Dewayne Cox v. Bradley Quinn

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-6943

DEWAYNE JACKSON COX, a/k/a Dwayne Cox,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

OFFICER BRADLEY QUINN; OFFICER JOSHUA PINKERMAN; OFFICER

BENJAMIN BAXLEY,

Defendants – Appellants,

and

CAPTAIN CHAD KELLER; SERGEANT WILLIE SMITH; MAJOR GREG

WINSTON; LIEUTENANT SHELTON; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER MYLES,

a/k/a Miles; OTHER UNKNOWN OFFICERS AND/OR EMPLOYEES OF THE

WESTERN VIRGINIA REGIONAL JAIL; BRANDON JAMAL REDDIX; JUSTIN

MILES,

Defendants.

No. 15-6944

DEWAYNE JACKSON COX, a/k/a Dwayne Cox,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

JUSTIN MILES,

Defendant – Appellant,

and

OFFICER BRADLEY QUINN; OFFICER JOSHUA PINKERMAN; OFFICER

BENJAMIN BAXLEY; CAPTAIN CHAD KELLER; SERGEANT WILLIE SMITH;

MAJOR GREG WINSTON; LIEUTENANT SHELTON; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER

MYLES, a/k/a Miles; OTHER UNKNOWN OFFICERS AND/OR EMPLOYEES

OF THE WESTERN VIRGINIA REGIONAL JAIL; BRANDON JAMAL REDDIX,

Defendants.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Glen E. Conrad, Chief

District Judge. (7:12-cv-00154-GEC)

Argued: May 11, 2016 Decided: July 6, 2016

Before DUNCAN, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Harris wrote the opinion,

in which Judge Duncan and Judge Wynn joined.

ARGUED: Jim H. Guynn, Jr., GUYNN & WADDELL, P.C., Salem,

Virginia; Christopher Carey Newton, FRITH ANDERSON & PEAKE,

P.C., Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellants. Melvin Edward

Williams, MEL WILLIAMS PLC, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee. ON

BRIEF: John C. Johnson, FRITH ANDERSON & PEAKE, P.C., Roanoke,

Virginia, for Appellant Justin Miles.

2

PAMELA HARRIS, Circuit Judge:

In 2011, appellee Dewayne Cox was severely beaten by a

fellow inmate while incarcerated at the Western Virginia

Regional Jail. Cox had repeatedly complained to jail

officials — including the appellants, correctional officers

Bradley Quinn, Joshua Pinkerman, Benjamin Baxley, and Justin

Miles — that he was being threatened, harassed, and robbed by

the group of inmates who ultimately orchestrated the beating.

Cox filed suit against Baxley, Quinn, Pinkerman, and Miles,

alleging that they had been deliberately indifferent to a

substantial risk to his safety, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and the Eighth Amendment. The district court denied summary

judgment to the correctional officers, finding that they were

not entitled to qualified immunity on Cox’s claims. We agree,

and we affirm.

I.

A.

Because this is an interlocutory appeal of a denial of

qualified immunity, we consider only “the facts as the district

court viewed them as well as any additional undisputed facts.”

Danser v. Stansberry, 772 F.3d 340, 345 (4th Cir. 2014).

In 2010 and 2011, Dewayne Cox was incarcerated at the

Western Virginia Regional Jail. Cox was housed in “Pod 3A” with

3

about fifty other men, including Terrence Jackson, David Cabell,

Sheron Harris, and Brandon Reddix. Jackson, Cabell, and Harris

formed an informal gang or group in the pod. At some point,

Reddix joined their group as well.

Cox and other inmates found the Jackson-Cabell-Harris group

to be loud, aggressive, intimidating, and threatening. As one

inmate, Gerald Garlic, explained,

They would snatch the T.V. remote from others[’]

hands, and take radio[]s or unplug headphones, and

disrupt board games or card games by pushing them out

of reach or taking p[ie]ces and issuing a challenge to

who-ever they chose to pick on at the time by saying

things like “what ya gonna do pops” “say something”

“I’ll fuck you up” [“]we rule this pod and if y[’]all

don’t like it just say something and we’ll take care

of you” or “say something to the [correctional

officers] we will beat your old toothless stinking ass

to death,” or [“]we are []Bloods and we run shit in

here.”

J.A. 317–18. According to another inmate, Joe Rutherford,

“Harris[,] Cabell and Jackson [were] constantly loud and

intimidating and more or less [were] in a gang all their own.

They were trouble waiting to happen.” J.A. 324.

Cox and at least one other inmate submitted informal

complaints, or “blue slips,” describing the group’s aggressive

and threatening behavior to jail officials, and Cox discussed

his concerns with Captain Chad Keller on March 8, 2011. Cox

informed Keller that Harris was harassing and stealing from him

and requested that either he or Harris be moved to a different

4

pod. According to Cox, Keller responded that he knew Harris was

“an asshole” who “creates problems everywhere he goes.” J.A.

282. But Keller asked Cox if he and Harris could remain in the

pod together if he talked to Harris and “ke[pt] him on a chain.”

Id. Cox agreed.

After Keller talked to Harris about Cox’s complaints,

however, the situation in the pod only got worse for Cox.

Harris called Cox a “snitch” and threatened that he “was going

to get” him. J.A. 283. Then, a few weeks later, Harris and

Cabell instigated a physical altercation with Cox and issued

explicit threats in front of other inmates. As one inmate

described:

[T]here were about six of us playing poker together.

. . . Dewayne [Cox] won a hand. Harris and Cabell

started raising their voices, telling Dewayne he was a

p[ie]ce of shit. Mr. Cabell jerked the sheet we had

covering the table[] off the table and threw cards

everywhere. He reached across the table and knocked

other cards . . . out of Dewayne’s hands and got in

Dewayne[’]s face and said “Do something punk,[] say

anything you old toothless son of a bitch and I’ll

stomp your white ass all over this pod.” Then Cabell

went to the telephone area, still angry, upset, and

threw a blue plastic chair . . . across the floor, and

issued a challenge for the whole pod, for “anybody say

one fucking word about it I will fuck em up” “Go on!

Anybody, please say something so I can beat some ass.”

J.A. 324–25 (affidavit of inmate Rutherford). In addition,

Harris and Cabell stole commissary items from Cox and harassed

him on other occasions. Cox submitted several more blue slips

complaining about these issues and requesting that either he or

5

the inmates who were threatening him be moved to a different

pod. He never received any response.

Appellants Quinn, Baxley, and Pinkerman were certified

correctional officers at the jail, and appellant Miles was an

uncertified officer — essentially, a trainee. On April 11,

2011, Quinn, Baxley, and Miles were on duty in Pod 3A, and

Pinkerman was working nearby. Cox approached Miles that morning

and asked “what they were going to do about what was going on in

the pod . . . with Cabell and Jackson and Harris.” J.A. 218.

He also inquired about the number of blue slips that jail

officials had received about those inmates. Miles stated that

he was aware of blue slips from Cox and one other inmate, and he

asked Cox to step out into the hallway to discuss his concerns

further.

Cox, along with inmate Garlic, went into the hall to talk

further with Miles. They explained that they “were being

harassed” and that Cabell and Harris were stealing from Cox.

J.A. 219. Cox told Miles that he feared for his safety, and

both Cox and Garlic requested that either they or the

problematic inmates be moved out of the pod.

Officers Quinn, Baxley, and Pinkerman eventually joined the

conversation and Cox repeated his concerns to them. Miles

assured Cox and Garlic that they would “take care of it,” and

the other officers agreed. J.A. 221. Cox asked the officers

6

what they planned to do, saying “[s]omebody needs to be moved,

somebody is going to get hurt.” Id. Miles stated that they

would “talk to the guys,” and Cox responded: “Don’t do that

because that will put an X on me and make the situation worse

than what it is.” J.A. 222. Garlic agreed with Cox, expressing

concern that if the officers spoke to the inmates, “they would

only get angry and retaliate against us.” J.A. 319. And both

Cox and Garlic again requested to either be moved from the pod

or to have the other inmates moved. The officers instructed Cox

and Garlic to return to the pod.

After speaking with Cox and Garlic, Miles reached out to

Sergeant Willie Smith for advice. According to Miles, Smith

responded that he was “busy” and that Miles needed to “get [his]

guys to handle it.” J.A. 102. But according to Smith himself,

he told the officers, “[I]f Cox is being threatened in any way

or if anybody is being threatened, remove them out of the pod,

lock the inmates down, lock the whole pod and question all of

the inmates in the pod to find out what was going on.” J.A.

343.

When Cox returned to the pod, he called a friend on the

telephone in the pod’s common area and spoke to her for several

minutes. While Cox was on the telephone, inmates began to

return to the pod from the recreation area. Cox noticed that

Cabell, Jackson, and Harris — who had been at recreation — did

7

not reenter the pod with the others. Then, about five minutes

later, the three men returned to the pod. Right away, Harris

“hollered at” Cox, loudly yelling, “You are a fucking snitch and

we are going to get your ass.” J.A. 225. Cox returned to his

cell, but he continued to hear Harris, as well as Jackson and

Cabell, yelling, “Miles told us what you said, that you told on

us,” that Cox was a “snitch,” and that they were “going to get”

him. J.A. 228. Cox also heard Jackson shout that he was

offering fifty dollars “for somebody to beat [Cox’s] ass.” J.A.

229.

Later that day, Cox left his cell for dinner and approached

Miles, who was serving the inmates’ meal. Cox said:

Mr. Miles, why did you all talk to these guys? Why

did you say anything to these guys? . . . Now they

are threatening me, going to do something to me. . . .

I want out of here, Miles. You all got to do

something.

J.A. 231–32. According to Cox, Miles responded by throwing up

his hands, saying, “What now, Cox?” and then turning around and

walking away. J.A. 232.

Cox sat down with Garlic to eat, and Harris stood up and

yelled, “We are going to get you, snitch, we are going to get

you. We are going to beat your ass before lockdown.” J.A. 232.

Cox returned to his cell without finishing his dinner. He later

came out of his cell and saw Cabell and Jackson walk by. Cabell

8

warned that Cox was “going to get fucked up” before the end of

the day. J.A. 236.

At that point, Brandon Reddix approached Cox and said, “I

want to talk to you, man.” J.A. 237. Cox had not previously

had any problems with Reddix and he started through his own cell

door to talk with Reddix there, but then he realized that Reddix

“was kind of buddy-buddy” with Harris, Cabell, and Jackson. Id.

Cox started to reverse course, but Reddix punched him in the

back of his neck and knocked him across the cell. Reddix

continued to beat Cox on his head, ribs, and back until another

inmate yelled that correctional officers were on the way. Cox

estimates that the assault lasted between 45 and 75 seconds, and

he suffered broken ribs, a loosened tooth, bruising, swelling,

and abrasions.

Miles later discovered Cox bloodied and injured from

Reddix’s attack. Cox reminded Miles, as well as Officer Quinn,

that he had warned them something bad was going to happen to

him.

Miles filed an incident report recommending that Cabell,

Harris, and Jackson be given “Major Violations” for assault.

According to Miles, even though none of those three inmates

actually attacked Cox, “they were a little group in that pod and

they were . . . notorious.” J.A. 147–48. Miles believed that

“they needed to be cited for planning” the attack on Cox. J.A.

9

148. Sergeant Smith concurred with this recommendation in a

separate report.

B.

In 2012, Cox filed suit against Quinn, Baxley, Pinkerman,

and Miles under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 1 Relevant here, Cox alleged

that the correctional officers had violated his Eighth Amendment

right to “protect[ion] from violence at the hands of other

prisoners,” which flows from the Amendment’s prohibition on

“cruel and unusual punishments.” See Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 832–33 (1994); U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

The correctional officers moved for summary judgment. They

argued that they had not violated Cox’s Eighth Amendment rights

because they were not “deliberately indifferent” to a

substantial risk that Cox would be assaulted by a fellow inmate.

See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (element of Eighth Amendment

violation is that defendant prison officials acted with

“‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety” (citation

omitted)). They also argued that they were entitled to

qualified immunity because reasonable correctional officers in

the same circumstances would not have known that they had

violated Cox’s clearly established rights. See Parrish ex rel.

1

Cox’s original and amended complaints also named other

defendants and included other claims, but those defendants and

claims are not pertinent to this appeal.

10

Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 2004) (element of

qualified immunity analysis is that the right in question “was

‘clearly established’ at the time of the alleged offense”

(quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001))).

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Cox, the

district court determined that there was a genuine issue of

material fact in dispute as to whether the correctional officers

had acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial threat

to Cox’s safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The court

further found that the officers were not entitled to qualified

immunity because the duty of jail officials to protect prisoners

from inmate violence was clearly established in April of 2011.

Accordingly, the court denied summary judgment to the

appellants.

Quinn, Baxley, and Pinkerman filed one interlocutory appeal

of the district court’s denial of qualified immunity, and Miles

filed another. We consolidated the two appeals, which we

consider below.

II.

Under the collateral order doctrine, we have jurisdiction

to review a denial of qualified immunity at summary judgment

only “to the extent that the court’s decision turned on an issue

of law.” Danser, 772 F.3d at 344; see Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d

11

225, 234 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting this exception to the rule that

“interlocutory appeals are generally disallowed”). Thus, we may

consider only “the facts as the district court viewed them as

well as any additional undisputed facts,” and our review is

limited to the legal question of whether the court correctly

denied summary judgment on those facts. Danser, 772 F.3d at

345.

We review the district court’s denial of qualified immunity

at summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light most

favorable to Cox, the non-moving party. Id. We may grant

summary judgment to the correctional officers only if “no

material facts are disputed and [they are] entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” See Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531

(4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Ausherman v. Bank of Am.

Corp., 352 F.3d 896, 899 (4th Cir. 2003)).

A.

At the first step of the qualified immunity inquiry, we

must determine whether, viewing the facts in the light most

favorable to Cox, the correctional officers’ conduct violated a

constitutional right. See Parrish, 372 F.3d at 301. The

correctional officers contend that the undisputed facts show

that they were not, as a matter of law, deliberately indifferent

to a serious risk of harm to Cox, in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. We disagree.

12

1.

The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to “take

reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.”

Id. at 832 (citation omitted); accord Makdessi v. Fields, 789

F.3d 126, 132 (4th Cir. 2015). And they have a specific

“duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of

other prisoners.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 (alteration in

original) (citation omitted). But a prison official will not be

liable for failing to protect a prisoner from inmate violence

unless two requirements are met. See id. at 834.

“First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively,

sufficiently serious.” Id. (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted); see Brown v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 612 F.3d 720,

723 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[A] prisoner must allege a serious or

significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the

challenged conditions.” (quoting Odom v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr.,

349 F.3d 765, 770 (4th Cir. 2003))). In this case, the parties

do not dispute that Cox’s injuries meet this standard.

Second, and central to this appeal, the defendant prison

officials must have had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citation omitted). “In prison-

conditions cases” like this one, “that state of mind is one of

‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Id.

(citation omitted). “Deliberate indifference” requires “‘more

13

than mere negligence,’ but ‘less than acts or omissions [done]

for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm

will result.’” Makdessi, 789 F.3d at 133 (alteration in

original) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835). It is a subjective

standard requiring that a prison official “both be aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial

risk of serious harm exists, and . . . also draw the inference.”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. And, in addition to subjectively

recognizing that substantial risk, the prison official must also

subjectively be aware that “his actions were ‘inappropriate in

light of that risk.’” Parrish, 372 F.3d at 303 (quoting Rich v.

Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 340 n.2 (4th Cir. 1997)).

Whether a prison official acted with “deliberate

indifference” is a question of fact that can be proven through

direct or circumstantial evidence. Makdessi, 789 F.3d at 133;

Parrish, 372 F.3d at 303. A plaintiff can make a prima facie

case of deliberate indifference “by showing ‘that a substantial

risk of [serious harm] was longstanding, pervasive, well-

documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past,

and the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being

sued had been exposed to information concerning the risk and

thus must have known about it.’” Parrish, 372 F.3d at 303

(alteration in original) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). And

a prison official may not avoid liability simply because he was

14

unaware that the inmate was “especially likely to be assaulted

by the specific prisoner who eventually committed the assault.”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843.

Furthermore, a prison official’s response to a known threat

to inmate safety must be reasonable. See id. at 844 (“[P]rison

officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate

health or safety may be found free from liability if they

responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately

was not averted.” (emphasis added)). Prison officials are

deliberately indifferent if they are aware that “the plaintiff

inmate faces a serious danger to his safety and they could avert

the danger easily yet they fail to do so.” Brown, 612 F.3d at

723 (quoting Case v. Ahitow, 301 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2002)).

And “a factfinder may conclude that the official’s response to a

perceived risk was so patently inadequate as to justify an

inference that the official actually recognized that his

response to the risk was inappropriate under the circumstances.”

Parrish, 372 F.3d at 303.

2.

In light of the facts as we may view them, and drawing

reasonable inferences in Cox’s favor, we find that the district

court correctly held that material issues of fact precluded

summary judgment for the correctional officers on the Eighth

Amendment deliberate indifference claim.

15

First, there is ample evidence suggesting that Quinn,

Pinkerman, Baxley, and Miles were subjectively “aware of facts

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk

of serious harm exist[ed], and . . . also dr[ew] the inference,”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837: Cox submitted numerous “blue slips”

complaining that he was being threatened and robbed by Harris,

Cabell, and possibly others; Cox repeatedly informed the

appellants that he feared for his safety and wished either to be

moved from the pod or to have the other inmates moved; and Cox

expressly requested that the correctional officers not discuss

his concerns with Harris and the others because he feared that

would put him at even greater risk. Moreover, Cox renewed his

plea for help to Miles only a short time before the beating

actually occurred. A reasonable jury could thus conclude that

the appellants “had been exposed to information concerning the

risk” to Cox’s safety and therefore “must have known about it.”

See id. at 842 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Furthermore, a reasonable jury could also decide that the

correctional officers knew Cox “face[d] a serious danger to his

safety” and could have “avert[ed] the danger easily” but

“fail[ed] to do so.” See Brown, 612 F.3d at 723 (citation

omitted). Sergeant Smith testified at deposition that he

specifically told the appellants to remove Cox from the pod and

lock it down if Cox feared for his safety. But instead of

16

taking this — or another — reasonable action to protect Cox, the

officers opted to do the very thing Cox warned them would lead

to disaster: They directly confronted the inmates who were

threatening Cox.

The correctional officers contend that the fact that they

took any action at all means that they were not deliberately

indifferent as a matter of law. But the Eighth Amendment

requires more than some action: It requires reasonable action.

See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. Viewing the facts in the light

most favorable to Cox, a jury could conclude that the

appellants’ response to Cox’s concerns — seeking, but

disregarding, Sergeant Smith’s advice, and taking the one action

Cox specifically warned would put him at greater risk — was not

only unreasonable, but “so patently inadequate as to justify an

inference that the official[s] actually recognized that [their]

response to the risk was inappropriate under the circumstances.” 2

See Parrish, 372 F.3d at 303.

The appellants also argue that there is no evidence they

ever drew the inference that Cox faced a substantial risk of

serious harm, see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, because, they say,

2

And Miles’s relative inexperience does nothing to alter

this analysis; indeed, we are hard-pressed to imagine a more

inappropriate response than throwing up one’s hands and walking

away when informed that an attack on an inmate is imminent.

17

when they addressed Cox’s concerns with the inmates who had

threatened him, the inmates assured the officers there would be

no trouble. But we do not have jurisdiction to consider this

argument because it is based on facts that the district court

did not consider and that remain in dispute. 3 See Danser, 772

F.3d at 345.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of

summary judgment on the constitutional violation prong of the

qualified immunity inquiry.

B.

Even if a correctional officer has violated a prisoner’s

constitutional right, however, he is shielded from liability by

qualified immunity if an objectively reasonable officer could

have believed that his actions were lawful “in light of clearly

established law.” 4 Henry, 652 F.3d at 531. A right is “clearly

3Furthermore, by the correctional officers’ own account,

Harris and Cabell’s response to their inquiry was, “We will stay

to ourselves if they stay to the[m]selves,” J.A. 374 — hardly an

ironclad assurance. A reasonable jury crediting the

correctional officers’ account of this conversation might still

conclude that they were subjectively aware that Cox remained in

danger.

4

Although we need not reach the issue here, we note that

some courts have concluded that it is not necessary to consider

the objective reasonableness prong of the qualified immunity

inquiry at all when summary judgment is denied on deliberate

indifference. See, e.g., Walker v. Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030,

1037 (7th Cir. 2002); Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120,

142 n.15 (3d Cir. 2001). Prison officials violate the Eighth

18

established” if “[t]he contours of the right” were “sufficiently

clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he

is doing violates that right.” Id. at 534 (alteration in

original) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640

(1987)). In conducting this inquiry, we must define the right

“in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad

general proposition.” Parrish, 372 F.3d at 301 (quoting

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). It is not necessary, however, that

“the exact conduct at issue” have been previously held unlawful;

Amendment through deliberate indifference if they are aware of a

substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate, Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 837, yet disregard that risk by taking action that they know

to be inappropriate, Parrish, 372 F.3d at 303. In other words,

for purposes of deliberate indifference, the Eighth Amendment

violation must have been committed knowingly. As we have noted

in the past, “applying an objective qualified immunity standard

in the context of an Eighth Amendment claim that is satisfied

only by a showing of deliberate indifference” — that is, a

knowing violation of the law — presents a “special problem.”

Rish v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 1092, 1098 n.6 (4th Cir. 1997).

Accordingly, some of our sister circuits have concluded that

deliberately indifferent conduct can never be objectively

reasonable for purposes of qualified immunity. See Walker, 293

F.3d at 1037 (holding that deliberate indifference and qualified

immunity inquiries “effectively collapse into one” and that

“[i]f there are genuine issues of fact concerning” a defendant’s

deliberate indifference, the “defendant may not avoid trial on

the grounds of qualified immunity”); Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at

142 n.15 (“Conduct that is deliberately indifferent to an

excessive risk to [juvenile detention center] residents cannot

be objectively reasonable conduct.”). But see Estate of Ford v.

Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1049–50 (9th Cir. 2002)

(rejecting approach that “collapses the deliberate indifference

part of the constitutional inquiry into the qualified immunity

inquiry”).

19

“[r]ather, our analysis must take into consideration ‘not only

already specifically adjudicated rights, but those manifestly

included within more general applications of the core

constitutional principle invoked.’” Odom, 349 F.3d at 773

(quoting Amaechi v. West, 237 F.3d 356, 362–63 (4th Cir. 2001)).

The correctional officers contend that the district court

erred in denying them qualified immunity because it was not

clearly established at the time of the assault on Cox that

“interceding and discussing” Cox’s concerns “with the allegedly

threatening prisoners violated Cox’s constitutional rights.”

Appellants’ Br. at 9. They argue that they “received assurances

that there would be no trouble” from the inmates, id. at 12, and

that they had no reason to believe that accepting those

assurances would be unreasonable in light of clearly established

law. But, again, we lack jurisdiction to consider this argument

because it is premised on facts about the officers’ conversation

with the inmates that the district court did not consider and

that remain in dispute. See Danser, 772 F.3d at 345.

On the record as we may view it here, we find that the

district court correctly concluded that the correctional

officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. It has long

been established that jail officials have a duty to protect

inmates from a substantial and known risk of harm, including

harm inflicted by other prisoners. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833.

20

Moreover, by 2011, we had made it clear that “a prison official

acts with deliberate indifference when he ignores repeated

requests from a vulnerable inmate to be separated from a fellow

inmate who has issued violent threats which the aggressor will

likely carry out in the absence of official intervention.”

Odom, 349 F.3d at 773.

Here, Cox repeatedly informed the appellants that he was

being threatened and robbed and that he feared for his safety,

and his concerns were corroborated by other inmates. But the

only action the correctional officers took in response to this

information — despite the instructions of their sergeant — was

to do the one thing Cox specifically warned them would increase

the risk to his safety. And when confronted with Cox’s concerns

again, Miles just threw up his hands and walked away. Under the

law of this Circuit, an objectively reasonable correctional

officer — certified or uncertified — would have known that these

actions were unreasonable, ran afoul of clearly established law,

and violated rights “manifestly included within more general

applications of the core constitutional principle” articulated

in Farmer. See Odom, 349 F.3d at 773 (citation omitted).

Accordingly, the correctional officers are not entitled to

qualified immunity.

21

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

denial of qualified immunity to the appellants.

AFFIRMED

22