Opinion

Susan Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran

  • 831 F.3d 470
  • 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13981
Court
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Filed
Aug 2, 2016
Status
Published
Author
Henderson
On the bench
Garland, Henderson, Randolph
Cited by
14 cases
Authority
More cited than 72.6%

Abrogated on other grounds by Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816 (2018)

“Once a section 1605A judgment is obtained, section 1610(g) strips execution immunity from all property of a defendant sovereign.”

How later courts described this case

  • “Once a section 1605A judgment is obtained, section 1610(g) strips execution immunity from all property of a defendant sovereign.”
  • subject matter jurisdiction can exist even where plaintiff did not establish exception to attachment immunity under FSIA
  • “To preserve an argument on appeal a party must raise it both in district court and before us.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Abrogated on other grounds by Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816 (2018)

    831 F.3d 470, 482 (D.C. Cir. 2016), abrogated on other grounds by Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816
    Supreme Court of the United StatesFeb 21, 20182 citing opinionsother groundsRead it

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 21, 2016 Decided August 2, 2016

No. 14-7193

SUSAN WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUALLY AS CO-ADMINISTRATOR OF

THE ESTATE OF IRA WILLIAM WEINSTEIN,

AND AS NATURAL GUARDIAN OF

PLAINTIFF DAVID WEINSTEIN (MINOR), ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Consolidated with 14-7194, 14-7195, 14-7198,

14-7202, 14-7203, 14-7204

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:00-cv-02601)

(No. 1:02-cv-01811)

(No. 1:08-cv-00520)

(No. 1:01-cv-01655)

(No. 1:08-cv-00502)

(No. 1:00-cv-02602)

(No. 1:14-mc-00648)

2

Meir Katz argued the cause for the appellants. Robert J.

Tolchin, Steven T. Gebelin and Scott M. Lesowitz were with

him on brief. Jeffrey A. Miller entered an appearance.

Noel J. Francisco argued the cause for the garnishee-

appellee Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and

Numbers. Tara Lynn R. Zurawski and Ryan J. Watson were

with him on brief.

Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney

General, United States Department of Justice, Beth S.

Brinkmann, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Douglas

N. Letter, Mark R. Freeman and Sonia K. McNeil, Attorneys,

were on brief the for amicus curiae United States.

Before: GARLAND, ∗ Chief Judge, HENDERSON, Circuit

Judge, and RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: The

plaintiffs—victims of terrorist attacks and their family

members—hold substantial unsatisfied money judgments

against defendants Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran),

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and

Syrian Arab Republic (Syria) arising out of claims brought

pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).

To satisfy the judgments, the plaintiffs sought to attach

Internet data managed by the Internet Corporation for

Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and, accordingly,

served writs of attachment on ICANN. On ICANN’s motion,

the district court quashed the writs, finding the data

∗

Chief Judge Garland was a member of the panel at the time

the case was argued but did not participate in this opinion.

3

unattachable under District of Columbia (D.C.) law. We

affirm the district court but on alternative grounds.

I. Background

A. TECHNICAL

This case requires substantial explanation of the sought-

after data. 1 The plaintiffs initiated these proceedings by

serving multiple writs of attachment on ICANN seeking the

country-code top level domain names (ccTLD) and Internet

Protocol (IP) addresses of Iran, Syria and North Korea,

respectively. Neither the ccTLD nor the IP address lends

itself to easy description.

Both data are parts of the Internet, the “network of

networks,” Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp.

824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996), which is “comprised of numerous

interconnected communications and computer networks

connecting a wide range of end-users to each other.”

Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 409 (2d Cir.

1

In district court, the parties apparently agreed that the motion

to quash should be decided under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). See Pls.’ Mot. for Six Month Discovery at 18 (describing

ICANN’s motion and its timing as “akin to a defendant filing a

Federal Rule 56 summary judgment motion at the very outset of a

case”); ICANN’s Opp. to Pls’. Mot. for Six Month Discovery at 13

n.3 (responding that “Motion to Quash is functionally identical to a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss”). We resolve all factual disputes

accordingly, “accepting as true all of the factual allegations

contained in the [plaintiffs’ submissions] and drawing all inferences

in favor of” the plaintiffs. Autor v. Pritzker, 740 F.3d 176, 179

(D.C. Cir. 2014) (alterations omitted).

4

2004). 2 The IP address is the appropriate starting point.

Every device connected to the Internet and every web page on

the Internet is identified by an IP address. The IP address

appears as a string of numbers separated by periods, for

example, “100.200.123.234.” It identifies the location, “i.e., a

particular computer-to-network connection” of an end-user’s

computer and also “serves as the routing address

for . . . requests to view a web page.” Id. The IP address is

critical to the Internet’s functioning in the same way a

telephone number is essential to the functioning of the

telecommunications system. One may dial a set of numbers

to connect to other individuals through the

telecommunications system and the same is true vis-à-vis an

IP address and the Internet. Granted, an ordinary Internet

end-user does not operate this way. For example, Google has

the IP address “173.194.65.113” but few would maintain that

entering that address in an Internet browser is the most

practical way to access the Google web page. Instead, most

end-users simply type “google.com” to access the Google

web page.

Because the numeric IP address is difficult to remember,

the domain name system (DNS) was created to provide a

more user-friendly Internet. At bottom, a “domain name” is

the alphanumeric “Web page address[] that end users type

into their browsers” and the DNS matches that name (i.e.,

“google.com”) “with the [IP] addresses of the servers

containing the Web pages the users wish to access.” Nat’l

Cable & Telecommn’s Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545

U.S. 967, 987 (2005). Thus, much of the DNS’s value lies in

its ability to enable an end-user, with a domain name in hand,

2

We hereinafter use “end-user” to refer to an individual

seeking to access a web page on the Internet through an Internet

browser.

5

to access a desired IP address and, more importantly, its

corresponding web page without in fact using the IP address.

But unlike an IP address, “a domain name does not signal

where a computer [or web page] is . . . located. . . . [A]

domain name is not an address as typically understood but

instead is a mark identifying a specific person’s or

organization’s site on the Internet.” Thomas v. Network

Solutions, Inc., 176 F.3d 500, 503 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1999). In

order to reach the “site,” the user’s domain name input must

be “translate[d] . . . into [a] numerical IP address,” Register,

356 F.3d at 410–11 & n.14, i.e., the domain name must be

“resolved,” Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202

F.3d 573, 577 (2d Cir. 2000).

Understanding the “resolving” process begins with

breaking down an Internet web page name—i.e. a domain

name (“google.com”)—into two parts. The first part appears

after the last dot—the “top level domain” (TLD). As relevant

here, there are two types of TLDs: generic TLDs and country

code TLDs (ccTLDs). The former include “.com,” “.net” and

“.org” whereas the latter are distinguished by a national,

geographic or political association—for example, “.us” for the

United States and, here, “.ir” for Iran, “.sy” for Syria and

“.kp” for North Korea. 3 The second part precedes the last

dot—the second level domain (SLD); i.e., “google” in the

“google.com” example.

Broadly speaking, an Internet end-user searching for (the

technical term is “querying”) a domain name like

3

The plaintiffs also sought to attach the defendants’

internationalized TLDs—TLDs that appear in a country’s language-

specific font—i.e., “.‫ ”ناريا‬for Iran. For simplicity, and because

the parties do not treat them differently, we use the term “ccTLDs”

to refer to both the conventional and the internationalized ccTLDs.

6

“google.com” reaches the web page in one of two ways

depending on whether he already has visited that web page.

In either case, his device ordinarily first sends the query to a

nearby DNS “caching server” operated by the end-user’s

Internet service provider (ISP). 4 See Daniel Karrenberg, The

Internet Domain Name System Explained for Non-Experts, in

INTERNET GOVERNANCE: A GRAND COLLABORATION 23 (U.N.

ICT Task Force 2004). The caching server knows the

location of the web page if it has “cached” it, i.e.,

“remembered it . . . from a previous transaction.” Id. at 24.

In that case the query does not go beyond the caching server

because it directs the end-user to the desired location. Id.

Thus, once an end-user has visited “google.com,” his caching

server remembers the web page location for subsequent visits.

And if the end-user has never visited the requested SLD—i.e.,

never visited “google.com”—but has visited another “.com”

web page (e.g., “amazon.com”), the caching server recognizes

the location of the TLD (“.com”), asks it for the location of

the SLD (“google.com”) and then routes the end-user

accordingly. Id. at 26–27.

An end-user can also locate a web page if he has not yet

visited the web page or even its TLD. This way involves a

caching server that is empty—it does not know the location of

“.com,” and even less “google.com,” because it has not yet

cached them. But the caching server knows at least one thing:

Pursuant to widely adopted pre-programmed DNS protocols,

the server knows to query “a special set of authoritative

4

As its name suggests, an ISP is “an entity that provides

access to the Internet.” Register, 356 F.3d at 410 n.13. Every

individual “Web [page], company, university, and government

agency that utilizes Internet access . . . subscribes to an ISP or is

one.” Id. at 410 n.13. Commonly-used ISPs include Comcast and

Verizon.

7

servers” otherwise known as “the DNS root servers,” id. at

27—of which there are thirteen world-wide; namely, one

“master root zone server,” which contains “the authoritative

root zone file,” 5 and “12 duplicate root zone servers,”

Name.Space, 202 F.3d at 577. In short, the caching server

knows to go to the top of the DNS’s “hierarchical tree

structure.” Id. These thirteen servers—the top of the tree—

know the location of all authoritative TLD servers and thus

the caching server can locate “.com,” “.ir” or any other TLD

by querying the DNS root servers. Once one of the root

servers tells the caching server the “.com” location, the

caching server can query that TLD for all SLDs within it and

does not have to revisit the root servers for subsequent web

page searches within the “.com” TLD. 6 Thus the root servers

form “a critical Internet chokepoint.” A. Michael Froomkin,

Wrong Turn in Cyberspace, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 50 (2000). To

use the entire DNS, a caching server need know nothing more

than the location of the DNS’s thirteen root servers; the root

servers, tied to the root zone file, permit any end-user to

access all downstream domains.

As relevant here, the DNS’s “hierarchical tree structure,”

Name.Space, 202 F.3d at 577, contains three levels—the

thirteen root zone servers at the top, TLDs one level below

and SLDs one level further below. Each level of the tree

“registers” entities one level below. See Harold Feld,

5

The root zone file is a file that “contains information on the

TLDs within the [DNS] and the location of . . . those TLDs.” Stern,

73 F. Supp. 3d 46, 49 (D.D.C. 2014). According to the DNS, the

thirteen root servers are “authoritative” because they reflect the

information contained in the root zone file.

6

Nevertheless, in reality, a caching server regularly discards

its cached information and revisits the root servers to ensure it has

current information.

8

Structured to Fail: ICANN and the ‘Privatization’

Experiment, in WHO RULES THE NET?: INTERNET

GOVERNANCE AND JURISDICTION 337–38 (Cato Inst. 2003).

Thus, a TLD must be registered in the root servers’ root zone

file in order to be accessible to an end-user. The relationship

between SLDs and TLDs is similar. An SLD registers within

a TLD; thus, one can access Google only by searching for it

in a TLD that it is registered within, i.e., the “.com” TLD.

And, just as a particular TLD ensures that no duplicate

domain name is registered within (i.e., the “.com” registry

allows only one “google.com”), the root zone file ensures that

there is only one of each TLD (i.e., only one “.com”). When

searched, that is the TLD to which the DNS root server directs

an end-user. Because “the vast majority of Internet users,”

via their ISP, query the root servers when searching for a

particular TLD, “[t]he root [zone file] determines which

TLDs are visible” to most Internet end-users world-wide.

Wrong Turn in Cyberspace, 50 DUKE L.J. at 46. Because an

end-user cannot use the DNS to locate a particular web page

without first accessing its TLD—i.e., an end-user cannot

locate “google.com” without first locating “.com”—the root

zone file effectively enables an end-user to access most

existing Internet web pages. Any TLD not “listed in the

root . . . become[s] effectively invisible,” id. at 47, keeping

both that TLD and its registered SLDs beyond the reach of a

typical end-user.

With the DNS background established, we turn to

ICANN. From shortly after its inception in 1983 until 1998,

the root zone file and the DNS were administered by “private

hands” under “loose federal supervision.” Harold Feld,

Structured to Fail: ICANN and the ‘Privatization’

Experiment, in WHO RULES THE NET?: INTERNET

GOVERNANCE AND JURISDICTION 335 (Cato Inst. 2003). In

1998 the United States government transferred much of its

9

oversight role to ICANN, a California non-profit corporation.

ICANN’s mission is to “protect the stability, integrity,

interoperability and utility of the DNS on behalf of the global

Internet community,” Decl. of John O. Jeffrey, App’x 24.2

¶ 5, and, pursuant to a contract with the United States

Department of Commerce (Commerce Department), the

organization now performs several functions essential to the

functioning of the Internet.

Each TLD requires management. ICANN’s first

responsibility relevant to this case is its selection and approval

of qualified entities to operate each of the Internet’s TLDs—

“registry operators” in ICANN parlance. Regarding the

ccTLDs, ICANN uses a comprehensive procedure for those

seeking delegation or re-delegation of registry responsibilities

(i.e., ccTLD management). Among other things, a proposed

ccTLD manager must (1) possess administrative and technical

competency, (2) ordinarily be located in the applicable

country or territory, (3) obtain consent from affected parties,

(4) manifest its commitment to serve the local Internet

community’s interest and (5) demonstrate that the appropriate

local government does not object to the delegation or re-

delegation. 7

Obtaining ICANN approval for ccTLD management,

however, does not automatically effect a registry change. The

delegation or re-delegation is effective only if recorded in the

root zone file. But ICANN cannot make changes to the root

7

Pursuant to ICANN publications, it is “expected that relevant

local governments are consulted” but it is “not a requirement that

they consent.” See Common Questions on Delegating and

Redelegating Country-Code Top-Level Domains (ccTLDs),

IANA.ORG, https://www.iana.org/help/cctld-delegation-answers

(last visited July 7, 2016).

10

zone file. Rather, Verisign, another American company,

performs the recording function under contract with the

Commerce Department. The Commerce Department

approves all ICANN ccTLD management delegations and re-

delegations and instructs Verisign to implement the

corresponding root zone file change. Thus, ICANN screens

and recommends, the Commerce Department authorizes and

Verisign implements all changes to ccTLD management. 8

ICANN’s second relevant function is the distribution of

IP addresses. First, ICANN generates and distributes IP

addresses to regional Internet registries (RIRs). There are five

RIRS world-wide, each responsible for its own multi-country

geographic zone. The RIRs then distribute the IP addresses

further downstream; ultimately to end-users and web page

operators. Once a website operator obtains an IP address, its

web page becomes Internet-accessible. In the usual course,

the operator then acquires and links a domain name to the

web page in order to use the DNS.

B. PROCEDURAL

The plaintiffs, victims of terrorist attacks as well as

surviving family members of those killed in the attacks, have

obtained judgments amounting to hundreds of millions of

dollars against the defendant governments for their respective

roles in those attacks. See Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of

Iran, 184 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2002) ($ 183,248,164 in

compensatory and punitive damages); Haim v. Islamic

8

But see Br. for United States as Amicus Curiae at 6

(describing government role as “largely symbolic” in that it is

“limited to ensuring that ICANN has followed appropriate

processes and avoided technical errors”); see also id. (“The policy

of the United States is that the Internet’s [DNS] should be free from

the control of any government, including our own.”).

11

Republic of Iran, 425 F. Supp. 2d 56 (D.D.C. 2006) (Haim I)

($ 16,000,000 in compensatory damages); Haim v. Islamic

Republic of Iran, 784 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2011) (Haim II)

($ 300,000,000 in punitive damages); Campuzano v. Islamic

Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258 (D.D.C. 2003)

($ 259,000,000 in compensatory and punitive damages to

Rubin plaintiffs); Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 908 F. Supp.

2d 216 (D.D.C. 2012) ($ 338,000,000 in compensatory and

punitive damages); Stern v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 271 F.

Supp. 2d 286 (D.D.C. 2003) ($ 313,000,000 in compensatory

and punitive damages); Calderon-Cardona v. Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea, 723 F. Supp. 2d 441 (D.P.R.

2010) ($ 378,000,000 in compensatory and punitive

damages). For example, in Weinstein the plaintiffs,

proceeding under the FSIA’s “state sponsor of terrorism”

exception to immunity from suit, see 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), 9

alleged that Iran sponsored the organization—HAMAS—

which detonated a bomb that killed the plaintiffs’ kin. A

default judgment was awarded pursuant to the state-sponsored

terrorism exception and 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (“No judgment by

default shall be entered . . . unless the claimant establishes his

claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the

court.”). This suit is the latest—although not the only10—

attempt to recover on the various judgments.

On June 24, 2014 the plaintiffs served writs of

attachment on ICANN seeking the defendants’ ccTLDs and

9

This provision has been updated and re-codified at 28 U.S.C.

§ 1605A, see infra nn.21, 22.

10

See, e.g., Calderon-Cardona v. Bank of New York Mellon,

770 F.3d 993 (2d Cir. 2014) (failed attempt to attach North Korean

electronic funds transfers in American banks); Rubin v. Islamic

Republic of Iran, 709 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2013) (failed attempt to

attach alleged Iranian antiquities in American museums).

12

“supporting IP addresses” and subpoenas duces tecum seeking

information regarding those data. Decl. of Eric P. Enson,

Supp. App’x 45–46. ICANN then moved to quash the writs,

arguing that (1) the data are not “property” subject to

attachment; (2) the defendants do not own the data; (3) the

data are not located within D.C. or even the United States; (4)

ICANN lacks unilateral authority to transfer/re-delegate the

data and (5) the court lacked jurisdiction to issue the writs. 11

After two months of discovery, the plaintiffs sought a six-

month extension arguing that ICANN had produced limited

information and that further discovery was needed regarding,

as relevant here, ICANN’s contention that ccTLDs and IP

addresses are not “property.” In support thereof, the plaintiffs

submitted the declaration of one of their counsel who

memorialized a discussion he had conducted with an expert

on Internet infrastructure and DNS operators. According to

the declarant, ICANN “ha[s] a monopoly or complete control

over the ‘root zone’ such that ICANN is wholly and solely

responsible for the mapping of [ccTLDs] to their respective

registries/name servers.” Decl. of Steven T. Gebelin at 3,

App’x 51 (Gebelin Decl.). Also according to the declarant,

the alleged expert explained that ICANN had in the past

“changed and redirected who runs certain ccTLDs . . . in

11

ICANN initially argued that the writs themselves were

invalid because they were not court-issued. See ICANN’s

Objections and Verified Answers to Writ of Attachment

Interrogatories at 3, Dkt. No. 88 (“ICANN objects to the Writ of

Attachment and each and every Interrogatory on the grounds, and

in that, they were not properly executed by the Court, as is required

by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.”). See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1610(c) (“no attachment or execution . . . shall be permitted until

the court has ordered such attachment and execution after having

determined that a reasonable period of time has elapsed following

the entry of judgment”). The district court did not address the

argument and ICANN has not pursued it on appeal.

13

conjunction with the ‘monetization’ of the ccTLDs by their

respective governments, including instances where the

governments transferred control away from academic

communities to government approved third parties that

acquired contractual property rights to exploit the ccTLD and

generate revenue.” Id. In short, the alleged expert opined that

ccTLDs are property that a sovereign can own and monetize

and that ICANN has unbridled authority to redelegate them.

The district court granted ICANN’s motion to quash on

November 10, 2014. Applying local law pursuant to FED. R.

CIV. P. 69(a)(1) (“[P]rocedure on execution—and in

proceedings supplementary to and in aid of judgment or

execution—must accord with the procedure of the state where

the court is located, but a federal statute governs to the extent

it applies.”), the court held that ccTLDs are not “goods,

chattels [or] credits” within the meaning of D.C. Code § 16-

544, 12 Stern, 73 F. Supp. 3d at 50–51; accordingly, the court

concluded that “there [we]re no factual disputes that require

further consideration” and denied as moot the plaintiffs’

motion for extended discovery. Id. at 51 n.3. On appeal the

plaintiffs challenge the district court’s interpretation of D.C.

law and suggest certification to the D.C. Court of Appeals

pursuant to D.C. Code § 11–723(a) (“The District of

Columbia Court of Appeals may answer questions of law

certified to it by . . . a Court of Appeals of the United

States.”). They also claim that the district court abused its

discretion in denying further discovery. Our jurisdiction is

based on 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

12

D.C. Code § 16–544 provides that “[a]n attachment may be

levied upon the judgment debtor’s goods, chattels, and credits.”

14

II. Analysis

A. ATTACHMENT IMMUNITY UNDER FSIA § 1609

The FSIA provides “a comprehensive set of legal

standards governing claims of immunity in every civil action

against a foreign state,” Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of

Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983), as well as the “sole basis

for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our courts,”

Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488

U.S. 428, 434 (1989). The statute establishes “two kinds of

immunity” for a foreign sovereign. Republic of Argentina v.

NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2256 (2014). First, as a

matter of “subject matter jurisdiction,” Verlinden, 461 U.S. at

489, the FSIA establishes immunity from suit in “the courts of

the United States and of the States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1604. The

seven judgments obtained were awarded pursuant to the state-

sponsored terrorism exception to the defendant sovereigns’

immunity from suit, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. See supra at 10–

11. 13 Second, it establishes immunity from “attachment[,]

13

The judgments in Haim I, Weinstein and Stern were entered

under the former state-sponsored terrorism exception, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1605(a)(7), but those plaintiffs did not convert their judgments to

the exception’s current version, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. The plaintiffs

concede this point and do not argue for its application to their

respective judgments. See Appellants’ Reply Br. at 23–24

(asserting only Haim II, Rubin, Wyatt and Calderon-Cardona

judgments were entered or converted under section 1605A); see

also Appellee’s Br. at 50 (Haim I, Weinstein and Stern “were

neither entered nor converted to a judgment under § 1605A.”). A

judgment entered under former 1605(a)(7) does not—without

conversion—trigger section 1610(g). See infra at 21–24.

15

arrest and execution,” 28 U.S.C. § 1609. 14

ICANN contends that, because the plaintiffs did not

adequately establish an exception to attachment immunity

under the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609–1611, the district court

lacked subject matter jurisdiction to “execute against” the

defendant sovereigns’ property. Appellee’s Br. at 39–40.

ICANN is mistaken, however, about the jurisdictional nature

of attachment immunity. Although the Supreme Court has

never expressly addressed whether attachment immunity is

jurisdictional, it has in dicta suggested otherwise. See Akins

v. FEC, 66 F.3d 348, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“Supreme Court[]

dicta . . . not bind[ing]” but “reliance on dicta may

nonetheless be reasonable”); see also ACLU of Ky. v.

McCreary Cnty., Ky., 607 F.3d 439, 447 (6th Cir. 2010)

(inferior court generally “obligated to follow Supreme Court

dicta” absent “substantial reason for disregarding it”). In

NML Capital, the Court referred to the first “kind of

immunity” as “jurisdictional immunity” and the latter as both

the “immunity defense” and “execution immunity.” 134 S.

Ct. at 2256. We are without “substantial reason for

disregarding” this distinction, see ACLU of Ky., 607 F.3d at

447, and the majority of our sister circuits that have

considered the issue are in accord, see Peterson v. Islamic

Republic of Iran, 627 F.3d 1117, 1125 (9th Cir. 2010)

(“[S]overeign immunity from execution does not defeat a

court’s jurisdiction”); Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 637

F.3d 783, 800 (7th Cir. 2011) (same). 15 We follow suit and

14

28 U.S.C. § 1609 provides in relevant part that “the property

in the United States of a foreign state shall be immune from

attachment arrest and execution except as provided in sections 1610

and 1611 . . . .”

15

One circuit has reached a contrary result, see FG

Hemisphere Assocs. v. Republique du Congo, 455 F.3d 575, 590–

16

reject ICANN’s challenge to the district court’s subject matter

jurisdiction.

B. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 69(a) AND D.C.

CODE § 16–544

Applying the reasoning of the Virginia Supreme Court in

Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int’l, Inc., 259 Va. 759

(2000), the district court observed;

[t]he ccTLDs exist only as they are made

operational by the ccTLD managers that

administer the registries of second level

domain names within them and by the parties

that cause the ccTLDs to be listed on the root

zone file. A ccTLD, like a domain name,

91 (5th Cir. 2006), but did so relying, in our view, on inapposite

precedent. The FG Hemisphere court cited a trio of Supreme Court

FSIA cases to inform its analysis of section 1609 but they

addressed only the Act’s immunity from suit provision, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1604. Granted the Fifth Circuit also cited Schooner Exchange v.

McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812), for the proposition that “American

courts ha[ve] no jurisdiction over” a foreign sovereign’s property,

FG Hemisphere, 455 F.3d at 590 (emphasis added). In Schooner

Exchange the Court held that certain property of France was

“exempt from the jurisdiction of” our courts, Schooner Exch., 11

U.S. at 147, and the case is “generally viewed as the source of our

foreign sovereign immunity jurisprudence,” Republic of Austria v.

Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 688 (2004). It is inapposite here, however,

because it involved an attempt to exercise in rem jurisdiction

despite the plaintiff’s not having obtained a valid judgment against

France. Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. at 117. FSIA sections 1609–

1611—those governing attachment—operate only after the award

of a valid judgment. See H.R. Rep. 94-1487 at 26 (1976), reprinted

in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6625 (“[S]ection 1609 has the effect of

precluding attachment as a means for commencing a lawsuit.”).

17

cannot be conceptualized apart from the

services provided by these parties. The Court

cannot order plaintiffs’ insertion into this

arrangement.

Stern, 73 F. Supp. 3d at 50 (internal quotations omitted). It

then relied on the D.C. Court of Appeals’ holding in

Cummings General Tire Co v. Volpe Construction Co., 230

A.2d 712, D.C. 1967), to conclude that the ccTLDs “may not

be attached in satisfaction of the plaintiffs’ judgments because

they are not properly subject to attachment under District of

Columbia law.” Stern, 73 F. Supp. 3d at 51. 16 Accordingly,

the district court quashed the writs of attachment under local

law, interpreting FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a) to require its

application. See Stern, 73 F. Supp. 3d at 49–50. 17

Similarly, ICANN uses the Rule 69(a) portal to argue,

inter alia, that ccTLDs are not “goods, chattels, [or] credits”

within the meaning of D.C. Code § 16–544 (permitting

attachment “upon the judgment debtor’s goods, chattels, and

credits”) and that local law prohibits attachment both because

the data are “inextricably bound up with the provision of

services” and because ICANN “cannot transfer them

unilaterally or even at Defendants’ behest.” Appellee’s Br. at

14–32. We assume without deciding that local law applies to

the determination of the “attachability” of the defendant

sovereigns’ ccTLDs. 18 In addition, we assume without so

16

As explained infra at 26–27, the district court did not

address the IP addresses.

17

The district court denied the plaintiffs’ discovery motion as

moot. See id. at 51 n.3. We affirm for the same reason.

18

Although we assume the applicability of D.C. Code § 16–

544, we nonetheless have reservations about its applicability.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a)(1) (“The procedure on

18

execution—and in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of

judgment or execution—must accord with the procedure of the state

where the court is located, but a federal statute governs to the extent

it applies.”) contains significant limiting language. It incorporates

only local procedure. There are precious few federal rules of

procedure for execution of judgments; the draftsmen evidently

“decided . . . to borrow the format employed in the courts of the

forum state,” Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ruggiero, 994 F.2d 1221,

1226 (7th Cir. 1993), at least in part to enable a plaintiff to execute

on a federal judgment, see, e.g., United States v. Harkins Builders,

Inc., 45 F.3d 830, 833 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Even though we look to

state law to determine the . . . procedure to be followed . . . we do

so in furtherance of federal law, giving effect to rules entitling

parties to enforce federal judgments in federal courts.”); cf.

Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 359 (1996) (“[T]he Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure provide fast and effective mechanisms for

execution” in order “[t]o protect and aid the collection of a federal

judgment.” (emphases added)).

In our view, application of Rule 69(a)(1) requires a

preliminary determination, i.e., whether D.C. Code § 16–544 is in

fact procedural. The answer may depend on an inquiry materially

identical to the Supreme Court’s so-called reverse-Erie precedent

holding that the “general and unassailable proposition” that local

“rules of procedure govern[] litigation” can be overcome if their

application is “outcome-determinative.” Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S.

131, 138, 141 (1988). The “reverse-Erie” title is plainly a nod to

the inquiry undertaken when a federal court hearing a state law

claim must decide whether an issue is “substantive”—and thus

determined by state law—or “procedural” and thus subject to the

federal rules. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965); see

also Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 428

(1996) (applying Erie’s “outcome-determinati[ve] test” with

reference to “the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of

forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the

laws” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here the proceedings

involve a federal, not state, claim. This difference has little

significance given Rule 69’s broad directive to apply the procedure

19

holding that local law does not operate to bar attachment of

the defendant sovereigns’ ccTLDs. 19

“of the state where the court is located.” FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a)(1).

But if, per reverse-Erie, a procedure is inapplicable in state court, it

would not “accord with the procedure of the state” for the federal

court to use that procedure. Id.

Granted, in dated cases regarding the scope of “Revised

Statutes § 916” (RS 916)—a Rule 69 predecessor, see United States

v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 355 (1966), the Supreme Court in effect

held that the Congress “adopted” all state laws bearing on

execution, Fink v. Oneil, 106 U.S. 272, 277 (1882). But RS 916

and Rule 69 contain materially different language, making Fink

inapposite. In addition, modern cases confirm that the Fink Court’s

wholesale adoption of state execution law is, like RS 916, a relic.

In Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825

(1988), faced with the assertion that a Georgia “state procedural

device for collecting judgments”—garnishment—was in fact

“substantive,” the Court examined its features before confirming its

procedural nature and resulting applicability via Rule 69. Id. at 834

n.10 (“under Georgia law, postjudgment garnishment is nothing

more than a method to collect judgments otherwise obtained”

(second emphasis in original)).

19

Assuming, again without deciding, that Rule 69(a)(1) can

be interpreted to incorporate a local law attachment bar, execution

on a FSIA judgment requires caution for another reason. “[A]ctions

against foreign sovereigns in our courts raise sensitive issues

concerning the foreign relations of the United States.” Verlinden,

461 U.S. at 493. Moreover, the conduct of our nation’s foreign

affairs, if not “vested in the national government exclusively,”

United States v Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942), nonetheless

restricts “[a]ny concurrent state power . . . to the narrowest of

limits,” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68 (1941). If a state

court’s application of a bar on property alienation vis-à-vis a

foreign sovereign represents an unconstitutional “intrusion by the

State into the field of foreign affairs,” Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S.

20

C. FSIA’S EXEMPTIONS TO EXECUTION IMMUNITY

Although attachment immunity is not “jurisdictional,” it

is nonetheless a “default presumption” that the judgment

429, 430, 432 (1968) (concluding Oregon law providing property

of deceased resident escheats if government of nonresident alien

heirs prohibited inheritance without interference unconstitutionally

intruded on foreign affairs), it can be argued that a federal court’s

similar application via Rule 69(a) would not “accord with the

procedure of the state,” FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a), at least, not with a

procedure that is—in this arena—constitutional.

The Supreme Court has consistently set aside state laws that

materially impede the national government’s conduct of foreign

affairs, including disposition of foreign assets. In United States v.

Belmont, the federal government sought to recover property in

federal district court from a banker with whom a Russian

corporation had deposited funds before the U.S.S.R.’s

nationalization of all “property and assets of every kind and

wherever situated, including the deposit account” in dispute. 301

U.S. 324, 326 (1937). The United States rested its claim on an

“international compact” with the Soviet government wherein the

latter “released and assigned to [the United States] . . . the deposit

account.” Id. at 326, 327. The district court held that, because the

“bank deposit was within the state of New York . . . in no sense

could it be regarded as an intangible property right within the

Soviet territory” and thus a “judgment for the United

States . . . would be contrary to the controlling public policy of the

state of New York.” Id. at 327. The Supreme Court did not “pause

to inquire whether in fact there was any policy of the state of New

York to be infringed” because, in foreign affairs, “state lines

disappear. . . . [and] the state of New York does not exist.” Id. at

327, 331 (emphasis added). Calling it “inconceivable” for any

“[s]tate Constitutions, state laws, and state policies” to “be

interposed as an obstacle to the effective operation of” the federal

power, the Court reversed. Id. at 332; see also Pink, 315 U.S. at

231–33.

21

creditor must defeat at the outset. See Rubin, 637 F.3d at 800;

see also Peterson, 627 F.3d at 1125 (execution immunity

begins with “presumption that a foreign state is immune and

then the plaintiff must prove that an exception to immunity

applies”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1609 (defendant sovereign’s

property “shall be immune . . . except as provided in sections

1610 and 1611” (emphases added)). In particular, the

plaintiffs now 20 rely on one or more of three exceptions. The

first is the terrorist activity exception, which provides in

relevant part that

[T]he property of a foreign state against which

a judgment is entered under section 1605A, 21

and the property of an agency or

instrumentality of such a state, including

property that is a separate juridical entity or is

an interest held directly or indirectly in a

separate juridical entity, is subject to

attachment in aid of execution, and execution,

upon that judgment as provided in this section,

regardless of—

20

ICANN contends that the plaintiffs forfeited or waived

reliance on any exception to attachment immunity by failing either

to raise the issue adequately in district court or to brief it on appeal.

See infra at 25–26.

21

Section 1605A is the state-sponsored terrorism exception to

a foreign sovereign’s general jurisdictional immunity. It abrogates

suit immunity if “money damages are sought against a foreign state

for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture,

extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the

provision of material support or resources for such act.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1605A(a)(1). Courts “shall” hear claims brought under this

section if “the foreign state was designated as a state sponsor of

terrorism at the time the [aforementioned terrorist act] occurred, or

was so designated as a result of such act.” Id. § 1605A(a)(2)(A).

22

(A) the level of economic control over the

property by the government of the foreign

state;

(B) whether the profits of the property go to

that government;

(C) the degree to which officials of that

government manage the property or otherwise

control its daily affairs;

(D) whether that government is the sole

beneficiary in interest of the property; or

(E) whether establishing the property as a

separate entity would entitle the foreign state

to benefits in United States courts while

avoiding its obligations.

28 U.S.C. § 1610(g). The second is the commercial activity

exception, which provides in relevant part that

The property in the United States of a foreign

state . . . used for a commercial activity in the

United States, shall not be immune from

attachment in aid of execution, or from

execution, upon a judgment entered by a court

of the United States or of a State . . . if the

judgment relates to a claim for which the

foreign state is not immune under section

1605A or section 1605(a)(7) (as such section

was in effect on January 27, 2008), 22

regardless of whether the property is or was

22

Section 1605(a)(7), as it read on January 27, 2008, is

materially identical to current section 1605A.

23

involved with the act upon which the claim is

based.

28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(7). And the third exception the plaintiffs

press to us is section § 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance

Act (TRIA), which provides in relevant part that

[I]n every case in which a person has obtained

a judgment against a terrorist party on a claim

based upon an act of terrorism, or for which a

terrorist party is not immune under section

1605A of [the FSIA] . . . , the blocked assets of

that terrorist party . . . shall be subject to

execution or attachment in aid of execution in

order to satisfy such judgment to the extent of

any compensatory damages for which such

terrorist party has been adjudged liable.

28 U.S.C. § 1610 note.

To preserve an argument on appeal a party must raise it

both in district court and before us. Odhiambo v. Republic of

Kenya, 764 F.3d 31, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[Plaintiff] does not

renew [his FSIA exception] argument on appeal, so we do not

consider it.”). The party must brief the issue with specificity.

See Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. U.S. R.R. Retirement

Bd., 749 F.2d 856, 859 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

Regarding the terrorist activity exception, the plaintiffs

made minimal reference thereto both in district court and in

their opening appellate brief. In its motion opposing extended

discovery, ICANN argued that “the FSIA divests this Court of

subject matter jurisdiction,” ICANN’s Opp. to Pls.’ Mot. for

Six-Month Discovery at 8, to which the plaintiffs responded,

inter alia, that “Section 1610(g) [removes immunity from]

property of a foreign state against which judgment is entered

24

under 1605A,” and that “ICANN completely ignores Section

1610(g).” Reply in Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. for Discovery 19 &

n.13. On appeal the plaintiffs noted that we have “federal

question jurisdiction” under “28 U.S.C. § 1610” and included

as an addendum the text of section 1610(g). Appellants’ Br.

at 1, a3.

Ordinarily we might find these “fleeting statement[s]”

insufficiently developed to preserve the argument, see Am.

Wildlands v. Kempthorne, 530 F.3d 991, 1001 (D.C. Cir.

2008), but the terrorist activity exception is, simply put,

different. Once a section 1605A judgment is obtained,

section 1610(g) strips execution immunity from all property

of a defendant sovereign. There is no genuine dispute that

four of the plaintiffs’ judgments were entered or converted

under 1605A. 23 Granted, the plaintiffs must show that the

assets in question are “property of” the foreign sovereign, 28

U.S.C. § 1610(g), whether Iran, North Korea or Syria. In our

view, there is no additional “argument” that must be

preserved. See Odhiambo, 764 F.3d at 35. To the extent the

plaintiffs must establish that the data at issue are “property”

that each defendant has at least some ownership interest in,

those matters were the subject of additional discovery

requests (ultimately deemed moot by the district court) and so

it would be premature for us to decide that their attachability

is forfeited on that basis. On appeal the plaintiffs included the

exception in their opening brief addendum and this was

sufficient to put both us and ICANN on notice that they

continued to rely on that exception.

23

See, e.g., Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 563 F. Supp. 2d

38, 39 n.3 (D.D.C. 2008) (giving effect to plaintiff’s judgment “as

if the action had originally been filed under section 1605A(c).”).

Cf. supra n.13. Accord Heiser, 735 F.3d at 937 n.4.

25

Four of the seven underlying judgments, Haim II, 784 F.

Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2011); Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of

Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258 (D.D.C. 2003) (Rubin); Wyatt v.

Syrian Arab Republic, 908 F. Supp. 2d 216 (D.D.C. 2012);

Calderon-Cardona v. Democratic People’s Republic of

Korea, 723 F. Supp. 2d 441 (D.P.R. 2010), were entered

under section 1605A. ICANN, however, argues that “the

plaintiffs presented no explanation or evidence” regarding

these judgments. Appellee Br. at 49 (quotation marks

omitted). We are at a loss to discern what “evidence” the

plaintiffs would be required to show under ICANN’s

approach, particularly given that ICANN does not appear to

dispute that four judgments were entered under section

1605A. Id. at 50 (“[The terrorist activity exception] is clearly

inapplicable to three of the seven underlying judgments at

issue here.”). Therefore, the plaintiffs have not forfeited

reliance on the terrorist activity exception to attachment

immunity regarding the Haim II, Wyatt, Rubin and Calderon-

Cardona judgments.

The two remaining exceptions are easily disposed of. 24

There is no reference to the commercial activity exception in

the plaintiffs’ opening brief notwithstanding ICANN

vigorously contested in district court whether the three

ccTLDs were “used for a commercial activity in the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a); see ICANN’s Mot. to Quash at

18 (“ICANN is aware of no evidence that the [ ] ccTLDs are

used for commercial activity of the defendants in the United

States.”). The plaintiffs rebutted this assertion in district

court, see Reply in Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. for Discovery at 19

(“[T]he Internet Assets at issue are used for commercial

24

The commercial activity exception covers all seven

judgments and the TRIA exception applies only to the judgments

obtained in Weinstein, Haim I and Stern.

26

activity in the United States and the United States is the situs.

For example, a .ir second level domain can be purchased in

the United States for approximately $100.”), but on appeal

they failed even to reference their objection in their opening

brief. See Appellants’ Br. at 1–2 (“[I]ssues presented”

includes only whether the assets are attachable property under

D.C. law, whether the district court erroneously failed to

allow additional discovery and whether we should pursue

certification to the D.C. Court of Appeals). Their failure to

brief the issues in their opening brief amounts to forfeiture.

Odhiambo, 764 F.3d at 35. Their reliance on the TRIA

exception likewise merits no close analysis. Notwithstanding

the section 1605A plaintiffs need only to identify “the

blocked assets” of the defendant sovereigns under this

exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1610 note, they failed to raise the issue

in district court.

Finally, we consider the plaintiffs’ claim to the IP

addresses under all of the three exceptions. The district court

did not reach the IP addresses. The plaintiffs contend that its

silence amounts to an abuse of discretion but the district

court’s failure to discuss the IP addresses is easily explained.

In their self-styled “preliminary response” to ICANN’s

motion to quash and their accompanying motion for extended

discovery, the plaintiffs only twice referenced the IP

addresses—once to claim “ICANN has presented virtually no

facts concerning its role in the distribution of IP addresses or

the ownership and value of IP addresses” and once to claim

that “ICANN’s Motion to Quash does not address the

economic value of IP addresses.” Pls.’ Response to ICANN’s

Mot. to Quash at 7, 9. By contrast, the plaintiffs’ same

submissions (their preliminary response and their discovery

motion) referenced the ccTLDs 78 times, replete with

allegations regarding ownership, monetary value and

ICANN’s administrative role. In light of the plaintiffs’

27

omission of any argument touching on the IP addresses, the

district court did not abuse its discretion in omitting to discuss

them. On appeal, Amicus United States expressly doubted

whether the plaintiffs had “preserved . . . arguments about IP

addresses,” Br. for United States as Amicus Curiae at 19,

which assertion the plaintiffs left unrebutted, see Br. for

Appellants in Response to the United States as Amicus

Curiae. We consider it waived on appeal. See United States

v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (“Whereas forfeiture is

the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is

the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known

right.”) (emphasis added and internal quotations omitted).

To sum up, those plaintiffs seeking to attach the

underlying judgments in Haim I, Weinstein and Stern have

forfeited their claims in toto. Those plaintiffs seeking to

attach the underlying judgments in Haim II, Rubin, Wyatt and

Calderon-Cardona have forfeited all but their claim grounded

in the terrorist activity exception to attachment immunity.

D. PROTECTION OF THIRD PARTY INTERESTS UNDER SECTION

1610(G)(3)

To this point we have assumed arguendo that D.C. law

does not impede the plaintiffs’ pursuit of the defendant

sovereigns’ ccTLDs. Moreover, the Haim II, Rubin, Wyatt

and Calderon-Cardona plaintiffs have not forfeited reliance

on the terrorist activity exception to attachment immunity vis-

à-vis the ccTLDs. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g). Ordinarily,

remand would be in order to allow the plaintiffs to continue

discovery in an effort to establish whether the ccTLDs can

properly be considered “property of” the defendants under the

FSIA. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)(1); Heiser v. Islamic Republic

28

of Iran, 735 F.3d 934 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Many critical issues

remain disputed. 25

We assume without deciding that the ccTLDs the

plaintiffs seek constitute “property” under the FSIA and,

further, that the defendant sovereigns have some attachable

ownership interest in them. Nonetheless, pursuant to the

terrorist activity exception, the court has the “authority” to

“prevent appropriately the impairment of an interest held by a

25

For example, ICANN contends that the defendants do not

own the .ir, .kp and .sy ccTLDs and that ICANN is therefore

powerless to effect an attachment thereof. As discussed supra at.

12–13, the plaintiffs submitted a declaration regarding their

counsel’s discussion with an “internet infrastructure management

and domain name systems operations and development expert”

suggesting that ICANN had in the past “changed and redirected

who runs certain ccTLDs . . . in conjunction with the ‘monetization’

of the ccTLDs by their respective governments, including instances

where the governments transferred control away from academic

communities to government approved third parties that acquired

contractual property rights to exploit the ccTLD and generate

revenue.” Gebelin Decl. at 2–3. There is also record evidence

regarding the nation of Tuvalu’s monetization of its .TV ccTLD by

sale or lease of its ccTLD management rights to a private company

for millions of dollars. On the other hand, ICANN contends that

ccTLDs are not property at all because they are “not an interest

capable of precise definition, because [they are] always in flux,”

Appellee’s Br. at 12, and that “there is, in fact, no established

market within which ccTLDs are purchased and sold,” id. at 13–14.

They also argue that no one has the requisite control over ccTLDs

in order to establish ownership and that, in any event,

“[a]uthoritative Internet protocol standards declare that concerns

about rights and ownership of domains are inappropriate.” Id. at

12. Finally, the United States as amicus argues that the internet

governance community “explicitly rejects efforts to assert property

rights in [ccTLDs].” Br. for United States as Amicus Curiae at 11.

29

person who is not liable in the action giving rise to a

judgment”—i.e., we are expressly authorized to protect the

interests of ICANN and other entities. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1610(g)(3). 26 Because of the enormous third-party interests

at stake—and because there is no way to execute on the

plaintiffs’ judgments without impairing those interests—we

cannot permit attachment. 27

The plaintiffs demand, in effect, that ICANN delegate

management of the “.ir” ccTLD 28 so that they can “sell or

license the operation of the ccTLD[] to a third party.”

Appellants’ Reply Br. at 26. As explained, the power to

operate a ccTLD includes the power to register (or remove)

domain names from that registry. Thus, an entity seeking a

26

Although the two FSIA exceptions to attachment immunity

the plaintiffs have either forfeited or waived do not include a

similar provision, this case does not turn on forfeiture/waiver. Only

the terrorist activity exception permits attachment “regardless of,”

inter alia, “whether th[e] [defendant] government is the sole

beneficiary in interest of the property,” 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)(1)(D).

And according to the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon of

statutory construction, that the terrorist activity exception expressly

provides for attachment of such property suggests that the other

exceptions require that the defendant sovereign have a more

complete ownership interest. Although we express no view on

whether and to what extent the defendant sovereigns, ICANN or

any other party can “own” the ccTLDs, it seems plain that

satisfying the other exceptions requires a more substantial

ownership interest than does this exception.

27

Moreover, although we do not find it necessary to reach the

issue, the United States may be a necessary party hereto and, if so,

this fact would provide another reason for quashing the writs of

attachment. Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558, 571–72 (1936).

28

We use “.ir” (Iran) as an example to illustrate the interests at

stake.

30

“.ir” domain name will have to register through the plaintiffs

or their designee—a process in which the ccTLD manager can

extract a fee. The plaintiffs’ plan plainly impairs the interests

of “person[s] who [are] not liable in the action giving rise to

[the] judgment” in myriad ways. 18 U.S.C. § 1610(g).

First, requiring ICANN to delegate “.ir” to the plaintiffs

would bypass ICANN’s process for ccTLD delegation, which

includes ensuring that the incoming manager has technical

competence and a commitment to serving the Iranian Internet

community’s interests. The plaintiffs and, more importantly,

their prospective designee may not possess that technical

competence or commitment. Granted, the plaintiffs are

“aware that the . . . court can—and should—protect the

interests of third parties” and they “welcome the opportunity

to work together with the district court and ICANN to ensure

a smooth transition.” Appellants’ Reply Br. at 26. But even

if the plaintiffs are able to show adequate competence and

commitment, the act of forced delegation itself impairs

ICANN’s interest in “protect[ing] the stability . . . [and]

interoperability . . . of the DNS.” Decl. of John O. Jeffrey,

App’x 24.2 ¶ 5.

Recall that a change in the root zone file will only affect

the routing of a search for “.ir.” But a change in the root zone

file does not also transfer the information stored on the

ccTLD server. 29 To ensure that any delegation occurs

29

For example, assume there is now a web page with the

domain name “example.ir,” meaning that the SLD “example” is

registered within the “.ir” ccTLD. An end-user searching for

“example.ir” reaches the web page by first querying the root servers

for “.ir” and then the “.ir” server for the “example.ir” domain. The

“.ir” server directs the end-user to “example.ir” because it knows

the location of “example.ir,” that is, “example.ir” is registered

within it. But, we may also assume, this web page is not currently

31

seamlessly, ICANN requires that the incoming manager

provide a plan to preserve the stability of the ccTLD, which

plan explains how existing registrants will be affected.

According to ICANN, the current ccTLD managers in the

defendant countries will not voluntarily transfer information

regarding their registrants and, because the relevant servers

are located abroad, we are powerless to so require them. If

ICANN is required to direct an end-user looking for “.ir” web

pages to the plaintiffs’ server but the plaintiffs are unable to

direct them to the requested SLD, the Internet’s stability and

interoperability are undermined. 30

The impairment does not end there. As the plaintiffs

recognize, ICANN occupies its position only because “the

global community allows it to play that role.” Appellants’ Br.

at 34 (emphasis added). “[T]he operators of . . . top level

domains” can “form a competitor to ICANN and agree to

refer all DNS traffic to a new root zone directory.” Id.; see

also Br. for United States as Amicus Curiae at 13 (“As a

technological matter, nothing prevents an entity outside the

United States from publishing its own root zone file and

persuading the operators of the Internet’s name servers to

treat that version as authoritative instead.”). This result,

registered within the plaintiffs’ server which, post-delegation,

would “host” the “.ir” ccTLD. Before the SLD is so registered, an

end-user searching for “example.ir” is not able to reach the web

page. Although it would remain accessible through the old “.ir”

server (i.e., Iran’s server), the root servers, as a result of the

delegation, would no longer direct queries there.

30

The plaintiffs do not allege that a particular ccTLD

management has ever been transferred without the cooperation of

the outgoing manager. Cf. Gebelin Decl. at 6, App’x at 54 (alleging

Tuvalu transferred management of its ccTLD to monetize its

interest).

32

known as “splitting the root,” is widely viewed as a

potentially disastrous development; indeed, some regard it as

the beginning of “ultimate collapse of Internet stability”—a

“doomsday scenario for the globally accessible” network and,

thus, for ICANN. Harold Feld, Structured to Fail: ICANN

and the ‘Privatization’ Experiment, in WHO RULES THE NET?:

INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND JURISDICTION 351 (Cato Inst.

2003). Whether that description of a split root is accurate

need not concern us; ICANN’s interests, as a third party “not

liable in the action giving rise to [the] judgment,” 18 U.S.C.

§ 1610(g)(3), are sufficient for us to protect them pursuant to

section 1610(g)(3) of the FSIA. See Appellee’s Br. at 34

(“[F]orced re-delegation of the Subject ccTLDs would . . .

wreak havoc on the domain name system.”); see also Br. for

United States as Amicus Curiae at 13 (“[T]he result would be

devastating for ICANN, for the [current] model of Internet

governance, and for the freedom and stability of the Internet

as a whole.”).

But given that the ICANN-administered DNS is the

beneficiary of substantial network effects, 31 how could such a

doomsday scenario arise? And why would forced delegation

31

“In markets characterized by network effects, one product or

standard tends towards dominance, because the utility that an end-

user derives from consumption of the good increases with the

number of other agents consuming the good.” United States v.

Microsoft Corp, 253 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (internal

quotations omitted). Here, the ICANN-administered DNS and the

authoritative root zone file “tend towards dominance” because

domain name registries “and end-users have powerful economic

incentives to remain compatible and connected with each other.”

Milton J. Mueller, Competing DNS Roots: Creative Destruction or

Just Plain Destruction, 3 J. NETWORK IND. 313, 315 (2002).

33

hasten its arrival? 32 In light of the plaintiffs’ recognition that

ICANN’s control “stems only from the fact that the global

community allows it to play that role,” Appellants’ Br. at 34,

and considering that the delegation of the three defendant

sovereigns’ ccTLDs could likely antagonize the global

community, see Br. for United States as Amicus Curiae at 13

(“It is not difficult to imagine that a court-ordered change to

the authoritative root zone file at the behest of private

plaintiffs would prompt members of the global Internet

community to turn their backs on ICANN for good.”), we

believe the doomsday scenario is not beyond imagining. 33

32

As others have explained, “the deck is stacked so heavily in

favor of an established root” that splitting is likely to occur only if

“the existing root is doing something seriously wrong.” Competing

DNS Roots, supra n.31, at 315.

33

As noted earlier, an end-user ISP ordinarily uses DNS

protocols to ask the root servers for the location of one of the

DNS’s TLDs. But there is no technological barrier binding ISPs to

the DNS. A sovereign has authority over ISPs operating in its

country and can “act[] unilaterally to redirect Internet traffic” for

end-users within its borders “by requiring Internet service

providers . . . to use what amounts to [that] government’s own

DNS.” Harold Feld, Structured to Fail: ICANN and the

‘Privatization’ Experiment, in WHO RULES THE NET?: INTERNET

GOVERNANCE AND JURISDICTION 354 (Cato Inst. 2003). For

example, a foreign government can require that, when receiving a

query for a particular TLD, an ISP operating within its borders not

direct that query to a root server but rather to a different location

altogether. If ICANN delegates management of “.ir” to the

plaintiffs and the plaintiffs control where a query for “.ir” SLDs is

directed, Iran has a powerful incentive to require its ISPs to bypass

the root servers altogether and instead require ISPs to direct queries

to the server that formerly hosted the “.ir” ccTLD. Under that

circumstance, end-users in Iran and other parts of the world might

access different web pages by querying identical domain names.

34

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court is affirmed.

So ordered.

And there is no reason to suppose that “members of the global

Internet community [would not] turn their backs on ICANN for

good.” Br. for United States as Amicus Curiae at 13. For example,

another sovereign whose citizens do business through web pages

registered under the former “.ir” ccTLD might no longer permit

their ISPs to search the root servers for “.ir” SLDs. Whether or not

this possibility is a positive development for the Internet, it

unquestionably impairs ICANN’s interests in “protect[ing] the

stability . . . [and] interoperability . . . of the DNS,” Decl. of John

O. Jeffrey, App’x 24.2 ¶ 5.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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