holding that a reasonable jury could find deliberate indifference by IDOC records official where there was no evidence that she sought legal guidance from "any state officials such as IDOC attorneys, the Circuit Court, or the Office of the Attorney General"
How later courts described this case
- holding that a reasonable jury could find deliberate indifference by IDOC records official where there was no evidence that she sought legal guidance from "any state officials such as IDOC attorneys, the Circuit Court, or the Office of the Attorney General"
- holding that a procedural due process claim for an inmate’s overstay in prison was unavailable because he “cite[d] no authority for the proposition that because he did not obtain immediate relief, his [state-law-afforded] remedy was inadequate”
- explaining that administrators are entitled to relegate to prison staff the primary responsibility for specific prison functions such as calculating release dates
- stating that a warden’s “reasonable response” to a grievance “does not demonstrate a sufficiently culpable state of mind”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 15‐2926
LIVELL FIGGS,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
ALEX DAWSON and LORI FISHEL,
Defendants‐Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois.
No. 3:13‐cv‐03218‐CSB‐EIL— Colin S. Bruce, Judge.
ARGUED MAY 27, 2016 — DECIDED JULY 25, 2016
Before POSNER and FLAUM, Circuit Judges, and ALONSO,
District Judge.*
ALONSO, District Judge. Plaintiff, Livell Figgs, was convicted
of murder and sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment in the
Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”). He served the
*
Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
2 No. 15‐2926
latter part of his sentence at Logan Correctional Center and
was released on June 28, 2012 after having survived summary
judgment in his state‐court mandamus proceeding in which he
alleged that his release date had been miscalculated. Figgs then
brought this § 1983 action against prison officials at Logan,
alleging, among other things, that they had been deliberately
indifferent to the possibility that he was being held unlawfully.
Figgs now appeals from the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the defendants.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On July 21, 1989, Figgs was arrested on a drug offense. He
committed a murder on August 5, 1990 while on bond for the
drug offense. After pleading guilty to the drug offense, Figgs
was sentenced on April 23, 1991 in the Circuit Court of Cook
County to a 4‐year term of incarceration with credit for 201
days he had already served. On March 24, 1992, Figgs was
arraigned in the Circuit Court of Cook County on a charge for
the August 1990 murder. On December 4, 1992, Figgs
completed his prison term on the drug sentence and began his
term of Mandatory Supervised Release (“MSR”). Because he
had been charged with murder, however, he was transferred
that day from IDOC custody directly into Cook County
custody pending trial.
On September 11, 1993, a jury convicted Figgs of
first‐degree murder. He was sentenced on October 25, 1993 to
40 years’ imprisonment with credit for time served in custody
since January 16, 1991, with the sentence to run consecutive to
the sentence on the drug offense. On November 5, 1993, Figgs
returned to IDOC custody.
No. 15‐2926 3
On November 16, 1993, Figgs received a “Violation Report”
from IDOC indicating that on December 4, 1992 (the date his
MSR began on the drug conviction), he had violated the terms
of his MSR by committing the murder for which he was
serving the 40‐year sentence. Figgs signed this report and
acknowledged receiving it. The Illinois Prisoner Review Board
(“PRB”) entered an order on the same date, declaring that
Figgs had violated his MSR as of December 4, 1992 by
committing the murder. The PRB’s order also stated: “Offender
contends that he was incarcerated on the violation date
(12/4/92). He subsequently pleaded guilty to poss of controlled
subst. and was found guilty of murder.” The form order did
not have the box checked indicating that Figgs’s parole or
release was revoked, nor did it indicate the consequences of
the determination that Figgs had violated his MSR. The order
also did not indicate whether a hearing had been conducted or
would be scheduled. The violation report and the PRB’s order
were entered in error; the murder occurred well before Figgs’s
conviction in the drug case, at a time when he was not on MSR.
After the PRB issued its order, IDOC’s chief record officer
sent multiple letters to the Cook County State’s Attorney
requesting that he review the mittimus (the order directing
jailers to carry out the judgment) for Figgs’s murder
conviction. The letters noted that Figgs had completed his
sentence for the drug offense on December 4, 1992 and was
released on a two‐year MSR term, which had not been revoked
at the time he was sentenced on the murder conviction. The
chief record officer explained that she sought clarification
regarding whether the circuit court intended for Figgs’s
40‐year sentence to “run consecutive to any mandatory
4 No. 15‐2926
supervised release violation time the inmate is required to
serve as a consequence of the Prisoner Review Board’s order
revoking mandatory supervised release,” and if so, asked the
State’s Attorney to ensure that a corrected mittimus was
issued. The record does not reveal what prompted the requests
or why the chief record officer sought clarification of Figgs’s
sentence from the State’s Attorney, as opposed to seeking
clarification directly from the court or from the PRB about the
basis for its order.
While the chief record officer awaited a response to her
letters, Figgs requested a transfer to a medium‐security facility
(at the time, he was incarcerated at Menard Correctional
Center). In October 1994, an IDOC official, the assistant deputy
director of adult institutions, responded in a letter stating that
Figgs was ineligible for transfer and that his projected release
date was January 16, 2011.
Two months later, on December 19, 1994, the circuit court
issued a “corrected mittimus” in Figgs’s murder case, which
stated that Figgs’s 40‐year sentence was “to run consecutive to
any sentence imposed after a violation of mandatory
supervised release” in the drug case. It is not clear why the
corrected mittimus was phrased this way, but the document
evidently perpetuated the mistaken belief within IDOC that
Figgs had violated his MSR term on the drug offense.
IDOC sentence calculations are prepared at the facility to
which an inmate is first assigned. When an inmate is
transferred to a different prison, the record office at the new
prison does not usually perform a new calculation but simply
checks the previous calculation for accuracy. If questions arise
No. 15‐2926 5
about an inmate’s sentence, the record office at the facility
where the inmate is housed will review the sentence
calculation, or it may refer the matter to the IDOC chief record
office in Springfield, Illinois, which oversees each institution’s
record office. Each inmate’s master file is kept at the facility at
which the inmate is housed.
In January 1995 and again in May 1996, before Figgs was
transferred to Logan, IDOC employees prepared handwritten
sentence‐calculation worksheets pursuant to the December
1994 “corrected mittimus.” The calculations were prepared on
a form used specifically for inmates who had been declared to
have violated MSR. Figgs’s projected release date, according to
these worksheets, was November 3, 2013. It appears that this
release date was computed by adding to the 40‐year sentence
a 2‐year term resulting from the (assumed) revocation of MSR
in the drug case and then adjusting for time served and
good‐time credit. The same calculation was repeated on
subsequent sentence worksheets prepared in December 2001
and May 2003, although the projected release date changed
due to later adjustments of good‐time credit.
Figgs arrived at Logan in 2005. He says that he became
aware in 2009 that Logan officials had miscalculated his
sentence and projected release date. In the months leading up
to January 2011 and thereafter, Figgs submitted several inmate
request slips to various officials at Logan, including defendants
Lori Fishel, who was the record office supervisor, and Alex
Dawson, who was the warden, complaining about a
miscalculation of his projected release date. Copies of these
slips are not in the record, but it is undisputed that Figgs
submitted them.
6 No. 15‐2926
Fishel looked at Figgs’s existing sentence calculation and
believed that it was correct because in her view, Figgs was on
MSR when he was sentenced for murder, so it appeared that he
had violated MSR. Fishel understood the “corrected mittimus”
as ordering Figgs to serve his 40‐year sentence after the
(nonexistent) two‐year term for violating MSR. Because the
matter seemed complex and Figgs raised “so many questions”
in his complaints to her, she “didn’t do too much with it” and
instead let the IDOC’s chief record office in Springfield handle
it. Fishel referred the matter to Ona Welch, who was then the
assistant chief record officer. Although Fishel sent some of the
pertinent documents to Welch, including an inmate request
slip, the corrected mittimus, the PRB’s order, and a sentence
calculation worksheet completed prior to Figgs’s arrival at
Logan, Fishel did not send Figgs’s entire master file, nor did
Welch request it.1 According to Fishel, Welch told her that the
current calculation was correct, and therefore Fishel informed
Figgs of this determination. Although Figgs’s projected release
date changed during his incarceration due to the revocation of
good‐time credits, all of Figgs’s previously‐revoked good time
credits were restored as of August 25, 2011.
On October 20, 2011, Figgs filed a petition for habeas corpus
against Dawson in the Logan County Circuit Court. In that
petition, Figgs alleged that he had “never had a[n MSR]
revocation hearing or … been told that he violated mandatory
supervised release” in the drug case. He also alleged that
1
The chief record office does not maintain inmates’ master files. They are
kept at the institution where an inmate is incarcerated.
No. 15‐2926 7
IDOC had erred in “starting his sentence credit to run after this
alleged [MSR] violation.”
On October 31, 2011, Figgs filed a formal IDOC grievance,
marking it as an emergency and asserting that he should have
been released from custody on January 16, 2011. He further
asserted that the corrected mittimus for the murder conviction
ordered his 40‐year sentence “to run consecutive to ANY
sentence imposed after a violation of mandatory supervised
release” in the drug case, but there “was never a parole
revocation or violation of [MSR]. Accordingly, there is no
[MSR] violation to run this sentence consecutive too [sic].” A
counselor discussed Figgs’s concerns with Fishel, who reported
that she had previously looked into the calculation of Figgs’s
release date and determined that it was correct. Fishel did not
recalculate Figgs’s sentence at this point or check again with
the chief record office. The counselor indicated that the
sentence calculation appeared to be correct because Fishel had
stated that “[MSR] time stopped when [Figgs] committed
offense. Sentence then ran consecutive with … [MSR] term.
Forwarded to Warden Dawson.” Dawson reviewed Figgs’s
grievance, but not his master file, and determined on
November 8, 2011 that it was not an emergency after
consulting Fishel, who confirmed that the sentence calculation
was correct.
On November 28, 2011, Dawson moved to dismiss Figgs’s
state habeas petition on the basis that Figgs was serving a term
of MSR at the time he committed the murder and therefore was
being legally detained, rendering unavailable habeas corpus
relief. On December 1, 2011, the state court dismissed Figgs’s
habeas complaint for the reasons set forth in Dawson’s motion.
8 No. 15‐2926
The court subsequently granted Figgs’s motion to reconsider
and for leave to amend his petition to seek mandamus relief,
and Figgs restyled his petition as a mandamus complaint.
In the meantime, the grievance officer who was handling
Figgs’s IDOC grievance reported on November 30, 2011: “The
records office supervisor contends that the inmate’s corrected
mittimus was adhered as directed by Judge James Flannery
[who issued the mittimus]. Fu[r]thermore, the clinical service
supervisor and the directing record office and the law office in
Springfield concurred with the Logan’s Record Office
interpretation of the mittimus.” The grievance officer
recommended that the grievance be “withheld” (stayed)
pending the outcome of Figgs’s state habeas petition. On
December 13, 2011, Dawson or someone acting on his authority
concurred in this recommendation, and the grievance was
stayed.
In November 2011, while the grievance and state‐court case
were pending, Figgs also wrote to IDOC’s chief record officer,
stating that record personnel at Logan had miscalculated his
release date by factoring in a nonexistent parole violation.
Figgs reiterated that during all his years of incarceration, he
had never had an MSR violation or a hearing. Along with his
letter, Figgs submitted the corrected mittimus and the October
1994 IDOC letter denying his request for a transfer from
Menard and noting a January 2011 projected release date. On
December 2, 2011, Welch responded to Figgs, attaching a copy
of the PRB’s order and stating: “Your current tentative
mandatory supervised release date is November 3, 2013, as
indicated on your sentence calculation work sheet dated May
3, 1996, because as of August 25, 2011, all of your revoked time
No. 15‐2926 9
for disciplinary issues has been restored … . The sentence
calculation has been completed per the Order of the sentencing
court and Order of the [PRB].”
On March 6, 2012, Dawson filed a motion for summary
judgment in the mandamus proceeding, arguing that the PRB
had revoked Figgs’s MSR and thus Figgs was lawfully
incarcerated and could not be released until his consecutive
sentences were completed. Fishel submitted an affidavit in
support of the motion in which she stated that IDOC had
released Figgs on December 4, 1992, he was then picked up on
a Cook County warrant, and in 1993 after the murder
conviction, the PRB had issued an order declaring Figgs to
have violated MSR as of December 4, 1992. On June 26, 2012,
the state court issued an order denying Dawson’s motion for
summary judgment, reasoning that Fishel’s statement about
Figgs’s 2013 projected release date was “conclusory” because
the calculations set forth in the attached sentence worksheet
were “not self‐explanatory and Defendant has failed to
otherwise inform the court of the manner in which the
Plaintiff’s projected discharge date was determined.”
The day after the state court denied Dawson’s motion, the
PRB vacated, without comment, its November 1993 violation
order. According to Fishel, someone in IDOC’s chief record
office prompted the PRB to review its order. The following
day, Fishel recalculated Figgs’s release date as January 11,
2011,2 and Figgs was immediately released from prison. The
2
Although defendants do not appear to dispute that this was the correct
release date, we have some reservations about it. The original mittimus for
(continued...)
10 No. 15‐2926
Logan County Circuit Court subsequently dismissed the
mandamus proceeding as moot.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 4, 2013, Figgs filed his complaint in the instant
case against Austin Randolph (a former warden of Logan),3
Dawson, and Fishel. Figgs alleged that Dawson and Fishel
violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He also
brought state‐law claims for false imprisonment and
negligence. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all
of Figgs’s claims, and Figgs moved for summary judgment on
his Eighth Amendment claim against Dawson and Fishel and
2
(...continued)
the murder conviction stated that Figgs was to receive credit for time served
since January 1991 (when he was still serving the sentence on the drug
conviction) while at the same time stating that the sentence was to run
consecutive to the drug sentence. Illinois law, 730 ILCS 5/5‐8‐4(d)(8) (which
was section 5‐8‐4(h) at the relevant time), requires consecutive sentencing
where a defendant is charged with a felony and commits a separate felony
while on pretrial release. The “corrected” mittimus muddied the waters by
omitting any reference to the drug sentence and providing for the murder
sentence to run consecutive to a nonexistent “sentence” for a nonexistent
MSR violation. It is possible that the newly‐calculated January 2011 release
date was in fact incorrect in that it would have allowed Figgs to have served
partially concurrent sentences in contravention of the consecutive‐sentence
requirement. The record does not enable us to confidently draw a
conclusion about the correct release date.
3
No claims against Randolph are involved in this appeal, and the record
does not disclose why he was not dismissed from this action. Although his
name is included in the caption on the complaint and there are certain
factual allegations against him, plaintiff did not attempt to state any claim
against him.
No. 15‐2926 11
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim against
Dawson. On August 4, 2015, the district court granted
defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and entered
judgment in their favor, on Figgs’s federal claims. The court
then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Figgs’s
state‐law claims and dismissed them without prejudice.
Figgs filed this timely appeal, challenging the grant of
summary judgment in favor of Fishel and Dawson on the
Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference and the
grant of summary judgment in favor of Dawson on the
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim.
DISCUSSION
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary
judgment, considering all facts and reasonable inferences in the
light most favorable to Figgs, the nonmoving party. See Boss v.
Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is
proper only where there are no genuine issues of material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Alexander v. Casino Queen, Inc., 739
F.3d 972, 978 (7th Cir. 2014)). We may affirm on any basis fairly
presented in the record. Ellis v. CCA of Tenn. LLC, 650 F.3d 640,
647 (7th Cir. 2011).
A. Deliberate Indifference
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment on a § 1983
claim, we focus on “‘(1) whether the conduct complained of
was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and
(2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws
12 No. 15‐2926
of the United States.’” Armato v. Grounds, 766 F.3d 713, 719‐20
(7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535
(1981)). Incarceration beyond the date when a person is entitled
to be released violates the Eighth Amendment if it is the
product of deliberate indifference. Burke v. Johnston, 452 F.3d
665, 669 (7th Cir. 2006); Campbell v. Peters, 256 F.3d 695, 700 (7th
Cir. 2001).
Deliberate indifference requires more than negligence or
even gross negligence; a plaintiff must show that the defendant
was essentially criminally reckless, that is, ignored a known
risk. Armato, 766 F.3d at 721; McGee v. Adams, 721 F.3d 474,
480‐81 (7th Cir. 2013). A state officer is deliberately indifferent
when he does nothing, Hankins v. Lowe, 786 F.3d 603, 605 (7th
Cir. 2015), or when he takes action that is so ineffectual under
the circumstances that deliberate indifference can be inferred,
Burke, 452 F.3d at 669 (citing Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 686
(3d Cir. 1993)); see also Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th
Cir. 2011) (noting that a prison doctor demonstrates deliberate
indifference by pursuing treatment “so blatantly inappropriate
as to evidence intentional mistreatment”).
It is undisputed that Dawson and Fishel knew of the
possibility that Figgs was being held beyond the date when he
was entitled to be released, but it is disputed whether their
conduct amounted to deliberate indifference. As for Dawson,
the district court first noted that it is undisputed that the
warden was not responsible for calculating prisoners’ release
dates. He was responsible, however, for reviewing emergency
grievances, and it was his or his designee’s decision to treat
Figgs’s grievance as a non‐emergency and withhold review
until the state‐court action was resolved. The district court
No. 15‐2926 13
concluded that the undisputed evidence showed that Dawson
checked whether Logan’s release date for Figgs matched the
most recent sentence calculation sheet, asked the Logan record
office whether the date was correct, and confirmed that Fishel
had reviewed Figgs’s file and she believed the release date to
be correct. Dawson therefore took some steps to address
Figgs’s grievance, the district court reasoned, so Figgs could
not establish that Dawson was deliberately indifferent. The
court further held that Dawson’s decision to let the state court
determine the validity of Figgs’s claims, which was made after
his consultation with the record office and determination that
the grievance was not an emergency, was not evidence of
deliberate indifference.
The district court correctly granted summary judgment for
Dawson on this claim. Dawson’s conduct does not demonstrate
a sufficiently culpable state of mind. He did not disregard
Figgs’s grievance or its designation as an emergency; rather, he
consulted with Fishel, the record office supervisor, to make
sure that she had looked into the problem, and he relied on her
determination that the calculations Logan was using were
correct. That was a reasonable response to Figgs’s emergency
grievance, as was Dawson or his designee’s ensuing decision
to stay the grievance pending resolution of the mandamus
proceeding. See Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1011 (7th Cir.
2006) (warden was not deliberately indifferent where he
investigated the situation, ensured that the medical staff was
monitoring and addressing the problem, and reasonably
deferred to the medical staff’s opinion); Greeno v. Daley, 414
F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir. 2005) (no deliberate indifference where
grievance appeals examiner investigated plaintiff’s complaints
14 No. 15‐2926
and referred them to the medical providers who could be
expected to address plaintiff’s concerns). Top‐level
administrators like Dawson are entitled to relegate to prison
staff like Fishel the primary responsibility for specific prison
functions. See Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir.
2009) (a prison warden is entitled to relegate to medical staff
the provision of medical care). Figgs contends that what
Dawson did was “not really anything of substance,” but this
argument is misplaced because it was not Dawson’s
responsibility to calculate, or investigate the calculation of,
Figgs’s release date, and Dawson consulted with the individual
who had that responsibility. See id. at 595 (“Public officials do
not have a free‐floating obligation to put things to rights … .
Bureaucracies divide tasks; no prisoner is entitled to insist that
one employee do another’s job. The division of labor is
important not only to bureaucratic organization but also to
efficient performance of tasks; people who stay within their
roles can get more work done, more effectively, and cannot be
hit with damages under § 1983 for not being ombudsmen.”).
Fishel’s conduct is another matter. The district court held
that Figgs cannot prove that Fishel was deliberately indifferent
to the risk of prolonged detention because she took “numerous
steps” to determine whether Figgs’s concerns were warranted.
The court explained that Fishel did not ignore or suppress
Figgs’s complaints, but took the following steps: (1) relied
upon the sentence calculation made prior to Figgs’s arrival at
Logan; (2) forwarded certain documents to the chief record
office; and (3) relied upon that office’s determination that the
sentence calculation was correct. On appeal, plaintiff points out
that Fishel personally did not attempt to calculate Figgs’s
No. 15‐2926 15
sentence until June 27, 2012, and contends that her act of
forwarding a few documents from the master file to someone
who was thus not fully equipped to evaluate the problem was
so woefully inadequate that it amounted to deliberate
indifference. Fishel, on the other hand, asserts that she
“thoroughly investigated” Figgs’s complaints.
When evaluating Fishel’s conduct, it is important to
consider the substance of Figgs’s complaints. In his emergency
grievance, Figgs was not complaining about simple arithmetic,
but that his projected release date was premised on the
falsehood that he was on MSR when he committed the murder
for which he was serving his sentence. He was asking prison
officials to verify the basis for the addition of two years to his
sentence. Although copies of Figgs’s inmate request slips are
not in the record, it can reasonably be inferred from Fishel’s
deposition testimony that Figgs made the same kind of
substantive complaints several months earlier in his request
slips. In response, Fishel admittedly did not perform any
calculation, nor did she review all of the documents in Figgs’s
master file. In Fishel’s own words, she responded to those
complaints by “let[ting] the chief records office handle it”
because Figgs raised “so many questions” in his multiple
request slips, the matter was “complex,” and she was not sure
about the calculation. Fishel was the only one who had Figgs’s
master file, yet when she referred the matter to the chief record
office, she sent only an inmate request slip from Figgs, the
previous sentence calculation sheet, the corrected mittimus,
and the PRB’s order. Fishel did not send anything else from
Figgs’s file (such as a Statement of Facts that would have
indicated when the murder had been committed) that would
16 No. 15‐2926
have enabled the chief record office to determine whether
Figgs’s complaints had any merit or whether further
investigation was needed. There is no evidence that Fishel had
discussions with the chief record office, contacted the PRB, or
sought legal guidance from any state officials such as IDOC
attorneys, the Circuit Court, or the Office of the Attorney
General, even when the matter resurfaced by way of the
emergency grievance.4 Furthermore, Julia Bickle, who
succeeded Ona Welch as assistant chief record officer in
Springfield, testified at her deposition that it was the
responsibility of the chief record officer at the facility where an
inmate is housed to contact the PRB or the court for
clarification of orders that are necessary to properly calculate
a sentence.
The record belies Fishel’s assertion that her investigation of
Figgs’s complaints was “thorough.” Her reliance upon the
previous sentence calculation, which was done long before
Figgs complained, did not constitute a step taken to verify its
accuracy (nor did her reliance upon the chief record office’s
determination). The only action she took prior to the state
court’s denial of Dawson’s summary judgment motion was
forwarding selected portions of Figgs’s master file to the chief
record office after receiving several inmate request slips. In
response to Figgs’s emergency grievance, Fishel relied on the
4
Although the clinical services counselor who reviewed and responded to
Figgs’s grievance stated in his response that “the law office in Springfield
concurred with” the Logan Record Office’s “interpretation” of the mittimus,
the record does not reveal who contacted the “law office in Springfield.”
Fishel did not testify at her deposition that she did.
No. 15‐2926 17
same prior determination by the chief record office without
further investigation. Given the circumstances, a jury could
find that this minimal action was so ineffectual that it rose to
the level of criminal recklessness and thus constituted
deliberate indifference. Therefore, we will vacate the grant of
summary judgment for Fishel on this claim and remand for
trial.5
Fishel argues that even if a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that she violated Figgs’s Eighth Amendment rights,
summary judgment in her favor was proper on an alternative
ground, qualified immunity. “The doctrine of qualified
immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982)). “In general, once the defendants raise the
qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff must show two
things: first, that there has been a violation of one or more of
5
It should be noted, however, that even if Figgs proves that Fishel acted
with deliberate indifference, he must also prove that this deliberate
indifference caused him to be held beyond his lawful term of incarceration.
See, e.g., Armato, 766 F.3d at 721. Causation could be difficult to prove for
the reasons discussed above at footnote 2. Still, we are not persuaded by
Fishel’s causation‐related arguments on appeal. They are myopically
focused on the sentence calculation itself and ignore the specific issues
raised by Figgs, the problems with the PRB’s order, and the admittedly
confusing “corrected” mittimus. Although Fishel points out that she had no
authority to disregard court and PRB orders, she fails to acknowledge that
she had other courses of action such as making inquiries of the PRB or court
and seeking legal guidance.
18 No. 15‐2926
her federal constitutional rights, and second, that the
constitutional standards at issue were clearly established at the
time of the alleged violation.” Campbell, 256 F.3d at 699
(citations omitted). The law is “clearly established” when
“various courts have agreed that certain conduct is a
constitutional violation under facts not distinguishable in a fair
way from the facts presented in the case at hand.” Id. at 701
(emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)). The right allegedly
violated must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity
before a court can determine if it was clearly established. Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wilson v. Layne,
526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999)).
Fishel contends that “no clearly established constitutional
rule established that [she] violated the Eighth Amendment by
failing to recalculate Figgs’s sentence in response to his
concerns or by referring it to” the chief record office. This
argument is flawed because it does not address the broader
deficiencies with Fishel’s chosen course of action, which we
have discussed above. The appropriate inquiry here is whether
it was clearly established that Fishel’s failure to investigate the
substance of Figgs’s complaints violated his constitutional
rights by requiring him to serve more time than his sentence
required. See id. at 700‐01 (“[W]e must determine whether it
was clearly established that the defendants, in revoking the
good conduct credits and computing a new release date after
the recommitment, were violating Campbell’s constitutional
rights by requiring him to serve more time than state law and
his sentence required.”).
No. 15‐2926 19
At the time Figgs presented his complaints, it was clearly
established by decisions in closely analogous cases that the
failure to investigate a claim that an inmate is being held
longer than the lawful term of his sentence violates the Eighth
Amendment if it is the result of indifference. See Haygood v.
Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354‐55 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the
Eighth Amendment is violated when prolonged detention is
the result of deliberate indifference, where prison officials
failed to investigate claims in prisoner’s letter questioning the
method used to compute his release date); Sample v. Diecks, 885
F.2d 1099, 1108‐10 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding same, where senior
record officer failed to take substantive action on prisoner’s
claim that he was being held despite the expiration of his
sentence); Alexander v. Perrill, 916 F.2d 1392, 1397‐99 (9th Cir.
1990) (rejecting defendants’ qualified immunity argument and
concluding that the right to be free from incarceration beyond
the expiration of one’s sentence was clearly established, where
prison officials failed to investigate the prisoner’s claim that he
was incorrectly denied credit for time served in a foreign jail).
While, to be clearly established, “a right must be specific to the
relevant factual context of a cited case and not generalized with
respect to the Amendment that is the basis of the claim,” the
“very action in question” need not have previously been held
unlawful for a public official to have reasonable notice of the
illegality of some action. Viilo v. Eyre, 547 F.3d 707, 710‐11 (7th
Cir. 2008) (citing Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198‐99 (2004)
and Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). Viewing
the record in the light most favorable to Figgs, the evidence
supports his claim that Fishel’s conduct violated his
established constitutional right to be free from cruel and
20 No. 15‐2926
unusual punishment. Thus, Fishel is not entitled to qualified
immunity.
After dismissing Figgs’s federal claims, the district court
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
state‐law false imprisonment claim against Dawson and
negligence claim against Dawson and Fishel. Because we are
vacating the judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim
against Fishel, and the state‐law claims relate to the same set of
operative facts, we reinstate those claims as to all defendants
they are asserted against. See Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 827,
832 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Albany Bank & Trust Co. v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., 310 F.3d 969, 975 (7th Cir. 2002) and Armstrong v.
Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 582 (7th Cir. 1998)).
B. Procedural Due Process
Figgs also challenges the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Dawson on Figgs’s Fourteenth
Amendment claim for violation of procedural due process.
Figgs had a constitutionally‐protected liberty interest in being
released from prison before the end of his term for good
behavior. See Toney‐El v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1224, 1227 (7th Cir.
1985) (citing McKinney v. George, 726 F.2d 1183, 1189 (7th Cir.
1984)). To prove a deprivation of procedural due process, Figgs
must show: (1) the deprivation occurred; (2) it occurred
without due process of law; and (3) Dawson subjected him to
the deprivation. See id. “In section 1983 actions challenging the
mistakes made by state employees rather than the state
procedures by which those mistakes were made, Parratt
requires a court to consider the adequacy and availability of
remedies under state law before concluding that a deprivation
No. 15‐2926 21
of life, liberty, or property violates due process of law.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also
Armato, 766 F.3d at 722 (noting that in Toney‐El, this court
found that state‐court remedies such as the right to seek a writ
of mandamus and a cause of action for false imprisonment are
“adequate and available” remedies for an inmate claiming he
was held beyond the term of his incarceration, precluding a
claim for a violation of procedural due process).
Figgs claims that Dawson violated his procedural due
process rights by deferring action on Figgs’s grievance until
resolution of the state‐court mandamus proceeding. In
granting summary judgment in Dawson’s favor, the district
court relied on Toney‐El and Armato and held that not only did
Figgs have available and adequate state‐court remedies, he
took advantage of them by filing the mandamus proceeding.
Figgs asserts on appeal, as he did before the district court, that
the mandamus proceeding was inadequate because it was
pending for several months until he was able to obtain a ruling
that led to his release.
In Toney‐El, this court found that the state‐court habeas
corpus remedy was adequate despite the fact that the prisoner
plaintiff had been held for 306 days past his lawful term of
incarceration. Like Toney‐El, Figgs did not utilize his
state‐court remedy until well after the point in time when he
maintains he was deprived of his liberty. Figgs cites no
authority for the proposition that because he did not obtain
immediate relief, his mandamus remedy was inadequate.
Accordingly, we agree with the district court that the
state‐court remedy, which Figgs utilized, precludes his claim
against Dawson for procedural due process.
22 No. 15‐2926
CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment in favor of
Alex Dawson on plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendment claims. We VACATE the grant of summary
judgment in favor of Lori Fishel on plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment claim for deliberate indifference, VACATE the
dismissal of the state‐law false imprisonment and negligence
claims, and REMAND the case to the district court for further
proceedings on those claims.