Opinion

Wright v. Brown

  • 146 Fla. 572
  • 1 So. 2d 871
Court
Supreme Court of Florida
Filed
Apr 11, 1941
Status
Published
On the bench
Brown, Terrell, Chapman, Thomas
Cited by
3 cases
Authority
More cited than 59.0%

The opinion

Per Curiam.

Sophia Rose Wright died intestate in Hillsborough County in November, 1938, leaving a husband but no children or near relatives surviving her. David Albert Wright, her husband, qualified as administrator of her estate which consisted of approximately $30,000 on deposit in two Tampa banks. The appellees, all residents of Louisiana, filed a claim with the probate judge for one-half of the •estate alleging that they were the children of Jessie Brow Bovert Brown, who they say was adopted by Sophia Rose Wright and a former husband, Albert Bovert, in the State of Michigan.

David Albert Wright filed his bill of complaint in the circuit court against appellees and the probate judge as defendants claiming the entire estate as a gift

causa mortis

or in the alternative as a gift

inter vivos

made by his wife August 6, 1938. On final hearing, the chancellor found that there was no gift to David Albert Wright by his wife and decreed accordingly. This appeal is from the final •decree.

Two questions are here to be answered, viz.: (1) Was there a gift

caus,a mortis

or

inter vivos

passing from Sophia Rose Wright to her husband, David Albert Wright, and (2) Was the adoption of Jessie Brow Bovert by the testatrix in Michigan legally sufficient to make it valid in Florida?

Both these questions turn on the showing made by the •evidence. It is not necessary to discuss the essential elements of a gift

c/ausa mortis

or a gift

inter vivos.

The evidence in this point fails to show a completed gift and is in other respects insufficient to warrant -us in overruling' the •chancellor. There is evidence that shows an intention on

*574

the part of testatrix to make the gift but it falls short of showing that her intention was perfected.

As to the adoption of Jessie Brow Bovert, the evidence shows that the adoption proceedings were substantially in compliance with the Michigan law, similar proceedings were shown to have been approved by the courts of that State and under Section 1, Article IV of the Federal Constitution, should be given full faith and credit in this State.

From this, it follows that the judgment below be affirmed.

Affirmed.

Brown, C. J., Terrell, Chapman and Thomas, J. J., concur.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.