed a
second request for an extension, which was denied. The following day, the
notes of testimony from the VOP hearing became available and, on May 19,
2015, Brown filed his Rule 1925(b) statement. A separate petition was filed
requesting that the court accept the statement of errors nunc pro tunc. The
trial court denied the petition and ruled that the Rule 1925(b) statement was
therefore untimely.
Before we address the issue raised on appeal, we resolve a preliminary
procedural matter. Instantly, the trial court found that Brown’s Rule
1925(b) statement was not timely filed. While this often requires remand,
where the trial court addresses the issues raised in an untimely Rule
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1925(b) statement, we need not remand but may address the issues on
their merits. See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 39 A.3d 335, 340 (Pa.
Super. 2012). Instantly, the trial court has addressed the issue raised in
Brown’s untimely Rule 1925(b) statement and, as such, we may address the
issue on its merits. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d
428, 433 (Pa. Super. 2009) (“[I]f there is an untimely filing, this Court may
decide the appeal on the merits if the trial court had adequate opportunity to
prepare an opinion addressing the issues being raise on appeal”).6
On appeal, Brown raises one issue for our review:
Did not the trial court err in finding Mr. Brown in violation of his
probation, insofar as his probation had already expired long
before the date of the purported violation?
Brief for Appellant, at 3.
The main thrust of Brown’s appeal is that his probationary period
began to run on December 26, 2008, at the conclusion of his 11½ to 23
month state incarceration sentence. Therefore, he claims his four-year
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6
We note that the trial court acknowledges that a delay in the transcription
of notes of testimony is generally considered “good cause” warranting an
enlargement of time to file a Rule 1925(b) statement. See Trial Court
Opinion, 6/11/15, at 3-4 n.1. However, the court denied Brown’s second
request for an extension, stating that “the notes were not necessary in this
basic VOP case.” Id. at 4 n.1. While this may be true, we also recognize
that without the notes to prepare the statement, a party could run afoul of
the requirement that the Rule 1925(b) statement “concisely identify each
ruling or error that the appellant intends to challenge with sufficient detail to
identify all pertinent issues for the judge.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii)
(emphasis added). Accordingly, we address the merits of Brown’s appeal.
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probation sentence concluded on December 26, 2012, well before he
committed the offense forming the basis for his violation on April 24, 2014.
Specifically, Brown contends that his time spent in federal custody should
count towards his state sentence. However, the trial court did not credit the
federal time towards his state sentence, reasoning that Brown was released
from Federal custody on September 26, 2013, and, thus, from that date his
state probation sentence began to run. As such, Brown’s retail theft was
committed within the time he was serving his probation sentence and, thus,
was a direct probation violation.
The issue on appeal concerns a question of law; thus, our scope of
review is plenary and our standard of review is de novo. Commonwealth
v. Mullins, 918 A.2d 82, 84 (Pa. 2007). The issue as to whether a state
probation period can be served while in federal imprisonment is an issue of
first-impression in our Court. For the following reasons, we conclude that
state probation time cannot run while a defendant is serving a federal
sentence or the court would be permitting a defendant to simultaneously
serve two distinct sentences which, in essence would be “killing two birds
with one stone.” Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that the
time Brown spent in federal custody did not count towards his state
sentence and, therefore, his state probation sentence began to run on
September 26, 2013, when he was released from federal custody.
“No section of the Sentencing Code contemplates imprisonment as an
element of a probationary sentence; probation is in fact a less restrictive
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alternative to imprisonment directed at rehabilitating the defendant without
recourse to confinement during the probationary period.” Commonwealth
v. Basinger, 982 A.2d 121, 127 (Pa. Super. 2009) (emphasis added). The
sentencing court assigns specific probationary conditions and requirements
the defendant must abide by to assist the defendant in leading a law-abiding
life. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9754. Where a probationary sentence is employed, the
Sentencing Code includes conditions to insure the defendant is rehabilitated
as a law-abiding citizen who modifies his behavior without the total
confinement of incarceration. Basinger, 982 A.2d at 127. The plain
language of the Sentencing Code itself does not contemplate incarceration
as a condition of probation. See, e.g., 42 Pa.C.S. § 9754(c).
Moreover, in Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 33 A.3d 31 (Pa. Super.
2011), this Court specifically rejected the idea of “constructive probation.”
In Allshouse, the defendant was convicted and sentenced to two years’
incarceration followed by a consecutive term of two years’ probation. Five
months later, the defendant was sentenced to one to three years’
incarceration on a separate offense. Upon serving his maximum five-year
sentence,7 he was detained for a probation violation stemming from the first
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7
The Department of Corrections aggregated the sentences for his first and
second convictions pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9757, which mandates
automatic aggregation of sentences once a trial court imposes a consecutive
sentence. Commonwealth v. Ford-Bey, 590 A.2d 782, 783 (Pa. Super.
1991).
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conviction. Allshouse argued that he “constructively served” his probation
on his first sentence while he was incarcerated for the second conviction.
This Court disagreed, and being a case of first impression, looked to relevant
federal law for guidance. Allshouse, 33 A.3d at 36.
The Allshouse court cited the following federal statute:
§ 3564. Running of a term of probation
(b) Concurrence with other sentences.—Multiple terms of
probation, whether imposed at the same time or at different
times, run concurrently with each other. A term of probation
runs concurrently with any Federal, State, or local term of
probation, supervised release, or parole for another offense to
which the defendant is subject or becomes subject during the
term of probation. A term of probation does not run while
the defendant is imprisoned in connection with a
conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the
imprisonment is for a period of less than thirty
consecutive days.
18 U.S.C. § 3564(b) (emphasis in original). The Court found that there is
“no support in the Pennsylvania statutes that the General Assembly intended
to permit defendants to serve a term of probation and a term of state
incarceration simultaneously.” Allshouse, 33 A.3d at 36.
While Allshouse may be factually distinguishable from the instant
matter, we find its reasoning persuasive. As previously stated, probation
rehabilitates a defendant in a less restrictive manner than total confinement.
Basinger, supra. As such, logic would lead to the conclusion that a term of
probation cannot be served while the defendant is imprisoned on an
unrelated sentence, whether it be in a state facility as in Allshouse or in
federal custody as with Brown.
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Brown would have us adopt an approach to sentencing akin to “serve
one sentence, get one free.” However, this Court has specifically
disapproved of such an approach. In Commonwealth v. Hallowell, 604
A.2d 723 (Pa. Super. 1992), the defendant argued that he should receive
credit for the same period of pre-sentence incarceration served on two
unrelated criminal incidents. This Court rejected Hallowell’s argument,
stating this would give defendant “a windfall in sentencing for a completely
unrelated crime. This court does not deal in ‘volume discounts.’” Id. at
726.
Similarly, Brown would have us grant a windfall for his time served for
the above-mentioned federal crimes. This double credit argument has been
rejected. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Merigris, 681 A.2d 194, 195
(Pa. Super. 1996) (stating 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760 bars defendant from receiving
credit against more than one sentence for time served).
Accordingly, we hold that Brown’s probationary sentence did not
commence until his release from federal custody on September 26, 2013.
Because Brown committed retail theft during his probationary period, his
crime was a violation of that probation. Therefore, the trial court acted
within its discretion when it revoked Brown’s probation and resentenced him
to 48 months’ reporting probation.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/9/2016
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