The opinion
CoNNOR, J.
There was no error in the trial of this action. For this reason, the plaintiffs are not entitled to a new trial.
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Defendants’ objections to the introduction as evidence of letters received by the plaintiff, G. E. Brown, and written by officers of the corporation whose stock was transferred to said plaintiff by the defendant, J. C. Featherstone, of deeds executed by the corporation, conveying- its property to another corporation, and of the minutes of a meeting of the stockholders of said corporation at which resolutions authorizing the board of directors to dispose of its property were adopted, were properly sustained by the trial judge. The stock was transferred to the plaintiffs on 10 February, and 15 April, 1930. The letters were written, the deeds executed, and the meeting of the stockholders held, many months after the dates of the transfers. The letters, deeds and resolutions were not competent as evidence tending to show the value of the stock at the dates of the transfers, but even if they were competent for that purpose, their exclusion was not prejudicial to plaintiffs. The contention of plaintiffs as to the value of the stock at the date of the transfer on or about 10 February, 1930, was sustained by the jury as appears from the answer to the second issue. Their contention as to the value of the stock transferred to the plaintiff, G. F. Brown, on or about 15 April, 1930, at the date of said transfer, became immaterial when the jury answered the third issue “No.”
The instructions of the court to the jury as to the law applicable to the facts involved-in the issues are in accord with authoritative decisions of this Court. Between the date of the first transfer of stock to the plaintiff, G. F. Brown, and the date of the second transfer, the plaintiffs had ample opportunity to form their own opinion, uninfluenced by representations made by the defendant, J. C. Featherstone, as to the value of the stock transferred on 15 April, 1930. This doubtless accounts for the negative answer of the jury to the third issue.
Plaintiffs’ exception to the judgment is sustained. At the close of the evidence for the plaintiff, and again at the close of all the evidence, the plaintiffs, in open court, tendered to the defendants the certificates for the shares of stock which had been transferred to the plaintiff, G. F. Brown, by the defendant, J. C. Featherstone, as the consideration for the deed dated 10 February, 1930, together with the check which plaintiff had received for a dividend on said shares of stock, but which he had not collected. There was no evidence tending to show that the value of this stock had been diminished since its transfer to the plaintiff, by reason of any act of said plaintiff. In
Hodges v. Wilson,
165 N. C., 323 , 81 S. E., 340 , it is said: “When the law cancels a deed or contract, it seeks to place the parties in
statu quo,
as nearly as can be done, for while the one party may have been wronged, its judgment is not punitive, and the wrong is considered adequately avenged if the
status quo
is fully re
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stored.” In the instant case, the
status quo
of each party may be fully restored by decreeing that the plaintiffs shall deliver to the defendant, J. 0. Featherstone, the certificate for 80 shares of the stock of the corporation, which the plaintiff, G. F. Brown, now holds. It was error to adjudge that the plaintiffs pay in cash to the defendants the sum of $2,000 and to decree that upon their failure to pay said sum, their lands should be sold by commissioners appointed for that purpose. The judgment modified in accordance with this opinion is affirmed.
No error in the trial.
Judgment modified and affirmed.