holding that a three-month lapse between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action was not sufficient to establish causation without further evidence of pretext
How later courts described this case
- holding that a three-month lapse between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action was not sufficient to establish causation without further evidence of pretext
- evidence that plaintiff was terminated three months after she complained of discrimination was insufficient to establish a causal connection
- summary judgment warranted where “[t]he only evidence of a connection between [plaintiff’s] firing and her [protected] activity . . . is the timing[.]”
- “the combination of suspicious timing with other significant evidence of pretext[] can be sufficient to survive summary judgment”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT January 14, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-10695
Bess J Myers,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
Crestone International LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.
--------------------
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:01-CV-1736-K
--------------------
Before REAVLEY, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
In this direct civil appeal, Bess J. Myers, Appellant,
challenges the district court’s summary judgment for Crestone
International LLC (“Crestone”), Appellee. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
I. Background
On February 3, 1998, Myers began working as Practice Manager
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
1
in the Human Resources department of consulting company Crestone.
Her job included recruiting, managing a group of consultants,
selling Crestone’s services, and coordinating marketing events.
Crestone largely functions as a “virtual company” where its
employees work from their home computers across the country. For
this reason, interaction and communication between employees is
basically limited to teleconferences, e-mails, and company
retreats.
Over the course of her employment, Myers witnessed a number
of incidents she deemed offensive. For instance, in the fall of
1998, while attending a company mixer, Myers came upon a number
of male employees huddled around a laptop viewing pictures of
naked women. This was brought to the attention of Human
Resources division head Lee Martini and Vice President of
Operations Sean McCormack. At another retreat, McCormack and
Company Practice Leader Mark Ranta “mooned” Myers. She expressed
her displeasure to McCormack, Ranta, Martini and Division Leader
Jeff Sigelbaum. In general, Myers claims that Martini,
McCormack, Supervisor Jeff Engel, and Supervisor Jon Commanday
mocked her many concerns about Crestone’s culture, referring to
her as “Ms. EEOC” or the “EEO Police.” Myers also recalls
company officials referring to women in demeaning ways and
charges that they perpetuated a “boys’ club” atmosphere.
On September 21, 2000, Engel sent Myers “an overtly
critical” e-mail. He sent her a second e-mail criticizing her
2
self-direction and initiative, on September 25, 2000. On
September 29, 2000, McCormack and Engel called Myers to tell her
she was fired. They pointed to a lack of initiative as the
primary reason for her dismissal. Crestone replaced Myers with
two employees, a male and a female.
On September 4, 2001, Myers filed a complaint against
Crestone in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, Dallas Division. She contended that Crestone’s actions
toward her violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII”), the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act
(“TCHRA”), and the federal Equal Pay Act (“EPA”). Following
discovery, the district court granted Crestone’s summary judgment
motion, finding “no genuine issues of material fact and [holding]
that Crestone is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
II. Discussion
We review grants of summary judgment under Rule 56 de novo,
applying the same standards the district court used. Am. Home
Assurance Co. v. United Space Alliance, LLC, 378 F.3d 482, 486
(5th Cir. 2004).
A. Prohibited Discrimination Under Title VII
Myers argues that, by firing her, Crestone violated Title
VII. The law reads, in relevant part: “It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge any
individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . sex . . . .”
3
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
Interpreting Title VII, the Supreme Court has set forth a
methodology for determining “the order and allocation of proof in
a private, non-class action challenging employment
discrimination,” when no direct evidence of discrimination is
presented. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800
(1973). In McDonnell Douglas, the Court dictated that the
plaintiff carries the initial burden to set forth a prima facie
case of discrimination. Id. at 802. Under this framework, “[a]
plaintiff satisfies this initial burden by showing that (1) he
belongs to a protected group; (2) he was qualified for the
position sought; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action;
and (4) he was replaced by someone outside the protected class.”
Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., 332 F.3d 874, 881 (5th Cir. 2003).
The district court determined on summary judgment that Myers
failed to set forth a prima facie case. We do not concur with
the court’s reasoning.1 But, because summary judgment was proper
nevertheless, we affirm. See Kerr v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue,
292 F.3d 490, 494 (5th Cir. 2002).
Two individuals, one male and one female, were hired to
replace Myers. Despite Myers’s assertion that the sex of her
1
The district court found that Myers was not qualified for
her job. The fact that Crestone hired her for this position and
employed her in it for a significant period of time belies such a
summary conclusion.
4
replacement remains a question of material fact, the record is
clear. We find that Myers was not replaced by someone outside of
her protected class.
Accordingly, we agree that Myers has not made a prima facie
showing of discrimination under Title VII.
B. Prohibited Retaliation Under Title VII & TCHRA
Under Title VII, to establish a prima facie case of
retaliation, absent direct evidence of such, Myers must show: (1)
that her activity was protected by Title VII; (2) that she has
suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that there existed
a “causal link” between the action and the protected activity.
See Roberson v. Alltel Info. Servs., 373 F.3d 647, 655 (5th Cir.
2004). Both parties treat Title VII and the TCHRA as identical
statutes for the purpose of this burden-shifting analysis, using
only federal precedents. Since Texas courts also look to federal
law to guide their application of the TCHRA, we follow their
lead. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Canchola, 121 S.W.3d 735, 739
(Tex. 2003).
The district court concluded that Myers failed to present a
prima facie case because, inter alia, she produced insufficient
evidence of a causal nexus between the adverse employment action
and her protected conduct. We agree.
The only evidence of a connection between her firing and her
5
activity that Myers’s offers is the timing: “Her termination
followed approximately three months after her June 2000
complaints of discrimination.”
We have held that “the combination of suspicious timing with
other significant evidence of pretext[] can be sufficient to
survive summary judgment.” Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touche,
LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 409 (5th Cir. 1999). See also Fabela v.
Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 329 F.3d 409, 417 n.9 (5th Cir. 2003);
Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.2d 39, 44 (5th Cir. 1992).
However, a reasonable finder of fact could not conclude that
Crestone’s proffered reasons for Myers’s dismissal were
pretextual. She simply has not produced enough “evidence [to]
create[] a jury issue as to the employer’s discriminatory animus
or the falsity of the employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory
explanation.” Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893,
897 (5th Cir. 2002).
Specifically, the incidents Myers’s points to as evidence of
discriminatory animus either do no relate to her employment at
Crestone or did not involve an employee responsible for her
dismissal. The inappropriate and patently sexist behavior
alleged, although abhorrent, does not meet this Court’s test for
showing “sufficient evidence of discrimination” in a plaintiff’s
6
discharge.2
Similarly, Myers’s argument that Crestone has been
inconsistent in the reasons provided for her dismissal is
unpersuasive. There is no evidence that the current grounds for
dismissal differ materially from those originally given. Rather,
the current explanations lend detail to the original assertion
that Myers “did not have the initiative that they would expect in
a leadership position and [she] wasn’t keeping up with what was
going on.”3
Since she has not shown pretext, Myers may rely only on the
dismissal’s timing. Such evidence is clearly insufficient for a
reasonable jury to find a causal connection.
C. Compensation Discrimination Under Title VII, TCHRA & EPA
Myers alleges she was discriminatorily paid less than her
male counterparts in violation of Title VII, the TCHRA, and the
EPA. We agree with the district court’s conclusion that Myers
2
We note that Myers did not complain of hostile work
environment or constructive discharge before the district court,
nor are such claims before us on appeal.
3
Myers also argues that her file did not contain negative
evaluations until after Crestone decided to fire her on September
18, 2000. But her brief acknowledges that her personnel file
contained “subjective personal evaluations” alleging “poor
performance” prior to September 18, 2000.
She also objects to Crestone’s failure to offer her
“progressive discipline” prior to dismissal. However, the record
shows that Crestone discontinued the progressive discipline
policy prior to Myers’s dismissal.
7
did not present a prima facie case under Title VII and the TCHRA,
and that, under the EPA, she failed to produce “evidence that
Crestone paid an appropriate male counterpart higher compensation
. . . for equal work on jobs, performed under similar working
conditions, and requiring equal skill, effort, and
responsibility.” Myers basically concedes that she had
significantly different responsibilities than her appropriate
male comparators. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); Uviedo v. Steves
Sash & Door Co., 738 F.2d 1425, 1431 (5th Cir. 1984). In fact,
she states that she and her male colleagues had “many common job
duties” but also “some ‘unique responsibilities.’” In contrast
with her comparators, Myers states that Crestone “whittled down
her areas of responsibility requiring her to focus more on just
one or two areas.” For example, Myers was required to route “all
sales leads” to another employee.
Thus, the district court correctly ruled that Myers failed
to put forth evidence establishing a prima facie case of
discriminatory pay in violation of Title VII and the THRCA.4
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is hereby AFFIRMED.
4
Although the district court’s ruling was correct, the
grounds it gave were not. It held that Myers failed to present a
prima facie case under Title VII because she did not show she was
qualified for her job. This is not the test for discriminatory
pay.
8