Opinion

Brown v. State

  • 3 Okla. Crim. 475
  • 106 P. 975
  • 1910 OK CR 47
  • 1910 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 187
Court
Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
Filed
Feb 7, 1910
Status
Published
Author
Owen
On the bench
Owen, Eurman, Doyle
Cited by
2 cases
Authority
More cited than 57.1%

The opinion

OWEN, Judge

(after stating the facts as above). In the brief filed in this ease counsel for plaintiff in error urges three reasons for the reversal of this case:

First, that the sixth amendment to the Constitution of the Hnited States, guaranteeing trial by jury, is in force in this state, and that a jury composed of 13 men is guaranteed by this provision of the Constitution.

Second, that section 19, art. 3, of the Constitution, providing for a jury of six in the county court, is in conflict with the sixth amendment to the Constitution of the Hnited States.

Third, that the act of the Legislature of the state of Oklahoma, enacting the jury law which has been applied in this case, is not in its subject-matter effective to the peace, health, or safety of the public, and cannot be of force until 90 days after the adjournment of the Legislature enacting it.

The questions raised under the first and second reasons urged

*477

by counsel have been settled by the uniform decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in cases too numerous to quote here. In the ease of

Spies v. Illinois,

123 U. S. 131 , 8 Sup. Ct. 22, 31 L. Ed. 80 , the court, in passing on this question, said:

“That the first ten articles of amendment were not intended to limit the powers of the state government in respect to their own people, but to operate on the national government only, was decided more than a half century ago, and that decision has been steadily adhered to since” — citing the numerous decisions of that court on this question.

The question raised under the third proposition urged by counsel was settled by the Supreme Court of this state in the case of

Oklahoma City v. Shields,

22 Okla. 265 , 100 Pac. 559 . Justice Williams, in rendering the opinion of the court, on this proposition, said:

“Most unquestionably, those who make the laws are required, in the process of their enactment, to pass upon all questions of expediency and necessity connected therewith, and must therefore determine whether a given law is-necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety. It has always been the rule, and is now everywhere understood, that the .judgment of the legislative and executive departments as to wisdom, expediency, or necessity of any given law is conclusive on the courts, and cannot be revieived or called in question by them. * * * The existence of such necessity is therefore a question of fact, and the authority to determine such fact must rest somewhere. The Constitution does not confer it upon any tribunal. It must, therefore, necessarily reside with that department of the government which is called upon to exercise the power. It is a question of which the Legislature alone must be the judge, and, when it decides the fact to exist, its action is final” — citing a great number of authorities.

We approve the conclusions reached by the Supreme Court in that ease.

The judgment of the county court is affirmed.

EURMAN, Presiding Judge, and DOYLE, Judge, concur.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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