holding that summary judgment on an excessive force claim was precluded when officers shot beanbag rounds at a man standing several feet in front of them and holding a knife pointed at himself
How later courts described this case
- holding that summary judgment on an excessive force claim was precluded when officers shot beanbag rounds at a man standing several feet in front of them and holding a knife pointed at himself
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JUL 18 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRANDON SMITH, No. 14-15969
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:12-cv-02391-FJM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CITY OF CHANDLER; KEITH SMITH,
Officer #616,
Defendants - Appellees.
BRANDON SMITH, No. 14-17512
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:12-cv-02391-FJM
v.
CITY OF CHANDLER; KEITH SMITH,
Officer #616,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Frederick J. Martone, Senior District Judge, Presiding
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Argued and Submitted May 10, 2016
San Francisco, California
Before: NOONAN, WARDLAW, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
Brandon Smith (“Brandon”) appeals the district court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of Officer Keith Smith (“Officer Smith”) on
Brandon’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim and the City of Chandler on
Brandon’s state law negligence claim. Brandon also appeals the district court’s
order granting attorney’s fees and non-taxable costs to the defendants. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse the grant of summary
judgment and vacate the award of fees and costs.
1. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo and take the facts in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
377–78 (2007); Barnett v. Centori, 31 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir. 1994). We construe
the district court’s order as a grant of summary judgment on the merits of the
Fourth Amendment claim. We conclude that material disputes of fact exist and
that the district court therefore erred in granting summary judgment. We are well
aware that “police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of
force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
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397 (1989). Nonetheless, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Brandon,
the officers entered the patio area with guns drawn on a man whom they knew to
be emotionally disturbed and possibly suicidal. They immediately began issuing
commands, and Brandon testified that he heard a command to “stand up.” When
Brandon began to stand up—with a knife cradled in his arm pointing towards
himself, positioned approximately eight feet from Officer Hawkins, who was
pointing a handgun at Brandon—Officer Smith shot him with two beanbag rounds,
and later claimed he did so in order to protect Officer Hawkins. Because triable
issues of material fact remain as to whether one of the four officers ordered
Brandon to “stand up,” and whether Officer Smith reasonably should have heard
this command, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the
merits of the excessive force claim. See Glenn v. Washington Cty., 673 F.3d 864,
871 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that summary judgment on an excessive force claim
was precluded when officers shot beanbag rounds at a man standing several feet in
front of them and holding a knife pointed at himself).
2. In the alternative, Officer Smith argues that he is entitled to qualified
immunity. To determine whether a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity,
we apply the two-prong test established in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001),
overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). We ask, “[t]aken
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in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged
show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” Saucier, 533 U.S. at
201. In addition, we ask “whether the right was clearly established,” meaning that
“it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the
situation he confronted.” Id. at 201–02. “We have the discretion to decide ‘which
of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in
light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.’” Lacey v. Maricopa Cty.,
693 F.3d 896, 915 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236).
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Brandon—that he was told by
one of the officers to stand up, and complied with that command—Officer Smith is
not entitled to qualified immunity. The circumstances surrounding the beanbag
shooting were not meaningfully different than those in Glenn, which was decided
before the shooting. 673 F.3d 864. The similarity of Brandon’s situation to the
situation in Glenn demonstrates that the law against discharging beanbag rounds
under these circumstances was clearly established at the time Officer Smith shot
Brandon. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201–02.
3. We also reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment on
Brandon’s state law negligence claim against the City of Chandler. As explained
above, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Brandon, Officer Smith did
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not act reasonably in discharging two beanbag rounds. Thus, there are disputed
issues of material fact as to whether Officer Smith acted negligently, and whether
his actions were of a kind for which the City of Chandler was vicariously liable.
4. Because we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment, we also
vacate the award of attorney’s fees and non-taxable costs.
REVERSED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
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