stating that dependents’ “right to compensation did not arise until his death, and .... [t]he basis of their claim was an original right which was enforceable only after his death”
How later courts described this case
- stating that dependents’ “right to compensation did not arise until his death, and .... [t]he basis of their claim was an original right which was enforceable only after his death”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Adams, J.
The amendment of section 24 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act was ratified on 12 May, 1933, and the opinion of the Industrial Commission was filed on 7 March, 1933. At the latter date section 24 read as follows: “The right to compensation under this act shall be forever barred unless a claim be filed with the Industrial Commission within one year after the accident, and if death results from the accident, unless a claim be filed with the Commission within one year thereafter.” Public Laws, 1929, chap. 120, sec. 24.
William J. Matthews, the employee, was injured on 28 November, 1930, and filed his claim with the Industrial Commission on 12 April, 1932. The claim, therefore, was not filed “within one year after the accident,” and for this reason it was dismissed. The limitation of time prescribed by the statute is mandatory and must be observed. 2 Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation Law, 1904, sec. 545; Minor, Workmen’s Compensation Laws, 310;
Kalucki v. Am. Car. & Foundry Co.,
166 N. W. (Mich.), 1011;
Bushnell v. Industrial Board,
114 N. E. (Ill.), 496.
Within a month after the death of the employee his dependents filed with the Commission a claim for compensation and it was allowed. The appellants contest the validity of this award mainly on the ground that the claim prosecuted by' the dependents was in the nature of an amendment to the proceeding begun by the employee and that an amendment could be made only by consent; that the order dismissing the employee’s claim was final and exclusive; and that the limitation which barred the employee bars his dependents. We do not regard this as a legitimate deduction.
With respect to the claim of the employee it may be granted that as to him the order denying relief was conclusive; but during his lifetime his dependents were not parties in interest to the proceeding he
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brought for the enforcement of his claim. Their right to compensation did not arise until his death and their cause of action was not affected by anything he did, not even to the extent of a reduction of their compensation by payments sought by him, because no such payments were made. The basis of their claim was an original right which was enforceable only after his death.
Curtis v. Slater Const. Co.,
168 N.
W.
(Mich.), 958;
Giannotti v. Giusti Bros.,
102 Atl. (R. I.), 887.
It is suggested that the evidence which was heard in reference to the claim of the employee was not competent in behalf of the dependents; but both claims originated in one accident and all the evidence relating to the accident and injury, the employment, the date and cause of the death, and other circumstances were matters of record and were proper subjects of investigation. There was ample evidence in support of the dependents’ claim and we are concluded by the facts as found by the Commission.
Clark v. Woolen Mills,
204 N. C., 529 ;
Johnson v. Bagging Co.,
203 N. C., 579 ;
Aycock v. Cooper,
202 N. C., 500 . Judgment
Affirmed.